All that, plus, I’d submit, that people in general are more conscious of their respective worldviews than they are of the metaphysics from which they are given.

Cart before the horse, if there ever was such a thing.

HA!!! Yeah, sorry, bud. Just calls ‘em as I sees ‘em, donchaknow.

I thought your Main Man was Chomsky anyway, so gimme credit for not throwing him under the transcendental bus, maybe?

We can, in a roundabout, absential way, observe these (“unconscious”) processes. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, but such are the exceptions to the rule, rather then a metaphysical, albeit speculative, establishment of it.
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…I don't actually think the whole modern focus on "beginning at the beginning" is actually helpful…. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Not helpful….in what context? I guess it depends on where “beginning” actually is, relative to whatever follows.

….“unconscious" processes, a concept unavailable to Kant? — Count Timothy von Icarus

“….a blind but indispensable function of the soul, without which we should have no cognition whatever, but of the working of which we are seldom even conscious….”

“….For they pass, unconsciously, from the world of sense to the insecure ground of pure transcendental conception….”

“….whether they be conscious or unconscious, be it of the manifold in intuition, sensuous or non-sensuous, or of several conceptions, is an act of the understanding….”

He had a conception of the “unconscious”, and for “unconscious processes” nothing could be said anyway, so….
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Might it be valid to say that what is often labeled in Kant as "a priori" might be better described using modern concepts of "unconscious" processes — Count Timothy von Icarus

Even if it is valid to say, it remains whether the newly described terms are as sufficient in their support of the theory in which they originated, as the terms described under the original conditions are necessary for it. Modern conceptions grounding modern descriptions of formerly defined terms tend to refute, or at least obfuscate, the original theories. Might be called “re-structuring” though, in order to assuage conscience, which is tacit acknowledgement the original should have just been left alone. (yeah, I’m talkin’ to YOU, Arthur!!!).

So, sure, to describe Kantian terms in modern understandings is just to have a newer theory. People been doing that since forever, right?

Not at all. — Manuel

Cool.

And I am refusing to read Hegel. — Manuel

Way cool. I did “Science of Logic”, but my persuasions had already been set.

It depends on how you think about the systems of other figures…… — Manuel

Do you think his predecessors constructed systems as complete as the three Citique’s entail?

an emphasis on the shift in perspective, more so that a entirely new mode of investigation. — Manuel

If no one had ever thought to consider the problem as he describes, wouldn’t an investigation into it be a new mode of investigation?

“….It is extremely advantageous to be able to bring a number of investigations under the formula of a single problem. For in this manner, we not only facilitate our own labour, inasmuch as we define it clearly to ourselves, but also render it more easy for others to decide whether we have done justice to our undertaking. The proper problem of pure reason, then, is contained in the question: “How are synthetical judgements à priori possible?” That metaphysical science has hitherto remained in so vacillating a state of uncertainty and contradiction, is only to be attributed to the fact that this great problem, and perhaps even the difference between analytical and synthetical judgements, did not sooner suggest itself to philosophers. Upon the solution of this problem, or upon sufficient proof of the impossibility of synthetical knowledge à priori, depends the existence or downfall of the science of metaphysics.…”

I agree there was a shift in perspectives, in an effort to connect the empirical with the rational rather than keep them separate, but it would have been impossible to connect them into a useful system without a new mode of investigation.

Kant is a metaphysician without knowing it…. — LFranc

Good to know. Thanks.

That’s the rub, innit? How would we as humans comprehend any intelligence, other than the one by which humans comprehend anything? Which is why it cannot be said noumena are impossible, insofar as some intellect other than ours might actually use them. How could we possibly be justified in saying there is no such thing? But at the same time, how could we say there is, if we could never comprehend an intelligence that fails to meet the functional criteria of our own?

Correct. But Kant relegates noumena to the human faculty of understanding alone, and for that reason they are necessarily unattainable goals of science. For an intelligence other than discursive, or for which sensible intuition conditioned by space and time is not necessary, it cannot be known as impossible that noumena function in such system.

Fundamental understandings are just what is taken for granted….. — Janus

I’d go as far as to say, beyond merely taken for granted, fundamental understandings are not even within Everydayman’s conscious considerations; that is to say, he hasn’t slowed himself down enough to figure out that he has them, and to know what they are.

And while it may be true you make that case for yourself alone, given that all humans are intellectually and morally equipped in exactly the same manner, it follows any other of congruent rationality may come to the same conclusion. I mean…look….you convinced me, so…that ya go.

its likely we are speaking the same metaphysical language here — AmadeusD

Yeah, but you know…..even though we share a language, it remains we may hold with different systems into which that common language fits. For me, “perception” is this and only does that, for you “perception” may be something quite different. So it is with CPR: it is a system, thought out and written as complete in itself. Whether it is right or not is irrelevant, it only matters that it is complete, and…..well, you know….logically comprehensible.

I really, really like this formulation…. — AmadeusD

And it answers how the thread title is backwards: the real transition loss, is from world to mind. Even science grants that, in the exchange of energy forms always and necesarily involves loss of data or information or whatever you want to call it. It follows that anything given to the mind, meaning anything exchanging domain from the external as one energy form, to the internal in a very different energy form, something will be lost in the transition.

The secondary mark of truth is that for which the negation is also true. As such, it is true there is no possible loss of data or information or whatever you want to call it, from mind to world, re: the thread title, insofar as the mind creates or generates or composes of its own accord all the data with which it is concerned, it follows that a loss created from itself, is impossible.

Long story short….loss in transition from mind to world? There isn’t any. Or maybe better yet, it makes no sense to say there is such a thing.
————

Much appreciated — AmadeusD

Thanks, but, I gotta say…whatever you got from me I got from CPR, which reduces to, insofar as there’s no measurable qualifier to support I’m that much smarter than you, you could have got it from CPR on your own. Might just be a matter of time spent on study. Personal attachment of value. Relative significance. Dunno.

the reality that surrounds us, is the subject matter of metaphysics — Rob J Kennedy

Is it? What then, of the natural sciences?

The subject matter of metaphysics, is the methodology by which the natural sciences regarding the reality surrounding us, is comprehensible.
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….best description of Metaphysics…. — Rob J Kennedy

“…. this kind of a priori knowledge must unquestionably be looked upon as given; in other words, metaphysics must be considered as really existing, if not as a science, nevertheless as a natural disposition of the human mind. For human reason, without any instigations imputable to the mere vanity of great knowledge, unceasingly progresses, urged on by its own feeling of need, towards such questions as cannot be answered by any empirical application of reason, or principles derived therefrom; and so there has ever really existed in every man some system of metaphysics. It will always exist, so soon as reason awakes to the exercise of its power of speculation. And now the question arises: “How is metaphysics, as a natural disposition, possible?” In other words, how, from the nature of universal human reason, do those questions arise which pure reason proposes to itself, and which it is impelled by its own feeling of need to answer as well as it can?

But as in all the attempts hitherto made to answer the questions which reason is prompted by its very nature to propose to itself, for example, whether the world had a beginning, or has existed from eternity, it has always met with unavoidable contradictions, we must not rest satisfied with the mere natural disposition of the mind to metaphysics, that is, with the existence of the faculty of pure reason, whence, indeed, some sort of metaphysical system always arises; but it must be possible to arrive at certainty in regard to the question whether we know or do not know the things of which metaphysics treats. We must be able to arrive at a decision on the subjects of its questions, or on the ability or inability of reason to form any judgement respecting them; and therefore either to extend with confidence the bounds of our pure reason, or to set strictly defined and safe limits to its action…..”

I would need to ask though, is that enough for you to say we 'see' those objects? — AmadeusD

I prefer to say my sensory devices are affected by them. Any object is an effect on each sensory device according to that device’s physiology, and from which a corresponding sensation ensues in each, which just is to perceive.

….perception is what is done with the sensory information to create the experience…. — AmadeusD

Cognition is what is done with sensory information. Experience is cognition by conjoined perceptions. Each in its place, doing only its job, as a system should.

Where is the mechanism by which we 'directly' access these objects? — AmadeusD

Wasn’t that the whole point of my intervention here? We don’t directly access anything; we have the capacities and abilities by which things are given access to us.

And now the really cool part: do you see how the thread title is backwards?

Relax. All is not lost.

Might it help to examine whether the other senses meet the same criteria you’ve assigned to vision?

I mean…jeeeezzz, ain’t it nonsense to suppose actual basketballs impress the eyes? Imagine how much that would HURT!!! Nevertheless, on the other hand, it is actually quite necessary that actual oysters (technically, some thing conceived of, named by, and eventually experienced as, “oyster”) impress the tongue. How in the HELL would you even call that slimey mess an “oyster”….or whatever you did end up calling it…. if it never hit the sensory device which allows that kind of determination? Does one ever call it an “oyster” because it sounds like Ravel’s “Bolero”?
(Sigh)

Perception does not occur in the mind; it occurs in the senses. Why the fork else would there even BE senses? What is done with what the senses inform you of, is in the mind.
(Crap-on-a-cracker, I hate that word. There is no mind; there is only reason. Or something. Whatever it is that humans have. What kinda fool denies whatever it is that humans have, huh??? Except rabid physicalists, but they don’t count. Sorta like analytic philosophers. You know….forest-trees/map-territory paradigmatic deniers)
(Double sigh)
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Stove’s Gem? Ehhhh…don’t worry ‘bout that Happy Horse-hockey. Guy just wondered how stupid things could get, and to give an example of it, he did something stupid. Wanna defeat Stove’s Gem? Just don’t do what he did, which 99%…..ok, fine: 80%…..of otherwise intelligent humans never did do in the first place. DUH!!!!)
(Double-double sigh)
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Now that we got the attaboys out of the way, time for the awww-crap’s.

It make no sense to infer the existence of real, external objects, as the sole criterion of their reality. Kinda silly to trip over the dog, but only credit the dog’s existence to the inference there was something there to trip over. Which would you have done first? If you tripped over the dog it means you didn’t know it was there, so why bother inferring it’s existence from the floor onto which you’ve quite unceremoniously planted your face? Nahhh…the damn dog was already there, which makes explicit you didn’t need any inference at all for it.

And if that don’t blow your dress up, think of it this way: inference is a logical maneuver, and there is no logic whatsoever in perception. Aristotle said so, as did his somewhat chronologically removed protege. I believe him, or, them, and so should you. Trust me; I wouldn’t steer you wrong, Honest.

Anyway…just sayin’. Even if you don’t believe a word of it, wasn’t it more fun to read that what’s passed as philosophical discourse here recently?

Ehhh…he’s around; he’ll get to this when he’s ready.

…..you may no longer believe exactly what you say here, or perhaps have modified your stance. — Manuel

I wondered about that, too. Now that you’ve brought it up, it’s likely we’ll be told one way or the other.

Hey back, and, thanks for the invite.

I was in general agreement with your list, maybe differentiating in terminology or a couple particulars here and there.

1. All thought/belief consists of mental correlation(s) drawn between 'objects' of physiological sensory perception and/or the agent itself(it's own state of 'mind' when applicable). — creativesoul

I took it upon myself to read this as: all thought/belief consists of correlations. These are correlations drawn either between physiological sensory perception and the agent (termed a posteriori), or, correlations drawn from the agent itself (termed a priori).

Can I get away with that? Or do my changes make a difference in what you meant to say?
—————

Also with respect to your list, what do you think about a greater separation of thought from belief?

We just need to escape the empiricist trap, which is a metaphysical belief that sound principles of "experience" can only be provided by sense observation. — Metaphysician Undercover

While I might agree with the notion of escaping the empiricist trap, I’d still ask whether a pure empiricist could have a metaphysical belief. At least from Hume, even the suggestion of metaphysical constructs of any kind are considered either absurd, impossible, or merely reckless.

This is good and I agree, in principle. Might I suggest one small change, re:

….metaphysical principle which allow for the reality (validity) of the non-physical. — Metaphysician Undercover

Insofar as the perspective is from logic alone rather than typically scientific experimentation, just seems fewer eyebrows would raise just before requiring you to prove the reality of, e.g., the abstract objects or ideas that ground principles a priori.

Just sayin’…..

I am personally a "radical emergence" guy, minds arise from configurations of natural stuff, but we have no idea how. — Manuel

I’d join that club, if there was such a thing.

I think that the exact relation between thinking and judgement is a very difficult issue. And, depending on how one would define each, both being somewhat ambiguous in general use, would dictate the relationship established. — Metaphysician Undercover

Oh absolutely. Definitions, relationships and whatnot are generally predicated on a specific theory, and that theory establishes an understanding for how all that stuff works together as a system. Still worthwhile to bear in mind the talking about the system is to reify its components, the cardinal sin of proper metaphysicals itself on the one hand, but necessary for metaphysical discourse on the other. So we’re screwed from the get-go, with regard to obtaining sufficient agreement on much of anything.
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In relation to arguments for "Physicalism", I would say that this is strong evidence against physicalism. — Metaphysician Undercover

Pretty much, yeah, under the assumption physicalism is the be-all, end-all of whatever one can think of. Which seems self-contradictory from the start, insofar as thinking quite literally is a non-physical activity. So….screwed again.

All good. Thanks.

Except, my mind isn’t included in stuff of the world. Or, at least, I make every effort to prevent the world from getting its grubby paws on it. I mean, really…..who or what would have the power to decide such a thing anyway?

…..one judgement is compatible with the opposing judgement. — Metaphysician Undercover

Assuming I’ve understood what you mean, and from the perspective of critical thought, I’m not sure how much sense it makes to grant compatibility to opposing judgements. I think the approaching object is John, judgement A, has nothing to do with judgement B, ……but my eyes ain’t so good no more. A relates a perception to a representation through experience, re: John, but B relates to a representation to its relative quality, so while both relate to the same representation, they don’t relate to each other. Dunno how compatibility has anything to do with it.

So, consider this example. The object is approaching at a distance, and my eyes are not very good (incidental evidence), so I'm hesitant to make the judgement call. — Metaphysician Undercover

This incidental evidence relates to your eyes, not to the approaching object. The former is a judgement with respect to the quality of a given representation, the latter is a judgement with respect to the validity of it. The former is contingent in accordance with physiology, the latter necessary in accordance with rules.

So what judgement call are you actually hesitant in making? That the approaching object is John? Haven’t you tacitly made that call already, by not thinking it is any particular object at all, insofar as your proposition makes no mention of what you think the approaching object may or may not be? In effect, you’ve thought it unjustifiable to name the approaching object, which your proposition in fact represents. Another way to say you’re hesitant in making a judgement call, is to say you just don’t know. Which is fine, of course.
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Notice what I've done. — Metaphysician Undercover

I understand and can accept most of that, with the exception of suspending judgement. From the perspective of critical thought, to think is to judge, from which follows suspension of judgement is impossible.

Anyway….not much more I can add here.

What about the factor I mentioned though (…), recognition that my judgement may be mistaken? — Metaphysician Undercover

That’s experience talking. You’ve been wrong before, so, given only so much evidence, you might very well be wrong again. Here, though, you haven’t the evidence to falsify the initial judgement you’ve made, re: “I think it is John”.

So as much as I believe that the approaching thing is John, I am uncertain because I know that my eyes are not good, and this uncertainty would be circumstantial evidence supporting the approaching object as being not-John. — Metaphysician Undercover

Sure, no doubt. With the evidence limited to perception of an approaching object alone, you’re not yet at the point of certainty regarding what the object actually is. If you were, you’d not be limited to “I think it is John”.

I’m not comfortable with the notion that evidence supporting an affirmative judgement is at the same time circumstantial evidence supporting its negation. You just confuse yourself if you say this evidence allows me to think it’s John, but it also allows me to think it isn’t. Rather arbitrary methodology, I should think, whereas, given some initial evidence, you would be perfectly justified in thinking it is John and at the same time not knowing it is.

As for your eyes…..the weather, the crowd, you’re being intentionally tricked, a whole menagerie of incidental evidence….. each is the content of an individual judgement, the compendium of which determines the experience you’re going to have, affirming your thought, in which case you know the approaching object is John, or negating it, in which case you know the approaching object isn’t John.

In the interest of critical though, then, just as it is impossible to determine an object by a single conception, it is also impossible to obtain an empirical certainty with evidence only sufficient for determining a single judgement. Hidden in that little tidbit, is the formal distinction between belief and knowledge.

the external is that by which sensations are possible.
— Mww

What happens when we receive stimulus with no external object, such as dreams? — Manuel

I don’t think it is the case dreams are the reception of stimuli, for one thing, and for another, reception of stimuli just is sensation anyway, which is only possible by the causality of external things.

But you probably mean the brain receiving stimuli from itself, which requires no immediate sensation. But then, does any dream contain that which was not at some former time a sensation, or at least a possible sensation? If so, then external objects are at least the mediate content of dreams, even if not their cause.
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Serious monism requires a lot of imagination, in my mind. — Manuel

What does serious monism look like? By what description might I understand what it is?

So, we are still left with the issue, what is external? — Manuel

I agree it hasn’t to do with properties of things, but it does seem quite easy just to say…the external is that by which sensations are possible.

Wanna get stickier….the external is the permanent in time, simply because the internal never is.

Helps to be a unrepentant dualist, though, right? If one isn’t, he would have a harder job with the issue, methinks.

Some study of critical thinking may be useful. — Metaphysician Undercover

First thing that presented itself to me was, the compound judgement in the form, “I see something coming”, subsequently complemented by “…. I think that it is John”.

The first is a general empirical judgement grounded in a perception alone; the second is a discursive judgement grounded in antecedent experience, insofar as the thought of a particular object approaching wouldn’t be represented as “John” without it. Pretty clear, really “I see (something)….”, followed by “……I think (John)”.

With respect to evidence, it follows that the evidence for the primary judgement, being a mere perception, cannot be contrary to the approach of something, insofar as the evidence just is the approach, in the form of motion over time.

As for the evidence of the complementary judgement, consequential to perception, insofar as the thought of the approaching object already has a representation belonging to it, such evidence is experience, which, given only these conditions, cannot be contradictory, for otherwise the thought that the approaching object is “John”, would not arise at all. To call it “John” presupposes all that is necessary for “John” to be that thought.

The only logical permission for the evidence to not support the approaching object as being “John”, is upon the instantiation of additional evidence in the form of different empirical qualities derived from subsequent perceptions, but not of the same evidence by which the representation was determined. It is by the analysis of these different qualities, and those of sufficient disparity from the antecedents, that the thought of the approaching object cannot in fact be “John”, which is, of course, a significantly distinct and entirely separate judgement in itself.

Rhetorically speaking. For what it’s worth.

a World 1, which Kant would call a thing in itself, does not exist for us. — Wolfgang

In fact, it does, and necessarily. From which follows, conclusions drawn on false premises, is invalid.

IBM in atoms, 1989;

“There’s Plenty of Room at the Bottom”, Feynman, 1959.

Descartes — Arne

There is something to be said affirming that choice. I personally didn’t consider him, for his adhesion to religion, however much the times forced him into it. I mean, you can’t really shift many paradigms if you’re still beholden to organized gods for whatever grace…or indeed, disgrace…..you receive for your work.

So you don't see Derrida or Deluze, say, as philosophers. — Tom Storm

Sure I do. But they haven’t seriously shifted any paradigms. Or, they haven’t shifted any serious paradigms. While they may have advanced this or that line of thought, they haven’t altered thought itself.
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….overthrown scientific paradigms from earlier eras fade from memory…. — Joshs

That criteria is low-level, I should think. There are certainly advances in science, but very few cancel their predecessors outright.

Ehhhh….sorry, man, but I have such little interest in the soft sciences. That said, I can’t claim enough knowledge to answer your question. With respect to Kant, though, I’m confident social sciences would relate to him only as far as he treats of anthropology (from a pragmatic point of view), 1796. Not having studied that work, I can’t say post-structuralism is a footnote to it.

I don’t get it. Paradigm shifts in science are not ignored, couldn’t be by definition actually, so what’s wrong with the logic of my submission, exactly?

What are such paradigm shifts in Philosophy? — SpinozaNietzsche

Maybe nothing more than who is still the more referenced, after the longer time.

I submit, under that criteria, there are but two: Aristotle with pure logic, Kant with pure reason. All others construct philosophies ultimately grounded in, or at least conditioned by, presuppositions of them.

….the things that must be us, are the hardest things to see…. — Fire Ologist

We as conscious thinking subjects, do not seem to operate in terms of the very natural law by which we understand the operation of all natural real things. The brain operates according to natural law, but none of the terms of it are present in our direct, first-person, unmediated thinking. We can never understand how the self-conscious thinking subject arises, by the same means by which we understand all other natural events, so perhaps a better question is….why does it seem like there is such a thing at all?

The account for the seemingly self-conscious thinking subject is the jurisdiction of metaphysics, at least this far into human evolution, even if for no other reason that science proper is not yet sufficiently equipped for it, which is the same as saying the scientist presently has no sufficient method for how to proceed.

All that being said, I reject that the things that must be us are the hardest to see. I rather hold the view, that for which the negation, for all practical intents and purposes, is impossible, one had best figure out how to see it, in order to get the best and most out of it. Hence the assemblage of the plethora of abstract ways, means and ends into manufactured speculative explanatory devices, none of which are real in the strictest sense but the denial of which is absurd. Still, it helps, to be “… sufficiently cautious in the construction of our fictions, which are not the less fictions on that account.…”

…..isn’t simply the generic givenness that things are intelligible….. — Joshs

Yes, I get that now, after paying attention to the video. The elapsed time reference in it, from helped with the transcendental part I took exception to.

Thanks.

I’ll have to think about that.

…..this is a transcendental claim, in Kant's sense of transcendental. It's about the conditions of possibility of the intelligibility of things, such as the past, or time, given that they are, indeed, intelligible. — Evan Thompson

Hmmmm…..

If it is given that a thing is intelligible, in what sense are there conditions for the possibility of its being intelligible? For that which is given, re: those things that are intelligible, the very possibility of it is also given, so wouldn’t the conditions be met?

?

That, I must say, was the most fabulously entertaining dissertation.

Having a long-standing inclination for analyzing perceived dialectical subtleties, I’ll be interested in Bob’s response.