Rather, it is both. — creativesoul

I think not. Without that to which north relates, north of is empty.

Oh. In that case, I must say you do philosophy very well, but you’re terrible at mischievous.

allowing you to assess the validity of the inferences you make — Pfhorrest

So I am judging my judgements. Understand my understandings.

Cognize my cognitions? Know my knowledge?

I see no profit in allowing myself to do that which I am mandated by my very nature to have already done.

What it takes to do philosophy is the same as what it takes for a human to do anything of conscious intent: reason.

Do you believe me when I say I see colors everywhere? If so, is that a rational belief? — Wheatley

The only rational response is none at all, to not consider the truth of your statement. Maybe you see colors in a perfectly dark enclosure, which is certainly a part of “everywhere”, but I know for a fact I cannot.

That humans attribute more to themselves than we deserve? If not that, what point did you get?

None of them have a coherent meaningful notion of thought and belief that is amenable to evolutionary terms and/or progression. — creativesoul

There’s a blatantly obvious reason for that.

Oh, I’m a big fan of the notion of different modes of being, but I don’t see any reason to grant more than two of them, re: the a posteriori and the a priori.

And I agree with your iteration of the concept of universals, which I would call ideals, which leaves universal, hence universality, to be conjoined freely with necessity as pure categories.

up to the German idealists (after which philosophy proper ceased — Wayfarer

Perfectly obvious to me, but congrats on having the cajones to state it for the record. Not the modern’s fault, though; after the real philosophers got done, there was nothing left except to FUBAR what they said, or make waves out of stuff nobody has any real reason to care about, yet think to call it “progress”.

(sigh)

Eriugena's five modes. — Wayfarer

Historically interesting (thanks), metaphysically cumbersome (no thanks).

It's not a philosophy, rather an economy. — Kenosha Kid

Must be a scientific domain then; there’s no such thing as economic philosophy.

we neglect the fact he hasn’t figured out that sometimes a curved stick would work a whole lot better. — Mww

Damn. Seems only some of us have neglected the fact. Color me.....educated.

Thanks.

Occam's razor is not really the same as reductionism.... — Kenosha Kid

Yeah, William was more into parsimony than reductionism, per se.

It's not really a philosophical position. — Kenosha Kid

What isn’t? Reductionism? True enough, although reasoning logically from the general to the particular might be considered a philosophical reduction.

Another interesting post, at any rate. So thanks for that.

If I were to take exception to anything, I would think science is at least partially reductionism-driven, insofar as science should always seek the simplest principles....derived from the fewest conceptions.....to justify its methods.

Otherwise......well done.

universal terms are real, but that their reality is of a different order, to the reality of individual particulars. — Wayfarer

Lots of cool stuff in there, which I can appreciate. I wonder what terminology you’d use to classify the different orders of reality; I know what I’d use, being the next metaphysical generation removed from a Scholastic realist.
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Animals don’t reason, no. — Wayfarer

Agreed, under certain paradigmatic conditions. Human reason is cognition by means of conceptions a posteriori or cognition by the construction of conceptions a priori. As such, lacking the cognitive system required for those paradigms, it is impossible that animals intellectually lesser than the human variety, reason. At the same time, it is impossible for the human animal to know with any certainty whatsoever, what kind of rationality is possible other than his own. The very best we can say, is that lesser animals associate instinctively, which reduces to nothing more consequential than simple stimuli/reaction, even if derived from mere accidental occassion.

I mean....c’mon. If there was no stick for the crow to use, would he have built one? We wonder at the fact he uses a stick, but we neglect the fact he hasn’t figured out that sometimes a curved stick would work a whole lot better. And to say, because of that, the crow just reasons a little bit, is beneath the dignity of philosophical discourse, better left to the rationally unencumbered.

You know.....we’ve seen porpoises/dolphins using breaking ocean waves in a fashion we’ve taken the un-warranted liberty of calling “surfing”. If it was a human using such waves for some specific purpose, the concept of surfing is justified; but without those criteria, which is altogether impossible for us to ascertain, saying porpoises “surf”, or rationalize the use of breaking ocean waves for any definitive purpose at all, is a liberty not logically granted to us. And if we can’t ask a crow how he got the idea of using a stick, what right do we have, other than rampant anthropomorphism, to say he reasoned his way to it? If only they could inform us.........
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our ability to reason and navigate is grounded in our ability to discern meaning — Wayfarer

I think this is backwards, in that meaning presupposes the subjective validity of the representations already given by our innate ability to reason. We assign concepts to objects not because of what the concepts mean, but as means to know what the object is. A concept or intuition represents some x; it doesn’t tell us what x means. If we want to know the meaning of some x, which always relates to its purpose, we need a different set of judgements, but even judgements are themselves predicated on the relation of concepts.
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Scholastic realist. Scotus? Peirce? St. Thomas? Other than medieval?

Anyway....thanks for letting me barge in here. Like Reese’s though......not sorry! (Grin)

Yep. That’s what the law says. Right there, “M.P.N.P”, 1687, Book1, pg 20, “Axioms or Laws of Motion”, depending on which edition/translation is referenced, of course.

The facts don’t lie, and in the case of me/cruise ship/deep space....they don’t matter. And in the case of me/car/icy street, I lose, car wins.

And experience. Ever tried to push a car on an icy street? Even if the car had a SaranWrap hood and you disfigured it with the pressure of your hands, the car ain’t goin’ nowhere but you’ll end up in a face-plant.

Not much point in claiming you accelerated the hood when the objects of discourse....the variables in Newton’s law....are you and the car.

How can one have failures at 16 — Nuke

My thoughts exactly. Failed chemistry lab? Struck out with that blonde in Mrs. Sherman’s French class?

Oh. Wait.

Never mind.

music born of tortured souls. — Nuke

A most touching vocalization of simple words, from Gregg’s “These Days”.......written by Jackson Browne when he was only 16, which I would never have guessed:

“Please don’t confront me with my failures.
I’m aware of them.”

Remember Duane....eat a peach.

I don't think a finger can generate the force necessary to move a cruiseliner. — TheMadFool

Yeah....me too. Seems I would move backward and the ship would pretty much stay put. Even with Newton’s law, there’s zero force on the ship if all the force is accelerating the lesser mass.

Wrong usage of the word "sense" or is there a grain of truth in it? — TheMadFool

Two things: it is said we have a naturally given “internal sense”, and, if a logical argument is consistent with itself and non-contradictory, concluding the validity of such internal sense, then it would seem to have a grain of truth, at least logically. Depends on the major premise, I guess.

Any adjustments? — tim wood

Your (synthesis2( appearance + understanding))) I would change to phenomenon + understanding. Imagination synthesizes the representation “appearance” with the representation “intuition”, into the representation “phenomenon”, so appearances are already accounted for. All that’s left is understanding the rules under which experience becomes possible, and that is accomplished through the synthesis, again by means of imagination, of phenomena with the categories. We have to recognize that which we have perceived, is either possible or necessary, is imbued with sufficient quantity and quality, whether a cause or an effect, whether permanent or changeable.
——————

perception: a signal
sensation: hot, burning
appearance: putting together burning with what burning is - being burned
phenomenon: understanding, or assigning, the meaning of the appearance.

Close enough? — tim wood

All in all, close enough. It’s all speculative metaphysics, after all. Experience has enabled us to use that listing, insofar as we already know there is a sensation we cognize as a burn. But the cognitive system itself as it normally operates, at the point of sensation alone, has as yet no name for it, it is merely a something, an affect on the faculty of sensibility. It is an awareness, a change in our subjective condition.

It epitomizes the distinction between being aware and being conscious.....theoretically. We are aware of an object empirically by the sensation of it; we are conscious of an object rationally by the conception of it.

my reckoning is that people have intuited, if not inferred through logical argument, that our minds, in a way, "sense" patterns. — TheMadFool

Yours, and a veritable HOST of like-minded individuals. Which is fine, each must hold to himself.

like Odysseus under the sheep, something is getting away that shouldn't. — tim wood

But Polyphemus, being blind as the proverbial bat, was easily fooled by a simple ruse. Humans in general, likewise easily fooled, still have the capacity to right themselves. Sometimes misused, such capacity, but there nonetheless.

I would allay your concern with the hypothesis that sensation, the direct and unambiguous product of perception, is that of which we are immediately aware. In metaphysical parlance, empirical sensation becomes appearance as representation, and is the matter of a synthesis, telling us what kind of sensation it is, in conjunction with intuition, which is its form, telling us particulars relative to its kind. That synthesis gives us phenomena, some as yet unknown something. The reason for the synthesis of appearance to intuition, is to prevent the confusion of, say, color with touch, pressure with scent, and so forth, in order to ensure the next synthesis....phenomena with understanding.....has the logically correct, that is, non-contradictory, material to work with.

Of course, science can confirm that certain areas of the brain are provably responsible for maintaining such lack of confusion, but......nobody really cares about that, because science can only explain how we get stuff wrong with a glitch in the mechanics, which tells us absolutely nothing useful, whereas reason allows us to understand how we got stuff wrong. And ya gotta admit, logical, rational speculation is more satisfying to the Average Joe than, “well, buddy.....what can I tell ya; your brain’s broke”.
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Because we talking perception, having to do with the empirical, Hume, the quintessential empiricist of his time, might hold with his “constant conjunction”, although his idea of conjunction was very far from transcendental synthesis. As such, his notion of immediate awareness would be the object of perception, thus not a Kantian “appearance” as mere representation thereof.

Anyway.....couple cents worth.

you surely won't deny that pattern recognition is part of the mind's act. — TheMadFool

I certainly wouldn’t deny this assertion. Nevertheless......

"I sense a pattern" is both semantically and syntactically unproblematic. — TheMadFool

.......while unproblematic as a proposition under those stringent conditions, forces the two assertions to contradict each other, insofar as perception, in and of itself, is not a function of mind but of a posteriori principles alone. My physiology senses only real physical objects, of which I immediately become aware; my mind apprehends the presence of possible patterns between those objects, or between myself and those objects, merely as judgements of logical relations.

My understanding of time (and space):

That which at least one apparent intelligence has developed from itself, specifically for the use of itself.

what we can "know" with our senses, with empirical data, is all that can be known — Xtrix

Not an advocate of a priori knowledge, huh? Are we to maintain that it is impossible to know anything that isn’t first perceived?

the "I think, therefore I am" should be inverted. (...) What I'm saying there is that the "sum" is even more primordial than "thought," and thus the Cogito should be inverted in that sense. I didn't mean to imply everything that "is" is a conscious, thinking being. — Xtrix

Not sure Rene would go for that; it is my understanding that he intended the “I” of “...therefore I am” to be necessarily conditioned by the “cogito”. In other words, they are mutually dependent, same subject, different predicates kinda thing. The “I” that thinks is not the cause of the “I” that is, and the “I” that is is not an effect of the “I” that thinks. The “I” that thinks is the very same as the “I” that is. Somewhat lame, perhaps, even labeled “problematic idealism” by the former Esteemed Professor of Logic and Metaphysics at Königsberg, but the proof of the “I” is itself. So while it is true some physically real manifestation is certainly more primordial that thought, that particular kind of existence isn’t applicable to the “I” we know as representing the transcendental thinking subject.
—————

As soon as you posit an "I" that thinks, or an "I" that is a conscious subject, you're only positing a certain conception of a being, and so presupposing the existence of some-thing that you're now labeling "I." — Xtrix

In effect, yes, agreed. I would call it positing a certain representation, rather than a being; makes it simpler to recognize the kind of object it is and its contribution to syllogistic inference,.

it is altogether impossible to escape the subject/object dichotomy.....
— Mww

I think we can, metaphysically. — Xtrix

How would that be arranged, that escape?

ontology of "mind" and "nature" (....) I don't think is the unmitigated foundation of all being, or even of all knowledge -- although almost ertainly for modern philosophy and science. — Xtrix

Ontology of mind and body? The study of the origin and existence of mind and body?

If the mind/body dualism isn’t thought to be the foundation of all knowledge, but almost certainly the foundation of modern philosophic and scientific knowledge, suggests there is yet another kind of knowledge that isn’t grounded in philosophic or scientific principles. What form would such knowledge have?

Nevertheless, I agree the study of the mind/body dualism isn’t sufficient to ground knowledge of any kind; it merely serves to establish the theoretical conditions under which the possibility of it may be given.
—————-

I don't think to myself "here I am as an individual engaged in this activity" — Xtrix

Of course not, it is impossible. Human thoughts are always singular and successive; engagement in any activity, except pure reflex and sheer accident, requires thought, so I cannot think myself thinking. I can think myself possibly engaged, or I can think myself having been engaged, but never think myself simultaneously thinking with respect to a present engagement. In addition, humans do not have the ability to think more than one object at a time, so if I think while being engaged in an activity, the activity is the only permissible object for me to form a cognition about, which makes my thought of myself, as another object being thought, quite impossible. You may recognize this scenario as the fundamental ground of the map/territory dichotomy, insofar as the thinker can never think itself. Represent itself, sure, in speculative metaphysics, think of itself as a necessary condition for that which follows from it, but that’s nothing more than theoretical place holding.
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the "I think, therefore I am" should be inverted — Xtrix

That can never fly as a philosophical principle, for such should then be the case that anything that is, thinks.

Ya know....poor ol’ Rene, sometimes so demonized. Given that the primary source for that infamous missive is “Principles of Philosophy”, 1, 7, one is well-advised to continue on through 8, in which he tells us what he means by “mind” from which we derive the “I”, and 9, in which he tells us what he means by “thought”. Taken as a whole, the only thing claimed to exist necessarily, is the “I” itself....not the body, not anything else. If that is the case, you have no warrant to claim being “thrown into a world and start with it” with the same absolute certainty as the existence of the thinking self demands.

we start with (and "in") being (as human beings) and with (and "in") time. — Xtrix

I dunno, man. We can only start with or in time, if it is possible to prove with apodeitic certainty we are not ourselves responsible for the creation of time as a mere conception. If we cannot do that, we can see it is impossible for us to be started with....to be initialized by.....that which wouldn’t even exist if not for us. The ol’ cart before the horse routine, doncha know.
—————-

We can explain this type of thing using the subject/object distinction, but this assumes a lot of things (....) leading to problems that have been with us for a long time. — Xtrix

No doubt; the dyed-in-the-wool physicalist won’t grant the time of day to “mind”, which is fine, there being no such real empirical thing. Which just makes philosophy that much more fun......how to close explanatory gaps by making sense out of something we can never put our fingers on.

Would you get the same results? — RogueAI

Probably; “Bucky balls” give an interference pattern, and they are monstrous compared to elementary particles.

What would the experiences of the people be? — RogueAI

If they’re still people, why wouldn’t they have people experiences?

we may be entering back into the subject/object dichotomy. — Xtrix

I submit it is altogether impossible to escape the subject/object dichotomy, or dualism. Can’t re-enter what’s never been vacated. Metaphysically speaking, of course.

If we’re teasing apart concepts that had been wrongly confused with each other, what then would synthesizing them back together again (in a better way?) be like? — Pfhorrest

The only way to analyze concepts is with other concepts; the human representational system knows no other way. If it be granted the definition validates the conception (experience or logic validates the synthesis of conceptions; reason validates the synthesis of conceptions to other representations in a transcendental system), then analyzing the definition usually distinguishes the application of conceptions, rightens the wrongly confused. It becomes a valid judgement that the object a posteriori, or thought a priori, belongs to the conception under which it is subsumed. The object “wing”, e.g., does not belong to the conception of a “dog”; the thought of “blue” is not qualitatively necessary to the conception of “triangle”.

I don’t think we’d normally synthesize back together conceptions we’ve already analyzed as being mutually contradictory with respect to a singular object. We could, I suppose.....hey!! I’m here to tell you there’s a dog in the outer reaches of Mongolia (innermost inaccessible Peru....whatever) that has wings. Not altogether impossible, but chances of knowledge of it is vanishingly small. On the other hand, there is historical precedence: the object “man” was once contradictory to the conception “walking on the moon”.

What methods do we use to do philosophy? — Pfhorrest

In (by) analyzing concepts and teasing them apart from each other.... — Pfhorrest

If that, then the synthesis of them should follow, or, the synthesis of them and something else subsumed under them, in order to complete a method.

For the most part....agreed. Although it must be said,

endlessly seeking answers to the uselessly confused and so perpetually unanswerable question — Pfhorrest

is a natural proclivity of reason itself, the search for the unconditioned, the bottom line, the terminus of infinite regress. But even so, you’re correct, insofar as practical reason curbs the irrationality of pure reason taken to promote impossible human experiences.

philosophy teachers, (...) but with no clear indication that they ever thought "being" for themselves. I think that's a shame. — Xtrix

Maybe it’s as simple as finding no profit in questioning the experience of our observations. Perception presupposes existence, therefore to question either makes for no progress in seeking knowledge. The same holds for possible experience, if it should be the case that, e.g., mathematics, and synthetic a priori cognitions in general, logically sustains that which humans presently conceive but may only eventually observe.

And those modern philosophers who don’t question being qua being, may still be guilty of radicalizing the bejesus out of concept, by theorizing different kinds of being, under different conditions, etc., which, of course, is anathema to pure philosophy. Even Feynman, a combined super-scientist and closet philosopher if there ever was one, posited that if we don’t know which path an electron took to arrive at some observable location, we are justified in supposing it to have taken every possible path (paraphrased sum over histories). But still, that is really nothing more than “...a lame appeal to a logical condition...”, meaning the fact the proposition is not self-contradictory doesn’t say anything worthwhile about its subject.
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But what does philosophy really "think" if not existence, if not "being" in the broadest sense? — Xtrix

Relations? And if it is humans that are asking, then that which is asked about must ultimately reduce to a relation between it and humans. It follows that at least some fundamental genus of philosophy relates what is, to what we think of it.

scientists who study a parcel of reality (...) do not care at all about the "being as being". — David Mo

“....it must still remain a scandal to philosophy and to the general human reason to be obliged to assume, as an article of mere belief, the existence of things external to ourselves (from which, yet,      we derive the whole material of cognition for the internal sense), and not to be able to offer a satisfactory proof to any one who may call it in question....”
(CPR Bxl)

Knowledge of what a thing is presupposes knowledge that a thing is, from which follows the study of the being of things in general is both redundant and superfluous. It is absurd to suppose the thing which indubitably affects human sensibility isn’t proven to exist by the affect that it has, otherwise we are met with the contradiction “...we should require to affirm the existence of an appearance, without something that appears...”

Philosophy and science are necessarily connected by the universal commonality of the human intellect that indulges in both. As such, both philosophy and science answer to that intellect, hence the ontological paradigm of theoretical speculation......

“....Reason must approach nature with the view, indeed, of receiving information from it, not, however, in the character of a pupil, who listens to all that his master chooses to tell him, but in that of a judge, who compels the witnesses to reply to those questions which he himself thinks fit to propose. To this single idea must the revolution be ascribed, by which, after groping in the dark for so many centuries, natural science was at length conducted into the path of certain progress....”
(Ibid Bxiii)

......, or, on the other hand, is it more the case that we actually are the “pupil” and must take what the “master” allows us to have, hence the ontic paradigm of absolute transcendent determinism? And while the speculative process contains no apodeictic certainty, it seems much the worse that the ontic process makes no allowance for the fundamental conditions of the human cognitive system, which is solely responsible for, not what we know, but rather, how it is possible to know anything.

All that to say this: I’m pretty sure scientists don’t care all that much about being qua being, and I’m almost positive Everydayman doesn’t give a damn about it at all.

Therefore, they exist only because they had at one time been thought by rational agency, hence they are a priori in origin
— Mww

That doesn't make them a priori in origin at all. It simply means a human mind conceived them at one point. — Xtrix

What’s the difference? Rules may become public, but they never initialize publicly.
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If we count any rule as a priori that human beings think up, then my rule of not eating after 8pm is an a priori truth. — Xtrix

Categorical error: rules are not necessarily related to truth. If it were to be impossible for you ever to eat after 8pm, the truth of it holds but it is not a rule. If you are ever forced to eat after 8pm, the rule holds but the truth of it does not. Otherwise, if you choose to not eat after 8pm because of a rule of your own instruction, then it is true you adhere to the rule, but that doesn’t say the rule in itself, is a necessary truth. You could have not eaten after 8pm because you’d just eaten at 7:45, or you’ve had a heart attack.....any one of an innumerable set of contingencies.

Strange indeed.

I don't see the rules of chess being a priori, — Xtrix

The rules of chess....or rules for anything else for that matter, along with laws, imperatives, principles, maxims, a veritable plethora of logical guides....do not exist naturally. Therefore, they exist only because they had at one time been thought by rational agency, hence they are a priori in origin, and only subsequently put into a natural state (written down, exercised in a game, etc.) by that agency.

But I grant you that mine is the minority position. — Xtrix

To which you are most certainly entitled.
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Reference please? — Xtrix

Sorry.....I edited and didn’t notice I deleted (CPR A849/B877).
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But here Heidegger is talking about being, not rules. — Xtrix

I realize that, yes. “Rule”, ”being”.......one no more a mere a priori human logical construct than the other.

things can certainly be re-learned — Xtrix

Hmmm......yes, my mistake; there always an exception to the rule. Things may be re-learned due to brain or mental malfunction. But philosophy has to do with the norm in that regard, not the exception to it, which is the realm of empirical psychology.
(“...Empirical psychology must therefore be banished from the sphere of metaphysics (...). It is a stranger who has been long a guest; and we make it welcome to stay, until it can take up a more suitable abode in a complete system of anthropology...”)
—————

The rules and principles of theory, reason, and other cognitive functions we use when dealing with the world consciously, scientifically, explicitly, etc. (...) just do not seem to play any role once we've reached expertise. — Xtrix

Principles of theory, rules, even reason itself, are a priori human explanatory constructs that facilitate understanding. If rules don’t play a part, how does one even become an expert? Just the comparison between an expert and a novice must be in accordance to a rule.

"it's something that does not show itself at all: it is something that lies hidden, in contrast to that which proximally and for the most part does show itself; but at the same time it is something that belongs to what thus shows itself, and it belongs to it so essentially as to constitute its meaning and its ground."(Being & Time, p. 35.) — Xtrix

Seems like “rule” would fit into that definition just fine.

I just don't see how the former somehow goes "underground" and is thus stored in the brain. — Xtrix

Two things: something is stored somewhere, and, nothing is ever learned twice. One may incorporate those into either a scientific or philosophical theory, but not both simultaneously. Science will probably prove brain mechanics someday but won’t be the least satisfying to Everydayman, and philosophical theories may very well satisfy Everydayman just fine, but stand no chance whatsoever of being proven.

Round and round we go.......

some people think reason, (...), may be something that is happening when we’re not aware of it.
— Mww

Sure. I think it's an unjustified move, but I'm aware it exists — Xtrix

I agree, in accordance with the theoretical tenet that reason is a conscious mental activity. That which happens on the other side, is not reason per se. Precursor to reason, ground of reason, that which makes reason possible.....take your pick. In much the same way as we are never aware of the transition from perception by means of sense organs to the excitation of functional brain mechanics, so too are we never aware of the transition from the appearance of external objects, to the synthesis of representations into knowledge.
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Yes, this is exactly the above: reason now become "implicit reason," working below consciousness somehow. So it's like saying when we learn something, we have to learn the rules and put conscious effort into practicing -- but then once we master the skill (let's say driving), the rules become stored in the brain somewhere, working unconsciously. — Xtrix

As aforementioned, reason doesn’t work below consciousness, insofar as consciousness stands for the state of that of which the subject is conscious, or aware.

The brain stores stuff, but it is only because of our own need to understand each other, that “rules” is the name given to that which is stored. If neural pathways are the means for storage of “rules”, and we are hardy aware of our neural pathways and the employment of them in the facilitation of extant knowledge rather than re-learning from each successive set of empirical stimuli.....what is it that is completely wrong?

Peirce (who apparently coined the term in reference to Kant), — Pfhorrest

“...CHAPTER III. The Architectonic of Pure Reason.
By the term architectonic I mean the art of constructing a system. Without systematic unity, our knowledge cannot become science; it will be an aggregate, and not a system. Thus architectonic is the doctrine of the scientific in cognition, and therefore necessarily forms part of our methodology...”
(A832/B860)

Minor point to be sure, but in the interest of accuracy, Peirce didn’t coin the term. If Peirce applied the term to his own system, with a tip of the pointy hat to The Esteemed Professor, it would have done the same job.