Therefore, they exist only because they had at one time been thought by rational agency, hence they are a priori in origin
— Mww

That doesn't make them a priori in origin at all. It simply means a human mind conceived them at one point. — Xtrix

What’s the difference? Rules may become public, but they never initialize publicly.
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If we count any rule as a priori that human beings think up, then my rule of not eating after 8pm is an a priori truth. — Xtrix

Categorical error: rules are not necessarily related to truth. If it were to be impossible for you ever to eat after 8pm, the truth of it holds but it is not a rule. If you are ever forced to eat after 8pm, the rule holds but the truth of it does not. Otherwise, if you choose to not eat after 8pm because of a rule of your own instruction, then it is true you adhere to the rule, but that doesn’t say the rule in itself, is a necessary truth. You could have not eaten after 8pm because you’d just eaten at 7:45, or you’ve had a heart attack.....any one of an innumerable set of contingencies.

Strange indeed.

I don't see the rules of chess being a priori, — Xtrix

The rules of chess....or rules for anything else for that matter, along with laws, imperatives, principles, maxims, a veritable plethora of logical guides....do not exist naturally. Therefore, they exist only because they had at one time been thought by rational agency, hence they are a priori in origin, and only subsequently put into a natural state (written down, exercised in a game, etc.) by that agency.

But I grant you that mine is the minority position. — Xtrix

To which you are most certainly entitled.
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Reference please? — Xtrix

Sorry.....I edited and didn’t notice I deleted (CPR A849/B877).
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But here Heidegger is talking about being, not rules. — Xtrix

I realize that, yes. “Rule”, ”being”.......one no more a mere a priori human logical construct than the other.

things can certainly be re-learned — Xtrix

Hmmm......yes, my mistake; there always an exception to the rule. Things may be re-learned due to brain or mental malfunction. But philosophy has to do with the norm in that regard, not the exception to it, which is the realm of empirical psychology.
(“...Empirical psychology must therefore be banished from the sphere of metaphysics (...). It is a stranger who has been long a guest; and we make it welcome to stay, until it can take up a more suitable abode in a complete system of anthropology...”)
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The rules and principles of theory, reason, and other cognitive functions we use when dealing with the world consciously, scientifically, explicitly, etc. (...) just do not seem to play any role once we've reached expertise. — Xtrix

Principles of theory, rules, even reason itself, are a priori human explanatory constructs that facilitate understanding. If rules don’t play a part, how does one even become an expert? Just the comparison between an expert and a novice must be in accordance to a rule.

"it's something that does not show itself at all: it is something that lies hidden, in contrast to that which proximally and for the most part does show itself; but at the same time it is something that belongs to what thus shows itself, and it belongs to it so essentially as to constitute its meaning and its ground."(Being & Time, p. 35.) — Xtrix

Seems like “rule” would fit into that definition just fine.

I just don't see how the former somehow goes "underground" and is thus stored in the brain. — Xtrix

Two things: something is stored somewhere, and, nothing is ever learned twice. One may incorporate those into either a scientific or philosophical theory, but not both simultaneously. Science will probably prove brain mechanics someday but won’t be the least satisfying to Everydayman, and philosophical theories may very well satisfy Everydayman just fine, but stand no chance whatsoever of being proven.

Round and round we go.......

some people think reason, (...), may be something that is happening when we’re not aware of it.
— Mww

Sure. I think it's an unjustified move, but I'm aware it exists — Xtrix

I agree, in accordance with the theoretical tenet that reason is a conscious mental activity. That which happens on the other side, is not reason per se. Precursor to reason, ground of reason, that which makes reason possible.....take your pick. In much the same way as we are never aware of the transition from perception by means of sense organs to the excitation of functional brain mechanics, so too are we never aware of the transition from the appearance of external objects, to the synthesis of representations into knowledge.
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Yes, this is exactly the above: reason now become "implicit reason," working below consciousness somehow. So it's like saying when we learn something, we have to learn the rules and put conscious effort into practicing -- but then once we master the skill (let's say driving), the rules become stored in the brain somewhere, working unconsciously. — Xtrix

As aforementioned, reason doesn’t work below consciousness, insofar as consciousness stands for the state of that of which the subject is conscious, or aware.

The brain stores stuff, but it is only because of our own need to understand each other, that “rules” is the name given to that which is stored. If neural pathways are the means for storage of “rules”, and we are hardy aware of our neural pathways and the employment of them in the facilitation of extant knowledge rather than re-learning from each successive set of empirical stimuli.....what is it that is completely wrong?

Peirce (who apparently coined the term in reference to Kant), — Pfhorrest

“...CHAPTER III. The Architectonic of Pure Reason.
By the term architectonic I mean the art of constructing a system. Without systematic unity, our knowledge cannot become science; it will be an aggregate, and not a system. Thus architectonic is the doctrine of the scientific in cognition, and therefore necessarily forms part of our methodology...”
(A832/B860)

Minor point to be sure, but in the interest of accuracy, Peirce didn’t coin the term. If Peirce applied the term to his own system, with a tip of the pointy hat to The Esteemed Professor, it would have done the same job.

Kant was attempting to do exactly this kind of thing.... — Pfhorrest

Maybe. Or maybe those coming after foisted such “synthesis” on him. He certainly didn’t acknowledge such synthesis as his philosophical intent, that I am aware of, anyway.

I think he found both the dogmatic idealism of Berkeley and the material realism of Hume entirely insufficient for satisfying the criteria for human knowledge. Then, of course, he went ahead and re-defined human knowledge, and created a completely new philosophy that did account for it. He named it Transcendental Philosophy, and intended it to be, not a synthesis of the two major antecedent philosophies, but a “system of perspectives, based on principles” meant to replace them.

On the other hand, Kant grants some valid rationality to both Hume’s empiricism and Descartes’ idealism while rejecting Berkeley’s, but granting validity doesn’t necessarily lead to the synthesis of parts in order to forge a new version.

Kinda comical, considering the time of his writing, in that at one time he calls Hume “ablest and most ingenious of all sceptical philosophers,” then turns right around and accuses him of making bone-headed mistakes in reasoning: “did not distinguish these two kinds of judgements, as he ought to have done“.

Perhaps a term might be....architectonic?

Anyway.....two cents worth of examples of a third way.

if you agree reason is conscious abstract thought, then if something is happening when we're not aware of it -- is that still "reason"? — Xtrix

There is a transcendental argument which says reason is the entirety of the human cognitive system, from perception to knowledge, so at least some people think reason, or at least some part of the system to which it belongs, may be something that is happening when we’re not aware of it.

However, in a certain speculative philosophy, thought is “cognition by means of conceptions”, and cognition is “process of joining different representations (conceptions) to each other and of comprehending their diversity in one cognition”. Therein, that which happens of which we are not aware is the generation of conceptions, as means given from the faculty of understanding, but the process of joining different conceptions, and of comprehending the diversity of them, is reason proper, the cognitions of which we are certainly aware, as ends given from the faculty of judgement.

Granting all that, the assertion that we reason constantly becomes clear, for otherwise we must have a system informing us of that which we already know, and a separate and distinct system informing us of that which we do not know. Just because we reason much faster under conditions of extant experience, as opposed to having to process new representations in order to cognize merely a possible experience, doesn’t mean we’re not using reason in same way.
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this "intelligent biological creature" is still more intelligent than anything else in the animal kingdom, if only for the simple fact that we all have the faculty of language. — Xtrix

We have no right to make that claim, that doesn’t smack of anthropomorphism, re: Nagel, 1974. Even if reason is a strictly human condition, and we claim it as proprietary, it is fraught with illusion and intrinsic circularity, one prime example of which is to judge by our standards, that which cannot possibly conform to it.

What was the question again????? (Grin)

I see reason....as....abstract thought. — Xtrix

So reason plays an important role, but it's not the only one. — Xtrix

In the synthesis of the two, are we not then left with one of two inevitable conclusions: either there are times in our conscious living when we don’t think, or, the constant mental activity called thought, implied by being conscious, isn’t necessarily reason?

I agree reason is conscious abstract thought, but I rather think we reason constantly, all else being given, whether or not we are aware of it, which makes explicit that not only does reason have an important role, it is the necessarily determinant one. Without it, we have no justification in calling ourselves human, as opposed to merely existing as some kind of intelligent biological creature.

Anyway.....thanks.

So....”What” is the answer to that question.....satisfies the query?

I’m ok with that; I just left out the rest of the declarative.

Odd, isn’t it? The answer is given in the query, but stating the answer extinguishes the query.

What’s the older version?

What.

my background is in psychology. — Xtrix

Of course reason has weight in our daily lives. — Xtrix

What role does reason play....wherein lays its weight....in humans generally, from a psychological point of view?

Lyrics need edit.

Judge conflicting opinions with something of demonstrably greater certainty.

I dunno, man......awful lot of free-thinking there, but with a conspicuous lack of method to justify it. I’m sure you understand, that for people who summarily reject such notions as soul, infinite knowledge, the unconscious/subconscious barrier, and so on, no method will be sufficient.

Interesting read, and I appreciate the effort, but I can’t do much with it, myself. I just don’t really care about the origin of all things.

if there is a conscious being who can perceive all perspectives at once, instantly, then the computational structure of "me" exists somewhere within that sentient being, and thus I remain an observer of the Universe. — Justin Peterson

Sure, I can see that. Mighty big if, and, would require a certain kind of sentient being. On the other hand, in order for your “me” to remain an observer, wouldn’t the omni-percipient being have to possess the same kind of consciousness as you? Otherwise, your computational structure would be lost. Pretty hard to make cross-sentient beings compatible, seems like, and anything else is very far into anthropomorphism.
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I'm saying that everything is a computation — Justin Peterson

A la Tegmark, MUH, 2007, you say? Fine for mathematicians, but hardly satisfies Everydayman.

nulled by the planets moving until they find a comfortable place, where everything becomes still — Justin Peterson

Entropic equilibrium? I assume you mean all matter, not just planets. In which case, there would be no need of time or space.

I don't think you realize that we are making the same argument here — Justin Peterson

I don’t see it, myself. I’m no where near that far outside the box. Hell....I’m still stuck in the Enlightenment, fercryin’ outloud.

But these seem philosophies of other times. — David Mo

So.....no causa sui? With respect to moral systems based on an autonomous will, rather than ethical theories based on cultural norms, I mean.

we must recognize that definitive reasons in morality are not very apparent. — David Mo

Not very indeed.

moral obligation is not a physical necessity. (...) In the moral sense you decide what rules you must follow. Even if you say reason obliges you, you can choose irrationally. — David Mo

I pretty much agree with your argument, but here, mightn’t it be said we chose immorally, rather than irrationally? Reason does obligate, but merely some other reason is sufficient to negate moral conformity.

Hmmm....maybe the choice is immoral, but the judgement which then facilitates the act which follows from the choice, is irrational. Could you live with that?

See Chalmers, 2004, “Representational Character of Experience”, pt 6 (on Russell), and 7 (on Frege).

I see you removed the false proposition “all possible propositions are necessary”. Every proposition, that is, all subject/copula/predicate compositions, are possible; there is no such thing as an impossible proposition.

If there are multiple universes, then there exists other forms of me with different thoughts. — Justin Peterson

In this proposition, there is no concept in the subject that is sufficient to justify the concept in the predicate. There may be other universes qua universe, but each so different there is no other form of me at all. And for one who identifies with his thoughts, or deems it to be the case he is identified by his thoughts, than “another form of me with different thoughts” is self-contradictory, hence impossible.
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the theory of Schroedinger's Cat — Justin Peterson

.....began as a co-conspiratorial exercise in perfectly rational absurdity between The Genius Twins, Erwin and Albert. I can’t imagine what place it would have here.
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something cannot be moved without time — Justin Peterson

Time is causality? Really? Is that what’s being taught at universities these days? Nahhhh.....just because the human understanding of the concept of motion necessarily presupposes the conditions of space and time, doesn’t mean time or space is responsible for physical motion. The ball flies into center field because I hit the damn thing with a bat. Done deal.

Motion in time, not because of it. Much more parsimonious to suppose physical things are moved by physical things (and yes, a gravitational field is a thing, according to Feynman anyway), than to suppose physical things are moved by immaterial notions. Begs the question....why wouldn’t Pythagoras’ formula move the needle on a voltmeter?

The rest.....too divinical, too psychological, too.....Hegelian.....for me. But, you’re more than welcome to it, so have fun with it.

Understood. Thanks.

So how does any of that relate to time and existence?

thought is such that it can be defined as conflict between two states. It is because of this that there is the conscious and unconscious mind. In the conscious mind there is conflict between multiple ideas or perceptions of a given subject. When the conscious mind has accepted one thing to be true, it is passed to the subconscious mind. — Justin Peterson

Ok....so....thought is the conflict between two states.......of mind? There are two conflicting states of mind, which can be used as the definition of thought?

In the conscious mind multiple ideas or perceptions conflict (with themselves?). When something is accepted as true, it is passed to the subconscious mind.

When a thing is accepted as true, there wouldn’t be that particular conflict in the conscious mind, and if that true thing is passed to the SUB-conscious mind, the other half of the definition of thought, the unconscious mind, is left out, which means the conflict with it shouldn’t have occurred, which means there shouldn’t have been that thought accepting a true thing, which raises the question, how did the true thing get accepted and then passed on? Can a thing be true without the thought of it, or the thought about it?

Could be, dunno. I never took a philosophy class, so........don’t mind me none.

So generalized, intuitions, concepts, and one’s conscience, would hence all be objects of awareness when thus contextualized – but these are all what I’ve termed “allologic”, for they are other relative to the subject which apprehends them. — javra

Technically everything is relative to the subject which apprehends, except whatever one chooses to represent his self, re: ego, “I”, consciousness......whatever floats boats. The only problem here would be, depending on the extent of metaphysical reductionism being called into play, it becomes inevitable that different renditions of a common representation will conflict with each other. That is to say, if “thirst” is an object of awareness and “basketball” is an object of awareness, some method must be instituted in order to tell them apart, which mandates that ideas such as thirst and sadness and such not be converted to phenomena on the one hand, and physical objects of sense not be converted into mere contingent ideas on the other.

That said, I’ll stick with these non-cognizable ideas as being called subjective conditions, rather than objects of awareness. Just because I am consciously aware of both basketballs and thirst, doesn’t mean I apprehend them the same way or use the same faculties for it.
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So, in being conscious of being glad I am not conscious of a representation of what I am but, instead, am conscious of what I momentarily am as subject of consciousness which apprehends representations. — javra

And there ya go......momentarily am as subject is the same as being in a subjective condition.

Well done!!!!

Yeah...that damn soapbox. Been luggin’ that thing around for better than half a century. It’s harmless, though, don’t worry.

One is certainly permitted to think whatever he likes, so if you think the C.I. is an improved golden rule, far be it from me to argue the thought.

Arguing the ground for it, is another matter, insofar as “Do unto others....”, even if considered a command of reason hence a subjective principle, can hardly be willed into law, much less a universal law governing moral agents in general, because that command is amended by another, separate subjective agenda which may be in conflict with it, re: “...as others would do...”. In other words, a legislative principle a priori, conditioned by something empirical, cannot be legislative at all. As much is said in the quote I gave above, from “Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals”.

As to “forming laws by legislative bodies”, they are indeed helpful and benevolent to the citizenry to which they are given, and their universality is not altogether impossible, but they also incorporate their own consequences. Neither the C.I. nor the golden rule incorporate their own consequences, which seems to indicate an irreconcilable antinomy between empirical judicial law punishable by others in the form of e.g., incarceration, and rational moral law punishable one’s self in the form of disrespect.

Interesting thinking, though.

Carry on.

Kant's work, 2nd Critique, Critique of Practical Reason, for Kantian Ethics added sanity to the Golden Rule. Note Critique of Practical Reason, Wikipedia — DrOlsnesLea

Given this from 1785......

“...Let it not be thought that the common "quod tibi non vis fieri" could serve here as the rule or principle. For it is only a deduction, though with several limitations; it cannot be a universal law, for it does not contain the principle of duties to oneself, nor of the duties of benevolence to others (for many a one would gladly consent that others should not benefit him, provided only that he might be excused from showing benevolence to them), nor finally that of duties of strict obligation to one another, for on this principle the criminal might argue against the judge who punishes him, and so on...”

...perhaps you could show me where the Critique “added sanity to the Golden Rule”, other than to refute its authority, insofar as a command imperative can never be a mere rule.

I like it's radicalness, and what that radicalness may imply. If forces upon me a kind of creativity — Statilius

Which is fine, thinking folks been so inclined for millennia. Still, beware the greatest danger to radical-ness, self-contradiction.

while there is no given term or phrase in the English lexicon for this mode of awareness that I know of (...) In my own work I’ve termed this form of awareness “autological”. — javra

Kudos on originality. Under the assumption, of course, that you were not aware of the “transcendental unity of apperception”, which for all intents and purposes, fairly well describes the content of your thesis, but originated in 1787. Sorry ‘bout that. (grin)

Or....you are aware of said apperception, and found it wanting.
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a state of affairs in which the subject of conscious awareness is simultaneously the object of which it is aware. — javra

one here doesn’t feel oneself to be X (.....) but, instead, one here is X: “I am thirsty”, “I am sad”, etc. — javra

These two are arguable. As to the first, because “thirsty”, “sad”, etc, are not objects, so “simultaneously the object” becomes an empty, hence impossible, judgement, and as to the second, to suggest the conjunction of the two, carries the implication that “....I must have as many-coloured and various a self as are the representations of which I am conscious....” (CPR B135), which is exactly the opposite of what the unity of consciousness is supposed to represent.

(On soapbox)
Still....congrats on the depth of your investigations. The dearth of good philosophy is understandable these days, given the mere crumbs left by the masters.
(Off soapbox)

I’ll defer, designate myself as second chair.

Understood.

Thanks.

Wouldn’t it have to exhaust something, in order to circumvent such infinite regress illusions as the dreaded homunculus argument?

But that’s alright....I don’t want to sidetrack the progress of the standing dialogue.

The Subject as Subject cannot be described in Objective terms because that which would be described is going to be an abstraction (such as an Object of thought or reflection) in the Subject's consciousness. — PessimisticIdealism

Agreed. It is impossible to intuit the self, for intuition is always an undetermined phenomenon, and all phenomena, hence all empirical intuitions, are predicated on sensibility. Therefore, to intuit the self is to have it met with perception, which is impossible. But it is nonetheless not contradictory, to think and thereby conceive a representation of the unity of consciousness in one transcendental object, and name such representation as “I”. While all that does is nip infinite regress in the metaphysical bud, whole philosophical paradigms have faithfully clung to it. For better or worse.

Again, I appreciate the enlarged context. If you, and/or she, had said some thinking is a function of morality, I wouldn’t have taken so great an exception.

“all thinking is a function of morality, it's done by humans, it's touched by values right into it's centre, empirical science is no exception” — Statilius

Good. Now I have proper context. It’s clear you and the author, and I, have very different conceptions of morality. Nothing wrong with that, of course, but I personally reject the supposition that thinking predicated on the appearance of an objective reality, re: empirical science, carries the same implications as thinking predicated on pure a priori conceptions, re: morality, having nothing whatsoever to do with objective reality. It is a fatal flaw in reason, to conflate the rational ground of moral thinking with the empirical exercise of it.

I can dig the gist of Polanyi‘s thesis, given your brief synopsis of sorts, but I really don’t see why a book needs to be written about personal knowledge, seeing as how there’s no such thing as knowledge that isn’t personal.

No. Best we can say is thought is in time, but time itself, if it merely signifies a relation, can have no content of its own. Divisions of time, is still just time.

HA!! Excellent.

Thankyouthankyouthankyou....donations gratefully accepted, and will be forwarded to your favorite charity. Honest. Trust me.

If every thought is singular and successive, then every thought is new with respect to its time, but not necessarily new with respect to its content.

Round 1.....

all thinking is a function of morality — Statilius

thinking itself can be pure, without values, like genuine science, like maths — Statilius

If one accepts that one’s thinking with respect to morality is the ground of a subjective code of public conduct, it must depend on personal values, in order for the subject to determine in which form his conduct manifests.

If one accepts thinking itself CAN BE without values, as in the genuine sciences, which manifest no personal code of conduct necessarily, then it follows that NOT all thinking is a function of values, hence NOT a function of morality.
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Round 2....

there is no such thing as a pure 'is' — Statilius

If that is the case, how much truth can there be in the assertion, “all thinking is a function of morality”? Even dyeing this “is” in an “ought”, giving “all thinking ought to be a function of morality” doesn’t diminish the falsification derived in Round 1.

Anyway....thanks for your effort with the dialogues. Nevertheless, would I be correct in supposing you insinuated the personal interpretation “all thinking is a function of morality” in place of the author’s “serious thinking depends on the justice and truthfulness of the thinker”? Perhaps justice and truthfulness suffice for your idea of morality? Among other things, to be sure.

Taking a sharp right turn here, it might be interesting to know how you connect judgements to the notion that the is/ought divide doesn’t exist. I guess....what is meant by the is/ought divide, such that judgements have something to do with the divide rather than the is or the ought.