…..you may no longer believe exactly what you say here, or perhaps have modified your stance. — Manuel

I wondered about that, too. Now that you’ve brought it up, it’s likely we’ll be told one way or the other.

Hey back, and, thanks for the invite.

I was in general agreement with your list, maybe differentiating in terminology or a couple particulars here and there.

1. All thought/belief consists of mental correlation(s) drawn between 'objects' of physiological sensory perception and/or the agent itself(it's own state of 'mind' when applicable). — creativesoul

I took it upon myself to read this as: all thought/belief consists of correlations. These are correlations drawn either between physiological sensory perception and the agent (termed a posteriori), or, correlations drawn from the agent itself (termed a priori).

Can I get away with that? Or do my changes make a difference in what you meant to say?
—————

Also with respect to your list, what do you think about a greater separation of thought from belief?

We just need to escape the empiricist trap, which is a metaphysical belief that sound principles of "experience" can only be provided by sense observation. — Metaphysician Undercover

While I might agree with the notion of escaping the empiricist trap, I’d still ask whether a pure empiricist could have a metaphysical belief. At least from Hume, even the suggestion of metaphysical constructs of any kind are considered either absurd, impossible, or merely reckless.

This is good and I agree, in principle. Might I suggest one small change, re:

….metaphysical principle which allow for the reality (validity) of the non-physical. — Metaphysician Undercover

Insofar as the perspective is from logic alone rather than typically scientific experimentation, just seems fewer eyebrows would raise just before requiring you to prove the reality of, e.g., the abstract objects or ideas that ground principles a priori.

Just sayin’…..

I am personally a "radical emergence" guy, minds arise from configurations of natural stuff, but we have no idea how. — Manuel

I’d join that club, if there was such a thing.

I think that the exact relation between thinking and judgement is a very difficult issue. And, depending on how one would define each, both being somewhat ambiguous in general use, would dictate the relationship established. — Metaphysician Undercover

Oh absolutely. Definitions, relationships and whatnot are generally predicated on a specific theory, and that theory establishes an understanding for how all that stuff works together as a system. Still worthwhile to bear in mind the talking about the system is to reify its components, the cardinal sin of proper metaphysicals itself on the one hand, but necessary for metaphysical discourse on the other. So we’re screwed from the get-go, with regard to obtaining sufficient agreement on much of anything.
————-

In relation to arguments for "Physicalism", I would say that this is strong evidence against physicalism. — Metaphysician Undercover

Pretty much, yeah, under the assumption physicalism is the be-all, end-all of whatever one can think of. Which seems self-contradictory from the start, insofar as thinking quite literally is a non-physical activity. So….screwed again.

All good. Thanks.

Except, my mind isn’t included in stuff of the world. Or, at least, I make every effort to prevent the world from getting its grubby paws on it. I mean, really…..who or what would have the power to decide such a thing anyway?

…..one judgement is compatible with the opposing judgement. — Metaphysician Undercover

Assuming I’ve understood what you mean, and from the perspective of critical thought, I’m not sure how much sense it makes to grant compatibility to opposing judgements. I think the approaching object is John, judgement A, has nothing to do with judgement B, ……but my eyes ain’t so good no more. A relates a perception to a representation through experience, re: John, but B relates to a representation to its relative quality, so while both relate to the same representation, they don’t relate to each other. Dunno how compatibility has anything to do with it.

So, consider this example. The object is approaching at a distance, and my eyes are not very good (incidental evidence), so I'm hesitant to make the judgement call. — Metaphysician Undercover

This incidental evidence relates to your eyes, not to the approaching object. The former is a judgement with respect to the quality of a given representation, the latter is a judgement with respect to the validity of it. The former is contingent in accordance with physiology, the latter necessary in accordance with rules.

So what judgement call are you actually hesitant in making? That the approaching object is John? Haven’t you tacitly made that call already, by not thinking it is any particular object at all, insofar as your proposition makes no mention of what you think the approaching object may or may not be? In effect, you’ve thought it unjustifiable to name the approaching object, which your proposition in fact represents. Another way to say you’re hesitant in making a judgement call, is to say you just don’t know. Which is fine, of course.
————-

Notice what I've done. — Metaphysician Undercover

I understand and can accept most of that, with the exception of suspending judgement. From the perspective of critical thought, to think is to judge, from which follows suspension of judgement is impossible.

Anyway….not much more I can add here.

What about the factor I mentioned though (…), recognition that my judgement may be mistaken? — Metaphysician Undercover

That’s experience talking. You’ve been wrong before, so, given only so much evidence, you might very well be wrong again. Here, though, you haven’t the evidence to falsify the initial judgement you’ve made, re: “I think it is John”.

So as much as I believe that the approaching thing is John, I am uncertain because I know that my eyes are not good, and this uncertainty would be circumstantial evidence supporting the approaching object as being not-John. — Metaphysician Undercover

Sure, no doubt. With the evidence limited to perception of an approaching object alone, you’re not yet at the point of certainty regarding what the object actually is. If you were, you’d not be limited to “I think it is John”.

I’m not comfortable with the notion that evidence supporting an affirmative judgement is at the same time circumstantial evidence supporting its negation. You just confuse yourself if you say this evidence allows me to think it’s John, but it also allows me to think it isn’t. Rather arbitrary methodology, I should think, whereas, given some initial evidence, you would be perfectly justified in thinking it is John and at the same time not knowing it is.

As for your eyes…..the weather, the crowd, you’re being intentionally tricked, a whole menagerie of incidental evidence….. each is the content of an individual judgement, the compendium of which determines the experience you’re going to have, affirming your thought, in which case you know the approaching object is John, or negating it, in which case you know the approaching object isn’t John.

In the interest of critical though, then, just as it is impossible to determine an object by a single conception, it is also impossible to obtain an empirical certainty with evidence only sufficient for determining a single judgement. Hidden in that little tidbit, is the formal distinction between belief and knowledge.

the external is that by which sensations are possible.
— Mww

What happens when we receive stimulus with no external object, such as dreams? — Manuel

I don’t think it is the case dreams are the reception of stimuli, for one thing, and for another, reception of stimuli just is sensation anyway, which is only possible by the causality of external things.

But you probably mean the brain receiving stimuli from itself, which requires no immediate sensation. But then, does any dream contain that which was not at some former time a sensation, or at least a possible sensation? If so, then external objects are at least the mediate content of dreams, even if not their cause.
—————

Serious monism requires a lot of imagination, in my mind. — Manuel

What does serious monism look like? By what description might I understand what it is?

So, we are still left with the issue, what is external? — Manuel

I agree it hasn’t to do with properties of things, but it does seem quite easy just to say…the external is that by which sensations are possible.

Wanna get stickier….the external is the permanent in time, simply because the internal never is.

Helps to be a unrepentant dualist, though, right? If one isn’t, he would have a harder job with the issue, methinks.

Some study of critical thinking may be useful. — Metaphysician Undercover

First thing that presented itself to me was, the compound judgement in the form, “I see something coming”, subsequently complemented by “…. I think that it is John”.

The first is a general empirical judgement grounded in a perception alone; the second is a discursive judgement grounded in antecedent experience, insofar as the thought of a particular object approaching wouldn’t be represented as “John” without it. Pretty clear, really “I see (something)….”, followed by “……I think (John)”.

With respect to evidence, it follows that the evidence for the primary judgement, being a mere perception, cannot be contrary to the approach of something, insofar as the evidence just is the approach, in the form of motion over time.

As for the evidence of the complementary judgement, consequential to perception, insofar as the thought of the approaching object already has a representation belonging to it, such evidence is experience, which, given only these conditions, cannot be contradictory, for otherwise the thought that the approaching object is “John”, would not arise at all. To call it “John” presupposes all that is necessary for “John” to be that thought.

The only logical permission for the evidence to not support the approaching object as being “John”, is upon the instantiation of additional evidence in the form of different empirical qualities derived from subsequent perceptions, but not of the same evidence by which the representation was determined. It is by the analysis of these different qualities, and those of sufficient disparity from the antecedents, that the thought of the approaching object cannot in fact be “John”, which is, of course, a significantly distinct and entirely separate judgement in itself.

Rhetorically speaking. For what it’s worth.

a World 1, which Kant would call a thing in itself, does not exist for us. — Wolfgang

In fact, it does, and necessarily. From which follows, conclusions drawn on false premises, is invalid.

IBM in atoms, 1989;

“There’s Plenty of Room at the Bottom”, Feynman, 1959.

Descartes — Arne

There is something to be said affirming that choice. I personally didn’t consider him, for his adhesion to religion, however much the times forced him into it. I mean, you can’t really shift many paradigms if you’re still beholden to organized gods for whatever grace…or indeed, disgrace…..you receive for your work.

So you don't see Derrida or Deluze, say, as philosophers. — Tom Storm

Sure I do. But they haven’t seriously shifted any paradigms. Or, they haven’t shifted any serious paradigms. While they may have advanced this or that line of thought, they haven’t altered thought itself.
—————-

….overthrown scientific paradigms from earlier eras fade from memory…. — Joshs

That criteria is low-level, I should think. There are certainly advances in science, but very few cancel their predecessors outright.

Ehhhh….sorry, man, but I have such little interest in the soft sciences. That said, I can’t claim enough knowledge to answer your question. With respect to Kant, though, I’m confident social sciences would relate to him only as far as he treats of anthropology (from a pragmatic point of view), 1796. Not having studied that work, I can’t say post-structuralism is a footnote to it.

I don’t get it. Paradigm shifts in science are not ignored, couldn’t be by definition actually, so what’s wrong with the logic of my submission, exactly?

What are such paradigm shifts in Philosophy? — SpinozaNietzsche

Maybe nothing more than who is still the more referenced, after the longer time.

I submit, under that criteria, there are but two: Aristotle with pure logic, Kant with pure reason. All others construct philosophies ultimately grounded in, or at least conditioned by, presuppositions of them.

….the things that must be us, are the hardest things to see…. — Fire Ologist

We as conscious thinking subjects, do not seem to operate in terms of the very natural law by which we understand the operation of all natural real things. The brain operates according to natural law, but none of the terms of it are present in our direct, first-person, unmediated thinking. We can never understand how the self-conscious thinking subject arises, by the same means by which we understand all other natural events, so perhaps a better question is….why does it seem like there is such a thing at all?

The account for the seemingly self-conscious thinking subject is the jurisdiction of metaphysics, at least this far into human evolution, even if for no other reason that science proper is not yet sufficiently equipped for it, which is the same as saying the scientist presently has no sufficient method for how to proceed.

All that being said, I reject that the things that must be us are the hardest to see. I rather hold the view, that for which the negation, for all practical intents and purposes, is impossible, one had best figure out how to see it, in order to get the best and most out of it. Hence the assemblage of the plethora of abstract ways, means and ends into manufactured speculative explanatory devices, none of which are real in the strictest sense but the denial of which is absurd. Still, it helps, to be “… sufficiently cautious in the construction of our fictions, which are not the less fictions on that account.…”

…..isn’t simply the generic givenness that things are intelligible….. — Joshs

Yes, I get that now, after paying attention to the video. The elapsed time reference in it, from helped with the transcendental part I took exception to.

Thanks.

I’ll have to think about that.

…..this is a transcendental claim, in Kant's sense of transcendental. It's about the conditions of possibility of the intelligibility of things, such as the past, or time, given that they are, indeed, intelligible. — Evan Thompson

Hmmmm…..

If it is given that a thing is intelligible, in what sense are there conditions for the possibility of its being intelligible? For that which is given, re: those things that are intelligible, the very possibility of it is also given, so wouldn’t the conditions be met?

?

That, I must say, was the most fabulously entertaining dissertation.

Having a long-standing inclination for analyzing perceived dialectical subtleties, I’ll be interested in Bob’s response.

The Good is not normative. — Bob Ross

Agreed. That which may or may not be good, as in instances of, is. The metaphysical argument being, one cannot know (appreciate, consider, allow….whatever) a thing as good, without the quality itself being resident in consciousness somewhere, somehow, over and above mere experience. Same with beauty, justice, and so on.

It’s when we try to get people to justify The Good where things get confused and diverse. — Bob Ross

Agreed. THE Good, good in and of itself, is an ideal, thus non-contingent given. Not susceptible to instances. It’s an aesthetic judgement of feeling, rather than a discursive judgement of thought.
————-

On the other hand, your triangle example doesn’t work the same as the ideal of The Good, in that it is impossible to think a triangle in general, for each though of one is immediately a particular instance of the conception. The Good, however, as an ideal, can never be constructed in accordance with a conception, hence remains a different kind of judgement.

En passant……

To posit the existence of an object of thought is to affirm that which is thought about is conditioned by the categories of quality (whatever it is, it is real) and modality (whatever it is, it has phenomenal representation, thus can be an existence).

To adjoin to an object of thought that there can be no possible matching object in the empirical world, is to deny to that object the condition of the categories (whatever it is, it does not have phenomenal representation thus cannot be determinable as an existence, hence cannot be determinable as real).

In order to alleviate the absurdity of methodological contradiction, it must be the case, then, that the object of thought as such, is not a real physical object, hence the categories are not necessary conditions, and, consequently the object of thought belongs to understanding alone, insofar as the understanding is given as the faculty of thought, and therefore the existence of that object is not necessary and the contradiction disappears.

By thesis-specific definition, thought is cognition by means of the synthesis of conceptions, which reduces the faculty of understanding to the faculty by which conceptions arise. In turn, conceptions are representations of that which understanding thinks, as are phenomena representations of that which the faculty of sensibility intuits.

Because thought is cognition by means of the synthesis of conceptions, it follows necessarily there must be a plurality of conceptions in order for there to be a synthesis of them. On the other hand, for that object understanding thinks, it does not follow necessarily that object contains a plurality of conceptions, and if it does not, no synthesis of conceptions and thereby no cognition with respect to that object, is possible. By the containing of a plurality of conceptions is meant the schema of the lesser conceptions under the general, by which synthesis itself is even possible.

Under the condition that no faculty has contained in its method that which serves no purpose for its systemic employment, it must be that no singular, uncognizable conception belongs to understanding alone, but rather, belongs to a higher order faculty, and is called an idea, and is properly a transcendental conception of pure reason. The categories are of course, exempt from this criteria, insofar as, while they are themselves singular conceptions albeit not of objects understanding thinks, they have schema, the lesser conceptions, subsumed under them, they serve a systemic purpose within the faculty to which they belong, hence are not mere ideas.

To plumb the subtleties of transcendental philosophy is to grant to reason its proclivity for stepping out on its own, re: the whole raison d’etre of CPR, juxtapositioned to lesser faculties that always operate in conjunction with each other, or with Nature, regarding existences and knowledge.

“…. Now, although we must say of the transcendental conceptions of reason, “they are only ideas,” we must not, on this account, look upon them as superfluous and nugatory. For, although no object can be determined by them, they can be of great utility, unobserved and at the basis of the edifice of the understanding, as the canon for its extended and self-consistent exercise—a canon which, indeed, does not enable it to cognize more in an object than it would cognize by the help of its own conceptions, but which guides it more securely in its cognition. Not to mention that they perhaps render possible a transition from our conceptions of nature and the non-ego to the practical conceptions, and thus produce for even ethical ideas keeping, so to speak, and connection with the speculative cognitions of reason….”

Now, it’s time for important stuff. Like…..football.

….reputable source…. — fdrake

Palmquist. Guyer. (?)

My point was from a German Kant commentator, and I agreed with his point. — Corvus

Then what is to be made of those dogmatic slumbers, and the awakening therefrom? The Dude Himself says he’s writing to justify synthetic a priori cognitions, and all that follows from them, by treating the established metaphysics of the day as a science.

That there is a place for transcendental objects….a synthetic a priori cognition if there ever was one…..is merely a happy consequence.

No longer pertinent.

No longer pertinent.

What I meant was your CPR reference had no relevance backing up your claims. — Corvus

Why do I have to repeat that I didn’t make a claim?

They are all transcendental objects. — Corvus

No, they are not. One is so-called, the others are merely transcendental ideas, the conception of an object adequate for representing them, is impossible.

Kant's main interest in writing CPR was building logical path and residence for the transcendental objects — Corvus

He did that, it was significant, but hardly his main interest.

The reference you provided didn't have the obvious, evident parts or information related to Thing-in-itself and God, Souls and Freedom, and the relation between them. — Corvus

Pretty much what I thought as well. There is no relation. The reference shows what god, freedom and immortality are, and from that, it is clear the thing-in-itself doesn’t relate to them. That’s the connection you missed. Which is sufficient refutation that the thing-in-itself was never used, as you claimed, “to posit the existence of God, Soul, Freedom and Immortality”.

The thing-in-itself is a logically conditioned conception; the three others are transcendental ideas of pure reason which signify the unconditioned. They arise in different faculties, they preside over different domains, in short, they have nothing to do with each other.

It is a serious breach of comprehension, that an empirical existence derived from understanding using general logic, can be the ground for an idea derived from pure reason using transcendental logic. Obviously, there is an existent object for any thing-in-itself; there is never, and never was meant to be, an existent object belonging to freedom, morality or gods.

Dunno what to tell ya, bud. If you can’t find the connection, or you think there isn’t one, that’s all on you. But I’m not doing your thinking for you.

I was asking which part of the reference backs up your claim, but you refused to provide the evidence. — Corvus

If you actually read the reference, you’d know. Which begs an obvious question…..why are you asking?

I was meaning, your claim " ….which just is not the case.
— Mww" — Corvus

My statement that your claim is not the case is proved in the reference. The only thing that has to do with me, is I know where to look for the refutation of your claim.

For your claim to be correct — Corvus

I’m not making a claim; I’m merely citing a source-specific refutation of yours.

Therefore I can only conclude that your claim was groundless and unfounded. — Corvus

Suit yourself. Hell, you might even be correct.

Nope, not gonna do that. You asked for a reference, you got it, do with it as you will.

But the point is that, Kant used Thing-in-itself to posit the existence of God, Soul, Freedom and Immortality.
— Corvus

….which just is not the case.
— Mww
Your reason for the claim is? — Corvus

See A333-338/B390-396, plus the footnote in B.

It just sounds meaningless to say Thing-in-itself is a concept, but it is totally unknowable, and even unthinkable. — Corvus

Meaningless is one way to put it. Concepts are representations of the understanding, arising spontaneously from pure thought. To say, then, the thing-in-itself, a valid concept, is unthinkable, is contradictory.

Claiming it is both unknowable and unthinkable comes from possible misunderstanding of CPR. — Corvus

Agreed, as long as we’re still talking about the thing-in-itself as a concept. And more specifically, perhaps, misunderstanding the cognitive procedure proposed in transcendental philosophy.

It is not both unknowable and unthinkable object. — Corvus

But this exchanges the concept for an object. Now it is the case the thing-in-itself can neither be thought as an real object, for to do so presupposes the possibility of its phenomenal representation, nor knowable as a real object, for to do so presupposes a judgement on the relations by which it becomes a particular cognition. But it still can be thought as having a real existence.

Concepts arise in understanding. Understanding is the faculty of logic. The conception of the thing-in-itself fills a logical gap, re: justification for that which appears to sensibility. That’s all it was ever meant to do.
————-

Thing-in-itselft must be the existences for us to think about, but not knowable. The concepts such as God, Souls, Freedom and Immortality fit in there, — Corvus

Agreed. But this is very far from your claim here….

But the point is that, Kant used Thing-in-itself to posit the existence of God, Soul, Freedom and Immortality. — Corvus

….which just is not the case.
————

Even if we see the books in front for us, but we don't know what they are??? That just sounds like a needless scepticism. — Corvus

Agreed, but with the caveat the object in front of us, is already known in a particular way, which is true because it carries the conception represented by the word “book”. One must agree, that until he learns an object, he cannot represent it with a name. If that is the case, everything ever learned, by any human person ever, at one time, had no name.

A better question, and one of the tenets of CPR is….how did a mere undetermined thing out there, be its mere appearance to our senses, get its name?