The world is what is the case. — Banno

To say the world is what is, presupposes “world”, yet still leaves “what” unanswered as to its case.

The world is what is the case is the analytical tautological truth we end up with, but says nothing about how we got there.

The world is all and any of that of which being the case, is determinable a posteriori.

Ok. Thanks.

I must have missed something, somewhere down the line. Just wondering why one would doubt something despite its various successes. Must be some subtleties involved I haven’t accessed.

…..every philosophy carries the seeds of its own destruction just by being philosophy. — Moliere

That may very well be, but as far as I’m aware, only one of any real significance puts the very ground of its own destruction in writing.

Gotta appreciate the forthrightness of the author of a philosophy, that says that even if one finds the supporting theory sufficiently justifies one’s own a-HA!!! moments, he’s still more than likely to ignore its lessons in toto.

I'd say the Enlightenment is over. — Moliere

I must agree, but with a touch of irony, if it be granted the single most influential textual representation contained an offer of benefit to posterity, and at the same time, the cause of its demise.
————-

….outside both of them….. — Wayfarer

Sorry to intrude, but to say outside both is to invite that pathologically stupid homunculus nonsense, and to some lesser degree, Ryle’s Regress and a Cartesian theater, for which there never was any admission.

All for which sufficient account had already been given….ironically enough…..in that self-same Enlightenment textual representation, which one should hope isn’t so much dead as neglected.

And that ain’t the height of irony, oh nosir-ee, bub!!! Simultaneity….misunderstood if not outright denied in its time as a justifiable albeit purely a priori condition in Enlightenment metaphysics, but subsequently given gasps of epiphanic revelation in post-Enlightenment/pre-proven therefore abstract, physical theory.

But I can dig it, donchaknow. We love our models, don’t we. Model for this, model for that. Model for every-damn-thing. All of which fails miserably, when we try to model the modeling, in which case we usually invoke the principle of sheer parsimony, insofar as the validity of our models is their non-contradictory relation to some empirical condition, re: its use, or what is done with it, when the fact remains any model, empirically validated or otherwise, is only non-contradictory, hence its very validity is even possible, iff its construction is in accordance with a set of rules.

So I now assume Rodin’s posture, and ask however rhetorically…..does it work to combine rule simultaneity with model construction? At worst, such feasibility removes the notion of “outside of” insofar as models and the rules to which all of them must conform are inseparable with respect to time (insert A/B reference as proof here), and from there, at best, it is not contradictory to posit that models and their intellectual constructions are exactly the same.

Kinda cool, though, in the end, when the original question regards fairness and justice, which are, you know…..always in accordance with somebody’s rules.

You are probably aware already of my disregard for the Kantian notion of the thing in itself. I can't see how to make sense of it in a way that enables it to be useful. — Banno

There is no reason to regard the Kantian ding an sich as anything other than a metaphysical construct a priori, the only usefulness of it being a representation of the limit of human experience.

Given the major premise, from a speculative metaphysical point of view, that human experience begins with the effect of things on sensibility, it does not follow that things that do not have an effect on sensibility therefore do not exist, for otherwise we must be sufficient causality for the existence of such things in Nature that are perceived, which is catastrophically absurd, but it does, on the other hand, follow without self-contradiction that things that do not have an effect on sensibility cannot be an experience.

So we cause nothing perceived, but experience only the perceived. Reason inserts…..er, manufactures….the thing-in-itself to reconcile the former with the latter, nothing more or less than that. Which does sorta make the concept, technically the transcendental idea, practically useless but nonetheless logically necessary, in order to invalidate any conclusion that affirms human perception is simultaneously causal.

So is the OP an attempt to provide a foundation for morality which somehow manages to quantify or capture freedom as something more than a contingent set of relations? — Tom Storm

I’m not really sure. It is described as a “…theory (…) (that) has advantages over other moral theories…” so it attempts to construct a moral foundation, yes, albeit predicated on consequentialism.

As for freedom arising as something more than a contingent set of relations, I’d agree with that. As I mentioned, I think freedom is that by which relations of a certain kind are even possible, which removes it from being a member of all such relations, which in turn makes it more than any set of them, contingent or otherwise. I just don’t know if that’s what the OP, as you say, manages to capture.

If the problem is….

…..how to weigh freedom over different things within the normative theory of freedom consequentialism. — Dan

….my view is there isn’t a problem, or at least there isn’t this problem, insofar as I do not treat freedom as weigh-able or relatively differentiated. It is merely an altogether fundamental, hence necessary condition, by which certain types of relations are possible, and these relations pursuant to aesthetic judgements alone.

On the other hand, even if I’m entitled to a personal view, I’m fully aware that not having any letters after my name sorta limits my scholastic value.

I think, these days, the professionals are less inclined to accept mere transcendental ideas as sufficient explanatory devices, and those of common understanding never heard of them anyway, so…..

Yes, sometimes I do ask for justifications, but these are asked from an interest rather than knowledge. This then gets me into a whole different class of cognitions and the logical grounds for them. In a matter of mere interest, I can be shown to be misguided but cannot be proven wrong, whereas in matters of knowledge I can be shown to be both misguided and wrong.

When justifying your own actions or statements, according to what factors do you formulate your argument? — Vera Mont

To formulate an argument, logic, specifically the LNC. To formulate an argument is, after all, merely to construct a judgement, which is nothing but to think a relation of conceptions.

On what grounds do you decide whether a justification is appropriate and valid? — Vera Mont

The validity of a judgement is not the same as its appropriateness, in that the former is given immediately from its construction, insofar as the validity of a relation is determined by its logical possibility, but the latter is determined solely by its mediated correspondence to experience.

What criteria do you use when judging someone's justification….. — Vera Mont

I cannot judge another’s justifications, in that I cannot know which relations he has employed in his internal constructions. All that is available to me, is the affect he has on me, so all I’m doing, is judging the effect, which resides in me, not its cause which resides in him.

In your 1-6, the subject is a person other than yourself. With respect to the general topic under discussion, shouldn’t the subject in fact be yourself? By what right does one have to say another ought, or is obliged, when the only possible way for one to say that, is by way of what he himself has already determined? So it isn’t really “you ought….”, but instead, is, “I think you ought….”, or, “if it was me you would have…..”, the truth of which in the former is in fact impossible to grant, insofar as the totality of conditions in one cannot be given in another. And this is readily apparent, for the internal relations necessary in the construction of a promise/obligation/etc., by one, can indeed be very far from those relations necessary for the experience of its object by another.

But then, it may just be the exposition you seek for the coherence of said conception(s) resides entirely in some metaphysical domain, from which the sum of raised participatory eyebrows inevitably takes away whatever power and justification that may have been contained in it.

For my money, ’s one-liner says it all. Or perhaps, establishes the groundwork for saying it all.

I don't understand what you mean by putting "knowledge" in opposition to "understanding." — T Clark

Not in opposition, as a consequence. Understanding is means, knowledge is ends, in accordance with Kantian theoretical metaphysics.

Perhaps one could say the usefulness of this theory is the explanation for how knowledge is possible.
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….what it might mean for a position to be useful — T Clark

I think to be useful is to explain something I want to know. But you’re right; some things can be explained quite well, without the possibility of ever being proven right or wrong. Admittedly, I don’t have enough experience with Taoism to know whether it explains anything or not, but I suspect that theory relies less on pure logical constructs than does speculative idealism, and because of that, is more susceptible to self-contradiction when reduced to principles, which may happen when one asks of it….well, just how does that come about?

Anyway….to each his own?

Fair synopsis, yes.

One man’s “absolute presupposition” is another man’s “principle”?
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In a sense, the world we know doesn't exist until it is named. — T Clark

Ok, I can live with that, as long as the world (as it is) and the world (as we know it), are taken as two very different things.
—————-

…..materialism's objective reality is not the only way of seeing things. — T Clark

Agreed, in principle, but with two distinct and separate paradigmatic conditions, re:
…..first, whether or not the senses are involved on the one hand, and “way of seeing things” is a mere euphemism for “understanding”, on the other. Understanding a material thing is possible without that which is objectively real, but for knowledge of that which is material, the objective reality of it is a necessary condition;
…..from which follows the second, insofar as for humans generally, materialism, being a monistic ontology, is necessarily conjoined with some form of epistemological foundational procedure, in order for the intellect, as such, to function.

Does your Taoist metaphysical theory satisfy these conditions? And if not, how does it get around them and still maintain its usefulness?

….judged (…) from each one’s internal logical consistency and each one’s non-self-contradictory construction.
— Mww

I would judge them based on usefulness. — T Clark

Ok, but how would you recognize usefulness? What does a metaphysical theory do, such that it is useful for that thing?

Maybe we can talk about this some other time. — T Clark

Sure. Whatever suits you.

I disagree with this….. — T Clark

Yeah, I get that a lot. But I don’t mind; it merely exemplifies the earlier blurb….

“…. those who are engaged in metaphysical pursuits are far from being able to agree among themselves…”

….in Bxv, and this in Bxxxiv:

“…. useful truths make just as little impression (…) as the equally subtle objections brought against these truths…”

And while no metaphysical theory is properly judged by its true/false quality, none of them should be judged absurd, merely from disregard of that relative attribute, but from each one’s internal logical consistency and each one’s non-self-contradictory construction.

If it be granted the human mind is a purely logical system…..
— Mww

Do you believe this is true? — T Clark

I treat the concept of “mind” as something everybody knows what is meant by it even if there really isn’t any such thing, and from that, I prefer to say pure reason is a purely logical system, but the subject at the time this came up was mind, and the nonsense of getting beyond it, so……
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noumena are conceptually valid but still only intuitively impossible
— Mww

Does this mean you reject noumena as a useful metaphysical concept? — T Clark

Oh absolutely. I treat noumena as the proverbial red-headed stepchild….he’s here, by accident, can’t pretend he isn’t so obligated to set a place at the table for him, but no freakin’ way he’s gonna be included in a will. Noumena in the Kantian sense are born from the faculty of understanding over-extending itself into the forging of general conceptions for which neither the remaining components of this particular type of cognitive system, nor Nature Herself as comprehended by that same system, can obtain an object.
—————

Where is this quote from? I think it's wrong, or at least misleading. — T Clark

It is Kant, B422, and concerns expositions surrounding the self as a closed, private, all-encompassing concept represented by “I think”, what Kant calls the “unity of consciousness”, and how that concept is misused by treating it as an object, which is what I meant by reification of pure conceptions.

Gotta remember the times of the thesis, long before neuroscience and those fancy-assed brain waves the average smuck…..er, sorry, I mean “….those of common understanding…”, re: 99.9% of humanity….couldn’t possibly care less about.
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For, as the world has never been, and, no doubt, never will be without a system of metaphysics of one kind or another….
— PeterJones

Is this from Bradley? Do you have a reference? — T Clark

Kant, Bxxxi, (translator-specific). Yeah, true, huh. Guy’s every-damn-where. Think of something having to do with theoretical human cognition, pre-quantum physics, morality/religion….plate techtonics, tidal friction, rotational inclination, relativity of space and time (sigh)……there’s a Kant quote relatable to it.

For non-dualism one has to look beyond mind to its origin. This cannot be done by the mind, of course,which is why scholars can never hope to understand non-duality in the way meditators and contemplatives come to understand it, as an actual phenomenon — PeterJones

If non-dualism is an actual phenomenon, according to meditators, what is it that appears? What is it that physically, quantitatively, exists, as effect on sensibility, which all an appearance was ever meant to indicate? Which sensory device is affected by a non-dual appearance, in order for the scholar or the regular joe to immediately intuit anything with respect to it?

While it is true the mind cannot look beyond itself, it is equally true the mind is that by which everything conceivable is looked for; there is no other irreducible originator of whatever it is that humans do pursuant to their intrinsic intellectual capacities.

If it be granted the human mind is a purely logical system, and as such, for any possible conception the negation of it is given immediately upon the spontaneity of the conception itself, it is then self-contradictory to suggest the origin of non-dualism can only reside beyond the mind, when it is necessarily the case dualism originates within it. If dualism is given, or if not given then at least determinable by the mind, and if the principle of complementarity holds, then it is necessarily the case the concept of non-dualism also originates under the same conditions and therefore from within that same mind.

So it would seem, despite what meditators and contemplatives would have it, the origin of non-dualism must be beyond the mind, or beyond the mind as scholars and regular joes understand it, for no other reason than that form of mind used by other than meditators cannot justify the conception beyond the principle by which it is a valid thought.

And from that arises the notion that the categories of thought, which legislate the speculative methodology of the scholar’s mind, in which the relation of conception and intuition are determinable, are not necessary functionaries for a mediator’s/contemplative’s notion of mind from which non-dualism would manifest.

Which gets us right smack dab into the phenomenal/noumenal dichotomy, insofar as, while it is irrational to degrade the distinction itself as impossible, re: noumena are conceptually valid but still only intuitively impossible, it remains the fact there is no non-contradictory means of constructing judgements with respect to empirical representations of them.

It follows that a mind predicated on an intrinsic duality cannot possibly originate that which is contradictory to it, but that in itself is not sufficient to prove another kind of mind also cannot, which immediately leaves it possible another kind of mind can originate a non-dualism absent its antecedent complement.

But how would an intrinsically dualistic mind, such as a human mind, which must include the minds of meditators and contemplatives insofar as these are humans, ever even enjoin to that which for it, is impossible?

“…. From all this it is evident that rational psychology has its origin in a mere misunderstanding. The unity of consciousness, which lies at the basis of the categories, is considered to be an intuition of the subject as an object; and the category of substance is applied to the intuition. But this unity is nothing more than the unity in thought, by which no object is given; to which therefore the category of substance—which always presupposes a given intuition—cannot be applied. Consequently, the subject cannot be cognized. The subject of the categories cannot, therefore, for the very reason that it cogitates these, frame any conception of itself as an object of the categories; for, to cogitate these, it must lay at the foundation its own pure self-consciousness—the very thing that it wishes to explain and describe….”
————

On the other hand, of course in one respect you are quite right:

“…. those who are engaged in metaphysical pursuits are far from being able to agree among themselves, but that, on the contrary, this science appears to furnish an arena specially adapted for the display of skill or the exercise of strength in mock-contests—a field in which no combatant ever yet succeeded in gaining an inch of ground, in which, at least, no victory was ever yet crowned with permanent possession.…”

Hence the fun in philosophizing well, or, as ol’ Rene admonishes, “rightly conducting reason”: display of skill in which no one is embarrassed, and an exercise in strength in which no one gets hurt.

Kant places the Ultimate……
— PeterJones

What is this Ultimate? — Mww

This is the question metaphysics has to answer. — PeterJones

If Kant placed this Ultimate, wouldn’t he have already asked and answered as to what it is? I’m trying desperately to understand how Kant’s idealism could be tweaked to a non-dualistic system by placing the Ultimate beyond the categories of thought, when it is the case Kant never placed the Ultimate anywhere, insofar as, to my knowledge, he never mentioned the concept in the first place.

Now, Kant does indeed place the unconditioned beyond the categories of thought, that towards which pure reason always directs itself in its purely metaphysical exploits but for which it never attains an object, but even if this is the case enforced by transcendental logic, it still leaves vacant the notion of non-duality necessarily arising from it. Not that it couldn’t so arise, but that it hasn’t been explained how it could.

And no, I don’t reject perennial philosophy; I simply don’t have any use for it, that expositions on critical thought hasn’t already sufficiently dismissed.
—————

“…. For, as the world has never been, and, no doubt, never will be without a system of metaphysics of one kind or another, it is the highest and weightiest concern of philosophy to render it powerless for harm, by closing up the sources of error….”

Seems like Bradley’s “metaphysics does not endorse a positive result” isn’t quite right after all. Powerless for harm seems a rather positive endorsement, n’est ce pas?

The idea that the categories of thought are not fundamental immediately gives rise to the principle of non-duality — PeterJones

Oh. Ok. So if one holds with the idea that the categories of thought are fundamental and fundamental necessarily, the principle of non-duality fails.

Kant places the Ultimate…… — PeterJones

What is this Ultimate? By what other (non-Perennial philosophy) conception might it be understood, given that the Kantian categories of thought are the ground always and only for a posteriori cognitions?

It is not my wish to be contentious, but being embedded in Western Enlightenment speculative metaphysics in which rational extravagances are properly cautioned, sorta prejudices one against various and sundry forms of ineffable mystical experiences.

Kant's idealism (….) is quite a vague affair, but it could be interpreted as a first step towards non-dualism — PeterJones

Interesting notion. How would you suppose non-dualism to arise from it, on what….logical?…. ground would it be possible?

The issues are tricky, however, because of the words.;For instance, 'transcendental' or 'absolute' idealism is non-dualism. — FrancisRay

Tricky may be dependent on mere subjective inclination, insofar as there is an established transcendental idealism, while not “absolute”, is certainly dualistic. Or, perhaps, sufficiently demonstrates the intrinsic duality of the human intellectual nature.

As far as I can see (…), any philosophy that specifies how other people should behave, is not moral at all, or even really a philosophy. — T Clark

That's pretty much as I would have it as well. How people in general should behave is reducible to mere administrative codes of conduct, and THAT is reducible to a member-specific personal moral disposition.

The consequences related to codes of right action, is very different than the consequences related to one’s own code of proper action.

Yikes. Four years on. I was just thumbing through, like I always do, looking for something interesting….

I think the thread is, maybe I rephrase a bit, that *appearances* have a cause. Kant discusses this notion. The logic is that 'appearance' is what things look like or seem to be rather than what they actually are. — Dan Langlois

Appearances have a cause, yes: things.

Appearances of things, in the Kantian sense, is NOT an indication of what they look like, nor do appearances indicate what a thing is or seems to be.

Do you equate beauty to goodness? — Rob J Kennedy

Yes, in that they are each conceptions in aesthetic judgements concerning relative quality.

No, in that the objects of the former are to be appreciated; the objects of the latter are to be respected.

Could just be a turn of phrase…. — Moliere

Oh absolutely. It’s those cursed turns of phrases in the Kantian corpus that instigates his successors to find contradictions. The most infamous being that gawd-awful noumena/phenomena thing. (Sigh)

Anyway, ever onward.
————

….it's the individual, rather than the group, that's more important in thinking through whether a maxim can be universalized, or an act is moral. — Moliere

Agreed. Given the possession of practical reason by humanity in general, then, all else being equal, each member would be individually conditioned by it with respect to his moral disposition, as long as it is the case practical reason is sufficient for the job, which, of course, the Esteemed Professor sought long and hard to prove.

The c.i. merely stipulates the necessary criterion for the worthiness of being happy, from which follows that disregard for it, is to be immoral, which is nothing more than even if some action willfully determined from your own version of pure practical reason makes you happy, you damned sure didn’t deserve to be. You’ve disrespected something along the line, perhaps without even knowing what it was. Or, which is more commonly witnessed, given human nature itself, one does know, but acts in disregard anyway. Either way, we all recognize this feeling we get from one or the other, hence the two primaries….pleasure or pain.

Excellent dialectical theme you’ve created here; I appreciate the thought-provoking aspect, even without total mutual accord.

Individuals will maxims…. — Moliere

I’m sorry, but I just don’t get that. A maxim is a subjective principle; how do we will a principle?

The will is the faculty of right action, or, volition. I can see acting on a principle, or in accordance with a principle, but I don’t see the willing of one.

In the lines just before your quote, is this…..

“…. As I have deprived the will of every impulse which could arise to it from obedience to any law, there remains nothing but the universal conformity of its actions to law in general, which alone is to serve the will as a principle, i.e., I am never to act otherwise than so that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law. Here, now, it is the simple conformity to law in general, without assuming any particular law applicable to certain actions, that serves the will as its principle and must so serve it, if duty is not to be a vain delusion and a chimerical notion….”

…..in which, to my understanding, just says the will is properly served iff one acts only in conformity to law in general universally, or, which is the same thing, without impulse from inclination or regard to consequence.

Notice as well, he says we will THAT our maxims, which just seems to indicate it is already presupposed.

It’s the little things, donchaknow. Our maxim is to act in a certain way, to will THAT our maxim is obtained, is to will a certain act, which makes much more sense within the theory as a whole.

Dunno…..maybe it’s just me. What say you?

It’s all good. It’s better to have taken the time to digest this philosophy, then to argue over differences in interpretations of it, perhaps from differences in primary sources. You seem to favor CpR, the philosophy concerning the empirical part of ethics, while I draw from Groundwork, which concerns the non-empirical parts, re: morality proper. Actually, you might find a mix of the two, but I kinda don’t.

I'm of the opinion that the three formulations are not "really the same" as Kant claims. — Moliere

An opinion to which you are certainly entitled, but I would offer that Kant, being the non-stop dualist he admits to being, wants it understood the c.i. also has a dualistic nature, re: its form and its content. As such the form is always the same, insofar as commands of reason cannot be self-contradictory, whatever be the act determinable by the formula of its content, which only expresses the relation between an imperfect subject and the objectively necessity…..lawful…..object of his will.
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….aiming to universalize principles…. — Moliere

Granted that a maxim is a subjective principle, is it the principle, or the law of nature which necessarily follows from it, to which universalizing is aimed? I don’t think that which is predicated entirely on subjective constitution has the power of universality as stipulated by the conception of law, especially regarding nature, which in Kant is the totality of all possible things, which in turn manifests as any act by any other moral agent.

If a principle could be universalized, why go through all the trouble of objectively acting as if the mere subjective will, in which the principle resides in the form of pure practical reason, is sufficient causality for all rational beings to follow suit? It is, after all, respect for the law which grounds the interest of the will relative to itself, hence it is respect for the law as universally willed by one, that subsequently becomes the duty of another’s to endorse. In a perfectly moral world, of course, as determined by pure a priori metaphysics.
—————

quote="Moliere;909588"]….an act can follow the moral law and so be legal….[/quote]

Be…..legal? An act that follows the moral law, is good, a tacit description representing the worthiness of being happy, whether or not such act is in accordance with jurisprudence.

I’m pretty sure you didn’t mean to implicate contingent administrative codes, but…..legal?? I just had to bring that one up, donchaknow. I’d beg forgiveness for quibbling, but I ain’t like that. (Grin)

…..let me know what you think. — Moliere

Regarding the SEP article, an informative compendium of opinions, as are most encyclopedic entries of this particular subject matter.

Regarding the SEP article’s effect on my opinions relative to the subject matter, it informed in a supplemental manner, but not sufficiently enough to alter my understanding of fundamental Kantian moral philosophy.

Kant is adamant that his thesis is not for popular consumption, therefore it fascinates me that folks reference a popular source for their definitive information.

Kant is adamant that his thesis is not for the common understanding, but my understanding is very specific, insofar as it is mine alone, thus it is hardly common. Why do you think he was so derisive of the “…. the arrogant pretensions of the schools…”?

Kant wanted his thesis to be understood; I doubt he figured it important, for that understanding, to also incorporate a familiarity with the affectations of his developmental environment. He wants to be known his reasons grounding what he says, as befits a proper theory, regardless of the conditions by which what he says, came about, except with respect to arguments relative to his peers or predecessors.

I don’t care one whit for his religious background, or even if there was or was not one to care about. I want to know if his epistemological and moral philosophies reflect my personality, or are that by which I may judge otherwise.

That is, when push comes to shove, precisely what a theoretical metaphysical philosophy is supposed to do, re: be subject, or object, in a logical cognitive system predicated on relations.

That’s what I think. Nothing all that special about it, in the Grand Scheme of Things, I admit.

you affirmed <this claim> — Leontiskos

C & P the claim.

The constant refrain that I am hearing from you and Mww is the dogmatic claim that Kant's philosophy simply did not have religious influences. — Leontiskos

You did not hear any such thing from me. Actually, I don’t know what you heard, but I know I never said any such thing.

…..it is a different matter altogether to read it out of him. — tim wood

I like it.

Putting aside the liberties taken with my statements, yes.

Oh. Ok. Thanks.

I'm still hesitant, and starting to see how this is a technical question in the philosophy of religion more than about Kant at all — Moliere

I feel the same way, but perhaps from a different point of view. I don’t think we have the authority to suggest for Kant anything he didn’t admit for himself.

I’m not saying he never mentioned the influence his religious upbringing may have had on the formulation of his moral philosophy, only that I’ve yet to find out about it. And from that it follows necessarily at least I have no warrant for understanding such philosophy as if it were conditioned by it.

…..the sort of conflict Kant mitigates with his philosophy. — Moliere

He sure had this proclivity to reduce a concept further than the average philosopher even considered. Who woulda thought general reason had so many qualified reductions, and it’s not that easy keeping them properly separated.

Ever notice, of all the tables of this and that Kant comes up with to facilitate his metaphysical intent, he doesn’t create one for reason? Like a pyramid…..reason at the apex, under it is branched pure/empirical, under pure is transcendental/practical, under empirical is theoretical/speculative. Or something like that.

But maybe he didn’t, because there aren’t any qualified reductions; there is only reason, and its singular role in a tripartite cognitive system. But, while it does have such singular role, it has it only in that kind of system, but is not restricted to that role in the entirety of it applicability, insofar as it is itself the originator of ideas, which rely nonetheless on the cognitive system for their representations.

It can get very confusing.
————-

But regarding the thread title and its ramifications, I’m really not that interested in it. While he does say morality inevitably leads to religion, albeit in his post-critical prime, hence the possibility of leading to Protestantism, if one studies his moral philosophy in and for itself alone, he doesn’t need to find out how it leads to religion.

….being a religious man is not in conflict with being a rational, scientific man. — Moliere

But one would conflict with the other, without sufficiently critical examination of the differences in the conceptions and principles by which each obtains its respective truth.

“…. it is only in this way that the doctrine of morality and the doctrine of nature are confined within their proper limits. For this result, then, we are indebted to a criticism which (…) establishes the necessary limitation of our theoretical cognition to mere phenomena….”

…and to be confined to its own limits just indicates, by extension, our own cognitive limits, relative to the possibility of experience of any of the objects of one or the other, science or morality. Experience being, of course, the final arbiter of empirical knowledge, all else being merely logical inference.

…..to understand Kant as Kant writing Kant, we should pay heed to his religious background….. — Moliere

If Kant doesn’t implicate his own religious background for the a priori pure metaphysics of his moral philosophy, why do we need to pay heed to it?

I think Kant writing Kant wanted Kant to be understood as a pure rational being, “….worthy to be a legislative member in the kingdom of ends….”, rather than a religious man.

But then, the conditions which grant the moral good may not adhere in rational beings in general, but only specify how he is necessarily so.

It's not so much about the baptism into community but about how God influences your ethical life as an individual rational being. — Moliere

I’d say this is pretty close to a Kantian ethical perspective, but I’d hesitate to call it Protestant.

“…. Accordingly he would feel compelled by reason to avow this judgment with complete impartiality, as though it were rendered by another and yet, at the same time, as his own; whereby man gives evidence of the need, morally effected in him, of also conceiving a final end for his duties, as their consequence. Morality thus leads ineluctably to religion, through which it extends itself to the idea of a powerful moral Lawgiver, outside of mankind, for Whose will that is the final end (of creation) which at the same time can and ought to be man’s final end…”
(Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, 1793, in Greene/Hudson, 1960)

Still, while morality leads inevitably to religion by means of pure speculative reason, pure practical reason, the ground of morality writ large, has no need of such inevitability, and thereby no need of religion as such.

It should be clear, the dichotomy between whether religion grounds our morality, the rationality of organized church domains generally, or, individual morality grants personal religious inclinations, the merely subjective philosophical approach.
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Deontology - and his categorical imperative(s) - are reason based. — tim wood

Absolutely; couldn’t be otherwise and still have Kant authorship. Still gotta be careful though, insofar as just reason isn’t quite enough, there being both theoretical and speculative reason and thereby the cognitions and principles derived from each. Only speculative reason, albeit of pure practical interest, justifies Kantian moral philosophy, subsequently deemed as deontological, as reason-based.