Relevant indeed.

Existence questions are hard, and Kant among others, doesn’t bother with them.

There’s a world, it’s really a world…..so what? World being, of course, an abstract entity. Sorta like Rawls (?)….where’s the university.
(Crap. I can't remember the author or the name of the paradox. Maybe identity. Guy sees all the accoutrements which constitute a university, but wants to know where the university he came to visit is located.)

…..thing-in-itself-as-it-is-in-itself….. — tim wood

I’ve seen that myself, but don’t remember, and couldn’t find, where I saw it. I thought Guyer/Wood’s marvelous intro, but, no luck. Anyway….good point.

What can be doubted is the accuracy of the correspondence of the perception to the dass itself — tim wood

Absolutely. And we depend on Mother to make us aware our inaccuracies, hopefully not at too great an expense.

…..as ordinary folk, not so much. — tim wood

Funny, innit. An ordinary folk looks out, is perfectly convinced he sees a tree, but you the metaphysician tell him, nahhhh, you don’t. You see a thing, and that thing is only called a tree because somebody, somewhere, some long time ago, said so, and you’re just regurtitatin’ what’s been taught to you.

But then, there’s markedly more ordinary folk than there are metaphysicians, so…..there ya go. “I see a tree” rules the day.

I am thinking that we use reason to determine that there must be a thing-in-itself which is the ground for our experience of some thing…. — Bob Ross

Good enough superficially….

…..and that this is a claim in concreto about the thing as opposed to in abstracta. — Bob Ross

…..and superficially because reason cannot do in concreto claims, but is transcendental, which is itself either theoretical or speculative. Even practical reason has a pure aspect, and while not always transcendental, re: with respect to moral judgements, is still entirely in abstracta.

So it is that reason does inform the system that for a thing that appears a thing-in-itself is a necessary condition, but makes no concrete claims with respect to that condition.
————

Kant was addressing philosophers (…) with respect to their long standing disputes about knowledge. — Bob Ross

Yes, addressing, but not in relation to one opposed to the other, but one combined with the other, re: human empirical knowledge requires both a rational and an empirical aspect, and, conversely, no empirical knowledge is at all possible without some determinable aspect of both. But, and more importantly, a priori knowledge is both possible and valid without any empirical content whatsoever, but relies nonetheless on empirical conditions for its justifications, re: pure mathematics.
————

“The limitation is proof for the impossibility of an intelligence of our kind ever cognizing the unconditioned.”
-Mww

So, the thing-in-itself to you is not real? The thing as it is unconditioned isn’t real? — Bob Ross

By definition the real is that which is contained in reality, and by definition reality is that of which the susceptibility to sensation is given. The thing-in-itself does not meet the criterion of susceptibility to sensation hence is not real. But it can still exist as a necessary condition for that which follows from it. Just as space and time are not real, but suffice as necessary conditions, in this case, as pure intuitions a priori, necessary for the construction of phenomena.

Also, as transcendental ideas given from reason, things-in-themselves are not real, in the same sense as things are real.

Also, the thing as it is unconditioned is a contradiction, in that sensibility is always conditioned by appearances. If the thing didn’t appear it couldn’t be a thing, hence the reality of a thing serves as the condition for its appearance. Space and time are the conditions for the experience of the thing, not for the appearance of the thing.

But to answer the question, no, things-in-themselves are not real to me. Or anybody else, iff he finds himself under the auspices of this particular speculative epistemological methodology. It does not follow from the condition that reason proposes a real existence, that there must in fact necessarily be one that corresponds to it.

Metaphysical reductionism, or, a dog chasing his tail. One must chose what to make of philosophy in general, right?

I agree with your comment therein; it was a very well done exposition.

……whether Kant intended a 'two world ' interpetation or a 'two aspect' interpretation. — Janus

“…..which has always two aspects, the one, the object considered as a thing in itself, without regard to the mode of intuiting it (…), the other, the form of our intuition of the object, which must be sought not in the object as a thing in itself, but in the subject to which it appears….”

A bone of contention that shouldn’t be. I mean….as long as one trusts the translator(s).
————-

……the mere logical counterpoint to phenomena. — Janus

Logic belongs to understanding, the faculty of thought/cognition, noumena are understood as logically counter to things-in-themselves….

“….. At the same time, when we designate certain objects as (…) sensuous existences*, thus distinguishing our mode of intuiting them from their own nature as things in themselves**, it is evident that by this very distinction we as it were place the latter, considered in this their own nature, although we do not so intuite them, in opposition to the former, or, on the other hand, we do so place other possible things, which are not objects of our senses***, but are cogitated by the understanding alone, and call them intelligible existences (noumena).…..”
* because we are affected by them;
**the above mentioned two-aspect dichotomy;
***a very different kind of two-aspect dichotomy.

…..we see “other possible things which are not objects of our senses” to be not sensuous existences, from which follows if not sensuous existence then intellectual existence, but existence nonetheless, in opposition to phenomena which are nothing but representations of existences given from the mode of being intuitions. As well, “but are cogitated” must implicate things, or objects, in order to maintain dialectical consistency with the beginning “when we designate certain objects”. That is to say, when we designate certain objects as sensed must relate to certain objects as cogitated. As found here:

“…. things which the understanding is obliged to cogitate apart from any relation to our mode of intuition, consequently not as mere phenomena, but as things in themselves….”

……things and objects of course, being equal and things-in-themselves always being apart from any relation to our mode of intuition, which is representative by means of internal imagination, yet always part of the causality of that which appears to those modes, which is sensuous by means of external reality.

So….understanding forced to cogitate things not as phenomena but as things-in-themselves…..but understanding cannot cogitate objects as things-in-themselves, insofar as things-in-themselves belong to reason alone. And here is the ground of ***, the very different kind of two-aspect dichotomy, which obviously isn’t going to work.

This whole exposition in CPR is to show understanding, with respect to human knowledge, has no business thinking objects on its own, which is to say cognitions with noumena as their objects are illegitimate, even if constructed with non-contradictory conceptions. And it is the illegitimacy of those cognitions by which noumena and things-in-themselves are confused with each other, insofar as both are futile attempts at representation, albeit under different conditions.

Now, and quickly because looking around I don’t see anybody still here….things-in-themselves belong to reason and noumena belong to understanding because reason is the only fully transcendental faculty, whereas….

“…. We have seen that everything which the understanding draws from itself, without borrowing from experience, it nevertheless possesses only for the behoof and use of experience….”

…..and nothing in experience, as such, is transcendental. It follows that things-in-themselves, because they can never be for the behoof and use of experience as such under any conditions whatsoever, while noumena would be if only our faculty of intuition was intellectual rather than sensuous, can only belong to that faculty which does not concern itself with experience as such, but only the construction of pure a priori principles by which the manifold of experiences are arbitrated with respect to each other and to reality itself.

IknowIknow…..shades of R.E.M.? I’ve said too much I haven’t said enough.

So as to not facilitate solipsism and radical skepticism, yes, I agree with that.

…..but still, they are known by us as appearing objects….. — Wayfarer

If the thing-in-itself is known to us as appearing objects, why is it said things-in-themselves are unknown to us?

If the thing-in-itself appears, it isn’t in-itself. It is isn’t in itself, and it is something that appears, then it must appear to us, which becomes phenomenon in us, which becomes an object of experience for us, and the entire transcendental aesthetic contradicts itself.

So either Hegel and Schopenhaur were right, or, the transcendental aesthetic does not contradict itself.

Six of one, half dozen of the other?

A sense of mystery indeed. The raison d’etre for the first Critique was to first, reign reason in from its proclivity for seeking the unconditioned, and second, prove the possibility and validity of synthetic a priori cognitions.

With respect to the first, granting possibility of knowing about the thing in itself promises knowledge of everything whether it be experience or not, which is immediately contradictory, insofar as we are constantly learning.
—————

Does this other cognitive mode happen to have a typically south-central Asian name?

Real thing as opposed to apparent thing is a common misconception, yes, which makes the comparison by means of them, moot.

But in light of this…..

“…. At the same time, it must be carefully borne in mind that, while we surrender the power of cognizing, we still reserve the power of thinking objects**, as things in themselves. For, otherwise, we should require to affirm the existence of an appearance, without something that appears, which would be absurd…”

……is found tacit acknowledgement that the thing that really exists that we do cognize, as first it appears, is the thing of the ding as sich, which also must really exist, but is not cognized because it isn’t that which appears.

This is what Bob was trying to get at by saying the thing-in-itself is the ground of the thing we perceive. The problem is, the thing we perceive is “…the undetermined object….” of intuition, which just says while it may be the case there is a ground for it, we have no means to determine anything about it, so …..like….who cares? If the perceived object is undetermined, what is there to say about its ground?
(Hegel and Schopenaur did, but that’s another can of transcendental worms altogether.)

** from which comes thing in itself “…considered by reason alone…”, which….(sigh)….was the A/B pagination clue I left for Bob.

Can you put in simple terms what you think it is? — Bob Ross

The thing in itself is the thing considered by reason alone. As the referenced quote says.

It represents an object in reality as it is in-itself—i.e., qua itself—i.e., independent of any experience of it — Bob Ross

Nothing independent of experience or possible experience can ever be represented. Or, which is the same thing, representation is always and only of things of possible experience. No human can ever experience an object considered by reason alone.

outlining the limits of reason; especially as it relates to rationalism vs. (british) empiricism. — Bob Ross

Yes, and no. Limits, but not as relates to rationalism vs empiricism.

Because something representational requires something which was not representational — Bob Ross

No. The limitation is proof for the impossibility of an intelligence of our kind ever cognizing the unconditioned.

Think as you wish, and I don’t understand “dead-ender”, so…….

There is nothing wrong with doing this….. — AmadeusD

YEA!!!!

…..but you would need to make this make sense outside of that for it to hold much water. — AmadeusD

Make sense outside of what….my interpretation? Or outside of one work? The work under discussion is CPR, so there is no other work that matters.

I never said nor implied my interpretations were the case, hence the liberal account from quotation; it’s almost a given they may not be, insofar as the quotes themselves may be misappropriations. If anyone wishes to refute what I say, he should have at it, but I’d ignore any attempted refutation that does not arise directly from Kantian philosophy.

are you saying that the thing as it is in-itself does NOT excite our senses such that we perceive something? — Bob Ross

I’m saying I think that’s what Kant wants understood. What do you think the thing-in-itself actually is, what concept is being represented by those words? As far as that goes, what do you think the Big Picture is for CPR? What does he mean by “critique”. And why, exactly, is it that the thing-in-itself ends up as one of the necessary limitations proved for this particular, albeit theoretical, method of human cognition and empirical knowledge?

The A/B pagination listed above is the place to start. If you’d researched it, you’d see what is meant by “that is” (without reference to our sensibility).

The thing as a whole excites such that we perceive, but it isn’t the whole thing we intuit from that perception. The thing as a whole is not the same a a thing in itself.
————-

And make no mistake: by his own admission, but in modern venencular, Prolegomena is “CPR For Dummies”, so if one wishes to critique the one, he must set aside the other.
————

I am pretty sure it also says it outright in the CRP…. — Bob Ross

If it does, and all else unsusceptible to equivocation, I’d be forced to re-think.

…it is far further from me to think I’m qualified to affirm the necessary conditions…..
— Mww

Oh, I think it's a bit over-cautious to say that we know nothing about animals. — Ludwig V

True enough; I trust nothing I said implies otherwise. If it appears I did, I shall reconcile whatever it was with granting without reservation that to claim we know nothing about animals, is catastrophically false.
————

However, I take the point that the sentimental explanation is not always the right one. — Ludwig V

While I agree wholeheartedly, if it is the case we looking for truths relative to other un-like animal’s rational machinations, we must first presuppose there is such a thing, and we find that the only way to grant such a presupposition, is relative to our own, for which no presupposition is even the least required. Further than that we cannot go, and remain strictly objective in our investigations.

I do agree that the thought is almost impossible to formulate clearly without a lot of dancing around explaining. — Ludwig V

Odd, innit. The thing everybody does, in precisely the same way….because we’re all human….is the very thing on which not everyone agrees as to what that way is. I for one, readily admit I haven’t a freakin’ clue regarding the necessary conditions controlling the disgust I hold concerning, e.g., Lima beans, or controlling the supposed exhilaration for an experience I never had.

With that in mind, it is far further from me to think I’m qualified to affirm the necessary conditions controlling the inner machinations of any animal that isn’t just like me, insofar as I have nothing whatsoever with which to judge those conditions except my own, which I’ve already been forced to admit I don’t know, hence can only guess. Or, as some of us are wont to say, in order to make ourselves feel better about not knowing…..speculate.

(Guy puts a camera in his living room, records his faithful companion looking out the window…
….Guy thinks….awww, how sweet; he’s anticipating my car coming into the driveway….
….Guy next door has a similar camera….
….1st guy shows his dog to the second guy, remarks: look at Fido sitting at attention, anticipating….
….2nd guy shows 1st guy a squirrel sitting on the lawn, by the tree, next to the 1st guy’s driveway…
….says, yeah, he’s anticipatin’ alright. Anticipatin’ the hunt, and lunch at the end of it.)

it makes no sense to say that the thing-in-itself is not the object which impacted our senses….. — Bob Ross

Notice in the text it’s “objects which affect our senses”, not thing-in-themselves. Which is to say things-in-themselves are not that which affects our senses.

Then I’d love to know, for you to inform me, what sensation I would receive from a thing-in-itself. If I receive a sensation in conjunction with the sensory device being impacted, then I should be able to smell, hear, taste, etc., a thing-in-itself. How, then, do I distinguish it from a thing?

Section 32 is intended to make clear the thing-in-itself just means not thing-in-us. The thing of the thing-in-itself is that which appears to sensibility, the thing-as-it-is-in-itself(without-influence-on-a-sensory-mechanism) is that which does not. That’s what he means by one being the ground of the other. That things-in-themselves are the ground of things is utterly irrelevant, when it is only things that appear, and of which are the matter of phenomena.

The thing is provided by Nature, appears to us and becomes empirical knowledge; the -in-itself is provided by reason, “….that is, without reference to the constitution of our sensibility….”, representing only non-appearance, and is merely a logical inference.

Obviously, without reference to our sensibility means sensibility has no part to play, hence is not affected, which means it is not an appearance, insofar as it is appearances only that do affect our sensibility. See A28/B44.

Your versions are fine, although I might insist every experience affects the condition of the subject.

“One’s self can never be an object of experience” works just fine, though, right?
— Mww

I think it does. But it is misleading to say that there's no such thing. It's just that one's self is not an object. — Ludwig V

Agreed. Hence the new terminology in new philosophies, to stand for a thing that is not an object. Or even an object that is not a thing. Or maybe just a new definition for old terminology. Either way, abolishing the concept itself isn’t likely in the near future, anyway, so…..the beat goes on.

From my reading of CPR, the thing-in-itself is what impacts the senses. — Bob Ross

I’ve posted quotes from CPR proving this is not the case. I would like to see where in your reading of CPR, that it is.

But isn't experience supposed to be the foundation of knowledge? — Ludwig V

While the case may be made that empirical knowledge is impossible without the experience of what the knowledge is of, but it is also quite often the case there can be experiences for which no knowledge is given. If it is sometimes the case and sometimes not the case, there’s a need for a different case.

Insofar as the negation of which is a contradiction, it is always the case that…..
Knowledge is an end in itself, pursuant to the operation of a system, that end being a change in the condition of the intelligence under which the system operates;
Experience is an end in itself, pursuant to the operation of a system, that end being a change in the condition of the subject to which the system belongs, all else being what it may.

As well, since Plato earlier and Russell later, knowledge of is very different than knowledge that, such distinction being entirely absent from experience.
—————

…..oneself can never be an experience.
— Mww
I think you mean that there can never be an experience that is an experience of oneself? Or one's self can never be an object of experience (since oneself is posited as the subject of expereience.)? — Ludwig V

I suppose. That isn’t necessarily contradictory or invalid, given the object immediately appended, re: of oneself. That only matters because without such appended object, the proposition is contradictory, re: never be an experience that is an experience. Which you must immediately recognize, given your historical commentary precedents, as a (gaspsputterchoke) language game.

“One’s self can never be an object of experience” works just fine, though, right?

If I understand what you are saying I think I agree. — Janus

Close enough.

the experiencer cannot be itself the object of experience, with the analogy of the eye that cannot see itself being invoked. However the eye is a real object which can be seen, so I think it is a rather weak analogy. — Janus

Out of respect for our history, I won’t be so brash as to throw the ol’, much-dreaded “categorical error” at you, but rather, merely bringing it up might provoke you into looking for it. Or, in all fairness, showing there isn’t one.
————

Either using tools is something that can be done by a mindless creature(a creature completely absent of thought and belief), or not only humans are rational creatures. Your position forces you to explain the former….. — creativesoul

To would seem impossible to explain how mindless creatures use tools. But to be mindful does not make explicit thought and belief, or thinking about thought/belief.

The use of tools indicates mindfulness, but not what form or kind it may or may not be, which affirms the possibility of mere instinct for such use. Even “use of tools” itself risks conceptual misappropriation, in that making that connection by a qualified observer does not justify that same connection being made by the observed.
(Man: did you just use a tool to get at those ants?
Chimp: dunno about that; finger/hole/ant, then finger/hole no ant, putting a stick in my hand is just growing a longer finger, finger/hole/ant)

It is irrational to say only humans are rational creatures. For those interested in such investigations, he has no choice but to judge other un-like creatures’ rationality, with the very one impossible for them to possess, which immediately prejudices his investigation.

Nagel’s glorified bat.

…..also related in minds. One of elemental constituency and perhaps also existential dependency. — creativesoul

……and I’m good with calling those correlations.

The concept of an apple is knowledge of what an apple is—that’s part of the whole idea of having a concept of an apple. — Bob Ross

The whole idea of having, the only reason to have, a concept, is to represent that thing perceived, by a name. The name apple merely indicates how the thing perceived is to be known, which is called experience.

……wouldn’t you agree the brain is the representational knowledge of those faculties? — Bob Ross

I may be misunderstanding, but assuming I do, no, I would not agree. Faculties are function-specific members of a system described in a metaphysical theory. There’s no possible method by which those faculties can be found in a brain, they being merely logical constructs, and by the same token, there’s nothing empirically provable, hence nothing falsifiable, in a metaphysical theory. All that can be said, insofar as empirical verifications for non-empirical theories are out of the question, is the brain has nothing to do with abstract conceptions authorized by such theory.

So…what good is it, is the usual modern ask. It’s all we got to work with being the best answer.
—————-

…..you have to concede that you have to trust your conscious experience to derive that that experience is representational—no?….. — Bob Ross

All I have to trust is that my knowledge obtained at one time, does not contradict Nature in another time.

That my experiences are representational, or, that all my experiences are of only representations, is proved at sensibility, systemically long before the experience itself, therefore I have no need to trust them to prove their constituency.

…….Otherwise, you are just blindly presupposing that objects affect our senses—there’s nothing, without the aid of experience, that can be used transcendentally to determine that. — Bob Ross

Why do I have to presuppose that objects effect my senses, when my sensations apodeitically prove my senses have been affected? If I can see a mosquito bite me, if I can smell the bacon I hear frying, why do I have to presuppose either one of those objects?

And on the other hand, why subject myself to the absurdity of supposing what just bit me, or that stuff I’m about to consume, wasn’t an object at all?

There’s nothing that can be used transcendentally to determine…..what, that it is only objects that effect the senses? Why do we need a transcendental source to determine empirical circumstance? We may like a transcendental source for determining how empirical circumstances are possible, but the fact of sensation already proves it, so why bother?

I’m a little in the dark here, not sure how you arrive at the questions you ask.

The question is which experience is veridical. — Ludwig V

….which is irrelevant if the experience in question is impossible. There no reason to care about semantic truths, indeed there couldn’t even be any such judgements, without having first established the objects contained in the utterances. I understand this must have been done, or at least attempts at it, somehow or another, otherwise Husserl’s philosophy lacks justification.

One has to bear in mind that our experience is laden with skills and expectations. — Ludwig V

And one can also bear in mind experience is an end in itself, laden with nothing, but is itself a laden on the condition of the subject to whom it belongs. Skills and expectations laden the system, but not that which the system finalizes as its product.

I can only recognize myself when I can recognise the other. — Ludwig V

I can see that, but that says more about relation between character or personality, and manifestation. I’m more interested in its development then its activities, which may even contradict that character.
—————

A proudly human linguistic reification of an idea. — Janus

Oh absolutely. Very well spoken. We post hoc name what we do, but the cum hoc doing, in and of itself, is nameless.

One experiences phenomena by perceiving them. How does on experience oneself? — Janus

If the first is true, experience of oneself makes oneself as phenomenon, necessary. Under the auspices of some theoretical metaphysics, phenomena are the product of the synthesis of the matter of a thing given a posteriori by the perception of it, and some form which resides a priori in that faculty doing the synthesizing. While it is not contradictory for oneself to contain a priori form, it is utterly contradictory for oneself to contain matter. Because it cannot, one cannot perceive oneself, the synthesis initiated by perception immediately becomes impossible, hence oneself can never be phenomenon, from which follows necessarily, oneself can never be an experience.

What’s needed to justify oneself as an experience, is to predicate experience itself on something other than what some another theory demands. But different predication, while being necessary in order to change things around enough to grant the possibility of that which was originally denied, the logic grounding such predication must also be stronger than the original under suspicion.

Phenomenology, in the view from this armchair, while sufficing as a sufficiently different source of predication affirming the possibility for the experience of oneself, leaves out too much of the original doctrines to be powerful enough to grant that which was originally denied.

Whew!! Thanks for editing me out, saves me any more time trying to figure out how to respond.

….I just like details…. — Ludwig V

Thing about details, upon being convinced of some set of them, it’s awful hard to put them aside. First thing that comes to mind, for that discipline considered as a science, what principles determine its methods and what laws govern its objects? For without those, how can it be a science at all?
—————

I see the epoché, the bracketing of the question of the existence of an external world as being the kind of reverse mirror image of the bracketing of concern about first person experience — Janus

Epoché; the bracketing. A method for removing the necessity for the human cognitive system to operate in a specific way for every occassion. In other words, a method for disassociating the subject that knows, from that which it knows about.

That being said, what opinion might you hold regarding this IEP entry:

“….It is important to keep in mind that Husserl’s phenomenology did not arise out of the questioning of an assumption in the same way that much of the history of thought has progressed; rather, it was developed, as so many discoveries are, pursuant to a particular experience, namely, the experience of the world and self that one has if one determinedly seeks to experience the “I”; and, Hume notwithstanding, such an experience is possible….”

It needs no mention of course, that my position must be that experiencing the “I” is impossible, if only the “I” is that which experiences. And why I have so much trouble finding favor with post-Kantian transcendental movements, insofar as those movements make necessary different kinds of “I”’s, or different forms of a single “I”, which makes epoché bracketing predicating one such movement, even possible.

Details. Devils. And how one meets and greets, and gets lost in, the other.

I was just trying to say that theoretical systems metaphysics is a pretty good way to distinguish one from the other, their respective commonalities notwithstanding.

No. For a number of reasons. — Ludwig V

D’accord.

Good enough reasons.

Would you be inclined to agree that although the prevalence of the continental tradition writ large has declined, at least it couldn’t be said to have killed itself, as the infusion of OLP and LP eventually self-destructed the analytic?

What are some of the major differences you see between Continental and Anglo philosophy? — Janus

First and foremost, and from which all relevant distinctions evolve, the presence in continental, the absence in analytic philosophy, of theoretical system metaphysics.

Probably isn’t a single all-consuming response, but I read this one somewhere, seemed to cover more bases.

It was very good. Thanks.

Gotta love Ferguson’s Andy Rooney-vibe.

Agreed, in principle. With the (entirely personal) caveat that any comprehensible notion of mind, as such, is necessarily conditioned by time, reflected in all the relations a mind constructs, including between matter and form in general, clay and statue as instances thereof.

Seems your pickle is one of logical consequences. — creativesoul

All logic is consequential: if this then that. For a logical system, if this then that and from that something else follows.

The implication from your comment is that my logic has consequences it shouldn’t. Be that as it may, I’m ok with my pickle being the consequences of my logic, as long as nothing demonstrates its contradiction with itself or empirical conditions, which is all that could be asked of it.

I do not see how that gets you out of the pickle you're in. — creativesoul

I’m guessing anyone thinking deeply enough about stuff he doesn’t know, gets himself into a pickle of some sort or another, sooner or later.

Assuming for the moment I’m actually in one, any recommendations as to how to get out of it?

So your argument also proves that we cannot know that other human bodies have a mind. — Ludwig V

There is that argument, but mine, given the context, is concerned with higher intellects in juxtaposition to lesser, and it is to the lesser the lack of knowledge pertains.

The argument leads to self-contradictions when higher is pitted against higher, for even if it is the case knowledge of minds in similar enough creatures is technically impossible, it becomes absurd to suppose humans do not all have the same kind of mind, or that any one of them may not have a mind of any kind at all.

How are the clay and the statue related? — frank

The matter is the clay; the general arrangement of the matter is the statue;
The matter contains all forms possible from the substance of the matter; the form necessarily contains no other substance than that of the matter from which it is arranged;
When both are given, without regard to either the constituency of the matter, nor the causality of the arrangement, the relation between them reduces to a modality, the primary schemata of which are change, re: a statue from clay, origination, re: this statue from clay, and necessity, re: this statue from clay.

Under the stated conditions, in which Bob paid for a certain arrangement, given as necessarily contained in the matter, but received back only the matter exhibiting no formed arrangement at all, relegates the relation, not to between the clay that exists and the statue that doesn’t, but to between Bob and the clay, which is still modality and still primarily the schema of change, in this case, the absence of it. The schema of necessity, on the other hand, becomes mere possibility, re: the clay still contains the possibility of arrangement into a statue.

So it is proper that the relation between the clay and the statue, and the relation between Bob and the clay, reduces to time, the only negotiable connection between that which changes and that which does not.

Bet you never saw that one comin’, dija???
(Charlie Chaplin-esque exit, stage right, or…guy gets his Mr. Smartypants ass yanked by giant hook, thrown out the backstage side door)

Opening a gate is possible by observation...
— Mww

No thought? No belief? No expectation? What, on earth, could mindless observation be? — creativesoul

Exactly, insofar as it is implicitly self-contradictory, hence altogether impossible, for a minded creature to comprehend a mindless condition. Comprehension by a higher intellect of a lesser animal’s behavior, which to an investigator of it is mere experience, was never the problem. To attribute to them a mind of some sort, sufficient for inciting that behavior, but without any means to prove THAT is the sort of mind they actually possess, from which arises causal necessity, or, without any means to prove they have any mind of any sort at all, when his only provision for it is his own experience, is certainly a problem.

To which the common rejoinder is….well, crap on a cracker, dude….how else could a dog, e.g., ever open a gate, if they didn’t do this or that first, which, in truth, is tacit admission that he could not possibly comprehend how that creature does anything at all, unless he supposes it to be enough like him that he could comprehend it, which immediately negates the possibility such lesser creature could manifest its behaviors by some means completely foreign to him. And that carries the implication he could comprehend the lesser creature’s behavioral causality iff he knew what it was.

But, where such investigator is human, he doesn’t. He can’t; he does not even know his own. He guesses his own, it works for him, the dog performs the same act therefore must be accredited with the same guesswork insofar as it apparently works for him too.

While this scenario may be good enough for sociologists, psychologists and lawyers, it is far and away “…beneath the dignity of proper philosophy….”
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Dogs do not take account of themselves and everything happening around them as it happens. They know what's happening sometimes, but they do not think about their knowledge of that. They think about what they're doing, what they're in the middle of. — creativesoul

I agree dogs do not take account of themselves, nor do they think about their knowledge, for to do so is to implicate a form of personal subjectivity separable from mere instinct, for which there is no observable warrant. I’d admit that it seems as though dogs take account** of the effects their behavior causes, but less so that they think themselves as causal.

How is to think about what they’re doing, not taking account of themselves? If it is the case dogs do not take account of themselves, it follows necessarily they do not think about what they’re doing, and if not of what they’re doing, then assuredly not temporal successions of it.

**Although, with that, is the lead-in to the suggestion they think, not about what they’re doing, but what they've done. But it is just as feasible to suppose an internal reaction predicated on external observed pain/pleasure, fight/flee, as rational thought in itself. I used to think my JRT did its thing just because it elicits a reaction from me which she found pleasurable, when it is just as likely she did her thing because to do otherwise elicits a reaction she finds less than pleasurable. Or, most likely of all, she did her thing regardless of me entirely.
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The striking singular difference….. — creativesoul

I like all that…..

Our own thought and belief(along with meaning, truth, and falsehood) are only discovered via language use. — creativesoul

…..except that. Which is a different can of different worms.

…..a priori/a posteriori was Kant’s summary of a fundamental philosophical distinction….
— Wayfarer

What I don't know is exactly why Kant embedded it in his work. — Ludwig V

If I may:

As to the summation….

“…. That all our knowledge begins with experience there can be no doubt. For how is it possible that the faculty of cognition should be awakened into exercise (…) and so to convert the raw material of our sensuous impressions into a knowledge of objects, which is called experience? (…) But, though all our knowledge begins with experience, it by no means follows that all arises out of experience. For, on the contrary, it is quite possible that our empirical knowledge is a compound of that which we receive through impressions, and that which the faculty of cognition supplies from itself (sensuous impressions giving merely the occasion)…..”

As to the why…..

“…..Of far more importance than all that has been above said, is the consideration that certain of our cognitions rise completely above the sphere of all possible experience, and by means of conceptions, to which there exists in the whole extent of experience no corresponding object, seem to extend the range of our judgements beyond its bounds. And just in this transcendental or supersensible sphere, where experience affords us neither instruction nor guidance, lie the investigations of reason, which, on account of their importance, we consider far preferable to, and as having a far more elevated aim than, all that the understanding can achieve within the sphere of sensuous phenomena. (…) The science which, with all its preliminaries, has for its especial object the solution of these problems is named metaphysics—a science which is at the very outset dogmatical, that is, it confidently takes upon itself the execution of this task without any previous investigation of the ability or inability of reason for such an undertaking.…”

Me, I think Kant imbedded this distinction in his work, because no one else, even if acknowledging the possibility of the distinction in one form or another, had constructed a method sufficient to prove both its feasibility and its limitations.

Construct, I think, rather than 'create', out of materials ready to hand, so to speak. — Wayfarer

Yes, much better. Thanks.
(Self dope-slaps. Shoulda got there by myself)
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You, too. Nice rendition of the essay. Thanks.
But I reserve self dope-slappin’ here, cuz I might not have got there by myself at all.

Might it be an even bigger problem, to label oneself with a philosophical label at all? To me it kind of suggests a closedness to different ways of looking at things. — wonderer1

Hmmmm…..

I think we’re allowed a certain closedness, which may reflect a related philosophical label, provided we’ve been intellectually honest in the procurement of it. We’re not entitled, on the other hand, intellectual honesty notwithstanding, when such closedness is falsified upon stronger ground.

I have no qualms about admitting to the rejection of some different ways of looking at things.

Isn’t the ‘order of reasons’ simply what it says? Something which any valid syllogism will exemplify? — Wayfarer

I thought that as well, but isn’t a syllogism a logical construct in propositional form, which we create?

Oh. Nice catch on scholastic philosophy/rigid adherence to dogma. It didn’t necessarily pertain to my comment; I just didn’t want the quote to feel naked cuz I was to lazy to included as its author would have expected.

An a prior conception is a prior knowledge: that is knowledge which one has independently of any possible experience. — Bob Ross

Given the procedure shown below, there is a systemic distinction between a conception and knowledge. We think an a priori conception iff there is no condition from experience contained in it, conceptions themselves being the purview of spontaneous discursive understanding or transcendental pure reason, a priori knowledge simply indicates that knowledge possible from a priori conditions. In other words, the conception alone is not knowledge.
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The end result of the unity of those two elements, phenomena and conception, is thought.
-Mww

So when you see a ball, you would call that the “thought” of a ball and not the “phenomena” of a ball? — Bob Ross

If I see a ball, I don’t call it either of those you mentioned. I call it a ball iff I already know it as such, or, if you inform me that’s what that thing I see, is.

When I see a ball, is not the same as what happens when my cognitive system operates correctly according to theoretical transcendental idealism.

In operating correctly, the system is affected by an object….
(I sense via vision, re: I see….)

(Remove long typically over-blown dissertation on correct metaphysical operations. You’re welcome. (Grin))
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This is cheating. I am asking what you call, generically, the thing which is the result of the intuition and cognition—of which we experience—and you just replied with “it’s whatever our brain thinks it is—e.g., a ball”. — Bob Ross

Ok, generically, you’re correct enough. Generically. In everyday situations. Mere convention. But convention cannot satisfy the relation between my “the unity of phenomenon and conception”, something we subconsciously do, and your “what do you see when you see a ball?”, an experience, something we consciously have. So I wasn’t cheating; I was being overly-analytic. Unnecessarily precise.

And I didn’t say whatever our brain says it is; I said whatever our understanding says it is, insofar as the faculty of understanding, in its full procedural operation, thinks, judges and cognizes….all those systemic artifices which are grounded in logic as opposed to being grounded in external reality and externally affected physiology, and internal reproductive imagination, re: intuition, the sum of which is called sensibility.
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Do you not believe that transcendental idealism presupposes that one has cogent knowledge that the individual exists in reality as it is in-itself and is of such a nature as to have representative faculties which represents objects which exist in reality in-itself according to how it is pre-structured to sense and represent? These are all claims about the world as it is in-itself, and not merely as it appears to us. — Bob Ross

I do not believe, more accurately stated as I do not hold with the opinion, transcendental idealism presupposes humans possess knowledge of some kind or degree, but does presuppose nonetheless, that the human individual is of such a nature as to have representational faculties imbued in a system by which any knowledge at all is possible. It follows that whatever cogent knowledge a human has, simply makes explicit the system presupposed as contained in the nature of individuals, is sufficient for the provision of it, and thereby denies to that system Locke’s notion of innate knowledge as such, while at the same time refuting Hume’s rejection of pure knowledge a priori.

I do not see all these claims as being about the world as it is in itself.
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Could it be that the biggest problem for indirect realists, is being called indirect realists?