Take the time to watch that video. Hoffman features in it.

We can firm it up. There are true statements about unobserved things. "The cup is in the dishwasher" is true, even though we can't see the cup.

So if asked where the cup is, I'll say "It's in the dishwasher" rather then "I last saw it when I closed the door on the dishwasher, but I've no idea where it is now, or even if it still exists. You might try looking inside the dishwasher to see if it reappears". — Banno

This isn't anythign to do with truth, but practicality. Taking those words as true is helpful.

What exactly does an 'objective way' entail? Even Hoffman and most idealists would say there is an objective world. — Tom Storm

I literally just mean something like: the world exists when no one is looking. It was here before we were born and will be there after we die. It exists mind-independently.

Isn't the key issue what is the nature of the world we have access to and think we know? — Tom Storm

So do you think I am contradicting myself when I say that the world exists objectively (mind-independently / when no one is looking) yet we cannot have knowledge of its intrinsic nature?

One of the points Donald Hoffman makes in that video above answers the question I had of him, 'what does objective mean?' At 1:37 he says 'By objective reality, I mean what most physicists would mean: that something is objectively real if it would continue to exist even if there were no creatures to perceive it.'

This isn't anythign to do with truth, but practicality. Taking those words as true is helpful. — AmadeusD

Of course it is to do with truth. But you can't say that because it undermines your antirealism.

The cup is in the dishwasher.

So we agree on this?

The cup is in the dishwasher. — Banno

Johnson kicks stone.

……most idealists would say there is an objective world. — Tom Storm

Dunno about most, but the ones that write books I own just say there are objects, the rest is either given through inference, or superfluous.

Isn't the key issue what is the nature of the world we have access to and think we know? — Tom Storm

KEY issue? I don’t think the nature of the world is key; it is the nature of particular things, that is, insofar as they are the constituency of our empirical knowledge. And I should hope no one thinks he knows the world, it being just some general concept used to denote the containment of all things, the nature of which, other than the schemata subsumed under it, is irrelevant to us.

So we agree on this? — Banno

If you wish to discuss it, at least make some reference to that post I entered on the previous page, the book the thread is about, or the video which features Donald Hoffman, author of the book that this thread is about.

Johnson kicks stone. — Wayfarer

Johnson's is most satisfactory argument.

Your coffee cups are safe.

Albert Einstein famously asked one of his friends whilst on an afternoon walk ‘does the moon cease to exist when nobody’s looking at it?’ If you read the account of the conversation, it was clear Einstein was asking the question ironically or rhetorically. But he was nevertheless compelled to ask! And why? It grew out of the discussions prompted by the famous 1927 Solvay Conference which unveiled the basics of quantum physics. It was at this time that the elusive nature of sub-atomic particles became obvious. — Wayfarer

Yes, I take the point that many people do believe that quantum mechanics suggests that the world is observer relative in a radical way but I strongly believe in my preferred stochastic interpretation which does not take this view at all and has particles in definite positions all the time while the wavefunction is not a real object and there is no collapse due to observers. So from my perspective, this phenomena you are talking about doesn't actually exist.

Cognitive science has shown how much of what we instinctively take to be the objective world is really constructed by the brain/mind 'on the fly', so to speak. There is unceasing neural activity which creates and maintains our stable world-picture based on a combination of sensory experience, autonomic reaction, and judgement. — Wayfarer

But what is being constructed here? Seems to me we are talking about statistical correlations latent in the structure of the world, lifted out of the noisy, non-linearities of sensory input. However, that structural information will differ depending on the perspective, its manner of receiving information, the structure of its neuronal architecture and obviously its poverty or imprecision of these sensory interactions, etc, etc. There could plausibly be infinite ways of synching up to and perceive the world in ways that are structurally consistent - i.e. in ways that you can consistently detect the same part of the world (in principle) and navigate to other parts.

I guess the fact we cannot directly detect precise details of the structure of the world like the structure of molecules might in some ways satisfy the Hofmann criteria of the world being very different to how we perceive it (same with probably the impoverished perceptual faculties of a worm or jellyfish). At the same time we have constructed alternative ways to interact with the world at better precision and get more information.

But what is being constructed here? — Apustimelogist

The world, to all practical intents and purposes. I think the sense that 'the world exists independently of observers' is fallacious, because of the meaning of the word 'exists'. Whenever we say of something that 'it exists', we already impose on it a structure and form that we bring to bear on it. We can't think outside that. The prestige of science tends to privilege the idea of objectivity, such that we accept that the world described by science is 'the real world'. But that world is actually an abstraction constructed from the extraction of quantifiable data from patterns of experience. Hence my recent reference to Schrodinger:

The scientific world-picture vouchsafes a very complete understanding of all that happens — it makes it just a little too understandable. It allows you to imagine the total display as that of a mechanical clockwork which, for all that science knows, could go on just the same as it does, without there being consciousness, will, endeavor, pain and delight and responsibility connected with it — though they actually are. And the reason for this disconcerting situation is just this: that for the purpose of constructing the picture of the external world, we have used the greatly simplifying device of cutting our own personality out, removing it; hence it is gone, it has evaporated, it is ostensibly not needed. — Erwin Schrodinger, Nature and the Greeks

Then having removed it, we wonder where it's gone, and try and work out ways to reconstruct it or explain it. And that is philosophical question, not a scientific question.

So from my perspective, this phenomena you are talking about doesn't actually exist. — Apustimelogist

I looked at the article on stochastic quantum mechanics, but I can't read the math. But in any case, it surely torpedoes LaPlace's daemon.

Of course it is to do with truth. But you can't say that because it undermines your antirealism.

The cup is in the dishwasher. — Banno

Again, a bare assertion.

It has nothing to do with truth. You have described why not consistently questioning our apprehensions is helpful for washing cups. All good my friend.

So do you think I am contradictong myself when I say that the world exists objectively (mind-independently / when no one is looking) yet we cannot have knowledge of its intrinsic nature? — Apustimelogist

I'm not sure. Then again, we can't really disprove hard solipsism either. The real quesion is what does it matter either way?

but the ones that write books I own just say there are objects, the rest is either given through inference, or superfluous. — Mww

Agree. I'll take that.

EY issue? I don’t think the nature of the world is key; it is the nature of particular things, that is, insofar as they are the constituency of our empirical knowledge. And I should hope no one thinks he knows the world, it being just some general concept used to denote the containment of all things, the nature of which, other than the schemata subsumed under it, is irrelevant to us. — Mww

I agree. My language is probably sloppy - when I said nature of the world I meant the nature of things in it.

I take the point that many people do believe that quantum mechanics suggests that the world is observer relative in a radical way but I strongly believe in my preferred stochastic interpretation which does not take this view at all and has particles in definite positions all the time while the wavefunction is not a real object and there is no collapse due to observers. So from my perspective, this phenomena you are talking about doesn't actually exist. — Apustimelogist

The point of Massimiliano Proietti's confirmation of the Wigner's Friend paradox is that the two apparently-contradictory results were actually observed, so whatever interpretation is chosen has to accomodate that, the nub of the issue being the observer-dependency of the outcome.

I ran this through ChatGPT to see what it had to say about how the stochastic interpretation would deal with this paradox. The conclusion it came up with was:

Stochastic quantum mechanics can accommodate the Wigner’s friend paradox by positing that observer-dependent realities are a natural consequence of the underlying randomness in quantum evolution. Different observers may be witnessing the outcomes of distinct stochastic processes, leading to multiple, equally valid, yet conflicting results.

Accordingly, while stochastic quantum mechanics provides a robust framework for understanding phenomena like the Wigner's friend paradox, it offers little reassurance to those who wish to defend a single, objective reality. Instead, it implies the possibility that reality is fragmented, observer-dependent, and shaped by underlying random processes. For proponents of a unified, objective reality, this interpretation is likely unsettling, as it suggests that the reality is indeterminate, rather than being fixed and the same for all observers.

As always with ChatGPT it could be mistaken, but it seems intuitively correct to me.

I can agree if I don't take your words too literally; after all, I have said always that there is no perspective-independent view. I am just keen to hang onto the notion that experiences are structures which are themselves tied to structure out in the world in some sense. It just may be very cheap structure as opposed to the one and only structure. I see your point about 'exists' in the sense that you cannot conceive of something outside of your own perspective. But at the same time, I don't think there is any contradiction in using words to convey something about what is in principle outside of one's perspective and cannot perceive or even conceive; after all, we can talk about these kind of things intelligibly. Maybe that this something must also be very abstract means it must always be very highly idealized though (when we speak about it); intelligib(ility) isn't perspective-independent. At the same time, what does it even mean to convey something intelligibly? What does exist even mean? At some point I just have to accept that I am just acting out words. That's all I am really doing. I kind of like the idea that even if words and meaning we are just like scientific instrumentalists when it really comes down to it.

Edits: in ( )

:up:

At the same time, what does it even mean to convey something intelligibly what does exist even mean? — Apustimelogist

I know, many big questions here. We'll keep mulling it over, no doubt!

Isn't this a bit loose?
— Tom Storm

We can firm it up. There are true statements about unobserved things. "The cup is in the dishwasher" is true, even though we can't see the cup.

So if asked where the cup is, I'll say "It's in the dishwasher" rather then "I last saw it when I closed the door on the dishwasher, but I've no idea where it is now, or even if it still exists. You might try looking inside the dishwasher to see if it reappears". — Banno

I can see how this is one obvious answer to the question, but philosophy certainly allows for different solutions. I know where you sit on this, but I don't know whether realism or anti-realism or idealism or constructivism are tenable. I'm not sure how many people on the forum have the capacity to arrive at an informed assessment.

↪Wayfarer The key here is what is to count as an "observer". You presume mind. That's down to you, not the physics. Alternative include "We don't know - shut up and calculate" and "whatever collapses a wave function". — Banno

I actually see this as irrelevant regarding the 'independent reality' of cups and other physical objects. Even if an observer is a generic 'physical object' as the relational interpretation of QM says, how can we be certain that another physical object has a definite position (e.g. being in a dishwasher) outside of the 'interaction/observation'?

IMO assuming that the observers are not necessrily conscious beings doesn't really change much about this issue.

Nelsonian stochastic mechanics seems a valid interpretation that is both realistic and non-deterministic, as far as I know. Not sure why ChatGpT seems to say that a stochastic and realistic interpretation is impossible (it must have some kind of non-locality)

I was reminded of the ‘does the moon exist?’ question by Apustimologist’s comment along similar lines. That’s what I was responding to. It is of course true that competing interpretations of quantum physics can never be resolved (but even that says something.)

My take on the 'observer problem' is not very complicated. The answer to the question 'does an electron exist prior to being measured?' is that it just is the wave-function, which is a distribution of possibilities, right? So it doesn't definitely exist, or exist as a definite object - there really is just a pattern of probabilites. It is the observation that reduces all the possibilities to zero (collapsing the wave function.) What's 'spooky' about it is mainly that the act of measurement is not itself part of the equation. And also the ontology of the purportedly fundamental particles of physics. A realist would rather hope there was a definitely-existing point-particle somewhere along the line. It's like the measurement 'makes manifest' something that was previously only potentially existing. (This is something that Heisenberg said, referring to Aristotle's 'potentia' (source).

That ties in with the role that I see in 'the observer' generally. As that video Is Reality Real? says 'of course there's an external world. We just don't see it as it is.' Our brain/mind is constructing reality on the fly at every moment.

It is the observation that reduces all the possibilities to zero…. — Wayfarer

To….one?

Philosophy 101 — Wayfarer

Indeed. If that were not the case, it might actually be impossible to explain how we make mistakes, insofar as given that we did in fact all see…..sense, understand, cognize, experience, and whatnot…..the external world as it really is, there shouldn’t even be any.

Right. And even @Banno’s cups - he made not have made ‘em, but he did choose them. And they were made because there are coffee- and tea-drinkers. All true but nevertheless they remain like all objects ‘permanent possibilities of experience.’

My take on the 'observer problem' is not very complicated. The answer to the question 'does an electron exist prior to being measured?' is that it just is the wave-function, which is a distribution of possibilities, right? So it doesn't definitely exist, or exist as a definite object - there really is just a pattern of probabilites. It is the observation that reduces all the possibilities to zero (collapsing the wave function.) What's 'spooky' about it is mainly that the act of measurement is not itself part of the equation. And also the ontology of the purportedly fundamental particles of physics. A realist would rather hope there was a definitely-existing point-particle somewhere along the line. It's like the measurement 'makes manifest' something that was previously only potentially existing. (This is something that Heisenberg said, referring to Aristotle's 'potentia' (source). — Wayfarer

Yeah, I sort of agree, but maybe with a qualification. If one interprets the wave-function epistemically, i.e. as a quantitative measurement of knowledge/degrees of beliefs (i.e. probabilities as interpreted in a Bayesian way), then the 'collapse' is simply an update of knowlege/degrees of beliefs. However, if one wants to interpret the wave-function epistemically, then such an approach should be followed to the end, in a consistent way: QM doens't allow us to make any ontological commitments.

Unfortunately, sometimes what is presented is a 'mixed' approach. For instance, my problem with saying that "the 'measurement' makes manifest something that was only 'potentially existent'" is that it can be misleading: if one attributes some kind of 'reality' to those 'potentialities', wehave a 'realist' view. After all, if it is supposed to describe 'what is really happening' when a measurement is done, then how is not a 'realist' interpretation?
If it is interpreted as a 'convenient way of speaking that should not be taken literally, then one remains faithful to an epistemic approach.

Of course, a truly consistent epistemic approach doens't deny that there is 'something' before a measurement/observation (or whetever word one might prefer) takes place. However, that 'something' cannot be described/known and is not an object of the theory. Indeed, an epistemic interpretation is actually like saying 'there is a limit of what I can know and what I can represent mathematically'. That's why instead of 'non-realist interpretations' I prefer 'non-representationalist interpretations'.
When one understands this IMO, all the talk about 'what is an observer' becomes irrelevant. The theory should be silent about such a question. But, of course, I can say that 'I' can be an observer - this and only this is self-evident apparently - and since I am a conscious being, every other conscious being might be an observer. Maybe only conscious beings are observers, maybe something else can also be. But how can I know that? How can I know that a computer might be an 'observer'? What can I have are speculations, maybe reasonable speculations. But real knowledge? IMO the best if we follow an epistemic/'non-representationalist' interpretation, we should admit that QM itself simply doesn't tell us what an 'observer' really is. It's silent.

Also, this 'epistemic interpretation' is not really restricted to QM. It can IMO be used also for other physical theories (after all, as I said in an another thread, nobody takes the 'forces' in newtonian mechanics as literally existent physical entities... they are useful fictions).

If on the other hand, one prefers a 'realist/representationalist' view one apparently is forced to accept non-locality (a weird kind of non-locality where non-local effects are 'hidden'*), many-worlds or something else (and weirdly enough, even if one accept a 'realist' interpretation, the epistemic interpretations can be still be used to make correct predictions...).

*non-local effects are hidden because in an experiment with, say, two entangled particles, Alice can discover that the 'non-local' effects have taken place only when she gets access to Bob's data on his particle.

Yep. Even if the permanent substance of an object remains, the experience of it, which for us is the same as knowledge about it, in separate times and conditions, is merely possible.

Simply put, the permanence of substance can never justify the permanence of knowledge. From which follows as a matter of logical necessity…..that I put some thing someplace at a time is not in itself sufficient for my knowledge of it at any other time.
————-

Added later…..cuz I’m old and sometimes forget what I meant to do:

Can possibilities really be reduced to zero? Seems like that would be the same as there being zero possibilities, which kinda makes experimental results rather suspicious.

For instance, my problem with saying that "the 'measurement' makes manifest something that was only 'potentially existent'" is that it can be misleading: if one attributes some kind of 'reality' to those 'potentialities', we have a 'realist' view. After all, if it is supposed to describe 'what is really happening' when a measurement is done, then how is not a 'realist' interpretation? — boundless

It is realist, but I think he really does say there are degrees of existence:

“This new ontological picture requires that we expand our concept of ‘what is real’ to include an extraspatiotemporal domain of quantum possibility,” write Ruth Kastner, Stuart Kauffman and Michael Epperson. Considering potential things to be real is not exactly a new idea, as it was a central aspect of the philosophy of Aristotle, 24 centuries ago. An acorn has the potential to become a tree; a tree has the potential to become a wooden table. Even applying this idea to quantum physics isn’t new. Werner Heisenberg, the quantum pioneer famous for his uncertainty principle, considered his quantum math to describe potential outcomes of measurements of which one would become the actual result. The quantum concept of a “probability wave,” describing the likelihood of different possible outcomes of a measurement, was a quantitative version of Aristotle’s potential, Heisenberg wrote in his well-known 1958 book Physics and Philosophy. “It introduced something standing in the middle between the idea of an event and the actual event, a strange kind of physical reality just in the middle between possibility and reality.”

Isn't that something like possibility space? It's governed by constraints but is still a field of possibilities. I think due to that idea, much of modern technological culture is reliant. The Greeks allowed us to peer into the domain of the possible and realise some of them.

But I am also impressed with QBism. But it can still be epistemic, as all of the 'permanent possibilities of experience' are themselves described by the laws of physics, with strong attractors emergent patterns and so on, but now interlaced with observation. But they still remain essentially grounded in subjective experience insofar as they're disclosed to us.

(The other recent great book I read on this is Nature Loves to Hide, Shimon Malin).

If you're interested, Hoffman has released a paper which assumes more ontological commitments WRT to his ITP: https://constructivist.info/12/3/265.fields

He has a physicist for a co-author here, and I really recommend following up Chris Field's own publications.

The paper takes a decoherence interpretation of quantum physics to explain how the world and agent co-construct or co-emerge in a new metaphysics which doesn't assume the ready made world. There is still work to be done on the notion of observation of course, but I think the implications take the theory a satisfying distance away from Kantianism.

I myself adopt a cybernetic metaphysic in the Von Foerster vein in my own stuff.

I don't see the contradiction and I think if you say there is one then maybe you should make it explicit through something like syllogism, where all ambiguities are removed.

I still think that maybe you have misinterpreted my position. You said you think I mean is:

[(1)] "An inference which you've made about the world based on repeated experience can directly translate to a conception of the world in an objective way"

What I said I mean is:

[(2)] "The world exists mind-independently when no one is looking."

["Mind-independently when no one is looking"] is all I mean by "objective". The world and things [in the world when I am not looking] are general concepts not picking out any specific perspective-independent nor perspective-dependent description - they just convey the idea that something, its exact nature unspecified, is happening when I am not looking.

[The two quoted statements (1) and (2) above] seem like two completely different statements to me. Furthermore, the fact that the latter does not seek to pick out some specific perspective-dependent nor perspective-independent description seems compatible with the idea that we cannot have access to the intrinsic nature of the world ["intrinsic" too is a vague concept not picking out anything in particular, is it not].

In fact, I can re-formulate the statement about "not being able to access the intrinsic nature of the world" in terms of the idea that I simply cannot access information about the world without looking at it, and looking at it consitutes some perspective.

Maybe now I can reformulate my thought that the world exists objectively (when I am not looking) yet I cannot access its intrinsic nature simply as follows:

I can only access information from the world by looking at it through my perspective, yet when I am not looking at it, the external causes of those percepts (of my perspective) continue to exist even when I am not looking and even despite the fact I cannot actually characterize them independently of my perceptions - but something is there, without needing to specify too much about that something.

This inference is based on regularities in my cognitive maps of the world when I look at it then turn away then turn back again, or based on reports from other people. My inferences are not infallible (there could be a Cartesian demon), my inferences are all based on prediction and empirical adequacy - but my experiences are not consistent with the idea that things disappear when I don't look at them.

I can emphasize that when I do look at them, I view a percept through my own perspective; however, this percept is being caused by something which exists beyond my experience even when I am not looking. When people disagree, we can explain that away in terms of brain mechanisms and perceptual differences.

Edit: some clarifying, [ ]

I think the implications take the theory a satisfying distance away from Kantianism. — Bodhy

(2017)
“….Implications: Our results contribute to an understanding of the world in which neither objects nor spacetime are observer-independent….”

(1787)
“….It is therefore from the human point of view only that we can speak of space, extended objects, etc. If we depart from the subjective condition, under which alone we can obtain external intuition, or, in other words, by means of which we are affected by objects, the representation of space has no meaning whatsoever.…”


“…. in general, (…) space is not a form which belongs as a property to things; but that objects in space are quite unknown to us, and what we call outward objects**, are nothing else but mere representations of our sensibility, whose form is space, but whose real correlate, the thing in itself, is not known by means of these representations, nor ever can be, but respecting which, in experience, no inquiry is ever made.…”
(**re: immediately aforementioned objects in space)
—————

Now, granting that cherry-picking in general is beneath the dignity of proper philosophy, a valid counterargument is still possible for any given stated position. So it is that a “satisfying distance” proposed by one, can be judged as no meaningful distance at all, judged by another.

If you’d said the means by which Hoffman, et al arrives at the conclusions supporting their theory is a satisfying distance from Kantianism, you’d have been quite right.

Just sayin’, and of no particular import.