Then a thing-in-itself is not a concept which is purely logical—that was my only point on this note. It is referencing something concrete. Mww is denying this, and I thought so were you. — Bob Ross

The thing-in-itself is a purely logical concept, distinguishing the concept of the empirical thing as sensibility would have it, from the concept of the empirical thing as reason itself would have it without input from sensibility. Thus, a purely logical concept can still have reference to something concrete, even if cognition of something concrete belonging to that conception, is not determinable from such mere reference alone.

Space, a purely logical concept if there ever was one, would be useless if it didn’t refer to concrete things, so……there ya go. The categories, even while being deduced a priori from reason, reference concrete things, in that no judgement regarding cognitions of concrete things is possible without the relevant schema of categories.

So, no, I do not deny the thing-in-itself references something concrete, while maintaining the thing-in-itself is a purely logical conception.

Hopefully there’s no need to clarify the sense of logic being used here. But just in case, it is entirely syllogistic and propositional in its expositions in the form of a particular philosophy, that is, first in its theoretical construction and then its subsequent analysis, as governed by Aristotle’s laws of proper rational thought, with the additional methodological limitation from Kant, that understanding and reason are the two cognitive faculties the metaphysical functions of which are legislated by those laws, which is not as much its philosophical exposition as its speculative use by a system predicated on that philosophy.

How, then, do you distinguish from a fake thing which is does not exist, and one which does (but of which both are not given to the senses)? — Bob Ross

In experience, I can do nothing with, thus have no more than passing interest in, that which does not appear to my senses. For that of which I merely think, which would be that thing which for me cannot be real because I have no intuition of it, there’s no difference in my internal treatment of a real and a non-real thing, insofar as the only representation for either of them is a conception or a series of conceptions, in accordance with a rule.

….a ‘fake [viz., non-real] thing’…. — Bob Ross

This is a logical contradiction when viewed from proper understanding, to which a fake thing is nonsense and a non-real thing is impossible, re: optical illusion, and a transcendental antinomy when viewed from reason, to which a synthesis of ideas and experience occurs but from principles without the power to unite them, re: deities, infinite time of the world, etc..
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It is necessary that some thing exists, which becomes the experience of, in this case, cup.
-Mww

Agreed; but you are also saying that this necessary thing that is given not only exists but is real; which implies that a thing which exists but is not given is not real. — Bob Ross

Yes, for any experience, a real existent is necessary for it. For that of which existence is possible, but for which there is no appearance to my senses of it, I can affirm nothing of its reality, for there is nothing to affirm.
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the sensibility must have some pre-structured way of sensing before anything is intuited or cognized—i.e., without reason. — Bob Ross

Yes, sensibility must be capable of accomplishing what reason theorizes in its prescriptions for it. If we are not conscious of the machinations of sensibility as an empirical faculty in a physical system, and there is a feasible method for its machinations as a metaphysical faculty in speculative system, why would those of us not in the field of cognitive neuroscience and related disciplines, care how it does it?
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I have no clue why we would assume that most, if not everything, can be sensed by our sensibility—viz., given to the senses. — Bob Ross

It is safe to assume every thing can be given to the senses, iff it meets the criteria of pure intuitions and pure conceptions proposed as belonging to human intelligence. Every thing is not, nor can ever be, the same as everything, and a silly language game ensues for lack of separating the respective notions from each other, according to rules.

The real and the existent are pretty much already interchangeable….
-Mww

Not at all under your view! The real is only a subset of existent things which are given or (perhaps) possibly given to the senses. I — Bob Ross

Not quite. Dialectical consistency mandates that, for us, the real and the existent are necessarily codependent, it follows that the merely possible existent holds as only possibly real. In other words, it is not certain that possible existences are real.

The real, then, is the set….not a subset…..of existent things given to the senses, which says nothing at all about things not given to the senses, and for which, therefore, the real has no ground for consideration.
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I think you still see my point: we can reason about our experience to know things which are not directly perceived. — Bob Ross

All experience is from that which is directly perceived. That which is not directly perceived cannot be experience. Hence to reason about experience, and to know things not directly perceived from that reasoning alone, is a posteriori reasoning. Knowledge of that which is not directly perceived is possible, but does not descend from, or relate to, experience, hence is called a priori reasoning. These are principles, pure conceptions, and so on, which ground experience but are not experiences themselves or reasoned from them but rather, make reasoning about them possible.

This is the difference between “…. though all our knowledge begins with experience, it by no means follows that all arises out of experience….”.
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What do you really know, with respect to the car itself, when somebody tells you he put your car in the garage?

I know it, because I have a true, justified belief. E.g., I just drove it into the garage, went inside, and now am being asked “is the car in the garage?” — Bob Ross

Your answer doesn’t respect the question. Trust me, it’s pertinent, at least to the theme we’re immersed in up to our eyeballs in right now.
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What makes something a priori and knowledge, then? — Bob Ross

Pure reason. What a human does, and the conclusions he infers, when he thinks in general.
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there is just a pre-structure for doing so, and that propositions that we (qua agents) know a priori because of that pre-structure (e.g., “all bodies are extended”)? I can get on board with that. — Bob Ross

Cool. This pre-structure is very far from the pre-structure you assigned to sensibility, however. The pre-structure here, re” “all bodies are extended”, is an empirical principle, in that it applies to things alone, and is only susceptible to natural proofs, but our knowledge of this arises through separate pure principles of universality and necessity, in that without these pure principles, the empirical principles cannot have natural proofs at all, from which follows the possibility some bodies are not extended, and we are presented with a contradiction and our knowledge of empirical things becomes forever undeterminable.
(Sidebar: technically called Hume’s dilemma, for which ol’ Dave had no answer.)

…..“that which is real its existence is given; a real thing cannot not exist (necessity)”
-Mww

Is this “real thing” the object which was given to the senses? — "Bob

Yes.

Why would it be necessary that a cup exists because we experience a cup? — Bob Ross

It is necessary that some thing exists, which becomes the experience of, in this case, cup.

I don’t see the necessity you are talking about here. — Bob Ross

The thing is necessary for human intelligence to have something to work with. If not the thing, then at least something not contained in any part of human intelligence, which is the same as being outside all parts of it, so why not just call it an appearance, in which case the thing is just shorthand for that which appears.
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The way we sense is prestructured (….) in a certain way to react to stimuli — Bob Ross

That just says what we sense with, is prestructured, which is true. Ears hear this way, eyes see this way, and so on. Science has a lot to say nowadays about the way we see, that wasn’t available in the times of traditional metaphysical theory. But even so, I suspect empirical science hasn’t much consideration for a priori ventures into the sublime.

Ehhhhh….until 1925 anyway, when scientists became philosophers once again, or at least were forced to think like one.
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Technically, though, the a priori structure of sensibility itself (…) resides in reason, insofar as the matter of sensation is transcendental.

I don’t see how it would be. Our neurons send the sensations to the brain; not vice-versa. — Bob Ross

Errrr….wha??? We don’t care what neurons do when talking about speculative transcendental architecture. You’re explicitly demanding neurons send the feeling of a mosquito bite, when the science legislating neural activity will only permit neurons to send quantitative electrochemical signals.
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I think we have good reasons to believe, e.g., that electrons exist. — Bob Ross

That was never a contention; believing in a thing is very far from knowledge of it.

Why not, though, just use ‘real’ and ‘existent’ interchangeably and note, instead, that not all the models and concepts we deploy to explain experience necessarily exist in reality (i.e., are not real)? — Bob Ross

The real and the existent are pretty much already interchangeable, and none of the concepts we deploy to explain experience exist in reality to begin with, so….what’s the point?
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If we can't sense it, can’t indicating an impossibility, how would we know it exists?

Through empirical tests with the help of self-reflective reason. — Bob Ross

Then it’s no longer impossible. Sensing an affirmative second-hand representation proves a possibility. Sensing changes in spectral lines proves that which changes state is possible, without sensing the electrons themselves.
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That’s an equivocation. (1) I wasn’t asking just about empirical knowledge…… — Bob Ross

Yes you were, you just didn’t know it. Because you’re talking sensing, the only knowledge you’re going to get from it, if you get any at all, is empirical.

your using the term ‘empirical’ to only strictly refer to what is sensed—that’s not what it usually means. — Bob Ross

That’s all it’s ever meant to me. I use empirical to describe a kind of knowledge, rather than a posteriori, which prescribes its ground or source.

What else does it refer to for you?
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I know that my car is in my garage even though no one is sensing it. For you, this is invalid knowledge. — Bob Ross

For me it’s unjustified to call it knowledge.

What do you really know, with respect to the car itself, when somebody tells you he put your car in the garage?
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……representing objects in space is a priori knowledge; which I thought you were denying because it is intuition. — Bob Ross

Representing objects in space is a priori; it is intuition, which isn’t knowledge.
———————-

We are getting there — Bob Ross

Helps to keep foremost in mind here….we’re not talking about things you know, we’re talking about how you know things.

We take it for granted for the sake of convenience, but the proof is not established. — Manuel

Well said.

Otherwise is Hume’s “constant conjunction”. Never once have I put a cup in the cupboard, come back later and NOT found that cup just where I left it. Hence, my claim that I know that stupid cup is right where I left it, even without seeing it, is proven?

Nahhhhh….it’s just easier on my poor ol’ brain to think the vanishing impossibility that it isn’t there, suffices for proof that it is.

If it is real, then it exists; and if it exists, then it is real. This clearly does not hold in your schema. — Bob Ross

Too simplistic. For that which is real its existence is given; a real thing cannot not exist (necessity). For that which exists, whether or not it’s real depends on experience; a thing may exist without ever being a real thing of experience (contingency).

Sensibility has an a priori structure for sensing…. — Bob Ross

No, it doesn’t. Sensibility has an a priori structure for representing; sensing is entirely physiological, real physical things called organs being affected by real physical appearances, called things.

Technically, though, the a priori structure of sensibility itself, as the faculty of empirical representation, resides in reason, insofar as the matter of sensation is transcendental. But with respect to the operation of the empirical side of human cognition, the transcendental aspect has no influence.

We are scientifically aware of many objects which are real… — Bob Ross

Or is that we are scientifically aware of second-hand representations of those objects? We don’t perceive electromotive force, re: voltage, as a real thing, but do perceive its manifestations on devices manufactured to represent it. Even getting a real shock is only our own existent physiology in conflict with a force not apprehended as such.
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Are you saying that anything that we can’t sense, but of which we know exists, isn’t real? — Bob Ross

If we can't sense it, can’t indicating an impossibility, how would we know it exists? if follows that if an existence is impossible to sense, it is then contradictory to say that same existence is real. That which is impossible to sense cannot be thought as real. That which is as yet not sensed, indicating a possible existence, holds a possible reality in conjunction with it.

Anything else is merely logical inference given from direct represention of an indirectly perceived, hence contingent, existence.
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Don’t you agree that we have knowledge of things which we cannot sense? — Bob Ross

No, I do not. We can think things we cannot sense, which is to say we can conceive things we cannot sense, from which the logical inference for the possibility of things we cannot sense, but in its strictest relation, there is no experience, hence no empirical knowledge, of things we cannot sense.

Such knowledge is the conclusion of a system’s function in its entirety, which makes explicit if the system does not function in its entirety, there is no possibility of a conclusion given by it, which is sufficient reason justifying that in the absence of sensed things the system has nothing on which to direct its function, so not only does it not function in its entirety, it doesn’t function at all, with respect to empirical conditions.
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What do you take a priori knowledge to be then? — Bob Ross

Well….that’s just the system functioning without regard to empirical conditions. In this case, the entirety of it is not required, which is fortunate on the one hand and awful damn convenient on the other, because in the case of a priori cognitions, there isn’t anything given to sensibility for the remainder of the system to use.

Technically, though, empirical knowledge is the synthesis of conceptions derivable from intuition, whereas a priori knowledge is the synthesis of internally constructed conceptions, without the input from intuition, re: mathematical symbology and geometric figure, logical principles, axioms, imperatives, and the like.

This is relevant, in that with this distinction in method and initial conditions, comes the justification for distinguishing between the real, and the merely valid.
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I sincerely am not trying to straw man nor misrepresent your view — Bob Ross

Oh, I know, Bob. It’s just that this stuff is so obviously reasonable to me, yet I cannot get either inkling nor epiphany from you from its exposition. Which means I’m not presenting it well enough, or, you’re of such a mindset and/or worldview it wouldn’t matter what form the exposition takes. Nobody’s at fault, just different ingrained perspectives.

I’m saying, the effect of objects on our senses is necessary, but not sufficient, for knowledge about them.

It is necessary for the human cognitive system, in whatever form it actually is, to do something with that effect, within its intrinsic capacities, sufficient to relate the effect the object imparts, to a cognition of it, such that what was initially given as mere appearance can be known as a certain particular object.

C’mon, Bob. You asked if things-in-themselves are real for me, I said no (by definition), and now you say I said things-in-themselves don’t exist for me. That’s not even wrong, as my ol’ buddy Wolfgang used to say.

I’ve never denied the existence of things-in-themselves, for to do so is to question the very existence of real things, insofar as the mere appearance of any such thing to human sensibility is sufficient causality for its very existence, an absurdity into which no one has rightfully fallen.

Do you really believe that all objects in reality are possible objects of sense for humans? — Bob Ross

Why would you not?

There’s absolutely nothing about reality that entails that there isn’t an object which we are incapable of sensing. — Bob Ross

Yes, agreed. Which calls into question why you might think it not possible that all objects in reality are possible objects of sense in humans. I mean….all any one of them has to do, is appear to our senses, and VOILA!!!!….we’re capable of sensing it. Doesn’t mean they will or must, but iff they do.
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If you take that reality is the totality of existence, on the contrary, then you find that things-in-themselves, as properly understood, are the things which comprise that totality. — Bob Ross

Hmmmm. Might this be backwards? If, instead, you take existence as the totality of reality, there remains the possibility of existences that are not members of reality, hence not members of that which is susceptible to sensation in humans, i.e., dark energy. Quarks. And whatnot.

Added bonus…if you let the totality of existence contain all of reality, that of which reality is not a condition may still be contained in it. Then you have justification for permitting things-in-themselves as existing but not for being real. Not to mention, we conceived the idea of e.g., dark energy, from its effects, so by the same token the idea of things-in-themselves is conceivable by their effects, re: things.
————

…..the intuition aspect of representation in space is non-cognitive (so there is no knowledge in that regard)…. — Bob Ross

Yes.

…..our faculty of judgment, understanding, and cognition must formulate justified, true, beliefs in relation to the a priori principles and conceptions…. — Bob Ross

Yes.

….in order to actually represent the objects in space, according to spatial-mathematical relations. — Bob Ross

Ehhhh…not so sure about that. According to spatial-mathematical relations is a form of knowledge, which flies in the face of what was already given as the case, re: there is no knowledge in regard to representation in space.

Objects are already represented in space by intuition, and are called phenomena. The in order, then, for these first two, is for the possibility of empirical knowledge, or, which is the same thing, experience.

And a minor supplement: justified true beliefs…assuming one grants such a thing in the first place….are given as stated, but in relation to a priori principles and conceptions is close to overstepping the purview of understanding, which, as afore-mentioned, is for the behoof and use of experience alone. While understanding may be in relation to such principles and conceptions, they do not arise from it, which hints there’s much more to the overall system.

the only thing we know about distal objects is how they affect our senses. — Michael

I considered that part irrelevant, insofar as we know nothing of a thing by its effect on our senses, except that is “…an undetermined something….”. To say we know how they affect our senses is already given by sensation, which only informs as to which sense it is, but nothing whatsoever about the thing, except its real existence.

D’accord.
————



Hey….I got the R right.

Thanks.
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I think this quote provides a simple account of it:

“And we indeed, rightly considering objects of sense as mere appearances, confess thereby that they are based upon a thing in itself, though we know not this thing as it is in itself, but only know its appearances, viz., the way in which our senses are affected by this unknown something.” — Michael

The quote is self-contradictory:
….objects of sense as mere appearance, yes;
….based upon a thing-in-itself, yes;
….know not this thing-in-itself, yes;
….but only know its appearance…..no. The thing-in-itself does not appear; if it did, it wouldn’t be in-itself. It would be that object of sense as mere appearance, hence the contradiction.

Under what authority do we “rightly confess”?

Relevant indeed.

Existence questions are hard, and Kant among others, doesn’t bother with them.

There’s a world, it’s really a world…..so what? World being, of course, an abstract entity. Sorta like Rawls (?)….where’s the university.
(Crap. I can't remember the author or the name of the paradox. Maybe identity. Guy sees all the accoutrements which constitute a university, but wants to know where the university he came to visit is located.)

…..thing-in-itself-as-it-is-in-itself….. — tim wood

I’ve seen that myself, but don’t remember, and couldn’t find, where I saw it. I thought Guyer/Wood’s marvelous intro, but, no luck. Anyway….good point.

What can be doubted is the accuracy of the correspondence of the perception to the dass itself — tim wood

Absolutely. And we depend on Mother to make us aware our inaccuracies, hopefully not at too great an expense.

…..as ordinary folk, not so much. — tim wood

Funny, innit. An ordinary folk looks out, is perfectly convinced he sees a tree, but you the metaphysician tell him, nahhhh, you don’t. You see a thing, and that thing is only called a tree because somebody, somewhere, some long time ago, said so, and you’re just regurtitatin’ what’s been taught to you.

But then, there’s markedly more ordinary folk than there are metaphysicians, so…..there ya go. “I see a tree” rules the day.

I am thinking that we use reason to determine that there must be a thing-in-itself which is the ground for our experience of some thing…. — Bob Ross

Good enough superficially….

…..and that this is a claim in concreto about the thing as opposed to in abstracta. — Bob Ross

…..and superficially because reason cannot do in concreto claims, but is transcendental, which is itself either theoretical or speculative. Even practical reason has a pure aspect, and while not always transcendental, re: with respect to moral judgements, is still entirely in abstracta.

So it is that reason does inform the system that for a thing that appears a thing-in-itself is a necessary condition, but makes no concrete claims with respect to that condition.
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Kant was addressing philosophers (…) with respect to their long standing disputes about knowledge. — Bob Ross

Yes, addressing, but not in relation to one opposed to the other, but one combined with the other, re: human empirical knowledge requires both a rational and an empirical aspect, and, conversely, no empirical knowledge is at all possible without some determinable aspect of both. But, and more importantly, a priori knowledge is both possible and valid without any empirical content whatsoever, but relies nonetheless on empirical conditions for its justifications, re: pure mathematics.
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“The limitation is proof for the impossibility of an intelligence of our kind ever cognizing the unconditioned.”
-Mww

So, the thing-in-itself to you is not real? The thing as it is unconditioned isn’t real? — Bob Ross

By definition the real is that which is contained in reality, and by definition reality is that of which the susceptibility to sensation is given. The thing-in-itself does not meet the criterion of susceptibility to sensation hence is not real. But it can still exist as a necessary condition for that which follows from it. Just as space and time are not real, but suffice as necessary conditions, in this case, as pure intuitions a priori, necessary for the construction of phenomena.

Also, as transcendental ideas given from reason, things-in-themselves are not real, in the same sense as things are real.

Also, the thing as it is unconditioned is a contradiction, in that sensibility is always conditioned by appearances. If the thing didn’t appear it couldn’t be a thing, hence the reality of a thing serves as the condition for its appearance. Space and time are the conditions for the experience of the thing, not for the appearance of the thing.

But to answer the question, no, things-in-themselves are not real to me. Or anybody else, iff he finds himself under the auspices of this particular speculative epistemological methodology. It does not follow from the condition that reason proposes a real existence, that there must in fact necessarily be one that corresponds to it.

Metaphysical reductionism, or, a dog chasing his tail. One must chose what to make of philosophy in general, right?

I agree with your comment therein; it was a very well done exposition.

……whether Kant intended a 'two world ' interpetation or a 'two aspect' interpretation. — Janus

“…..which has always two aspects, the one, the object considered as a thing in itself, without regard to the mode of intuiting it (…), the other, the form of our intuition of the object, which must be sought not in the object as a thing in itself, but in the subject to which it appears….”

A bone of contention that shouldn’t be. I mean….as long as one trusts the translator(s).
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……the mere logical counterpoint to phenomena. — Janus

Logic belongs to understanding, the faculty of thought/cognition, noumena are understood as logically counter to things-in-themselves….

“….. At the same time, when we designate certain objects as (…) sensuous existences*, thus distinguishing our mode of intuiting them from their own nature as things in themselves**, it is evident that by this very distinction we as it were place the latter, considered in this their own nature, although we do not so intuite them, in opposition to the former, or, on the other hand, we do so place other possible things, which are not objects of our senses***, but are cogitated by the understanding alone, and call them intelligible existences (noumena).…..”
* because we are affected by them;
**the above mentioned two-aspect dichotomy;
***a very different kind of two-aspect dichotomy.

…..we see “other possible things which are not objects of our senses” to be not sensuous existences, from which follows if not sensuous existence then intellectual existence, but existence nonetheless, in opposition to phenomena which are nothing but representations of existences given from the mode of being intuitions. As well, “but are cogitated” must implicate things, or objects, in order to maintain dialectical consistency with the beginning “when we designate certain objects”. That is to say, when we designate certain objects as sensed must relate to certain objects as cogitated. As found here:

“…. things which the understanding is obliged to cogitate apart from any relation to our mode of intuition, consequently not as mere phenomena, but as things in themselves….”

……things and objects of course, being equal and things-in-themselves always being apart from any relation to our mode of intuition, which is representative by means of internal imagination, yet always part of the causality of that which appears to those modes, which is sensuous by means of external reality.

So….understanding forced to cogitate things not as phenomena but as things-in-themselves…..but understanding cannot cogitate objects as things-in-themselves, insofar as things-in-themselves belong to reason alone. And here is the ground of ***, the very different kind of two-aspect dichotomy, which obviously isn’t going to work.

This whole exposition in CPR is to show understanding, with respect to human knowledge, has no business thinking objects on its own, which is to say cognitions with noumena as their objects are illegitimate, even if constructed with non-contradictory conceptions. And it is the illegitimacy of those cognitions by which noumena and things-in-themselves are confused with each other, insofar as both are futile attempts at representation, albeit under different conditions.

Now, and quickly because looking around I don’t see anybody still here….things-in-themselves belong to reason and noumena belong to understanding because reason is the only fully transcendental faculty, whereas….

“…. We have seen that everything which the understanding draws from itself, without borrowing from experience, it nevertheless possesses only for the behoof and use of experience….”

…..and nothing in experience, as such, is transcendental. It follows that things-in-themselves, because they can never be for the behoof and use of experience as such under any conditions whatsoever, while noumena would be if only our faculty of intuition was intellectual rather than sensuous, can only belong to that faculty which does not concern itself with experience as such, but only the construction of pure a priori principles by which the manifold of experiences are arbitrated with respect to each other and to reality itself.

IknowIknow…..shades of R.E.M.? I’ve said too much I haven’t said enough.

So as to not facilitate solipsism and radical skepticism, yes, I agree with that.

…..but still, they are known by us as appearing objects….. — Wayfarer

If the thing-in-itself is known to us as appearing objects, why is it said things-in-themselves are unknown to us?

If the thing-in-itself appears, it isn’t in-itself. It is isn’t in itself, and it is something that appears, then it must appear to us, which becomes phenomenon in us, which becomes an object of experience for us, and the entire transcendental aesthetic contradicts itself.

So either Hegel and Schopenhaur were right, or, the transcendental aesthetic does not contradict itself.

Six of one, half dozen of the other?

A sense of mystery indeed. The raison d’etre for the first Critique was to first, reign reason in from its proclivity for seeking the unconditioned, and second, prove the possibility and validity of synthetic a priori cognitions.

With respect to the first, granting possibility of knowing about the thing in itself promises knowledge of everything whether it be experience or not, which is immediately contradictory, insofar as we are constantly learning.
—————

Does this other cognitive mode happen to have a typically south-central Asian name?

Real thing as opposed to apparent thing is a common misconception, yes, which makes the comparison by means of them, moot.

But in light of this…..

“…. At the same time, it must be carefully borne in mind that, while we surrender the power of cognizing, we still reserve the power of thinking objects**, as things in themselves. For, otherwise, we should require to affirm the existence of an appearance, without something that appears, which would be absurd…”

……is found tacit acknowledgement that the thing that really exists that we do cognize, as first it appears, is the thing of the ding as sich, which also must really exist, but is not cognized because it isn’t that which appears.

This is what Bob was trying to get at by saying the thing-in-itself is the ground of the thing we perceive. The problem is, the thing we perceive is “…the undetermined object….” of intuition, which just says while it may be the case there is a ground for it, we have no means to determine anything about it, so …..like….who cares? If the perceived object is undetermined, what is there to say about its ground?
(Hegel and Schopenaur did, but that’s another can of transcendental worms altogether.)

** from which comes thing in itself “…considered by reason alone…”, which….(sigh)….was the A/B pagination clue I left for Bob.

Can you put in simple terms what you think it is? — Bob Ross

The thing in itself is the thing considered by reason alone. As the referenced quote says.

It represents an object in reality as it is in-itself—i.e., qua itself—i.e., independent of any experience of it — Bob Ross

Nothing independent of experience or possible experience can ever be represented. Or, which is the same thing, representation is always and only of things of possible experience. No human can ever experience an object considered by reason alone.

outlining the limits of reason; especially as it relates to rationalism vs. (british) empiricism. — Bob Ross

Yes, and no. Limits, but not as relates to rationalism vs empiricism.

Because something representational requires something which was not representational — Bob Ross

No. The limitation is proof for the impossibility of an intelligence of our kind ever cognizing the unconditioned.

Think as you wish, and I don’t understand “dead-ender”, so…….

There is nothing wrong with doing this….. — AmadeusD

YEA!!!!

…..but you would need to make this make sense outside of that for it to hold much water. — AmadeusD

Make sense outside of what….my interpretation? Or outside of one work? The work under discussion is CPR, so there is no other work that matters.

I never said nor implied my interpretations were the case, hence the liberal account from quotation; it’s almost a given they may not be, insofar as the quotes themselves may be misappropriations. If anyone wishes to refute what I say, he should have at it, but I’d ignore any attempted refutation that does not arise directly from Kantian philosophy.

are you saying that the thing as it is in-itself does NOT excite our senses such that we perceive something? — Bob Ross

I’m saying I think that’s what Kant wants understood. What do you think the thing-in-itself actually is, what concept is being represented by those words? As far as that goes, what do you think the Big Picture is for CPR? What does he mean by “critique”. And why, exactly, is it that the thing-in-itself ends up as one of the necessary limitations proved for this particular, albeit theoretical, method of human cognition and empirical knowledge?

The A/B pagination listed above is the place to start. If you’d researched it, you’d see what is meant by “that is” (without reference to our sensibility).

The thing as a whole excites such that we perceive, but it isn’t the whole thing we intuit from that perception. The thing as a whole is not the same a a thing in itself.
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And make no mistake: by his own admission, but in modern venencular, Prolegomena is “CPR For Dummies”, so if one wishes to critique the one, he must set aside the other.
————

I am pretty sure it also says it outright in the CRP…. — Bob Ross

If it does, and all else unsusceptible to equivocation, I’d be forced to re-think.

…it is far further from me to think I’m qualified to affirm the necessary conditions…..
— Mww

Oh, I think it's a bit over-cautious to say that we know nothing about animals. — Ludwig V

True enough; I trust nothing I said implies otherwise. If it appears I did, I shall reconcile whatever it was with granting without reservation that to claim we know nothing about animals, is catastrophically false.
————

However, I take the point that the sentimental explanation is not always the right one. — Ludwig V

While I agree wholeheartedly, if it is the case we looking for truths relative to other un-like animal’s rational machinations, we must first presuppose there is such a thing, and we find that the only way to grant such a presupposition, is relative to our own, for which no presupposition is even the least required. Further than that we cannot go, and remain strictly objective in our investigations.

I do agree that the thought is almost impossible to formulate clearly without a lot of dancing around explaining. — Ludwig V

Odd, innit. The thing everybody does, in precisely the same way….because we’re all human….is the very thing on which not everyone agrees as to what that way is. I for one, readily admit I haven’t a freakin’ clue regarding the necessary conditions controlling the disgust I hold concerning, e.g., Lima beans, or controlling the supposed exhilaration for an experience I never had.

With that in mind, it is far further from me to think I’m qualified to affirm the necessary conditions controlling the inner machinations of any animal that isn’t just like me, insofar as I have nothing whatsoever with which to judge those conditions except my own, which I’ve already been forced to admit I don’t know, hence can only guess. Or, as some of us are wont to say, in order to make ourselves feel better about not knowing…..speculate.

(Guy puts a camera in his living room, records his faithful companion looking out the window…
….Guy thinks….awww, how sweet; he’s anticipating my car coming into the driveway….
….Guy next door has a similar camera….
….1st guy shows his dog to the second guy, remarks: look at Fido sitting at attention, anticipating….
….2nd guy shows 1st guy a squirrel sitting on the lawn, by the tree, next to the 1st guy’s driveway…
….says, yeah, he’s anticipatin’ alright. Anticipatin’ the hunt, and lunch at the end of it.)

it makes no sense to say that the thing-in-itself is not the object which impacted our senses….. — Bob Ross

Notice in the text it’s “objects which affect our senses”, not thing-in-themselves. Which is to say things-in-themselves are not that which affects our senses.

Then I’d love to know, for you to inform me, what sensation I would receive from a thing-in-itself. If I receive a sensation in conjunction with the sensory device being impacted, then I should be able to smell, hear, taste, etc., a thing-in-itself. How, then, do I distinguish it from a thing?

Section 32 is intended to make clear the thing-in-itself just means not thing-in-us. The thing of the thing-in-itself is that which appears to sensibility, the thing-as-it-is-in-itself(without-influence-on-a-sensory-mechanism) is that which does not. That’s what he means by one being the ground of the other. That things-in-themselves are the ground of things is utterly irrelevant, when it is only things that appear, and of which are the matter of phenomena.

The thing is provided by Nature, appears to us and becomes empirical knowledge; the -in-itself is provided by reason, “….that is, without reference to the constitution of our sensibility….”, representing only non-appearance, and is merely a logical inference.

Obviously, without reference to our sensibility means sensibility has no part to play, hence is not affected, which means it is not an appearance, insofar as it is appearances only that do affect our sensibility. See A28/B44.

Your versions are fine, although I might insist every experience affects the condition of the subject.

“One’s self can never be an object of experience” works just fine, though, right?
— Mww

I think it does. But it is misleading to say that there's no such thing. It's just that one's self is not an object. — Ludwig V

Agreed. Hence the new terminology in new philosophies, to stand for a thing that is not an object. Or even an object that is not a thing. Or maybe just a new definition for old terminology. Either way, abolishing the concept itself isn’t likely in the near future, anyway, so…..the beat goes on.

From my reading of CPR, the thing-in-itself is what impacts the senses. — Bob Ross

I’ve posted quotes from CPR proving this is not the case. I would like to see where in your reading of CPR, that it is.

But isn't experience supposed to be the foundation of knowledge? — Ludwig V

While the case may be made that empirical knowledge is impossible without the experience of what the knowledge is of, but it is also quite often the case there can be experiences for which no knowledge is given. If it is sometimes the case and sometimes not the case, there’s a need for a different case.

Insofar as the negation of which is a contradiction, it is always the case that…..
Knowledge is an end in itself, pursuant to the operation of a system, that end being a change in the condition of the intelligence under which the system operates;
Experience is an end in itself, pursuant to the operation of a system, that end being a change in the condition of the subject to which the system belongs, all else being what it may.

As well, since Plato earlier and Russell later, knowledge of is very different than knowledge that, such distinction being entirely absent from experience.
—————

…..oneself can never be an experience.
— Mww
I think you mean that there can never be an experience that is an experience of oneself? Or one's self can never be an object of experience (since oneself is posited as the subject of expereience.)? — Ludwig V

I suppose. That isn’t necessarily contradictory or invalid, given the object immediately appended, re: of oneself. That only matters because without such appended object, the proposition is contradictory, re: never be an experience that is an experience. Which you must immediately recognize, given your historical commentary precedents, as a (gaspsputterchoke) language game.

“One’s self can never be an object of experience” works just fine, though, right?

If I understand what you are saying I think I agree. — Janus

Close enough.

the experiencer cannot be itself the object of experience, with the analogy of the eye that cannot see itself being invoked. However the eye is a real object which can be seen, so I think it is a rather weak analogy. — Janus

Out of respect for our history, I won’t be so brash as to throw the ol’, much-dreaded “categorical error” at you, but rather, merely bringing it up might provoke you into looking for it. Or, in all fairness, showing there isn’t one.
————

Either using tools is something that can be done by a mindless creature(a creature completely absent of thought and belief), or not only humans are rational creatures. Your position forces you to explain the former….. — creativesoul

To would seem impossible to explain how mindless creatures use tools. But to be mindful does not make explicit thought and belief, or thinking about thought/belief.

The use of tools indicates mindfulness, but not what form or kind it may or may not be, which affirms the possibility of mere instinct for such use. Even “use of tools” itself risks conceptual misappropriation, in that making that connection by a qualified observer does not justify that same connection being made by the observed.
(Man: did you just use a tool to get at those ants?
Chimp: dunno about that; finger/hole/ant, then finger/hole no ant, putting a stick in my hand is just growing a longer finger, finger/hole/ant)

It is irrational to say only humans are rational creatures. For those interested in such investigations, he has no choice but to judge other un-like creatures’ rationality, with the very one impossible for them to possess, which immediately prejudices his investigation.

Nagel’s glorified bat.

…..also related in minds. One of elemental constituency and perhaps also existential dependency. — creativesoul

……and I’m good with calling those correlations.

The concept of an apple is knowledge of what an apple is—that’s part of the whole idea of having a concept of an apple. — Bob Ross

The whole idea of having, the only reason to have, a concept, is to represent that thing perceived, by a name. The name apple merely indicates how the thing perceived is to be known, which is called experience.

……wouldn’t you agree the brain is the representational knowledge of those faculties? — Bob Ross

I may be misunderstanding, but assuming I do, no, I would not agree. Faculties are function-specific members of a system described in a metaphysical theory. There’s no possible method by which those faculties can be found in a brain, they being merely logical constructs, and by the same token, there’s nothing empirically provable, hence nothing falsifiable, in a metaphysical theory. All that can be said, insofar as empirical verifications for non-empirical theories are out of the question, is the brain has nothing to do with abstract conceptions authorized by such theory.

So…what good is it, is the usual modern ask. It’s all we got to work with being the best answer.
—————-

…..you have to concede that you have to trust your conscious experience to derive that that experience is representational—no?….. — Bob Ross

All I have to trust is that my knowledge obtained at one time, does not contradict Nature in another time.

That my experiences are representational, or, that all my experiences are of only representations, is proved at sensibility, systemically long before the experience itself, therefore I have no need to trust them to prove their constituency.

…….Otherwise, you are just blindly presupposing that objects affect our senses—there’s nothing, without the aid of experience, that can be used transcendentally to determine that. — Bob Ross

Why do I have to presuppose that objects effect my senses, when my sensations apodeitically prove my senses have been affected? If I can see a mosquito bite me, if I can smell the bacon I hear frying, why do I have to presuppose either one of those objects?

And on the other hand, why subject myself to the absurdity of supposing what just bit me, or that stuff I’m about to consume, wasn’t an object at all?

There’s nothing that can be used transcendentally to determine…..what, that it is only objects that effect the senses? Why do we need a transcendental source to determine empirical circumstance? We may like a transcendental source for determining how empirical circumstances are possible, but the fact of sensation already proves it, so why bother?

I’m a little in the dark here, not sure how you arrive at the questions you ask.

The question is which experience is veridical. — Ludwig V

….which is irrelevant if the experience in question is impossible. There no reason to care about semantic truths, indeed there couldn’t even be any such judgements, without having first established the objects contained in the utterances. I understand this must have been done, or at least attempts at it, somehow or another, otherwise Husserl’s philosophy lacks justification.

One has to bear in mind that our experience is laden with skills and expectations. — Ludwig V

And one can also bear in mind experience is an end in itself, laden with nothing, but is itself a laden on the condition of the subject to whom it belongs. Skills and expectations laden the system, but not that which the system finalizes as its product.

I can only recognize myself when I can recognise the other. — Ludwig V

I can see that, but that says more about relation between character or personality, and manifestation. I’m more interested in its development then its activities, which may even contradict that character.
—————

A proudly human linguistic reification of an idea. — Janus

Oh absolutely. Very well spoken. We post hoc name what we do, but the cum hoc doing, in and of itself, is nameless.

One experiences phenomena by perceiving them. How does on experience oneself? — Janus

If the first is true, experience of oneself makes oneself as phenomenon, necessary. Under the auspices of some theoretical metaphysics, phenomena are the product of the synthesis of the matter of a thing given a posteriori by the perception of it, and some form which resides a priori in that faculty doing the synthesizing. While it is not contradictory for oneself to contain a priori form, it is utterly contradictory for oneself to contain matter. Because it cannot, one cannot perceive oneself, the synthesis initiated by perception immediately becomes impossible, hence oneself can never be phenomenon, from which follows necessarily, oneself can never be an experience.

What’s needed to justify oneself as an experience, is to predicate experience itself on something other than what some another theory demands. But different predication, while being necessary in order to change things around enough to grant the possibility of that which was originally denied, the logic grounding such predication must also be stronger than the original under suspicion.

Phenomenology, in the view from this armchair, while sufficing as a sufficiently different source of predication affirming the possibility for the experience of oneself, leaves out too much of the original doctrines to be powerful enough to grant that which was originally denied.

Whew!! Thanks for editing me out, saves me any more time trying to figure out how to respond.

….I just like details…. — Ludwig V

Thing about details, upon being convinced of some set of them, it’s awful hard to put them aside. First thing that comes to mind, for that discipline considered as a science, what principles determine its methods and what laws govern its objects? For without those, how can it be a science at all?
—————

I see the epoché, the bracketing of the question of the existence of an external world as being the kind of reverse mirror image of the bracketing of concern about first person experience — Janus

Epoché; the bracketing. A method for removing the necessity for the human cognitive system to operate in a specific way for every occassion. In other words, a method for disassociating the subject that knows, from that which it knows about.

That being said, what opinion might you hold regarding this IEP entry:

“….It is important to keep in mind that Husserl’s phenomenology did not arise out of the questioning of an assumption in the same way that much of the history of thought has progressed; rather, it was developed, as so many discoveries are, pursuant to a particular experience, namely, the experience of the world and self that one has if one determinedly seeks to experience the “I”; and, Hume notwithstanding, such an experience is possible….”

It needs no mention of course, that my position must be that experiencing the “I” is impossible, if only the “I” is that which experiences. And why I have so much trouble finding favor with post-Kantian transcendental movements, insofar as those movements make necessary different kinds of “I”’s, or different forms of a single “I”, which makes epoché bracketing predicating one such movement, even possible.

Details. Devils. And how one meets and greets, and gets lost in, the other.

I was just trying to say that theoretical systems metaphysics is a pretty good way to distinguish one from the other, their respective commonalities notwithstanding.

No. For a number of reasons. — Ludwig V

D’accord.

Good enough reasons.

Would you be inclined to agree that although the prevalence of the continental tradition writ large has declined, at least it couldn’t be said to have killed itself, as the infusion of OLP and LP eventually self-destructed the analytic?

What are some of the major differences you see between Continental and Anglo philosophy? — Janus

First and foremost, and from which all relevant distinctions evolve, the presence in continental, the absence in analytic philosophy, of theoretical system metaphysics.

Probably isn’t a single all-consuming response, but I read this one somewhere, seemed to cover more bases.

It was very good. Thanks.

Gotta love Ferguson’s Andy Rooney-vibe.

Agreed, in principle. With the (entirely personal) caveat that any comprehensible notion of mind, as such, is necessarily conditioned by time, reflected in all the relations a mind constructs, including between matter and form in general, clay and statue as instances thereof.

Seems your pickle is one of logical consequences. — creativesoul

All logic is consequential: if this then that. For a logical system, if this then that and from that something else follows.

The implication from your comment is that my logic has consequences it shouldn’t. Be that as it may, I’m ok with my pickle being the consequences of my logic, as long as nothing demonstrates its contradiction with itself or empirical conditions, which is all that could be asked of it.