Are you saying that the methods by which we come to know what something is aren't methods at all? — Ludwig V

Of course not; that’s self-contradictory. I’m saying the method by which things in particular are known, re: the system, in whichever form it may have, is very far from talking about the things possible to know, re: reality in general.

….thinking of what enables us to know what a thing is as a veil between us and what we seek to know — Ludwig V

I dunno, man; what enables us to know is a system of cognition; thinking of what enables us to know is philosophizing about a system of cognition. Those don’t fit the conceptual “veil”. On the other hand, the representation, not being the thing, but necessarily that of which our knowledge consists, is a better fit for the conceptual “veil”, but to think of what enables us to know, the system itself, is not to think of representations, which are mere parts of the system. For a whole boatload of -isms reflecting the confusion this nonsense brings, see the SEP article.
————-

Riddle me this: do we seek to know a thing, or do we seek to know the cause of a sensation?

Pretty silly, methinks. I know what a basketball is, but trust me when I say there isn’t and never was any such thing in my head. Why should both of those judgements be so apodeitically yet trivially true, but some folks still want to make some sort of veil out of it? And….spoiler alert…therein lay the answer to the riddle.

That's why we know that things are not entirely dependent on our minds. — Ludwig V

Ehhhhh….on the other side of a very large coin, why we know things are not entirely dependent on our minds, is because it is not things we know, from which follows nothing of a thing is dependent on our minds. A simple re-stating of the thread title.

Havin’ fun yet?

I would say that morality also is about how one relates to others. — boundless

To get to the bottom, though, it might be closer, to say morality is that by which one decides what his relation to others ought to be, irrespective of the particular incident for which a morally predicated act is required. What I mean is, how one relates to others, or, the manner by which the relation manifests, requires some relevant act, but something else must be the ground for determining what the act ought to be.

Another two cents, and an entirely different philosophical doctrine, then merely supporting the mind-independence of reality.

….one can be moral or immoral even when alone. — boundless

One is moral or immoral only if he is alone. Otherwise, he is possibly criminal, or merely unethical, which stand as objects of moral dispositions, but says nothing regarding the determinations of them.

Caveat: this under the assumption morality, in and of itself, is an intrinsic human condition, and if so, can only be represented in himself, by himself, because of himself. Criminality and ethics presupposes a community in which a member can be alone within; morality itself, does not, and indeed, such communal presupposition negates the validity of intrinsic condition.

Two cents…

….cognitive disorientation….
—Wayfarer

Disorientation is a good way of characterizing philosophical problems. But I don't experience that here. — Ludwig V

Cognitive disorientation: the empirical kind, a posteriori, and properly reduced, occurs when we say we know what a thing is but we don’t realize it is not the thing but always and only the representation of it, to which such knowledge expression relates. So yes, you, and everyone else, is a victim of it, but it isn’t an experience, as such. It is the mistake of conflating the occurrence of a cognitive method with the post hoc ergo propter hoc expression of its functional terminations.

Some folks like to quip….the universe doesn’t care what the human thinks about it, it is what it is. Compounded categorical errors aside, it is at least consistent to quip that human thought doesn’t care what the universe is. It remains the case that the universe, or, with respect to empirical knowledge, the objects contained in it, can never be comprehended as anything but that of which the human mode of intellectual determinations prescribes. Why these should be considered incompatible with each other, is beyond reason itself.

It only becomes a contradiction if you claim the existence of misunderstanding, and also claim the lack of existence of anything. — noAxioms

Which is precisely what you did, on both counts, affirming the LNC violation you asked for.

I don't see how the lack of anything violates any of those laws…. — noAxioms

…..and yet, in order to not understand what I said, what I said necessarily must have been something that appeared to your senses. Hence, the LNC….which follows from the quoted absurdity on the bottom of pg17….you can’t claim to misunderstand something that wasn’t there.

Same deal with the cause/effect principle. What I said caused your misunderstanding; your misunderstanding is an effect causally related to what I said. If I hadn’t said it you wouldn’t have misunderstood it.

….I don't need idealists defending the realist view…. — noAxioms

….and yet an idealist can defend a realist view better than a realist, insofar as the latter denies, or at least refuses to acknowledge that he necessarily employs, the very intellectual machinations the former provides, for defending anything at all. Not to mention, of course, a proper idealist is in fact a dualist, as are all humans, with respect to their fundamentally relational cognitive powers.

(Sigh)

I admitted to unabashedly supporting mind-independent reality, which makes explicit something that is, and is necessarily, regardless of what I think about it.
— Mww

I agree. The interesting part is which items qualify as mind-independent and under what criteria. — Ludwig V

For me anyway, the only mind-independent items are those I don’t think about, either particularly, from the lack of occassion yet for which an experience is nonetheless possible immediately upon such occassion, or, generally, from the impossibility of a conception sufficient to represent them, for which there can never be an experience at all.

This relates iff mind-dependence begins at intuition, not perception, insofar as, with respect to criteria, at intuition is the first representational construct, which replaces the empirically real of things effecting the senses, in a theoretical point of view regarding the human intellectual system.

I’m not a fan of the concept of mind; all that is mind can be replaced by reason. The explanatory power of mind I can do without; of reason I cannot.

“…. For, otherwise, we should require to affirm the existence of an appearance, without something that appears, which is absurd….”

What’s violated, absent the something that necessarily is…the LNC and the principle of cause/effect.

….reality is real because it's necessary. — noAxioms

Reality is not real; things that appear to the senses are real, and those are real necessarily. Reality is merely that general pure conception representing the totality of real things that appear to the senses, and from which the possibility of experience itself, is given.

I find both "empirically objective" and "rationally subjective" to be somewhat contradictory terms. It is quite difficult to communicate with such a gulf in how we choose to use language. — noAxioms

Ehhhh….we use language the same way, as means to represent a favored system, one in which you find the terms contradictory, another in which I find them complementary. The gulf resides in the disparity of the systems, not so much the words used to talk about them.

Objective implies something that is, independent of context. — noAxioms

As first responder herein, I admitted to unabashedly supporting mind-independent reality, which makes explicit something that is, and is necessarily, regardless of what I think about it.

I’m not sure how to relate the mind-independence of reality with context-independence, if mind just is the context from which reality is independent. If mind is necessary context for that objective which is independent, it follows the totality of context-independence for the objective, is impossible.

Most interesting set of comments. I’m sort of attracted to new things my old ways would like to snub but realize quickly they’re not properly qualified for it.

Natural philosophy – as the systems science legacy of Aristotelean metaphysics – got it right. We won. — apokrisis

Yet “I” am still here.

It seems a thermostat has some sort of nature in itself just like anything else. — noAxioms

Nature in itself? I’m not sure how you mean the concept of nature to be understood in these cases, but I personally can think of no reason to even consider what the nature of a thermostat, or anything of existential likeness, might be. I can’t be blamed, given this general idea of a thing’s nature, for thinking a hammer’s latent nature, manifest sooner or later, is to hit my thumb instead of the nail.
————-

….something appearing to something's senses makes it by definition subjective, not objective. — noAxioms

My use of appearance merely indicates the presence of a thing as an effect on my senses, which is the parsimonious method for distinguishing the empirically objective from the rationally subjective. The effect of the thing on my senses by its appearance, affects me as a sensation, and THAT is where subjectivity arises. Effect of the object is the affect on the subject.
—————-

I don't think anything at all has objective existence…… — noAxioms

Interesting. Where do you find fault with the concept of objectivity, then?

Collingwood: the only modernization of Kant worth a damn. (That I know about)

Absolute presuppositions of the one, are the transcendental principles of the other.

….that because physics finds no purpose, the universe therefore has none. This is not science speaking, but metaphysics ventriloquizing through the authority of science. — Wayfarer

….and doing it badly, first, in that the impossible is not analytically contained in the merely insufficient, and second, effect is always analytically conjoined with cause, but purpose, and by categorical subsummation a priori, intent, is not necessarily conjoined with effect.

Just tickled by the catchy phrase, I was. Nothing particularly noteworthy in what I said. Common knowledge sorta thing, I hope.

What would a thermostat-in-itself even mean?
— Mww

Well it wouldn't have the name 'thermostat', and it wouldn't even have 'thingness'….. — noAxioms

Pretty much, yep, hence….unintelligible.

How is it being 'natural' or intentionally created or not in any way have any bearing on the nature of the thing in itself? — noAxioms

It isn’t a question of natural; it’s naturally-occuring. It relates to things-in-themselves only insofar as things-in-themselves are the only necessary naturally-occuring existents, which, of course, a thermostat is not. To say or even imply it is the one is unintelligible, to say or imply it is the other is a contradiction.

….whether or not the objective reality of a thermostat….
— Mww

It being an objective thing is already a mind-dependent assessment. — noAxioms

I don’t agree. All that’s required for being an objective thing, is the possibility of its appearance to our senses, which, the senses being purely physiological in function, is very far from mind-dependent.

Now, I grant the logic from which this is the major is mind dependent, but in such case, the objective thing is presupposed as given, and THAT is not mind-dependent. If infinite regress is not nipped in the bud, every cognitive speculation is immediately reduced to junk, the human empirical knowledge theoretically possible from it is lost, and all the toaster ovens, particle colliders and…..er, you know…..thermostats, just never were.

….a question posed to nature…. — ChatGPT

“…. It is only the principles of reason which can give to concordant phenomena the validity of laws, and it is only when experiment is directed by these rational principles that it can have any real utility. Reason must approach nature with the view, indeed, of receiving information from it, not, however, in the character of a pupil, who listens to all that his master chooses to tell him, but in that of a judge, who compels the witnesses to reply to those questions which he himself thinks fit to propose….”
(B intro)

Cool. Bot ‘n’ I read the same book.

Oh. I missed the clue. Sorry.

What a thermostat would be like absent human experience, is unintelligible, insofar as any named thing follows from a possible human experience. That being given, the reverse proves the case, for it remains impossible, absent human experience, to cognize how that in-itself could ever be referred to as thermostat. Or, simply put….how does a thermostat-in-itself get its name?

You might be thinking the thermostat-in-itself is the one outside my kitchen window, that I don’t experience from my tv room. Be that as it may, that thermostat, while a natural object, is not for that reason alone a naturally occuring object, nor is it absent my experience, but only my immediate awareness.

Agreed: less critical. Kant’s absent human experience means all and every human experience, ever. A totality irrespective of time.

What would a thermostat-in-itself even mean?

Could there ever be a thermostat that wasn't a possible human experience?

The question never was - is a thermostat a natural object, which is easily affirmed - but whether or not the objective reality of a thermostat, re: the existence of it, reduces to a necessary conscious reflection of a particular intelligence.

Even the idea of a naturally-occurring thermostat still requires some human cognitive relation by which such thing meets the rational criteria employed in the experience of that thing to which the conceptual representation initially applies. Is Ol’ Faithful a thermostat?

I wonder….but not very much….what these AI chatbots would say about that.

Long live the observer.

I got a ton of unreal stuff in mine, bordering on a chaotic rhapsody if I’m being honest, all of which I’m somehow persuaded I can’t do without.

Language games. Put unreal stuff in an unreal place, then call it by real names. Sure. Why not.

But I do have a problem with the skimpy version of the idea that we have here. It is a fragment of the practice of betting — Ludwig V

I agree it is a skimpy version of the idea, and it is a fragment of the practice itself. I was thinking to highlight the history, the origin and purpose the idea represents, rather than its manifestation as a practice.

When push comes to shove, it seems to me elaboration of the idea into a practice degrades the dialectic regarding it, to a psychologically-bounded exhibition, when it started as a metaphysical idea. In other words, we’re at the ends of a thing without the means by which the thing occurs, from which arises the legitimate right to ask, not about what or how much the bet, which presupposes no more than the belief related to it, but rather, the composition of the belief itself such that a bet relative to it represents defense of that composition. So we have what looks like belief in a belief, which is absurd.
—————-

“The usual test, whether that which any one maintains is (…) his firm belief, is a bet.”

From a subjective point of view, isn’t it possible for one to bet on his firm belief, shown subsequently some conditions by which his construction of it is flawed, yet still firmly maintains it? Furthermore, in Kant, there are those beliefs in the purely empirical domain of which maintaining the firmness of them is irrational in which case some tests are failed, but there are others in the purely moral domain, the firm maintenance of them is necessary, in which case every test is passed.

And this is what happens when skimpy versions are filled out. Or….bloated, as some might say (grin)

….philosophy is “larger” than science…. — Antony Nickles

No science, besides the accidental, is ever done that isn’t first thought, but even accidental science makes necessary thought relative to purpose.
—————-

Bernard Williams offers some of his own thoughts about the nature of philosophical inquiry. He points to a familiar problem: We would like some sort of absolute knowledge…. — J

Yeah, humans, huh? If they want something badly enough, they’ll change the conditions under which it was formerly impossible, in order to satisfy themselves that it isn’t. First glance, absolute knowledge is unintelligible; second glance, absolute knowledge is at least conceivably transcendent relative to human intelligence; third glance, absolute knowledge as a valid conception, the attainment of which remains nonetheless logically impossible; at some future glance, absolute knowledge may be provided by empirical science. They’ll talk it to death, thereby losing sight of what set the stage in the first place.

A true brain teaser, given from and determinable only by that which refuses access to its works, all the while allowing us the knowledge that we don’t know how it works.

Funny animal it may seem, yet still be nonetheless relevant to the topic at hand. Or, I guess, now, the sub-topic.

Ehhhhh….dialectical precedent has it that responses to a quote are subjectively more honest without the influence of the author’s name, which is often detrimental to the message on the one hand, or tautologically affirms it on the other.

That, and my clandestine supposition that 1787 would be a sufficient clue.

Do you have more? Didn’t mean to shut you off.

But those details are what give you the evidence of the degree of belief, or confidence. — Ludwig V

A bet was intended to represent the subjective validity of a belief, for which the quality of the evidence just is the degree, both of which are presupposed in the construction of it.

That which evidences my degree of belief, and that by which I am confident of its truth….and indeed whether or not I’m inclined to bet on it at all…..is determined by the possibility of my experience of its object.

Those conditions incorporated in a bet I make, what kind and how much, or even the one I wouldn’t, give YOU the evidence of the degree of my belief, and the confidence in it. This becomes quite apparent, when I admit you are more justified in betting greater on the sun rising tomorrow, than I am betting there is life on other planets we can see.

But enough of this, yes? I was only pointing out the peripheral notion of bets in historical metaphysical investigations.

“…. Thus we find in purely theoretical judgements an analogon of practical judgements, to which the word belief may properly be applied, and which we may term doctrinal belief. I should not hesitate to stake my all on the truth of the proposition—if there were any possibility of bringing it to the test of experience—that, at least, some one of the planets, which we see, is inhabited. Hence I say that I have not merely the opinion, but the strong belief, on the correctness of which I would stake even many of the advantages of life, that there are inhabitants in other worlds….” (ibid)

The nature of and how much the bet, and by whom the validity of the ground of the bet is judged, is irrelevant, with respect to its occurrence. Hence the implied correspondence to induction, which serves a subject as sufficient rational justification a priori for the construction of his empirical beliefs, while not being sufficient for their proofs.

The point being, of course, all of this has been done before, in which case should be found, if not the congruent thesis, then at least a conceptually similar initial condition, merely clothed in new words.

“…. The usual test, whether that which any one maintains is merely his persuasion, or his subjective conviction at least, that is, his firm belief, is a bet. (…) If we imagine to ourselves that we have to stake the happiness of our whole life on the truth of any proposition, our judgement drops its air of triumph, we take the alarm, and discover the actual strength of our belief. Thus pragmatical belief has degrees, varying in proportion to the interests at stake.…” (1787)

….although the conceptual relations don't cause natural events, they describe them? — BillMcEnaney

For dialectical consistency, we must say that metaphysically, conceptual relations as such, represent human understanding of natural events. Words describe; understanding uses no words hence doesn’t describe.

In whichever form conceptual relations are eventually understood, the words used to express such relation represents a description post hoc ergo propter hoc, of the understanding alone, which is twice removed from the event itself.

And still as yet has no sufficient justification for reference as law, but merely the initial condition established for its possibility, for as yet there is no account of the principles to which the relations must accord.

Metaphysics: that fun shit in which every single rational human ever necessarily indulges but, all-too-humanly, seldom bothers to acknowledge, while nonetheless thrilled to hear himself talk and then think there’s something important about that.

….metaphysical, not linguistic. I want to know what a law of nature consists of. — BillMcEnaney

All law consists of the relation of conceptions in accordance with principles. That subsumed under law is determined by the source of the principles to which it accords, and that legislated by law is determined by the source of the causality of its objects.

The possibility of law in general on the one hand, and the apodeitic certainty of law on the other, is given from the principles of universality and necessity.

In the case of natural law, then, in which all causality of objects is Nature itself, the source of conceptions is empirical understanding, which is itself always predicated on observation of those objects, the relation being an effect to its cause.

An expression of a law is linguistic in one form or another; the construction of it, is always metaphysical, the purview of speculative pure reason for natural law, and practical reason for moral law in the case made by deontological philosophy.

A metaphysical answer to a metaphysical question.

For whatever that’s worth.

My basic (and speculative) thesis is this:…. — Tom Storm

Yeah, I like it too. Or something pretty close to it.

…..this process doesn't necessarily map onto any external reality independent of us; rather, it helps us cope with whatever it is we inhabit. — Tom Storm

Agreed, insofar as all natural external reality is independent from us with respect to its existence, but whatever of external reality to which the process….whatever it may be….does map, is necessarily not independent from us with respect to its perception by us, hence is the mere occassion for the possibility of any experience for us.

I agree we see and use patterns. — Tom Storm

I’ve had better luck with relations, which seems to be what patterns reduce to. Another story, though, for another time. Or not.

It would just take spacetime closer and closer to alpha without ever reaching the point of completion. — jgill

I haven’t the slightest clue regarding Banach space, but I recognize the common version of Zeno’s Paradox when I see it.

Happy doodling.

the entire structure of spacetime contracts to that singular alpha.(…) Which means no "end" to spacetime, but eventually all is taken to the vicinity of alpha. — jgill

Now that got me off on a Planck-scale research trip, I must say. Fascinating idea to be sure, but, if spacetime structure contracts to a single point, for which descriptions of events is complete insofar as there wouldn’t be any more events to describe, wouldn’t that suffice as the end of spacetime?

Granted, only for this particular model, which gets us back to the notion of ending spacetime just is the ending of models representing it. I mean….there was a beginning of spacetime, 1908 or thereabouts, so its ending shouldn’t be all that inconceivable, right?

(Can you hear it? In the background? The whispers? That here, is a perfect example of philosophy getting in the way of science? (Sigh))

Be cool as hell, wouldn’t it, to find the palette idea in the marginations of the very first outline of his magnum opus? When he was, like, 18yo? His rather extensive corpus doesn’t give that clue, as far as I am aware, but to find something like it would be quite interesting.

On the other hand, the applicability of analogies are somewhat the opinions of their creators, and opinions are assertorically denied as syllogistic devices in CPR, so, there is that….

At any rate, it was fun.

I am referring to the end of space-time, and its associated laws. — Jack Cummins

The thread title and the OP refer to different concepts. The end of time and the end of spacetime can only be determinable by very different sets of conditions.

Time ends with the end of the last relational intelligence; spacetime ends after the last formulation of a mathematical model of a relativistic continuum.

Nahhh….all that fits well enough.

Did you keep the palette at three colors only to represent a relatively simple idea? How are the “moving parts of other areas and concepts and systems” affected?

Bigger palette?

The analogy to sensation is one thing, and the colors represent the things of sensation. The analogy to Kant is taken as another thing entirely. — Fire Ologist

I understand; my point was only that the three colors in Kant don’t do what you’re suggesting.

That, and, sorry, I misspoke in saying Kant would agree we live in a green world of phenomena. Our intelligence functions on representations, from which follows our knowledge is not of things as such, but we exist as objects, thus live, in a world of real things.

Why wouldn’t Kant agree we live in green world, behind the phenomenal veil that our mind construct, keeping us separate from things in themselves? — Fire Ologist

He would agree with that, I’ve no doubt. But he would not agree with “So blue represents the thing-in-itself that we can never know in its blue self; yellow represents the categories of mind that construct or allow for our experience; and our experience is all green phenomena.”

First….we have no way of knowing the blue self of a thing. It is only ever blue because we say it is;

Then…the yellow as category belongs to understanding, hence is not the OP’s yellow analogous to the senses, which is mere sensation belonging to sensibility;

Then…our experience is not of phenomena, but is the synthesis of phenomena with conceptions. Phenomena represent only that which is conditioned by both space and time, thereby are only the determinant conditions for the possibility of experience.

Finally…the green of sensation in the Sense Perception bracket of the OP is not the green of the phenomena found in the Kant bracket. Phenomena, in Kant are the “…undetermined object of empirical intuition…”, but sensation is merely “….that of reality by which the senses are affected…”

So….behind the phenomenal veil the mind constructs, keeping us separate from the things-in-themselves….yep, spot on. No metaphors needed. On the other hand, neither of your iterations of green in the aforementioned brackets, is a sufficient metaphor representing the world we live in.

Again, I have no warrant to critique your analogy in general, only that of it which reflects improper attributions to Kantian speculative metaphysics, as I understand it.

Either the analogy works to depict Kant’s idea, or it doesn’t. I think it does. — Fire Ologist

Depict as to give an idea of perception in general, yeah, maybe. Under Kantian textual scrutiny, I think it does not. That being said, I have no wish to upset the resident applecart.

I would say that members of the rational community (i.e. everyone) do understand rational norms, but they do not subscribe nor need to subscribe to them. — Leontiskos

I would agree, in principle. A norm, insofar as it is a euphemism for some explicit rational condition, understanding is that by which that condition is given its object. That I understand perfectly well the explicit condition, e.g., respect as a certain, albeit merely cultural, norm, it does not follow I must always without exception, hold the door for a lady.