Your claim is that:

science cannot address even in principle [what value is] — javra

Can the question of what value is be addressed without regard to what it is that people value? Whatever answer we might give to the question "what is value?" wouldn't it be rejected if it is something that no one values? Is there a tipping point? Would it be an adequate answer if one person values it or only a few people? Does it matter who it is that values it?

What it is that people value is an empirical investigation. People often provide what others might regard as acceptable answers. How we might distinguish between what people say they value and what they actually value is something that experiments can help determine.

science is quite limited in what it can address. — javra

Isn't this true of every field of endeavor?

There are some who are critical of the notion of a political or social science, but many in academic political science departments, wanting to mark and defend their territory, regard what they are doing as science.

With regard to value, a social or political scientist might study what it is that people value, putting aside or rejecting the question of what value is essentially. Does philosophy or any other discipline do any better?

From Republican Tom Cole, chairman of the Rules Committee:

Since September, the House has been engaged in an impeachment inquiry, examining whether sufficient grounds exist for the House to exercise constitutional power to impeach the president of the United States ...

In other words, an impeachment investigation into whether there are grounds for an impeachment investigation. An investigation into whether they can find something they have not been able to find, something to charge him with.

Hunter Biden has exposed the cloak and dagger tactics of their Hunter hunt by not complying with the House Oversight Committee's requirement for closed door testimony. Why their refusal to open the door and let in some light?

True words seem paradoxical. — FrancisRay

The paradox of words is that there would be no Daodejing without words. The text begins with a warning about words, but the warning cannot be given without words.

Chapter 32 of the Daodejing says:

When unhewn wood is carved up, then there are names.
Now that there are names, know enough to stop!

The Dao or Way is without name, but it must be named in order to say anything about it. But the name is not what is named. There is in this sense no "true words".

Thus it is easy to know the answers, albeit difficult to understand them. . — FrancisRay

To the contrary. It is easy answer "non-dualism" but the unity so named is not to be found in such questions and answers. With words the unity spoken of cannot be preserved. With words there is dualism.

Chapter 16 says:

Attain extreme tenuousness

By way of explanation a couple of quotes from Zhuangzi:

But exhausting the spirit trying to illuminate the unity of things without knowing that they are all the same is called “three in the morning.” What do I mean by “three in the morning”? When the monkey trainer was passing out nuts he said, “You get three in the morning and four at night.”
The monkeys were all angry. “All right,” he said, “you get four in the morning and three at night.” The monkeys were all pleased. With no loss in name or substance, he made use of their joy and anger because he went along with them. So the sage harmonizes people with right and wrong and
rests them on Heaven’s wheel. This is called walking two roads.

If we’re already one, can I say it? But since I’ve just said we’re one, can I not say it? The unity and my saying it make two. The two and their unity make three.

But actually, you can't just go on about differences without acknowledging similarities. — Ludwig V

Right. In order to show that things that look the same are different one needs to acknowledge similarities since they would not look the same if there were not similarities.

If the facts are that a President has immunity from federal prosecution for crimes he's been impeached for, but acquitted then it would be interesting to hear what other facts would make a difference.

They might approve if it helps Trump but they might not want to help a liberal president.

I was more interested in the differences between the three than the similarities. — Ludwig V

Malcolm tells the following story:

In response to a comment about Hegel by Drury, Wittgenstein said: 'Hegel seems to me to be always wanting to say that things which look different are really the same.Whereas my interest is in showing that things which look the same are really different.' He had thought about using a sentence from King Lear, 'I'll teach you differences', as a motto for his book.

The question of the relationship between ontology and epistemology deserves greater consideration. Questions of ontology are often treated as if they are separate from and independent of epistemology, but both the questions and answers given say much more about how we conceive things to be than about how they are.

Is a dualist ontology more than a misattributed dualist epistemology?

Well, it might be that his decisions will be those his wife concurs with. It might also be that consideration of whether she will concur is a determining factor. But, she too might see how this might come back to bite her in the ass.

On the other hand, and contrary to what I said above, the court might decide to rule in favor of Trump and deal with what comes when the person in office is someone whose politics they disapprove of when they come to that bridge.

1) Whether a President has absolute immunity from federal prosecution in all circumstances — Relativist

Of course not!

As to how the court will rule, although political bias might favor protecting Trump, I think they are smart enough to see that such a ruling could bite them in the ass. Because of their bias they would not want to give the same protection to those who they are biased against.

2) Whether a President has immunity from federal prosecution for crimes he's been impeached for, but acquitted. — Relativist

No. Acquittal does not mean that the person impeached is not guilty of the crimes for which they were impeached.

philosophical foundation of mysticism — FrancisRay

In my opinion, when someone makes an appeal to a particular doctrine they should provide an explanation of what it is being said and how they understand it. Looking back I see @180 Proof makes this point.

You say "Perennial Philosophy" explains but you do not give (or summarize) the explanation. — 180 Proof

'Nondualism' and 'perennial philosophy' do not have a single agreed upon meaning. The same can be said of 'mysticism' and 'metaphysics'.

180's approach to philosophy is dialectical. A mode of inquiry. It is antithetical to doctrines. It asks questions but a doctrinaire approach is based on the assumption that answers to these questions have been given. There may be some common ground here in undecidable. Socratic (but not Hegelian) dialectic is an examination of opinions, but I am not sure what FrancisRay's means with the claim that:

It predicts that all metaphysical questions are undecidable and gives answers for all such questions. — FrancisRay

Is the answer that there is no answer? If so then 180 and FrancisRay are in agreement. If not then perhaps FrancisRay can tell us what these answers are.

I have wasted enough time responding to, by your own admission, your thoughtless words. The cure cannot lie in more words. The only cure would be for you to begin to THINK. Clearly and honestly, as a matter of integrity. Drop the rhetorical defense of Trump and with it the defense of all the nonsense this leads you to say.

But perhaps I give you too much credit by implying that you are capable of doing this.

The discussion of categories is complicated. — Ludwig V

This is why common examples such as "the number two is blue" are problematic. It has the advantage of illustrating a clear difference between categories, but with the exception of someone with synesthesia no one conjoins them. One might easily get the impression that philosophers waste their time with things that no one in their right mind would have the least concern with.

(By the way, if I've understood the metaphor correctly, categories don't carve anything up. That privilege is reserved to concepts in certain categories. — Ludwig V

I think they both do, but will focus on the second lecture.

The quote is Ryle, not I; so it's not I who does not say. — Banno

But he does say. And what he says is not to be found it what you quoted.

One charitably presumes that here, in the first chapter, he is setting a direction, on which he continues in the remainder of the book. — Banno

This is why attention should be paid to what is said in the beginning wherthe direction being set.

It seems from this that you think making a category error as carving stuff up wrong. — Banno

Yes, that is the question:

The question arose for me .... — Fooloso4

But further, your critique looks misplaced. — Banno

When you misquote by leaving out the beginning of what I said it may look this way, but you carve it up wrong.

I hope it's clear from the SEP article that it's more about taking a term from one category and misapplying it in another. — Banno

It should be clear from my quotes from Ryle himself that this point has been made.

It seems to me somewhat crude to take the one example to undermine Ryle's point when there are others at hand that serve him better. We might better understand his work if we are a bit more charitable. — Banno

As I said in a response to Ludwig:

My comments and questions are intended as a mode of inquiry. — Fooloso4

[Added. Quoting Ryle]

"I have said that when intellectual positions are at cross-purposes in the manner which I have sketchily described and illustrated, the solution of their quarrel cannot come from any further internal corroboration of either position." — Banno

And why is that? You do not say. He does. As I understand it, it is because the solution is to be found by navigating the "public road" rather than the "private road" (@Ludwig V I should have picked up on that) of physics or biology. And so he concludes:

These inter-theory questions are not questions internal to those theories. They are not biological or physical questions. They are philosophical questions.

As the saying goes, paths are made by walking. His claim that:

The kind of thinking which advances biology is not the kind of thinking which settles the claims and counter-claims between biology and physics.

(13)

This is questionable. Questioning something when and where it appears is not premature. When you claim that doing so "undermines Ryle's point", you sound like the Christian faithful who dare not question the Bible. The fact of the matter is, questioning is an effect and well regarded mode of seeking understanding. It does not undermine the text unless it is one's intent to do so. I do not.

If it is your first time reading Ryle, then let's read Ryle. — Banno

A surprising comment coming from someone who responds to my questions taken directly from the text by citing the SEP instead of the text.

The danger is that we trot out the pat rejoinders rather than pay attention to the text at hand. — Banno

Indeed! Glad to see you have gotten around to paying a bit of attention to the text.

The key is that Descartes thought in terms of different "substances" which is how people thought about this issue. — Ludwig V

The term 'substance' is problematic, but as you indicate it was not a problem unique to Descartes. Does Ryle others who use the term of making a category mistake? From what I cited above it does not seem that the category mistake was the use of the term.

Remember, for many people Dualism is the basis for survival after death — Ludwig V

Yes, but this predates Descartes. He makes use of accepted duality of soul and body in order to say something substantially (pun intended) different.

Well, Ryle argues that there are not a fixed number or type of categories, so he's pretty much on your page. (See pp. 8 (last line of page) to 11.) — Ludwig V

That the logical types or categories are not fixed in number is not the same thing as their being fixed, at least to the extent that biology and physics are different logical types.

I quoted from these pages above. Page 12 too.

I believe and hope that you won't regret filling in this gap - whether you agree with him or not. — Ludwig V

No regrets.

He means that only specialists use the "private" concepts — Ludwig V

Got it.

But the subject matter of biology differs in important ways from the subject matter of physics, and applying only the methods of physics would ignore what makes living systems different from non-living systems. The methods of physics do not allow that distinction to appear. — Ludwig V

This is why I asked earlier:

Consider, for example, is the question regarding the determining factors between what is living and what is not a biological or a philosophical question? Is the question itself problematic because we lack the conceptual clarity this distinction presupposes? Is it exasperated by the assumption that there are conceptual and categorical boundaries to disciplinary domains? Does the question of life itself contain a category mistake in boundary cases? — Fooloso4

I would not rule out the possibility that physics might contribute to this at some point.

I never said words do not matter. — NOS4A2

Just about everything you say demonstrates your disregard for words.

I was arguing words have no power — NOS4A2

If words have no power then they have no power and do not matter. The problem is, you open your mouth and stick your foot in it. In your attempt to extricate it you stumble.

I never said meaning is arbitrary. — NOS4A2

If words are arbitrary then they have no meaning.

I didn’t say that since the form and sound is arbitrary, the meaning must be. — NOS4A2

You claimed:

Words are independent of thought. — NOS4A2

and

It is not possible to deduce the underlying meaning from its word form. — NOS4A2

It makes no sense to treat words as if they are independent of thought and an equivocation to pretend that what is at issue with words is the form they take.

Simply to be worthy of what? What is "it"? — Athena

Living without a god. Living without something higher. Plato does this with the idea of the good.

The Greek gods were nothing like the God of Abraham so what does it mean to become gods? — Athena

That is something Nietzsche asks us to consider. His inversion of Dionysus gives us some idea of what is at issue:

I, the last disciple and initiate of the God Dionysus: and perhaps I might at last begin to give you, my friends, as far as I am allowed, a little taste of this philosophy? In a hushed voice, as is but seemly: for it has to do with much that is secret, new, strange, wonderful, and uncanny. The very fact that Dionysus is a philosopher, and that therefore Gods also philosophize, seems to me a novelty which is not unensnaring, and might perhaps arouse suspicion precisely among philosophers.

— Beyond Good and Evil, 295

Both the God of Abraham and the Greek gods were willful gods. They were not lovers of wisdom in the sense of desiring and pursuing knowledge and wisdom. Through the influence of the Greek philosophers God becomes omniscient. Man is taught not to question. But a god who questions does not forbid man to question.

The moral is, that we need the gods. — Athena

But if we have killed God then what? What will replace them? Where can we find direction and guidance?

I think a person's brain must be pickled in Christianity to appreciate what Nietzche is saying. — Athena

I think it must be just the opposite. A person must overcome the burden Christianity has imposed on us. We must question rather than obey the tablets of "thou shall nots". See the chapter "The Three Metamorphoses of the Spirit" in Zarathustra.

I don't mean the person needs to be a Christian, but despite not being a Christian s/he can relate to Nietsche because s/he has no other frame of thought. — Athena

Yes, this frame of reference is important. To be like a god man must be a creator.

@NOS4A2

I forgot to mention Plato's Cratylus. The question of linguistic arbitrariness is not something new and not something I was not aware of.

Your round-about way of defending censorship pushed you into maintaining a position you have been unable to defend. — NOS4A2

Your attempt to separate words from their meaning and consequence is the result of your irresponsible defense of Trump's irresponsible claims. Your inept defense of his right to free speech is based on your treating words as if they do not matter. Any rational discussion of free speech and censorship needs to address this.

You clearly didn’t know what the concept was until I mentioned it. — NOS4A2

If you just look elsewhere you will see I have discussed this with regard to Wittgenstein in various threads. For example here from 5 years ago.

Note that the issue of linguistic arbitrariness goes much deeper than the form and sound of words.

I asked you to start a thread on your linguistic theories but you declined.

Later, after giving you the word “arbitrariness” to google, you confirm what I was arguing all along. — NOS4A2

I don't know if this is a reflection of your failure to understand or an attempt to dissemble. I am not confirming what you have been arguing, I am pointing out your fundamental misunderstanding. The arbitrariness of the form and sound of words does not mean that the meaning of words is arbitrary. It does not mean that words do not have power or do not matter.

Why do you keep saying “our democracy”? Why not just say “democracy”? — NOS4A2

First, because it is our democracy that Trump endangers.

Second, there are various forms of democracy. You have no trouble with:

your version of democracy — NOS4A2

but question the notion of our democracy. The reason you have a problem with this is because you reject the idea of a common good, of anything that is ours rather than mine or yours. There is ample evidence of this earlier in this thread. For you there is only the competition between individual rights.

Trump makes demagogical use of this. His only interest is in what benefits him. Perhaps he sees no problem with this because he assumes we are all like this, but perhaps because he just does not care, and to think otherwise is a weakness. But what does the demagogue say:

In the end, they're not coming after me. They're coming after you — and I'm just standing in their way.

This is my first time reading Ryle. I took it as an opportunity to fill in some gaps. To read some things I had intentionally neglected. My comments and questions are intended as a mode of inquiry.

In "Dilemmas", he identifies them as puzzles about "public" concepts — Ludwig V

Perhaps this will become clear as I continue reading, but from the first lecture I do not see where he makes a distinction between public and private or how it comes into play.

Biology does indeed welcome physics, chemistry and similar disciplines. But it also welcomes inputs from psychology, sociology and other sciences. — Ludwig V

To the extent this is true doesn't it go against Ryle's move to keep them separate?

... biophysics studies living organisms as physical systems ... — Ludwig V

It studies living organisms as biological systems, but makes use of the principles and methods of physics.

... molecular biology studies them as chemical systems — Ludwig V

Molecular biology studies biological organisms at the molecular level, but this does not mean that it studies them as chemical rather than biological systems.

There is, however, the question of whether biology can be reduced to chemistry and chemistry to physics. I won't address but, but will ask whether this is a biological or chemical or physical or philosophical question? Ryle, as quoted above, seems to regard it as a philosophical question. I don't think it can be divided categorically in this way. To do so would be a category mistake.

I must be missing your point; nothing in that is about "cross-disciplinary studies such as biophysics". — Banno

Right. That's the point. Ryle separates the disciplines of biology, physics, and philosophy. As quoted above:

The kind of thinking which advances biology is not the kind of thinking which settles the claims and counter-claims between biology and physics. These inter-theory questions are not questions internal to those theories. They are not biological or physical questions. They are philosophical questions.

The assumption is that there are different kinds of thinking. In the terms of The Concepts of Mind, they are not of the "same logical type". It would be a category mistake then to address the claims and counter-claims of biology and physics as if they are of the same logical type. The development of cross-disciplinary studies such as biophysics, however shows that his assumption is mistaken. There are not fixed logical types of thinking.

What I am suggesting is that Descartes' mistake was not categorical in the sense of failure to recognize differences between fixed categories, but rather his mistake resulted from the application of the framework of the categories of his time. Ryle's own category mistake is in this way the same as Descartes, thinking in terms of the framework of the categories of his time.

Then perhaps he is on about something else. — Banno

Is he? And what is that? Simply citing an article that goes beyond Ryle without identifying which of the issues in this debate are pertinent does not tell us what this something else he is on about is.

More helpful is what Ryle himself says in the section "The Origin of the Category- Mistake" from The Concept of Mind

As a man of scientific genius he [Descartes] could not but endorse the claims of mechanics, yet as a religious and moral man he could not accept, as Hobbes accepted, the discouraging rider to those claims, namely that human nature differs only in degree of complexity from clockwork. The mental could not be just a variety of the mechanical.

... since mechanical laws explain movements in space as the effects of other movements in space, other laws must explain some of the non-spatial workings of minds as the effects of other non-spatial workings of minds. The difference between the human behaviours which we describe as intelligent and those which we describe as unintelligent must be a difference in their causation ...

The differences between the physical and the mental were thus represented as differences inside the common framework of the categories of ‘thing’, ‘stuff’, ‘attribute’, ‘state’, ‘process’, ‘change’, ‘cause’ and ‘effect’. Minds are things, but different sorts of things from bodies; mental processes are causes and effects, but different sorts of causes and effects from bodily movements.

(9)

Further on he says:

I am not, for example, denying that there occur mental processes. Doing long division is a mental process and so is making a joke. But I am saying that the phrase ‘there occur mental processes’ does not mean the same sort of thing as ‘there occur physical processes’, and, therefore, that it makes no sense to conjoin or disjoin the two.

If my argument is successful, there will follow some interesting consequences. First, the hallowed contrast between Mind and Matter will be dissipated, but dissipated not by either of the equally hallowed absorptions of Mind by Matter or of Matter by Mind, but in quite a different way.
For the seeming contrast of the two will be shown to be as illegitimate as would be the contrast of ‘she came home in a flood of tears’ and ‘she came home in a sedan-chair’. The belief that there is a polar opposition between Mind and Matter is the belief that they are terms of the same logical type.

(11-12)

I think you've got him upside down. He sets up his target:- — Ludwig V

Perhaps I do, but when I ask:

...whether Ryle is making his own version of category mistake — Fooloso4

what I have in mind is the treatment of the categories of different disciplines, that, for example, as cited, there are according to him different "kinds" of thinking such as those he names, biology, physics, and philosophy. He says that the claims and counter-claims between them are not questions internal to those theories. But cross-disciplinary studies such as biophysics seems to contradict this. The boundaries are not natural or immutable. Understanding biology at some point requires an understanding of physics. Consider, for example, is the question regarding the determining factors between what is living and what is not a biological or a philosophical question? Is the question itself problematic because we lack the conceptual clarity this distinction presupposes? Is it exasperated by the assumption that there are conceptual and categorical boundaries to disciplinary domains? Does the question of life itself contain a category mistake in boundary cases?

I finished reading the first lecture. The question arose for me as to whether Ryle is making his own version of category mistake when he attempts to cleanly and neatly divide things along the lines of categories, as if cutting along the inherent joints of things rather than in conformity to some disciplinary practice.

For example:

The kind of thinking which advances biology is not the kind of thinking which settles the claims and counter-claims between biology and physics. These inter-theory questions are not questions internal to those theories. They are not biological or physical questions. They are philosophical questions.

(13)

On the other hand, and with this I am in agreement, when he says that the disputes between Idealists and Realists or Empiricists and Rationalists do not matter (13), this supports my point. There is a seemingly endless set of divisions within and across these distinctions. The problems these disputes attempt to solve and problems they create.

I think this thread may have died and I do not know if we can go any further in an exploration of greatness? However, another exciting piece of this puzzle is the role gods have played in shaping civilizations, our evolution, and our present consciousness. Do you have any thoughts about how that subject applies to great nations? — Athena

In the section "The Parable of the Madman" from Zarathustra our old friend (enemy?) Nietzsche asks:

God is dead. God remains dead. And we have killed him. How shall we, murderers of all murderers, console ourselves? ... Is not the greatness of this deed too great for us? Must we not ourselves become gods simply to be worthy of it? There has never been a greater deed; and whosoever shall be born after us - for the sake of this deed he shall be part of a higher history than all history hitherto.

One minute we’re talking about words, next we’re talking about meaning. The goal posts continue to expand. — NOS4A2

This whole exchange has been about your attempt to separate words and meaning. I called you out on this from the beginning of this exchange. From my first two posts on this:

One of the greatest dangers of words comes from disregard for their importance, as if what Trump says does not matter. — Fooloso4

The fact of the matter is that you use words as a rhetorical devise in an attempt to destroy the power and meaning of words, accusing those who oppose him of whatever it is he is accused of. — Fooloso4

More on this last point below.

You then go on to defend yourself by misunderstanding and misusing the concept of linguistic arbitrariness. But we should expect no less from someone who claims to think without words.

Only an autocrat would suggest no one is allowed to contest an election. — NOS4A2

Back to this factless talking point. But thanks for confirming my point that:

... Trumpsters will attempt to render the term meaningless by accusing their opponents of being autocratic. — Fooloso4

I don’t support your version of democracy ... — NOS4A2

We have not discussed my version of democracy. I have never said what it is. Despite all its faults and weaknesses one positive thing about our democracy is that we will have the opportunity to vote to keep Trump from being elected. But, of course, the way the system works he might be elected. The price of freedom.

My biggest concern is what he will attempt to do if elected. As he is promising, one thing he will attempt to do is remove the checks and balances that prevented him from doing whatever it is he wanted last time around.

And you have to supply them with meaning and significance. — NOS4A2

If they are devoid of meaning and significance I'm not going to do for you what you have failed to do for yourself. If your words are devoid of meaning and significance there is no reason to take anything you say seriously.

In linguistics it is called “arbitrariness”. — NOS4A2

You clearly do not understand what linguistic arbitrariness means. 'Water' and 'agua' have a different form and sound but mean the same thing. Theform and sound of words may be arbitrary but the meaning is not. If you look up the meaning of a word in the dictionary it does not say that the meaning is arbitrary, that it means whatever you want it to mean.

You gave me three words in text. Point to me any of the words that you’re thinking in. — NOS4A2

You are deeply confused. When I think of those words I am thinking in terms of those words. I am thinking about what democracy and freedom mean and how a demagogue like Trump and his followers threaten our democracy. I am thinking about how there has been a disturbing shift to autocracy in many countries and how if Trump is elected or attempts to overturn the election again the US will become an autocracy as well. And I am thinking of how Trumpsters will attempt to render the term meaningless by accusing their opponents of being autocratic.

This reminds me, a while back I asked you if you support democracy. You never answered. Is it that you think it is a meaningless sound or are you just unwilling to admit that your loyalty to Trump trumps democratic rule?

Then you should be able to show me this “more to words” ... — NOS4A2

Are your words just scratches and sounds without meaning or significance? Can you replace them indiscriminately with any other words? Or, just strings of sounds and scratches? Does your defense of Trump amount to more than grunts? Is there more to what you say than there is to a dog barking?

... or point to any word in your lexicon of thoughts. But you won't. — NOS4A2

But I did. I gave you three: freedom, democracy, and autocracy. But you refuse to explain how you think about them and other words without words.

I think about things, like words or concepts, but that does not entail that I think in things like words and concepts. — NOS4A2

Then what is it you "think in" when thinking about them without them?

Words are independent of thought. — NOS4A2

No, but you treat them as if they were.

It’s the reason we can’t understand a language simply by reading it or hearing someone speak it. — NOS4A2

Not understanding a language does not mean the words of that language are independent of thought.

Scratches on paper, text on screen, and articulated guttural sounds are arbitrary, merely conventional — NOS4A2

This shows that there is more to words than just scratches and sounds. Your thinking that this is what words are is a damning indication of just how empty and meaningless your inept but endless defense of Trump and his use of "the best words" is.

I'll ask you again:

Please explain how you think about concepts such as freedom, democracy, and autocracy without words. — Fooloso4

I’d love for you to show me where these words are. — NOS4A2

They are not physical entities like words on a page that exist somewhere that can be shown to you. But words that are on the page or spoken are not, or at least should not, be independent of thought.

As is evident in much of what you say, the corollary to your claim to think without words it your using words without thinking.

Please explain how you think about concepts such as freedom, democracy, and autocracy without words.

I don’t think in words. — NOS4A2

I would be very interested in hearing you start a thread explaining how you think without words and how you understand the words you respond to without words,

I speak and write in words. — NOS4A2

The question is the degree to which you think in words. You avoid making the connection.

Yes conmen believe in the power of words. Are you a conman, or so easily conned, that you’ll believe the same? — NOS4A2

What is at issue is not whether I or any other single individual can be conned or believe people can be conned. It is evident that they can. I am on the fence as to whether you have been conned by Trump. Perhaps you are just testing the extent of your ability to argue whether or not you believe what you say.

If others are forced to move at the sight and sound of words, what’s your excuse? — NOS4A2

I make no excuses. It is not the sight and sound of words that move me but their content. Unlike you do (or pretend to do), I do not believe that they are all just empty sights and sounds devoid of meaning or consequence.

sometimes poetry expresses a truth better than facts. — Athena

Aristotle said that poetry is more philosophical and serious than history, because poetry tends to give general or universal truths while history gives particular facts. The poet is a "maker of stories" (Poetics, 145b)

Our understanding of reality might be totally different if the Hebrews who left Ur, had acknowledged the Sumerian contribution to their story of creation and the story of the flood. — Athena

Ours perhaps, but the question of authorship has a long and ancient history. Storytellers often credit gods and muses for the stories they tell. Some still regard the Bible as the word of God. Pseudonymous writing was an accepted practice and not regarded as deceit.

You might find the book "God: An Anatomy" by Francesca Stavrakopoulou
interesting. It deals with how the stories and concepts of what comes to be the god(s) of the Bible develop from one culture to another. As the title indicates, the focus is on gods as physical beings.

Words have power because I like defending Trump. — NOS4A2

So, if you did not like defending Trump then words would not have power? You are incapable of seeing beyond yourself as he is.

I don’t believe I’m changing the world with my words. — NOS4A2

That much we can agree on. But you are not Trump. Who says something, where and when it is said, and to whom it is said all matter.

A conman relies on the power of words. Don't you know this? Or do you just deny it in an attempt to make the weaker argument stronger?

What do you think is the connection, if any, between words and thoughts? Do you think in words? Does what you think influence what you do?

This dialogue presents a friendly conversation between the philosopher and the poet — Paine

In this symposium speeches on love take the place of drinking since several participants have hangovers. Two highly regarded poets speak, the tragic poet Agathon, in whose house this party takes place, and the comic poet Aristophanes, who in his play The Clouds satirizes Socrates and philosophy. Just as Socrates could out drink them all, he demonstrates that he could give a better speech on love then them all. With regard to both wine and love, he suffers the least adverse effects.

Just as [correction: Plato] never speaks in his own name in the dialogues, Socrates does not speak in his own name but rather recounts in his own words those of an unknown, possibly fictitious, woman Diotima on matters of love and wisdom.

I am very excited by the link I used ... — Athena

A few quick comments.

From the second section on consciousness I am reminded of Dewey on the meaning of conscience (con - with, science -knowledge) to be, with the knowledge of others. What one would do if others were aware of what we are doing.

Plato makes great use of mythos, both existing mythos and those he creates. There is a logos to mythos. Although we typically think of logos as reason and logic, its range of meaning is much greater. Etymologically its root meaning is to collect or gather. In the dialogues, however, an appeal to mythos often occurs when argument fails.

In addition to the opposition between logos and mythos, there is the related opposition between philosophy and poetry. In this opposition too there is unity. Philosophical poiesis.

... a plagiarized Sumerian story of the creation of man. — Athena

Certainly stories from one culture became part of those of other cultures, but I do not think we should think of it as plagiarism. It is, rather, closer to what happens in fashion style.

Words don't have the power you pretend they do. — NOS4A2

Of course they do, and you know it. Why do you continue defending Trump if words do not have power? Why do you object to the gag order if words do not have power? Why insist on his right to say whatever he wants if his words do not have power?

The fact of the matter is that you use words as a rhetorical devise in an attempt to destroy the power and meaning of words, accusing those who oppose him of whatever it is he is accused of.

If they do act it is because they perceive an injustice, not words. — NOS4A2

If they perceive an injustice it is based in large part on words, on what they have been told. On Trump telling them:

In the end, they're not coming after me. They're coming after you — and I'm just standing in their way.

and:

The ridiculous and baseless indictment of me by the Biden administration’s weaponized Department of Injustice will go down as among the most horrific abuses of power in the history of our country ... Many people have said that; Democrats have even said it. This vicious persecution is a travesty of justice.

Words are dangerous ... — NOS4A2

One of the greatest dangers of words comes from disregard for their importance, as if what Trump says does not matter.

When Trump speaks his "patriots" listen. When he says:

The threat from outside forces is far less sinister, dangerous and grave than the threat from within.

they believe him. Do you think these "patriots" will act on his words or not?