The Good is not normative. — Bob Ross

Agreed. That which may or may not be good, as in instances of, is. The metaphysical argument being, one cannot know (appreciate, consider, allow….whatever) a thing as good, without the quality itself being resident in consciousness somewhere, somehow, over and above mere experience. Same with beauty, justice, and so on.

It’s when we try to get people to justify The Good where things get confused and diverse. — Bob Ross

Agreed. THE Good, good in and of itself, is an ideal, thus non-contingent given. Not susceptible to instances. It’s an aesthetic judgement of feeling, rather than a discursive judgement of thought.
————-

On the other hand, your triangle example doesn’t work the same as the ideal of The Good, in that it is impossible to think a triangle in general, for each though of one is immediately a particular instance of the conception. The Good, however, as an ideal, can never be constructed in accordance with a conception, hence remains a different kind of judgement.

En passant……

To posit the existence of an object of thought is to affirm that which is thought about is conditioned by the categories of quality (whatever it is, it is real) and modality (whatever it is, it has phenomenal representation, thus can be an existence).

To adjoin to an object of thought that there can be no possible matching object in the empirical world, is to deny to that object the condition of the categories (whatever it is, it does not have phenomenal representation thus cannot be determinable as an existence, hence cannot be determinable as real).

In order to alleviate the absurdity of methodological contradiction, it must be the case, then, that the object of thought as such, is not a real physical object, hence the categories are not necessary conditions, and, consequently the object of thought belongs to understanding alone, insofar as the understanding is given as the faculty of thought, and therefore the existence of that object is not necessary and the contradiction disappears.

By thesis-specific definition, thought is cognition by means of the synthesis of conceptions, which reduces the faculty of understanding to the faculty by which conceptions arise. In turn, conceptions are representations of that which understanding thinks, as are phenomena representations of that which the faculty of sensibility intuits.

Because thought is cognition by means of the synthesis of conceptions, it follows necessarily there must be a plurality of conceptions in order for there to be a synthesis of them. On the other hand, for that object understanding thinks, it does not follow necessarily that object contains a plurality of conceptions, and if it does not, no synthesis of conceptions and thereby no cognition with respect to that object, is possible. By the containing of a plurality of conceptions is meant the schema of the lesser conceptions under the general, by which synthesis itself is even possible.

Under the condition that no faculty has contained in its method that which serves no purpose for its systemic employment, it must be that no singular, uncognizable conception belongs to understanding alone, but rather, belongs to a higher order faculty, and is called an idea, and is properly a transcendental conception of pure reason. The categories are of course, exempt from this criteria, insofar as, while they are themselves singular conceptions albeit not of objects understanding thinks, they have schema, the lesser conceptions, subsumed under them, they serve a systemic purpose within the faculty to which they belong, hence are not mere ideas.

To plumb the subtleties of transcendental philosophy is to grant to reason its proclivity for stepping out on its own, re: the whole raison d’etre of CPR, juxtapositioned to lesser faculties that always operate in conjunction with each other, or with Nature, regarding existences and knowledge.

“…. Now, although we must say of the transcendental conceptions of reason, “they are only ideas,” we must not, on this account, look upon them as superfluous and nugatory. For, although no object can be determined by them, they can be of great utility, unobserved and at the basis of the edifice of the understanding, as the canon for its extended and self-consistent exercise—a canon which, indeed, does not enable it to cognize more in an object than it would cognize by the help of its own conceptions, but which guides it more securely in its cognition. Not to mention that they perhaps render possible a transition from our conceptions of nature and the non-ego to the practical conceptions, and thus produce for even ethical ideas keeping, so to speak, and connection with the speculative cognitions of reason….”

Now, it’s time for important stuff. Like…..football.

….reputable source…. — fdrake

Palmquist. Guyer. (?)

My point was from a German Kant commentator, and I agreed with his point. — Corvus

Then what is to be made of those dogmatic slumbers, and the awakening therefrom? The Dude Himself says he’s writing to justify synthetic a priori cognitions, and all that follows from them, by treating the established metaphysics of the day as a science.

That there is a place for transcendental objects….a synthetic a priori cognition if there ever was one…..is merely a happy consequence.

No longer pertinent.

No longer pertinent.

What I meant was your CPR reference had no relevance backing up your claims. — Corvus

Why do I have to repeat that I didn’t make a claim?

They are all transcendental objects. — Corvus

No, they are not. One is so-called, the others are merely transcendental ideas, the conception of an object adequate for representing them, is impossible.

Kant's main interest in writing CPR was building logical path and residence for the transcendental objects — Corvus

He did that, it was significant, but hardly his main interest.

The reference you provided didn't have the obvious, evident parts or information related to Thing-in-itself and God, Souls and Freedom, and the relation between them. — Corvus

Pretty much what I thought as well. There is no relation. The reference shows what god, freedom and immortality are, and from that, it is clear the thing-in-itself doesn’t relate to them. That’s the connection you missed. Which is sufficient refutation that the thing-in-itself was never used, as you claimed, “to posit the existence of God, Soul, Freedom and Immortality”.

The thing-in-itself is a logically conditioned conception; the three others are transcendental ideas of pure reason which signify the unconditioned. They arise in different faculties, they preside over different domains, in short, they have nothing to do with each other.

It is a serious breach of comprehension, that an empirical existence derived from understanding using general logic, can be the ground for an idea derived from pure reason using transcendental logic. Obviously, there is an existent object for any thing-in-itself; there is never, and never was meant to be, an existent object belonging to freedom, morality or gods.

Dunno what to tell ya, bud. If you can’t find the connection, or you think there isn’t one, that’s all on you. But I’m not doing your thinking for you.

I was asking which part of the reference backs up your claim, but you refused to provide the evidence. — Corvus

If you actually read the reference, you’d know. Which begs an obvious question…..why are you asking?

I was meaning, your claim " ….which just is not the case.
— Mww" — Corvus

My statement that your claim is not the case is proved in the reference. The only thing that has to do with me, is I know where to look for the refutation of your claim.

For your claim to be correct — Corvus

I’m not making a claim; I’m merely citing a source-specific refutation of yours.

Therefore I can only conclude that your claim was groundless and unfounded. — Corvus

Suit yourself. Hell, you might even be correct.

Nope, not gonna do that. You asked for a reference, you got it, do with it as you will.

But the point is that, Kant used Thing-in-itself to posit the existence of God, Soul, Freedom and Immortality.
— Corvus

….which just is not the case.
— Mww
Your reason for the claim is? — Corvus

See A333-338/B390-396, plus the footnote in B.

It just sounds meaningless to say Thing-in-itself is a concept, but it is totally unknowable, and even unthinkable. — Corvus

Meaningless is one way to put it. Concepts are representations of the understanding, arising spontaneously from pure thought. To say, then, the thing-in-itself, a valid concept, is unthinkable, is contradictory.

Claiming it is both unknowable and unthinkable comes from possible misunderstanding of CPR. — Corvus

Agreed, as long as we’re still talking about the thing-in-itself as a concept. And more specifically, perhaps, misunderstanding the cognitive procedure proposed in transcendental philosophy.

It is not both unknowable and unthinkable object. — Corvus

But this exchanges the concept for an object. Now it is the case the thing-in-itself can neither be thought as an real object, for to do so presupposes the possibility of its phenomenal representation, nor knowable as a real object, for to do so presupposes a judgement on the relations by which it becomes a particular cognition. But it still can be thought as having a real existence.

Concepts arise in understanding. Understanding is the faculty of logic. The conception of the thing-in-itself fills a logical gap, re: justification for that which appears to sensibility. That’s all it was ever meant to do.
————-

Thing-in-itselft must be the existences for us to think about, but not knowable. The concepts such as God, Souls, Freedom and Immortality fit in there, — Corvus

Agreed. But this is very far from your claim here….

But the point is that, Kant used Thing-in-itself to posit the existence of God, Soul, Freedom and Immortality. — Corvus

….which just is not the case.
————

Even if we see the books in front for us, but we don't know what they are??? That just sounds like a needless scepticism. — Corvus

Agreed, but with the caveat the object in front of us, is already known in a particular way, which is true because it carries the conception represented by the word “book”. One must agree, that until he learns an object, he cannot represent it with a name. If that is the case, everything ever learned, by any human person ever, at one time, had no name.

A better question, and one of the tenets of CPR is….how did a mere undetermined thing out there, be its mere appearance to our senses, get its name?

That we can't reason to satisfying explanations of our phenomena — AmadeusD

Ya know….everything from the output of our sensory devices, to the input to the brain, and even through some of the regions of the brain itself…..we haven’t a clue as to what is actually happening, real-time? We are not the least conscious of all that transverse the nervous system proper, just as in speculative metaphysics, we are not conscious of any of our intuitive representations and precious little of the machinations of our understanding.

As I mentioned way back at the beginning, sometimes it doesn’t pay to ask too many questions. And in fact, the overall thesis of CPR is to relegate pure reason to experience alone, letting the transcendental side be merely of some relative interest, as in God, freedom and immortality and such, but not much else.

Its just unsatisfying because we can never have any knowledge of that which 'causes' the appearance of any object of intuition. — AmadeusD

Then why not let Nature be the causes the thing that appears. That way, we can get away with saying the appearance is caused by the thing. We don’t know, at the time of appearance, what the thing is anyway, so what does it really matter what causes it? As well, we can let there be a causal relation between the thing and the thing-in-itself without contradicting either Nature or ourselves, insofar as the the former we can only possibly know and the latter we never can.

We end up with a causal relation between the thing and the thing-in-itself, a relation between the thing and us, without the need of a relation between the thing-in-itself and us. Everybody goes home happy.

Kant used Thing-in-itself to posit the existence of God, Soul, Freedom and Immortality. — Corvus

Those existences….more accurately termed transcendental conceptions…..are listed under something very much other than the thing-in-itself. To be fair, I have an inkling of how you got here, but I’d be willing to bet, with closer examination, you might retract the statement. A CPR reference substantiating your claim would be nice, to determine if we’re on the same page.

Thing-in-itself has nothing to do with the physical objects in the empirical world. — Corvus

While the thing-in-itself may have nothing to do with our knowledge of representations of physical objects in the empirical world, they very much have to do with those objects. Unless, once again, you have a CPR reference substantiating your claim.

No one was denying the concept of Thing-in-themselves. — Corvus

Not here, no, but there are objections, which was what I actually implied. And it is true, if one doesn’t hold with transcendental philosophy and all its conditions, he has no need of things-in-themselves.

But what is the point even bringing up a concept that you cannot even think about? (…) If it was unknowable, then how did you know it was unknowable? — Corvus

Been the bone of contention since 1781, hasn’t it? Why have something necessary for this one thing, but about which nothing can be known? If nothing can be known about it, why conceive it in the first place? Why think about that of which our empirical knowledge isn’t even about?

Problem is…the answers for the plethora of why’s don’t help much, mostly because the line of reasoning for what they really imply is so long and convoluted, it’s just easier to pretend they don’t stand as the original intention for them demanded. Every decent thinker from Schopenhauer right on through Quinne took exception to that intent.

The proof for the conceptual validity of things-in-themselves manifests in the reality of the human type of cognitive system being representational. The long line of reasoning, then, merely outlines why and how the human cognitive system is in fact representational, and that, of course, in keeping with the general critical thesis from a transcendental prospectus.

Pretty simple, really. If one doesn’t hold with transcendental philosophy, he has no need for things-in-themselves as such. By the same token, though, one can’t hold with some principles of CPR while rejecting others, and at the same time deny the notion of things-in-themselves.

The claim that the external world is caused by the internal world is wrong…..
— Mww

I'm not convinced. We cannot conceive of things entirely askance from any empirical intuition. — AmadeusD

While we cannot conceive of things entirely askance from any empirical intuition, these are merely representations belonging to the internal human system, hence have no concern with external causal conditions, which belong to Nature itself.

You know, like….round pegs/round holes; square pegs/square holes. Neither fits in the other.

The root of our discussion is here, from pg 12, with which I disagree:

I do recall passages in which it's essentially said that by inference, we can't get away from accepting that there are things-in-themselves causing our impressions of them — AmadeusD

Then, from pg. 16, in which I disagreed with #1:

All we know is that it is something with sufficient affect on our senses, a mere appearance.
— Mww

(…) I suppose the thing remaining is that thing between the two -

1. Thing-in-itself appears to us as an unknowable entity;
2. ????;
3. Something is presented to our sensuous organs; — AmadeusD

Now, because the second effectively repeats the errors in the first, re: the thing-in-itself appearing, I didn’t consider “the thing remaining”, the “????” you were apparently trying to account for, in this:

The transcendental object, i cannot find as distinguished from the thing-in-itself. If that's the case, then Kant seems to be fairly obviously connecting the two in a causal relationship - albeit, one with entirely unknowable properties. — AmadeusD

Then, from reference in A538, “Possibility of Causality…..”, which is an exposition on the dual nature of an object of the senses from the domain of pure reason alone, I wonder……what do you think all that really says, and, what exactly does it have to do with the fact things-in-themselves are not that which appears?

I’m just not sure what you’re trying to convey, as a way to fill in the “????” in #2 in your list. And, why there needs to even be a #2 anyway.

Help a brutha out, wodja?

I find the distinction between object/objective and subject/subjective quite intelligible. — Wayfarer

In any relational environment, such must be the case. In order to dismiss the distinction, the conditions by which it is necessary must be dismissed, in which case there remains, regarding human intelligence, nothing.

Has there ever been a sufficiently explanatory thesis, in which human intelligence is not predicated on relations necessarily?

The claim that the external world is caused by the internal world is wrong….
— Mww

Agreed. It sounds like an extreme subjectivism or solipsism. — Corvus

It’s actually impossible, no matter what -ism is assigned to the idea. While it may be the case we alter the state of affairs in Nature with highrise buildings and forest destructions and whatnot, we just don’t have the capacity, nor should we, for creating natural things.

We strip the seas of fish, but can’t create roe. Although, I recall an article on 60 Minutes awhile ago, where we’ve eliminated almost every variety of banana, for purely economical reasons. It follows logically, that given enough time and a certain purpose, science will inevitably screw up our place in the world, compared to the philosopher who merely thinks about what might be.

But you’re right; those who would think it so, exhibit extreme subjectivism or solipsism.
————

As long as one's sensibility and understanding works with concept, categories and intuition, one must be perceiving the external world, and making sense of the them acquiring knowledge of the world. — Corvus

That’s fine, with the caveat that knowledge is contingent on the sense derived from perceiving the world. We know now lightning is not the wrath of angry gods, and spacecraft don’t fall apart when they get far away, which indicates mathematical propositions are indeed universal.

There are various types and levels of knowledge. — Corvus

Various levels, yes, depending on each individual’s experience, but I’d draw the line at only two types, myself, re: a priori or a posteriori. So, I guess, yes, various, but very many of the one and very few of the other.

A193 doesn’t relate to the paragraph title you gave, which is found at A538. And I couldn’t come up with a reasonable connection between A193, A538 and your hesitations for accepting the differences in things-in-themselves and the empirical representations which regulate human knowledge.
————-

Kant makes it clear here that we are free to infer, with some certainty, that objects in themselves exist and exert some 'causal lineage' with out phenomena….. — AmadeusD

He states for the record that things-in-themselves exist and from that we can infer the necessity of a causal lineage from such external existence, to appearance, through perception, sensation, intuition, ending in internal phenomenal representation. As such, for the entire range of faculties having to do with sensibility.
————-

Your claim that the external world is caused by your internal world is wrong….
— Corvus

I think the point, and I completely missed this with Mww, is that what you are capable or conceiving, is a result of your perceptions in aggregate. — AmadeusD

The claim that the external world is caused by the internal world is wrong, but that has nothing to do with the capacity for conception. The aggregate of perception, technically**, is how we come by objects of sensation, which just is the totality of intuition, not conception. The capacity of conception is unlimited, or, more correctly, is limited by productive imagination, which is itself unlimited. Remember “…..I can think whatever I wish…..”.

If you like, you could with justice say what you are capable of knowing is the result of your perceptions in aggregate, insofar as any and all empirical knowledge is of things perceived.

(** Kant didn’t need to know about the operational physiology of the human sensory devices, but he did know Newtonian conservation of matter. He knew whatever was outside us had to be converted to something inside us, so he just called it aggregates of perception to show the principle of cause and effect relative to time, such that the thing of appearance and its phenomenal representation related to each other necessarily. In that way, there is no reasonable conclusion which allows us to merely imagine we are being affected by the appearance of things to our senses on the one hand, and forbids, through temporal sequence, the causality of appearances from any internal constructions on the other. The nuance behind this way of reckoning, is that would be impossible to obtain an apodeictic logical conclusion, re: every experience is certain, if we started out with that by which its support is questionable.)

This isn't even a problem for Kant, it's a problem for you. — AmadeusD

I’m sorry for not presenting an argument sufficient enough to prevent being so badly misunderstood.

“…. In order to prevent any misunderstanding, it will be requisite, in the first place, to recapitulate, as clearly as possible, what our opinion is with respect to the fundamental nature of our sensuous cognition in general. We have intended, then, to say that all our intuition is nothing but the representation of phenomena; that the things which we intuite, are not in themselves the same as our representations of them in intuition, nor are their relations in themselves so constituted as they appear to us; and that if we take away the subject, or even only the subjective constitution of our senses in general, then not only the nature and relations of objects in space and time, but even space and time themselves disappear; and that these, as phenomena, cannot exist in themselves, but only in us.

What may be the nature of objects considered as things in themselves and without reference to the receptivity of our sensibility is quite unknown to us. We know nothing more than our mode of perceiving them, which is peculiar to us, and which, though not of necessity pertaining to every animated being, is so to the whole human race. With this alone we have to do. Space and time are the pure forms thereof; sensation the matter. The former alone can we cognize à priori, that is, antecedent to all actual perception; and for this reason such cognition is called pure intuition. The latter is that in our cognition which is called cognition à posteriori, that is, empirical intuition. The former appertain absolutely and necessarily to our sensibility, of whatsoever kind our sensations may be; the latter may be of very diversified character.

Supposing that we should carry our empirical intuition even to the very highest degree of clearness, we should not thereby advance one step nearer to a knowledge of the constitution of objects as things in themselves. For we could only, at best, arrive at a complete cognition of our own mode of intuition, that is of our sensibility, and this always under the conditions originally attaching to the subject, namely, the conditions of space and time; while the question: “What are objects considered as things in themselves?” remains unanswerable even after the most thorough examination of the phenomenal world.

To say, then, that all our sensibility is nothing but the confused representation of things containing exclusively that which belongs to them as things in themselves, and this under an accumulation of characteristic marks and partial representations which we cannot distinguish in consciousness, is a falsification of the conception of sensibility and phenomenization, which renders our whole doctrine thereof empty and useless…”

Something must be presented to our sense organs to even perceive that something has happened — AmadeusD

How can I be “clearly wrong” when we agree? That, however, is different from your…..

1. Thing-in-itself appears to us as an unknowable entity; — AmadeusD

….and therein the discord with CPR which is my objection.

The thing-in-itself is not that which appears.
— Mww

Well, it doesn't appear in intuition, but for the system to make any sense it must appear to our sense organs to impart an impression outside of our ability to perceive that process. — AmadeusD

Actually, it doesn’t. Looks like you’ll need some sort of self-generated epiphanic episode to catch the philosophical drift. But, as I said, most folks just give up.

But I get it. When a mosquito bites, it’s really hard to think it isn’t the mosquito itself that bit you.

All good, except….

1. The thing-in-itself is not that which appears. As I said, it is “-in-itself”. In German, it is ding an sich, which some translators make into “thing as it is in itself”, in order to separate it from “thing as it is in us”, which is, of course, mere representations of things. Copies, if you will. Constructions. Manufactured look-alikes. Whatever. As long as the thing out there is not the same in kind as the thing in here, while at the same time at least corresponding to it, call it anything you like.

5. Off to the races indeed, and has all the right constituency, but not quite in the proper sequence. Called the “higher powers” to distinguish them from sensibility and phenomena, they are understanding/judgement/reason. Kant treats the higher powers as a standard Aristotelian tripartite logical syllogism in form, where understanding is the major, re: a conception, judgement is the minor, re: a unity of conceptions into a proper cognition, and reason determines the relation between them or between that immediate conclusion and those antecedent in consciousness a priori or experience a posteriori.

Obvious our impressions are not of the thing — AmadeusD

Our impressions are not of the things-in-themselves; they must be of things, otherwise we couldn’t say where such impressions come from. Like here:

“…. For, otherwise, we should require to affirm the existence of an appearance, without something that appears—which would be absurd.…”

From this, I can only be left with things that have no effect on sense, and impressions that come from nowhere/nothing. — AmadeusD

There is that which has no effect on the senses, re: things-in-themselves, but impressions cannot come from nowhere/nothing, for if such was the case there would be no sensations, no phenomenal representations given from them, hence nothing to experience. And it is obvious we have experiences, which presupposes the things we have experiences of.

Don’t worry too much about the things we perceive, at least as far as CPR is concerned. They are, after all, nothing but…

“…. The effect of an object upon the faculty of representation, so far as we are affected by the said object, is sensation. That sort of intuition which relates to an object by means of sensation is called an empirical intuition. The undetermined object of an empirical intuition is called phenomenon.…”

….so the thing we perceive? We don’t know anything about it anyway, at the point of its perception. All we know is that it is something with sufficient affect on our senses, a mere appearance. That’s it. Philosophers since Plato (knowledge of vs knowledge that), and lately, in Russell (knowledge by acquaintance vs knowledge by description), figured this out, setting the stage….or making a stronger case…..for the intrinsic duality of the human cognitive system, from which follows the subjective/objective dichotomy the postmoderns detest but cannot figure out how to escape.
————-

i really hope its not tedious and you turn into 180 Proof on me — AmadeusD

Nahhhh. I’ll play the game as long as it’s interesting. Truth be told, most people just sorta disappear, give it up, so to speak. Either found it too difficult to understand, or, understood it well enough to consider it a thoroughly stupid way to do things.

That's in the Amphiboly if I don't misremember — Manuel

Yes, an altogether fascinating appendix to The Analytic of Principles. It solidifies what some consider the gibberish of that preceding book. Kinda funny, too, in that it makes explicit, in relatively plain speech, the errors in thinking that no one really even knew they were doing anyway.

I mean, c’mon, man. When was the last time either of us stopped to think….opps, can’t do that, can’t substitute a transcendental conception in that for which an empirical one is expressly required. Shame on us, I must say, for attempting such an illusory cognition!!!
(Grin)

HA!!! I consider myself warned.

Kant considers monads to be negative noumena available to introspection! — Manuel

Yes, regarding monads. “…. And so would it really be, if the pure understanding were capable of an immediate application to objects, and if space and time were determinations of things in themselves…”

He respected Leibnitz but held this against him:

“…. This philosopher’s celebrated doctrine of space and time, in which he intellectualized these forms of sensibility, originated in the same delusion of transcendental reflection.

The great utility of this critique of conclusions arrived at by the processes of mere reflection consists in its clear demonstration of the nullity of all conclusions respecting objects which are compared with each other in the understanding alone, while it at the same time confirms what we particularly insisted on, namely, that, although phenomena are not included as things in themselves among the objects of the pure understanding, they are nevertheless the only things by which our cognition can possess objective reality, that is to say, which give us intuitions to correspond with our conceptions…..”

The delusion of transcendental reflection is the attribution of objective validity to objects by the understanding alone. If that is the case, such that understanding does that and it is not a delusion but is a valid methodology, the proposition…..

“…. Thoughts without content are void; intuitions without conceptions, blind….”

….is meaningless, and Kantian metaphysics falls apart.

As with most philosophies, one can pick and choose which he favors. The professionals, though, they who construct the philosophies the rest of us choose from, invariably reject others in favor of his own. Sometimes for the better, sometimes not.

I take issue with the "idiotic insistence" suggestion, as if the equation of the noumena and thing in itself is such an unsustainable suggestion — Hanover

Yeah, my bad. I get a little carried away sometimes. Nevertheless, and despite Kant’s apparent textual contradictions, there are entries where the equation(s) is (are) clear-cut, thus making the conceptions quite distinguishable.

I understand it’s hard, when a simple, maybe even a one-line statement gets lost in the massive amount of information, to bear in mind the system as a whole. Thing is, those one-liners are in there, in black and white. And if that wasn’t enough, it should be apparent the two of those things have no business being connected to each other, when it is the case they are each individually connected to understanding alone. The whole empirical side of transcendental philosophy depends on it.

Or….I got it all wrong. There is that, of course, so……

we can't get away from accepting that there are things-in-themselves causing our impressions of them — AmadeusD

In Kant, this is wrong.

we can't get away from accepting that there are things-in-themselves causing our impressions
— AmadeusD

This is correct. IFF one accepts that the thing that appears to our senses, is the thing of the thing-in-itself. — Mww

I left off the part of your post which parted ways with CPR. Our impressions cannot be of the things in themselves, else they wouldn’t be in themselves. The very meaning, as Kant intended it, for “-in-itself”, is merely…..not in us. What is in us are representations, so if not in us means representations not in us, and from that, as you said…impressions of them is exactly what is not in us.

But those representations in us must have a cause. That which makes an impression on the senses, an appearance, from which follows a sensation, is sufficient cause. But, as already proved, it cannot be the thing-in-itself that causes the impression on the senses, which leaves only the thing of the thing-in-itself.
————-

Kant tells us that there are real, material objects 'out there' of which we can know nothing things in themselves. But that these objects cause our intuitions... which are not, as far as we care capable of knowing, anything like hte thing-in-itself.. — AmadeusD

We can’t know they are alike, because our knowledge is of representations of things, but not the things-in-themselves. But we have given to us the appearance of things, what Kant calls the matter of those representations, which gives us something to go on, when we subject the thing we perceive, to the system that informs of us of how we should know it.

So it isn’t the thing-in-itself that causes our intuitions. The matter of things we perceive, is all we get from the thing “out there”, via the sensation we get from it, hence the cause of our intuitions is much more than the mere sensation of a perceived thing. It is here that two of the necessary predicates of transcendental philosophy enter the speculative metaphysical fray, re: synthesis, and imagination.
————-

These seem cautious admissions that the only inference is that things-in-themselves cause us to receive empirical intuitions of them, — AmadeusD

I think it rather a warning, that the only inference allowed to us, is that things-in-themselves are the cause of things we perceive. If he doesn’t cover that base, and stifle that logical inconsistency, it remains that the human cognitive system is both sufficient and necessary causality, as he says here….

“….out of that which I should reckon as phenomenon, I made mere illusory appearance….”
————-

Going to leave this here, though, as it directly contradicts what I've come to think is what Kant meant:

"The conception of a noumenon, that is, of a thing which must be cogitated not as an object of sense, but as a thing in itself (solely through the pure understanding) — AmadeusD

Just break down the statement itself: conception…of a thing….cogitated…as a thing in itself.

Switch from 18th century Enlightenment Prussian to modern English and you get: However a thing-in-itself is thought, that is how a noumenon is thought.

Ok, so…solely through the pure understanding. Because understanding has already been said to stand for the faculty of thought, and cognition….being cogitated, in old Prussian…..is the synthesis of conceptions, we have….noumena is nothing but conceptions understanding synthesizes into a cognition, all by itself, for no particular reason. Maybe it was just bored, has nothing better to do. Maybe it follows from an earlier aphorism….

“…..I can think whatever I please, provided only that I do not contradict myself….”

The text itself, however, just says understanding, because it’s been entitled to think whatever it wants, has no limits on its capacities. Nevertheless, the entire Critique is an exposition on limiting various functions of the human intelligence, so if he doesn’t nip this unlimited stuff in the bud, his system won’t work.

So it is, then, both noumena and things-in-themselves are nothing but conceptions, that which understanding takes upon itself to cognize, and, of course, no empirical knowledge is at all possible from a mere conception alone.

This is where Kant confuses the average reader, by connecting noumena to things-in-themselves. All he means when he does that, is that understanding thinks them in the same way, and NEVER EVER that they are the same thing.
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This seems to restrict noumena to merely things-in-themselves…. — AmadeusD

That is impossible, for us anyway, insofar as things-in-themselves are real existences, of which the representations are known by us, whereas noumena are nothing but conceptions, having no phenomenal representations at all, hence cannot even be known to exist.

…..perceived by something other than sensuous intuition. — AmadeusD

Sorta right, except we can’t say anything about a non-sensuous intuition. We can say, if noumena are perceivable by a non-sensuous intuition, for that kind of intuition then, noumena could be like the thing-in-itself is for us.

Another thing, for background, maybe. The argument has been that Kant painted himself into a corner, by positing the understanding can think whatever it wants, which he had to do on the one hand, because it is clear imagination is nothing if not pure thought and ever single otherwise rational human bing ever, images stuff at one time or another. But on the other hand, part of the overall Kantian transcendental system resides in the condition that reason is the caretaker of understanding, in that reason is what prevents understanding’s imaginings from running away with themselves and causing all kindsa harm to our knowledge.

So if phenomena are the representations given from human sensibility, noumena cannot be either the representations, or the means for the possibility of them. Otherwise, we have exactly what the aforementioned aphorism says…..something is thought that is self-contradictory.
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Curious, and unhelpful — AmadeusD

Yeah, most unhelpful. I can see why he brought those stupid noumena thingys into the fold, but when it comes right down to comprehending the overall system, they are very unhelpful. We want to know what we can do, what our system allows us to do, not so much what we can’t, because it doesn’t.

Anyway….hope that helps.

thinking in images OR words is required for meaningful cognition. — AmadeusD

THAT’S what I hoped to hear. I might insist images or words, or the irreducible seeming of them, just IS cognition, presupposed in meaning.

Bu this is hardly a best argument for physicalism, per the thread title, so let’s agree and leave it at that.

I was just pointing out that language can't be utilized by everyone in their mind…. — AmadeusD

Cool. I get that. I wonder though, if they can’t use language….or if they don’t do what seems to be congruent with the use of language….what do they use?

I’m addressing the difference between what you said, and what’s in the title of the link.

Same with internal dialogues.... — AmadeusD

I get your point, but it can’t be a dialogue. It’s just the brain keeping you informed that it’s still working.

Won’t ever let you know how it does what it does, but at least you know it’s doing something.

Ahhhh, ok. Thanks.