If the answer is that we cannot say, then you have no reason to believe that a will can be good. — Bob Ross

I addressed that very concern: the evidence that humanity in general determines good acts, is sufficient reason to think the will as good. I only said there is no scientific cause/effect evidence for the will itself, which is to say there is objective or empirical knowledge of it.

Our conversation became so spectacular, that they couldn’t help themselves — Bob Ross

Exactly the way I see it. Which makes….you know….two of us.

I am asking what makes a will good? — Bob Ross

I’m a fan of metaphysical reductionism, that is, reduce propositions to the lowest form of principles which suffice to ground the conceptions represented in the propositions, and, justify the relation of those conceptions to each other. Which is fine, but comes with the inherent danger of reducing beyond such justifications, often into relations irrational on the one hand and not even possible on the other, from the propositions themselves. The proverbial transcendental illusion, the only way out of which, is just don’t reduce further than needed.

And this is what happens when asking what makes a will good. If whatever makes the will good, can be represented as merely some necessary presupposition, it doesn’t matter what specifically is the case. It is enough to comprehend with apodeitic certainty that it is possible for there to be a root of what good is, hence it is non-contradictory, hence possibly true, the will just is the case. This is where it is proper for the common understanding to rest assured.

After having desolved the question of what makes a will good, it remains to be determined at least the conditions by which the possibility of its being good in itself, is given, which is the domain of the philosopher of metaphysics. These conditions are evidenced, and the case that there is such a thing as a will that is good in itself obtains, by the relevant activities of humanity in general, evil being the exception to the rule.

It is impossible to determine what it is exactly that makes the will good, for the simple reason it is impossible to determine exactly what the will is, which makes any scientific use of the principle of cause and effect in its empirical form useless. Best the metaphysician can do, is attribute certain rational constructs to the idea of a will, sufficient to explain man’s relevant activities, then speculate on the more parsimonious, the most logical, method by which those constructs originate, from which, as it so happens, arises Kantian transcendental logic.

That logic, then, while saying nothing about what makes a will good, is quite specific in a purely speculative fashion, with respect to the principles enabling the will to be that which is directly that faculty responsible for making the man a good man, by his proper use of it, and to whom is attributed moral agency.

The transcendental necessary presupposition: there is no good, in, of and for itself, other than the good will.
The form of transcendental principles: maxims, imperatives.
The transcendental logic’s original constructs: freedom, and autonomy.
————-

Right has nothing to do with good, but only with a good, or the good.

Anyway….food for thought. Or confusion. Take your pick.

For me it is the act we are questioning and whether this should or should not provide a person with satisfaction — Tom Storm

Agreed. That you use satisfaction, or I use contentment, we are in principle saying the same thing. To be a perfectly moral agent is to act, regardless of circumstance, only in accordance with that which provides satisfaction for the agent. Humans rarely do that regardless of circumstance, being influenced by everything from peer pressure to superficial personal gratifications, mere desires.

With that being said, I rather think it is the reason for the act needing the closest examination. It is, after all, my act, determined by my reason, so I am the act’s causality. That’s the easy part; it remains to be explained what reason uses to make these determinations. Hence….moral philosophy.

Why wouldn’t the son just say oh HELL yeah I’m happy!!! Being a kid, he doesn’t consider it as being given pleasure, but only being given that by which pleasure in him just happens to be a consequence.

I mean, even if happiness is merely a subjective condition represented by contentment, contentment itself is no less a feeling of pleasure.

….philosophers and teachers are worthless if we can never be mistaken about what is best for us? — Count Timothy von Icarus

We can never be mistaken about what’s best for ourselves iff we alone are the causality for it. We can be, and often are, mistaken in choosing to act in opposition to what is best. Philosophers and teachers have nothing to do with all that, except perhaps in the formulation of a speculative theory that explains how it all happens.

And how might we explain the ubiquitous human experience of regret…. — Count Timothy von Icarus

That’s just the feeling one gets from a post hoc judgement that he’s chosen an act in opposition to what he knows is best. The proverbial easy way out….

…..you know by human nature what morally good acts are…. — Corvus

Absolutely. And from which arises my primary contention herein, that knowing what good acts are makes explicit you know what good is. And comes the notion that asking what is good, was never the right question to ask.

Oooo…devolution. I like that better. Aristotle = eudaimonia with or without arete, and Kantian happiness writ large, re: “…contentment with one’s subjective condition…”.

Sure, the distinction between pleasure and happiness is alive and relatively well presently, insofar as pleasure is the primary conception of the singular positive feeling, happiness being one of many subsumed under it. Right? Is that what you’re getting at?

Is the contention that individuals always know what is best for them and what is true for them vis-á-vis ethics? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Not ethically, insofar as ethics carries the implication of external authority, re: jurisprudence, and my knowledge of what is best for me merely keeps me out of jail. If I do not accept the truth of external jurisprudence, I am entitled to simply remove myself from it, which makes that truth contingent on whether or not I am suited to it.

Knowing what’s best for me, on a much stricter sense, is an internal necessary truth, carries the implication of an internal authority alone, the escape from which is, of course, quite impossible. Being human, and given a specific theoretical exposition, yes, individuals always know what is best for himself, and he certainly knows what is true, because he alone is the cause of what he knows as best for him.
———-

I mean it just in the common sense that we have the potential to be/do things we currently aren't/can't. — Count Timothy von Icarus

We do in fact have the capacity to acquire skills. I admit we do have the capacity, the potential, to do things we currently wouldn’t consider possible. I won’t deny myself the capacity to cheat on speed limits which experience affirms and from which the potential stands, but experience proves I will deny myself the capacity for cutting off lil’ ol’ ladies in the checkout line, and from which the potential has always fallen but may not always. Doesn’t all that make common sense attributions rather lacking in explanatory power?

On the other hand, I do know I have the capacity to throw the trolley switch, I do know my moral constitution or agency proper, mandates that I will not, but I do not know, given the immediate occassion, whether or not that act manifests through my will. Which sorta IS the point, re: explanatory power for determining acts can never be found in capacity for acting, but only in that by which originates the determinations themselves.

True dat….but much more fun to figure out why, both that it is barmy, and in addition, the incessant supposition it’s necessary.

Cool. Gotta love it when a plan comes together.

Hey…people exploded on us. We got somebody’s attention, it seems. Was it our intellectually piercing dialectic, or were they just bored with what they were doing?
————-

…how does one evaluate what is a good or bad will? — Bob Ross

Oh, that’s easy: the goodness or badness of the will is a direct reflection on the worthiness of being content with one’s subjective condition, which is commonly called being happy, which is itself the prime condition for moral integrity. The one willing an act in defiance of his principles would post hoc evaluate his will as bad, earning himself the title of immoral.

It is only under the apodeictic presupposition of a good will, that immoral practices are possible. On the other hand, if the will is neutral or bad, it becomes nearly impossible to explain why the predisposition of humans in general, given from historical precedence, is to do good, to act virtuously.

….good itself is a word for property of the actions. — Corvus

I might expand to say that a word represents a property of actions, good is a word that represents a property of actions, quality is a property of actions, therefore good is a word that represents the quality of actions.

Does that expansion diminish your point? Hopefully not too much anyway, cuz I agree with your major point.

This is quite similar to the discussion (…) elsewhere…. — Leontiskos

I’m aware; I left a scant two cents there a few days ago.
———-

Aristotle would call this pleasure. — Leontiskos

True enough. and I understand the symbiosis on the one hand and the conceptual evolution on the other.
————-

….you are depriving yourself of what is truly best… — Count Timothy von Icarus

From the perspective of a case-by-case basis, have I not determined by myself the best for myself, in granting his personal philosophy irrespective of my possible disagreement with it, and, asking for his opinion of mine, irrespective of whether or not I think he’s understood it? Doesn’t this demonstrate that, at the very least, I am aware of how arrive at such determinations in this case, which would then serve as sufficient reason for consciousness of how to arrive at them in any case?
———-

Imagine a world where everyone is their best….. — Count Timothy von Icarus

You mean like one of these “possible worlds” the postmodern analytical mindset deems so relevant? Dunno about all that pathological nonsense, except I’ll wager that world wouldn’t be inhabited by the humans commonly understood as such, by themselves.

So it is that, the circumventing of my own deprivation does nothing to show “St. Augustine, Boethius, or Plato are right”, which is indeed possible, but only that I am, which is apodeitically certain. And from that point of view….the only one that really matters….there is the ideal of good from pure practical reason.

How’s that for bourgeoisie metaphysics? Consign it to the flames?

…..virtues are tide to our nature…. — Bob Ross

I don’t know that my moral integrity remains intact until there’s a call for its exhibition. The best I can do until then, is come up with a way in which it ought to work, given any case I am inclined to actively address. And the way itself, is to check the checker; for any act of will, check for its accordance with a principle. The quote I used, re: “tide”, merely demonstrates that people generally are not, or at least seldom, inclined to enforce such subjective legislation.

Through metaphysical reductionism, from volitions in accordance with principles results the good as the ideal of pure practical reason, which answers the question, how do you define good. Although not a proper definition……also wasn’t ever a proper question anyway but oh well, right?….. it becomes clear, under certain theoretical conditions, why there isn’t going to be one, and furthermore, why there’s no need for it.

I’m happy but I cheated to be that way….
— Mww

Aristotle doesn’t call this kind of cheating happiness happiness at all — Bob Ross

No he doesn’t, but there isn’t any doubt that I am happy. If I actually feel happy in the sense of pure pleasure, seems kinda silly for someone else to say I’m not really. To be consistent along those lines, that someone else would also have to say I didn’t really steal the car, insofar as the theft of the car is the necessary condition for the feeling. It’s absurd to say I didn’t steal the car, therefore the inconsistency is given.

I get the point.
————-

Aristotle is right to point out that it is not about taking no pleasure in the act; it is about taking pleasure in acts that are good; and displeasure in acts that are bad. — Bob Ross

Perhaps, but being…..you know, a Western modern…..I find it more the wiser, to point out the advantage in discerning, not so much whether an act dispenses pleasure or pain, but rather, the method by which any act of will leaves my moral integrity intact.

Why is it always one kind of hurt for the guy who owns the car, but a very different kind of hurt for me in the theft of it? Something as mediocre as displeasure isn’t going to make the explanatory cut.

The happiness being referred to in enjoying the stolen car is superficial, cheap dopamine. There is no true happiness in that…. — Bob Ross

Cool. Point was pretty easy to make, truth be told. The point of superficial happiness, mere pleasure as it were, highlights a thing that makes that feeling possible, so we call it a good thing, even if it only good for that one thing…..making me love driving in a particular fashion.

But that still leaves me without the worthiness of that kind of happiness, that particular pleasure. I’m happy but I cheated to be that way, so I don’t deserve it. Seemed like a cool thing to do at the time but I regret it now, kinda thing.

I want to know what kinda thing it is, to be happy and deserve it. It’s not enough to know what it is not, I want to know what it is. What happiness would I not regret, and by extension, what thing can I do that may not make me happy at all, but I don’t regret having done it? Now the worthiness comes to the fore, in such case where I do a thing, feel anything but happy about, take no pleasure in the act, but remain happy….read as satisfied, content, undeterred, consistent with my virtues….with myself for the having the fortitude to act for the sake of good in itself.

Herein lay the ideal, re: the transcendental good in Kant, and a form of Nicomachean Ethics in Aristotle, combined with the pure practical reason as the means for determining those principles under which acts in accordance with those principles, are possible as volitions of the will. So says one moral philosophy amidst a veritable plethora of them.

You are confusing hedonic with eudaimonic happiness. — Bob Ross

When I quote you, then immediately respond relative to that quote, then you respond to my response with something suggesting my confusion, I wonder if you’ve missed the point of my response.

Different renditions of happiness aside, we are Western moderns after all, I shall consider it proved that worthiness of happiness and happiness itself, are very far from….

….interlinked to the point where one cannot come without the other. — Bob Ross

….and sufficiently so, that it serves as the form of a rule rather than an example of an exception to it.

So if I have given the inkling of a rule, is it something you understand well enough to form an opinion? Or, tell me how it shouldn’t be a rule in the first place?

…..worthiness of happiness and being happy are interlinked to the point where one cannot come without the other. — Bob Ross

So I’m driving along, in this cool-as-hell ‘67 Cobra, hair flyin’, head-bangin’ to some classic Foghat turned up to 11….happy as a pig in an overturned hotel restaurant dumpster.

The car isn’t mine, I stole it.

And with that…..(Sigh)
————-

You are welcome to your philosophical inclinations, as anyone is, but obviously they are very far from mine. Not that that’s a problem for either of us, only that there’s little chance of meeting in the middle.

But that’s what ‘redness’ means: it’s the property of being red. — Bob Ross

So a property of a property? Red is a property of a thing and redness is a property of red? Usually, a property facilitates establishment of consistent identity of an appearance, so that it can be said of any thing perceived as having that property, it is a particular thing. Must we then concede red is only so, inasmuch as it has this property of redness, all the while the thing we actually perceive as being red, retains its identity without regard to its redness?

That may be fine, but the problem lies in the negation, in that we can still say of a red thing it is that thing even if it has relative redness, but we cannot say of a thing it is that thing if it isn’t red.

Sure, a property is attributed to things by subjects; and so it is an estimation, to your point, of the quality which the thing has….. — Bob Ross

Property attributed by subjects to things, yes. The quality a thing has because of it, no. Property relates to the identity the thing has, whereas quality is an estimation of the property itself. This reflects the error of calling redness a property of red, when it is actually the quality of it, leaving red itself alone, to be the property of the thing.

I am not following the relevance. When analyzing redness, we would analyze redness — Bob Ross

The relevance follows from, originally, the concept under discussion was “good”, but has since been replaced by “red”, which doesn’t matter much, in that adding “-ness” to either one has the same implication. The real point resides in this: when analyzing redness we are analyzing red, not redness.

By extension, then, when analyzing goodness we are analyzing good, not goodness. And the comment addressing biology as the inappropriate science for analyzing good, resides in the “-ness” qualifier, which implies relative degrees, and herein lies the authority of metaphysics proper, insofar as for any relative degree there must be an extreme, which is EXACTLY what we’re looking for, in the negative sense…..good in and of itself, not good for this or that, but just plain ol’ good. Period. Full stop. Bare-bones, pure conception representing a fundamental condition upon which a proper moral philosophy follows.
————-

I would rather see us giving them the tools to ‘ethicize’ then tell them our own ethical theories. — Bob Ross

We’re already in possession of the tools for “ethicizing”. They are codes of conduct, administrative rules, edicts and assorted jurisprudence generally, in the pursuit of what is right. None of which has anything to do with what is good.

…..the question asked is “how do I determine what is good?”? — Bob Ross

Which is the whole point…..that is the wrong question to ask. It is good to “ethicize” in accordance with assorted jurisprudence, which reflects one’s treatment of his fellow man, which one can accomplish for no other reason than that’s what everyone else is doing.

When asked what good is, as indicated above, good in and of itself, not good for this or that end, not good in reflection of treatment of fellow men, we may come closer to what makes us tick as subjects rather than what makes us tick as herds. Which reduces to….a reflection on how man treats himself in accordance to his own personal code, for which he and he alone is the law-giver.
————-

I don’t disagree that eudaimonic happiness is the chief good for any living being — Bob Ross

Hmmm….for any living being? What happened to tools for “ethicizing”? Are ants being ethical for not crowding each other out of the way when entering the hole to the lair? I’ve seen one guy punch other guy in the face for trying to get through the same door at the same time.

Only certain forms of living beings are conditioned by happiness on the one hand, and it isn’t the chief good on the other. The chief good is worthiness for being happy, which reduces to a principle..….that by which his worthiness of being happy, directly relates to the good of his will.

So in this roundabout way, arises the premise: there is no other good, as such, in and of itself….hence undefinable….as a good will. That which doesn't do for the good of something else, but does because it is good to do. And that by which “living well” does not necessarily comport with being happy.
————-

I apologize Mww, I forgot to respond to this one. — Bob Ross

No need; I get that a lot.

….we mustn't engage in some sort of "leveling of history"….. — J

Well said.

Shoulders of giants all the way down.

just like redness is the one property of ‘being red’. — Bob Ross

Redness isn’t so much a property as the relative quality of being red. It may be that a thing has a certain redness, indicating some relative quality of a certain property. But this latter use requires an object to which the property belongs, whereas the concept, in and of itself, does not. We perceive that a thing is red; we appreciate how or what kind of red it is, its redness.
————-

Good is an ideal of pure practical reason
—Mww

This seems to contradict your previous point though: if practical reason is attributing to things ‘good’….. — Bob Ross

Attribution requires a conscious subject, the conscious subject requires functional intelligence, functional intelligence requires reason. You might say attribution requires reason, but you can’t say reason attributes.

Ideal of is not attribution to; your misunderstanding is not my contradiction. I may have, and you may show that, I’ve contradicted myself; just not with that.
—————-

…..all moral judgements are a priori in necessary reference to it.

Moral philosophy is not transcendental in a Kantian sense.
—Mww

Then, what do you mean by moral judgments being a priori? — Bob Ross

Moral judgements being a priori doesn’t make them transcendental. Reason isn’t necessarily transcendental, is only so in the consideration of those ideas the objects of which arising as schema of understanding, contain no possibility of experience.

Moral philosophy, then, while it may contain transcendental ideas, re: freedom, the c.i., and so on, isn’t itself a transcendental doctrine, for its end just is experience, in the form of acts conforming to it.
————-

…..are given to Nature.
— Mww

This sounds like you are saying that moral judgments do not express something objective, correct? — Bob Ross

Wouldn’t “given to Nature” indicate something objective?
————-

How reality is can dictate how it ought to be (for me). — Bob Ross

Yes, that’s the common position of the pure realist, insofar as he’s already determined reality without understanding it. And there’s your proverbial cart before the horse. In truth, reality merely presents itself, dictating nothing of its own or of itself.

Common, in that the comfort of certain knowledge as an end diminishes the theoretical means by which it obtains.
————-

I would say biology. — Bob Ross

Wonderful. In a place where the main contributing dialectical factor….is metaphysical?

What an odd lot we are: we know how biology gives us brains but we don’t know how brains give us reason; we know how reason gives us metaphysics but we don’t know how metaphysics gives us brains.

I dare you to call THAT a false dichotomy!!!
—————-

This is a classical mistake, and the most common of which (in this thread) was nudging the OP in the direction of happiness. — Bob Ross

I do that on purpose, for the simple reason the moral philosophy I favor has it as a condition. It may not necessarily be true humanity in general gravitates towards instances of personal happiness, but it is certainly persuasive that it does. And even if that general gravitation isn’t happiness, it is something, otherwise there is no fundamental underlying condition which serves as a rule for describing humanity proper. Nothing is lost by initiating a rational moral philosophy, which may even attempt to define good as the OP inquires, with happiness as a fundamental condition.

Goodness is just the property of being good. — Bob Ross

I reject that good has properties, like most balls have a round property and gasoline has a fluid property. Good is an ideal of pure practical reason, that principle which serves as the ground of determinations of will which satisfy the worthiness of being happy.

I agree with Moore, insofar as to define an ideal principle does little justice to it, while at the same time, all moral judgements are a priori in necessary reference to it.
————-

we inevitably begin discussing transcendental idealism — Bob Ross

Don’t have to, there are plenty of other kinds. But if that happens, then Kant yes; idealism, yes; transcendental philosophy…..no. Moral philosophy is not transcendental in a Kantian sense.

how can we know what is in-itself good? — Bob Ross

Because the subject in his moral philosophy uses a different aspect of his understanding, judgement and reason for his moral determinations, than are used for his knowledge claims. An in-itself from the strictly moral perspective or domain, is such insofar as it is a construct completely internal to the subject himself, and its relative goodness is known with apodeitic certainty because it is measured against how good the subject feels about it, rather than whether or not he contradicts himself.

The understanding is prudential rather than cognitive; the judgement is aesthetic rather than discursive, and pure reason is practical rather than transcendental.

From the human point of view, a pure dualist intelligence is necessary to appreciate that…..
…..Real things, re: reality writ large, belong to Nature, insofar as Nature is their causality, and are given to us for the use of pure theoretical reason in determining how they are to be known;
…..Moral things, re: morality writ large, belong to us, insofar as we are their causality from the use of pure practical reason in determining what they will be, and are given to Nature.

Given this obvious and universal dualism, the dual aspect of pure reason itself is justified.
————-

So, for me, I would say that we have a sense of what it beautiful just as much as what is good (and just as much as what is a car) by our conditional knowledge of the world around us. — Bob Ross

Maybe not so much as what is a car, but we certainly do have a sense of what it is to be beautiful. That’s the question: what is it that just is this sense and from whence does it arise. As well, with this, for you, it is impossible to explain those fundamental conditions by which we can all have the same sense of what a car is, but we do not all have the same sense of what good is.
————-

….since you probably meant a faculty of some sort that is special for grasping morality — Bob Ross

There ya go. Others may differ, of course.

Tictoktictok???

As my ol’ buddy Billy Gibbons might say to Bob….got (you) under presssssuuurre….

I didn’t ask about goodness, and I’m not interested in meta-ethics.

It seems to me you’re advocating somewhat of what you claim Moore is refuting. At least, with respect to what I asked about, you haven’t shown that by which you understand what good is, yet you’ve presupposed goodness as a qualitative judgement of it.

There is no legitimate warrant for determining how good a thing is, re: its goodness, without an a priori sense of good itself. Just as you can’t say of a thing its beauty without that to which its beauty relates.

Which immediately requires you to separate the empirical contingency of the one from the a priori necessity of the other.

Clock’s ticking, Bob.
(Grin)

What might your primary consideration be, for separating what good is, from what is good?

I think 'ignore' would be more appropriate…. — Wayfarer

I think ‘finds fault’. Which is rather easy to do, when either the original is merely re-arranged, or, conditions are attached that were excluded as irrelevant in the original.

Doncha just love it, when you invent something, and some guy comes along later and tells everybody you invented it wrong?

He can’t. He just doesn’t know it, never stopped to think about it.

Dunno about Moore. The title asks for something to be said about good, not about what is good, not how it is good, not goodness.

Good doesn’t have a definition, but if you think you can build your own set of rules, you must already have an idea of what good will be.

I suspect, when you go about building a set of rules, you’ll find you’re only discovering them.

Where should you begin, then?

Stop asking where to begin.

“How can natural relations, cognized in accordance with empirical conditions, be transcendent?

It is a map of the territory. We use math, e.g., to model laws which do not pertain to way we cognize (e.g., law of gravity). You would have to deny this. — "Bob

I think the math used to establish the laws that represent perceived natural relations….is exactly how we cognize empirical events. It is now called mapping the territory, which is merely embellishment of what was once just plain ol’ understanding, but it’s only euphemistic language for a representational system of cognition.

Not sure what I'm denying here. Which of the map/territory relation is transcending the other?

The brain seems to be the external representation of whatever ‘thing’ is doing the cognizing. That seems pretty clear (to me). — Bob Ross

It shouldn’t, in that no representation is external. As well, the brain doesn’t cognize, I do. The brain does absolutely nothing but employ natural conditions in accordance with natural law, which somehow manifests as me cognizing that the brain does absolutely nothing but…...

Brain is a thing in the same manner as a dump truck is a thing. Dump trucks as things do not cognize, therefore brains as things in the same manner, do not cognize.

“Dump truck” is a conceptual representation of an intuitive thing, “brain” is a conceptual representation of an intuitive thing. Intuitive things, re: phenomena, irrespective of their individual form, have no power of their own for cognition, therefore brains do not cognize.

you were denying this before. So to clarify: you do, in fact, believe that the brain is the ontological grounding for reason? — Bob Ross

No, I wasn’t. To clarify, even if I cannot deny or affirm that it is, if I cannot know how it is, I don’t care that it is. That is to say, even if I think it inconceivable that it isn’t, is not in itself tacit authorization that it is. This is expandable to, even if it is absurd to suppose the brain isn’t the ontological origin of reason, unless I know how such is the case with apodeitic certainty…..it is a waste of my time to give a damn.

This doesn’t negate the fact that the brain is ontologically what facilitates that reasoning. — Bob Ross

It also doesn’t affirm that it does.

That A and !A cannot both be true presupposes that A = A. — Bob Ross

I don’t know what !A represents. If it is not-A, then A and not-A can both be true, when not-A is B. The presupposition is invalid. If !A cannot be re-written as not-A, then never mind.

if LNC only applies to our understanding of reality, then it plainly follows that it is at least logically and actually possible for an object in reality, independently of our understanding of it, to both be and not be identical to itself. — Bob Ross

Account for this is already given, at least in Enlightenment metaphysics and probably elsewhere, the end being it makes no difference at all, insofar as anything independent of our understanding, which is….theoretically….predicated on the laws of logic generally and the LNC in particular, cannot be said to abide by the same laws.

In addition, to be logically possible does not imply the empirical proofs by which the truth of the logic is determined and from which the actual is given or not. Not to mention, “actually possible” is superfluous, insofar as actually possible just is conceptually equivalent to possibility itself. It is enough to say a thing is logically possible without the additional qualification that it is also actually possible.

So what??? Why would we even consider any methodology relevant, if it isn’t ours? If it isn’t the one we’re convinced we have and thereby the one we unconditionally use?

You would have to posit some sort of soul or immaterial mind, I would imagine, to go the route that you are—i.e., reason is not grounded in the brain. — Bob Ross

I’m not interested in what is not; I wouldn’t say reason is not grounded in the brain. I work with what I know, and how reason is a product of the brain, while being a deduction logically consistent with experience, cannot itself be an experience. And if I cannot learn the operational parameters of a physical thing with sufficient certainty using my internal non-physical means, I am entitled to dismiss it, at least temporarily, along with its other, related originating notions, re: soul, mind, deity, spirit, and assorted abstracted whatnots, in conjunction with what I may or may not eventually come to know.

In which case, then…..

“….. the proud name of an ontology, which professes to present synthetical cognitions à priori of things in general in a systematic doctrine, must give place to the modest title of analytic of the pure understanding…”

….which is to say, whatever the brain is doing is not contained in my internal analysis of my own intelligence. I already opined as much, in that the human subject in general does not think in terms of natural law.

And is found here the inconsistency regarding the notion and subsequent application of transcendent law, that which even if the idea of which is thought without self-contradiction, can give no weight to the possibility of empirical knowledge, the attempt in doing so is where the contradiction arises. It follows that I am not, or, have no legitimate reason to be, properly interested in such laws, insofar as they do not and cannot support the method by which my knowledge is deemed possible.
—————

“There are natural relations, represented by laws the conceptions of which are empirical.
— Mww

These are transcendent, no? — Bob Ross

How can natural relations, cognized in accordance with empirical conditions, be transcendent? Observation of natural relations is certainly within the purview of universality and necessity, that is to say, in order for there to even be natural relations given by observation they must be given universally and necessarily….

(you can’t look outside here today and see rain falling then look outside there tomorrow and see rain rising)

…..and while universality and necessity are pure a priori transcendental deductions of pure reason which are the form of principles in general by which laws as such are determinable, they are not from that called transcendent.

Are they transcendent with respect to the possibility of experiencing a priori deductions, is a nonsense question, insofar as experience is only of synthesized representations of real physical things by means of intuition, which conceptions themselves never are. From which follows such conceptions while certainly not experiences, are not because they do not arise from intuition, rather than because they are transcendent.
————-

Best I can do, is say that for any given thing, it cannot simultaneously both be whatever it is and not be whatever it is.
—Mww

The law of non-contradiction, which you noted here…. — Bob Ross

A = A and its negation A /= ~A is the law of identity. The LNC, on the other hand, states that simultaneously A =/ B. I disagree one presupposes the other, but grant that either one presupposes their respective content, re: A and B, or any other general conception represented by A or B.

The law of non-contradiction (…) doesn’t just pertain to just how we cognize objects. Otherwise, you are admitting the actual possibility of an object that exists in reality which is not identical to itself….or/and identical and not identical to itself…etc. — Bob Ross

So if I claim the LNC just does pertain to how we cognize objects, I have no need of admitting any such possibility? Parsimony suggests and experience confirms I don’t hold with that admission. The root caveat being, of course, how we cognize objects consistently with respect to time and, by association, change.

Now I readily admit the possibility of underlaying causality for our intellectual manifestations. But I won’t admit transcendent law as being contained in that causality, for it is the case I cannot be made conscious of how such law would be possible, hence I cannot be conscious of them as having the authority necessary to overthrow, insofar as they must contradict the very rules to which I’ve already granted sufficient functional integrity.
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From this armchair, you’re foisting on me, not an emperor in new clothes whose authority I might accept insofar as I don’t care what this guy is wearing, but rather, an entirely new emperor, whose authority I wouldn’t even begin to accept until I can comprehend his methods.

That being given, rather than…..

the brain is clearly the organ responsible for facilitating reason. — Bob Ross

….I’d posit that the brain is the organ necessary for all human intellectual functionality, but it is in no way clear how it is responsible for all by which its subjective condition occurs. Furthermore, it may just be that it never can be clear just how that organ is responsible for anything at all, that isn’t strictly contained in the same empirical domain as physical object itself.

I see my mistake. A creature IN-capable of thought (…) doesn’t have any, making his incapacity for comparing them with anything, moot.

You are hardly one to be imprecise. That being given, it just seemed to me, in-capable would have lent more consistency to the overall point being made in that particular entry.

If I’m mistaken, that’s on me.

The Cogito signifies that I don't just blend into a monolithic universe. I arise out of it as a distinct thing. — frank

Ooooo….I like that.

….in the sense that we cannot understand reality other than by using our own modes of cognizing it…. — Bob Ross

Hmmm. Has your position been that transcendent has to do with that by which laws are determinable, as transcending the experience required to enounce the objective validity of those laws? If so, I can get on board with it, in a rather loose conceptual assignment anyway. Understanding certainly is very far from experience, but I’d not so much say understanding is transcended by it.
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The brain (…) has no part to play in the tenets of such process.
—Mww

Interesting. What, then, is responsible for it? A soul? — Bob Ross

Reason.
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there are natural laws — Bob Ross

There are natural relations, represented by laws the conceptions of which are empirical.

The most fundamental would be logical laws — Bob Ross

These are the most fundamental, but not of Nature but of pure reason. Where is Nature in A = A?

do you think an object as it were in-itself can be and not be identical to itself? — Bob Ross

Identical to itself makes no sense to me. Best I can do, is say that for any given thing, it cannot simultaneously both be whatever it is and not be whatever it is. I cannot say that about any thing as it were in itself, which is merely the glorified rendition of the ding an sich we’ve all come to know and love. From a distance.

How else would you say “disunity”? What other word carries similar implication?

any further knowledge about the self is unwarranted. — J

….because for that knowledge, we must have recourse to empirical science. But then, how does one experiment for that which isn’t to be found? Which gets us to : we automatically become dualists…..
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…..we automatically become dualists of some kind. — frank

….or, we always were, and must necessarily be.

Why…. — frank

Is there an answer that doesn’t just invite another question?

Comprehension needs to be bestowed on something representing a particular accomplishment, iff one wishes to express himself in regard to it. The cognitive system, in and of itself, in its normal modus operandi, doesn’t require it, insofar as it just IS it.
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…thinking is something I do. That's not "nothing." — J

Agreed. Thinking is something I do, and it does tell me something. It tells me there is a thinker and I am it. And I am….what, exactly? If I am that which thinks, I am conscious of that already. Even if it is that determines what it is to think, I still haven’t said what I am, other than I am a necessary condition for that which thinks, which is highly circular or abysmally tautological.

Hence….psychologists. (Sigh)