Reading Gilbert Ryle's "Dilemmas"

Ludwig V

I’m proposing a reading group for Gilbert Ryle’s “Dilemmas” as a continuation of the exploration of Ordinary Language Philosophy that started in the discussion of Austin’s “Sense and Sensibilia”. However, this is a very different take on the idea, if it is any take on the idea; indeed, one could think that Ryle had never read or encountered Austin (just as there is no hint in Austin’s book that he had ever encountered Ryle).

The book is a series of lectures, delivered in 1953, so more than 10 years before ”Sense and Sensibilia” and some 3 years after Ryle’s best-known book, “The Concept of Mind” (1949).

Here's a link to download the book. This is a .PDF from University of Milan. Seems Ok. -
Ryle's "Dilemmas"

The lectures are an exploration of a specific dilemmas, but not dilemmas in which two (or more) solutions are proposed to a given problem or question, such that if one is true, the other(s) is/are false. Presumably, since it’s just a question of evidence, there is no role for philosophy.

He is interested in disputes, “which are not rival solutions of the same problem, but … which seem to be irreconcilable with one another.” (p.1) He gives three examples, all of which occur in the topics of the other lectures, to illustrate his general description:-
1. “From one point of view, … we find out what is there by perceiving. From the other point of view, that of the inquirer into the mechanism of perception, what we perceive never coincides with what is in the world.” (p. 2)
2. “We feel quite sure both that a person can be made moral and that he cannot be made moral; and yet that both cannot be true” (p.4)
3. “In the eighteenth and again in the nineteenth century, the impressive advance of a science seemed to involve a corresponding retreat by religion.” (p.6)

There is a discussion of each example. It is typical of Ryle that his main aim is to bring out the variety of reasons why the issue is a dilemma.

Then he arrives at the topic of categories. This is quite extensive (pp. 8 – 11). He concludes with “It follows directly that neither the propositions which embody such concepts nor the questions which would be answered, truly or falsely, by such propositions admit of being automatically entered into a ready-made register of logical kinds or types.” (p.11) He resists fixed frameworks and careless generalization. He “pulls” the threads together on this page, and moves on to some remarks about philosophy and outlines of what his project is.

His claim is modest:- “… the most radical cross-purposes between specialist theories derive from the logical trickiness not of the highly technical concepts employed in them, but of the underlying non-technical concepts employed as well in them as in everyone else's thinking.” (p.12) This focus on “non-technical” concepts (also identified as “public” concepts) is the nearest we get to any focus on anything ordinary. What he does say is that:- “These inter-theory questions are not questions internal to those theories. They are not biological or physical questions. They are philosophical questions.” (p.13)

It is striking that Ryle has not chosen any of the well-known philosophical dilemmas – “the feud, for example, between Idealists and Realists, or the vendetta between Empiricists and Rationalists.” (p.13) In fact, of course, his examples all have connections to well-known philosophical issues. But they are re-cast into a different articulation. No doubt, this is to enable or compel us to approach them without the orthodox philosophical spectacles.

Ryle explains his approach with a metaphor:- “A live issue is a piece of country in which no one knows which way to go. As there are no paths, there are no paths to share. Where there are paths to share, there are paths; and paths are the memorials of undergrowth already cleared.” (p.13) Compare Wittgenstein’s remark that he “does not know his way about” and his desire for an “oversight”.

There is nothing specifically about ordinary language here. On the contrary, he includes technical, scientific or specialist concepts in his concerns – it is a marked difference from Austin. He is analysing the issues with apparently little self-consciousness about his method. However, the last lecture will give us a more detailed discussion of that dilemma.

He ends with a few further remarks about philosophy and his final word is:- “He (sc. Plato) was too much of a philosopher to think that anything that he had said was the last word. It was left to his disciples to identify his footmarks with his destination.” (p. 14) That sounds like a warning to us all.

The lectures are:-

Dilemmas
'It Was To Be'
Achilles And The Tortoise
Pleasure
The World Of Science And The Every-Day World
Technical And Untechnical Concepts
Perception
Formal And Informal Logic

Just for fun, here’s the Ngram for Ryle vs Austin:-
Ngram Ryle vs Austin

Fooloso4

I finished reading the first lecture. The question arose for me as to whether Ryle is making his own version of category mistake when he attempts to cleanly and neatly divide things along the lines of categories, as if cutting along the inherent joints of things rather than in conformity to some disciplinary practice.

For example:

The kind of thinking which advances biology is not the kind of thinking which settles the claims and counter-claims between biology and physics. These inter-theory questions are not questions internal to those theories. They are not biological or physical questions. They are philosophical questions.

(13)

On the other hand, and with this I am in agreement, when he says that the disputes between Idealists and Realists or Empiricists and Rationalists do not matter (13), this supports my point. There is a seemingly endless set of divisions within and across these distinctions. The problems these disputes attempt to solve and problems they create.

Bella fekete

“ Ryle explains his approach with a metaphor:- “A live issue is a piece of country in which no one knows which way to go. As there are no paths, there are no paths to share. Where there are paths to share, there are paths; and paths are the memorials of undergrowth already cleared.” (p.13) Compare Wittgenstein’s remark that he “does not know his way about” and his desire for an “oversight”.

With so little time on my hands , would like to nail down a remark by Wittgenstein that helps me get into the essential crux of the matter upon which to build subsequent structure , so as to recollect some way of commenting a-posterior .

Interesting forum from different points of tangency .gearing toward

Bella fekete

Ludwig V /\

Ludwig V

There is a seemingly endless set of divisions within and across these distinctions. — Fooloso4

Yes, and I have the impression that's a biig part of Ryle's reason for trying to find another way to articulate philosophical problems. More and more interpretations don't help - they're infected with the same problems. And philosophers are supposed to be very clear about things!

mistake when he attempts to cleanly and neatly divide things along the lines of categories, — Fooloso4

I think you've got him upside down. He sets up his target:-
"Some loyal Aristotelians, who like all loyalists ossified their master's teaching, treated his list of categories as providing the pigeon-holes in one or other of which there could and should be lodged every term used or usable in technical or untechnical discourse. Every concept must be either of Category I or of Category II or ... of Category X. Even in our own day there exist thinkers who, so far from finding this supply of pigeon-holes intolerably exiguous, find it gratuitously lavish; and are prepared to say of any concept presented to them' Is it a Quality? If not, then it must be a Relation'."

... and knocks it down.
"In opposition to such views, it should suffice to launch this challenge: 'In which of your two or ten pigeon-holes will you lodge the following six terms, drawn pretty randomly from the glossary of Contract Bridge alone, namely "singleton", "trump", "vulnerable", "slam", "finesse" and "revoke"?' ........... The truth is that there are not just two or just ten different logical metiers open to the terms or concepts we employ in ordinary and technical discourse, there are indefinitely many such different metiers and indefinitely many dimensions of these differences". p.10

I must say, I sympathize with his impatience with systematizers. But I don't think that the hand-waving in the last sentence is helpful. Even if there is no systematic structure, it would be good to have some ideas about when and why two concepts should go into different categories. And one wonders why he suddenly stops talking about categories and starts talking about "metiers".

Ludwig V

With so little time on my hands , would like to nail down a remark by Wittgenstein that helps me get into the essential crux of the matter upon which to build subsequent structure , so as to recollect some way of commenting a-posterior . — Bella fekete

Wittgenstein is hard to nail down. He has several remarks about philosophy which are mostly different metaphors. "The point of philosophy is to show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle" or "Back to the rough country!" I don't think you could get a consistent, complete definition from them.

Neither Ryle nor Wittgenstein are fans of essences.

/\ — Bella fekete

I'm sorry, I don't understand this.

Banno

Thank you,

↪Ludwig V

.

As the engram shows, Ryle was well thought of in the Sixties and Seventies, but has scarcely dimmed since then. He occupies a singular place in the history of Philosophy, as what is misleadingly known as Ordinary Language Philosophy moved through considerations of intentionality into the recent work on Consciousness and Philosophy of Mind. Ryle is a progenitor of this path, his main contribution being the book The Concept of Mind, in which he coined the term "Ghost in the machine" and developed the philosophical notion of the "category mistake".

But here we have a discussion of what might loosely be called "domains of discourse", where what we have to say about a topic, considered in one way, is utterly at odds with what we have to say when we consider the very same topic in another way. We would talk of one having responsibility what one does, until we talk about what caused us to act, and responsibility no longer enters into the issue. We would talk about what we see or hear, until we talk about the physiology of perception, and cease to mention seeing and hearing, instead talking or nerves and physics. How can this be?

Fooloso4

I think you've got him upside down. He sets up his target:- — Ludwig V

Perhaps I do, but when I ask:

...whether Ryle is making his own version of category mistake — Fooloso4

what I have in mind is the treatment of the categories of different disciplines, that, for example, as cited, there are according to him different "kinds" of thinking such as those he names, biology, physics, and philosophy. He says that the claims and counter-claims between them are not questions internal to those theories. But cross-disciplinary studies such as biophysics seems to contradict this. The boundaries are not natural or immutable. Understanding biology at some point requires an understanding of physics. Consider, for example, is the question regarding the determining factors between what is living and what is not a biological or a philosophical question? Is the question itself problematic because we lack the conceptual clarity this distinction presupposes? Is it exasperated by the assumption that there are conceptual and categorical boundaries to disciplinary domains? Does the question of life itself contain a category mistake in boundary cases?

Banno

. But cross-disciplinary studies such as biophysics seems to contradict this. — Fooloso4

Then perhaps he is on about something else.

Bella fekete

“ Is it exasperated by the assumption that there are conceptual and categorical boundaries to disciplinary domains? Does the question of life itself contain a category mistake in boundary cases?”

-Banno

Boundary situations are it seems to me either all or none inclusively conceived , where the later leads to a reduction to none sense. As revolutionary pressures oblige further and further restructuring, the signs, the meanings or words become progressively tenuous.

Bella fekete

“ Wittgenstein is hard to nail down. He has several remarks about philosophy which are mostly different metaphors. "The point of philosophy is to show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle" or "Back to the rough country!" I don't think you could get a consistent, complete definition from them.

Neither Ryle nor Wittgenstein are fans of essences.‘

-Ludwig V

/\ is apparently only the inverse of V that I thought indicated various metaphors , one conceivably signaling an inverse position.

I have no idea of the possible intervening variables to such predisposed structural problems, in line with the basically essentialist position taken by Wittgenstein where:

“ Ryle explains his approach with a metaphor:- “A live issue is a piece of country in which no one knows which way to go. As there are no paths, there are no paths to share. Where there are paths to share, there are paths; and paths are the memorials of undergrowth already cleared.” (p.13) Compare Wittgenstein’s remark that he “does not know his way about” and his desire for an “oversight”.

There is nothing specifically about ordinary language here. On the contrary, he includes technical, scientific or specialist concepts in his concerns – it is a marked difference from Austin. He is analysing the issues with apparently little self-consciousness about his method. However, the last lecture will give us a more detailed discussion of that dilemma.”

What I get from this is the last paragraph in which he looses the path where the ground below that can no longer can be recalled.

Which goes along you thought: “way out of the fly- country and back to the rough country”- ( he needs an oversight)

This comparison is actually grounded on an inverse topological layout,

An oversight and a return to the rough country cover a non too transparent intension to hold the object at bay, which seems to bear out with:

“ I think you've got him upside down. He sets up his target
— Ludwig V”

That series of conjectures is more convincing than not even by the progression within this here forum, of the con-foundation of intended disposition

jgill

This comparison is actually grounded on an inverse topological layout — Bella fekete

I take it you use "topological" loosely, like some use "fractal" - both well-defined mathematical terms.

That series of conjectures is more convincing than not even by the progression within this here forum, of the con-foundation of intended disposition — Bella fekete

??

Banno

↪Bella fekete

That was Fool, not I.

Forum Tips and Tricks - How to Quote

Bella fekete

No matter matter who, the important difference is Unlike topological dimensions, the fractal index can take non-integer values, indicating that a set fills its space qualitatively and quantitatively …‘

-Fool

Fooloso4

Then perhaps he is on about something else. — Banno

Is he? And what is that? Simply citing an article that goes beyond Ryle without identifying which of the issues in this debate are pertinent does not tell us what this something else he is on about is.

More helpful is what Ryle himself says in the section "The Origin of the Category- Mistake" from The Concept of Mind

As a man of scientific genius he [Descartes] could not but endorse the claims of mechanics, yet as a religious and moral man he could not accept, as Hobbes accepted, the discouraging rider to those claims, namely that human nature differs only in degree of complexity from clockwork. The mental could not be just a variety of the mechanical.

... since mechanical laws explain movements in space as the effects of other movements in space, other laws must explain some of the non-spatial workings of minds as the effects of other non-spatial workings of minds. The difference between the human behaviours which we describe as intelligent and those which we describe as unintelligent must be a difference in their causation ...

The differences between the physical and the mental were thus represented as differences inside the common framework of the categories of ‘thing’, ‘stuff’, ‘attribute’, ‘state’, ‘process’, ‘change’, ‘cause’ and ‘effect’. Minds are things, but different sorts of things from bodies; mental processes are causes and effects, but different sorts of causes and effects from bodily movements.

(9)

Further on he says:

I am not, for example, denying that there occur mental processes. Doing long division is a mental process and so is making a joke. But I am saying that the phrase ‘there occur mental processes’ does not mean the same sort of thing as ‘there occur physical processes’, and, therefore, that it makes no sense to conjoin or disjoin the two.

If my argument is successful, there will follow some interesting consequences. First, the hallowed contrast between Mind and Matter will be dissipated, but dissipated not by either of the equally hallowed absorptions of Mind by Matter or of Matter by Mind, but in quite a different way.
For the seeming contrast of the two will be shown to be as illegitimate as would be the contrast of ‘she came home in a flood of tears’ and ‘she came home in a sedan-chair’. The belief that there is a polar opposition between Mind and Matter is the belief that they are terms of the same logical type.

(11-12)

Bella fekete

Guys, forgive my not putting apostrophes around a general description , not my own- above.

Bella fekete

“Then perhaps he is on about something else.
— Banno

Is he? And what is that? Simply citing an article that goes beyond Ryle without identifying which of the issues in this debate are pertinent does not tell us what this something else he is on about is.”

-Fooloso4

Sure , it may be merely a categorical error, but then again merely an effort to hide his uncommon defense of that unknown entity, which, not actually opposite to a mechanistic representation, may imply that it really no defense, because it really is presumed to be bounded by it.

This logical subtly was present ages ago in the the Eastern World, where such distinctions need not require a mechanistic interpretation.

Banno

↪Fooloso4

I must be missing your point; nothing in that is about "cross-disciplinary studies such as biophysics".

jgill

No matter matter who, the important difference is Unlike topological dimensions, the fractal index can take non-integer values, indicating that a set fills its space qualitatively and quantitatively …‘

-Fool — Bella fekete

I'm not following you. But that's OK, I am not a philosopher.

Wayfarer

Minds are things, but different sorts of things from bodies

↪Fooloso4

Those passages are surprisingly resonant for me. I have been making a very similar observation in another thread in respect of Descartes' Meditation #3, especially the pernicious consequences of Descartes' concept of 'spiritual substance'. I will try and find time to listen to some of the materials.

Ludwig V

But cross-disciplinary studies such as biophysics seems to contradict this. The boundaries are not natural or immutable. Understanding biology at some point requires an understanding of physics. — Fooloso4

More helpful is what Ryle himself says in the section "The Origin of the Category- Mistake" from The Concept of Mind — Fooloso4

Yes, that example confirms what the encyclopedia is pointing at. Ryle is pointing to an alternative way of looking at, and dissolving, certain kinds of puzzles. In "Dilemmas", he identifies them as puzzles about "public" concepts, i.e. those which we all, scientists or not, use all the time. In "Dilemmas" he labels them philosophical, and this example confirms that. Whether it is the end of the story is another question - few people seem to have raised that.

The cross-disciplinary studies you mention do not raise the same kinds of issues. We can say immediately that the concepts of physics are not "public" in the sense that Ryle is using the term. But we can go further.

Biology does indeed welcome physics, chemistry and similar disciplines. But it also welcomes inputs from psychology, sociology and other sciences. But, biophysics studies living organisms as physical systems, molecular biology studies them as chemical systems and so forth. All these contribute to biology, without being the whole of it. But they all apply to the organism whether it is living or dead. The category issue comes when you come to the contribution of psychology, which involves studying living organisms as living organisms. Psychology has nothing to say about a dead organism - it has become a purely physical entity and not an organism at all. That's where the category issue comes in. At least, that's how I interpret what Ryle says.

What I get from this is the last paragraph in which he looses the path where the ground below that can no longer can be recalled. — Bella fekete

You don't have him quite right. In the country that Ryle envisages, there is no path to recall. It is unexplored, unmapped. As he says "As there are no paths, there are no paths to share. Where there are paths to share, there are paths; and paths are the memorials of under-growth already cleared." You may be wondering what he would say about the efforts of philosophers before him. I think he would say that most of them are an undergrowth and need to be cleared away.

This logical subtly was present ages ago in the the Eastern World, where such distinctions need not require a mechanistic interpretation. — Bella fekete

Yes. But, then, in those systems, there is no concept that parallels the Western concept of the "mechanistic", so it's a tricky thing to negotiate.

I will try and find time to listen to some of the materials. — Wayfarer

Yes. Descartes is Ryle's main quarry in "The Concept of Mind". He's taking on a wider range of issues here, and, perhaps elaborating his idea.

schopenhauer1

↪Ludwig V

The idea that mental activity is somehow behavioral dispositions seems incoherent to me.

And somehow trying to save this view by pointing to how qualia comes from development is committing its own “category mistake”. We “learn” discrimination of red and not red or some such they’ll say. That doesn’t mean the qualia of red doesn’t exist.

Emergentism and “integration” weasily conceits that always try to save the day as a spoon stirring dissolves the powder into the liquid as if magic. You can’t emerge or integrate your way out of the hard problem. Homunculus Fallacies are pesky and near intractable.

Ludwig V

The idea that mental activity is somehow behavioral dispositions seems incoherent to me. — schopenhauer1

Yes. I do think that this is the weakest point in the book. I much prefer the more complex - and elusive - ideas that emerged from Wittgenstein's private language argument. But the main point, which I think is precisely that qualia are not distinct objects in their own right, stands.
Qualia, so far as I understand them (which is not far) seem to me to be exactly like sense-data in that they are a label for something that "must be there". But the road there seems impassable to me.

Emergentism and “integration” weasily conceits that always try to save the day as a spoon stirring dissolves the powder into the liquid as if magic. — schopenhauer1

Yes, I agree that they are not really satisfactory. But once one has seen the light about "qualia" it is hard to see what would satisfy the demand. That's how the hard problem of consciousness is created. Hardly a satisfactory solution itself.

But I don't think that Ryle plays that card in this book. I could be wrong.

Fooloso4

I must be missing your point; nothing in that is about "cross-disciplinary studies such as biophysics". — Banno

Right. That's the point. Ryle separates the disciplines of biology, physics, and philosophy. As quoted above:

The kind of thinking which advances biology is not the kind of thinking which settles the claims and counter-claims between biology and physics. These inter-theory questions are not questions internal to those theories. They are not biological or physical questions. They are philosophical questions.

The assumption is that there are different kinds of thinking. In the terms of The Concepts of Mind, they are not of the "same logical type". It would be a category mistake then to address the claims and counter-claims of biology and physics as if they are of the same logical type. The development of cross-disciplinary studies such as biophysics, however shows that his assumption is mistaken. There are not fixed logical types of thinking.

What I am suggesting is that Descartes' mistake was not categorical in the sense of failure to recognize differences between fixed categories, but rather his mistake resulted from the application of the framework of the categories of his time. Ryle's own category mistake is in this way the same as Descartes, thinking in terms of the framework of the categories of his time.

Fooloso4

↪Ludwig V

This is my first time reading Ryle. I took it as an opportunity to fill in some gaps. To read some things I had intentionally neglected. My comments and questions are intended as a mode of inquiry.

In "Dilemmas", he identifies them as puzzles about "public" concepts — Ludwig V

Perhaps this will become clear as I continue reading, but from the first lecture I do not see where he makes a distinction between public and private or how it comes into play.

Biology does indeed welcome physics, chemistry and similar disciplines. But it also welcomes inputs from psychology, sociology and other sciences. — Ludwig V

To the extent this is true doesn't it go against Ryle's move to keep them separate?

... biophysics studies living organisms as physical systems ... — Ludwig V

It studies living organisms as biological systems, but makes use of the principles and methods of physics.

... molecular biology studies them as chemical systems — Ludwig V

Molecular biology studies biological organisms at the molecular level, but this does not mean that it studies them as chemical rather than biological systems.

There is, however, the question of whether biology can be reduced to chemistry and chemistry to physics. I won't address but, but will ask whether this is a biological or chemical or physical or philosophical question? Ryle, as quoted above, seems to regard it as a philosophical question. I don't think it can be divided categorically in this way. To do so would be a category mistake.

Ludwig V

Ryle's own category mistake is in this way the same as Descartes, thinking in terms of the framework of the categories of his time. — Fooloso4

That's a very good characterization, from Ryle's point of view. The key is that Descartes thought in terms of different "substances" which is how people thought about this issue. One problem about this way of thinking is that there was never a satisfactory characterization (definition) of that term. Famously (as I expect you know), Locke was reduced to saying that substance was "something, I know not what". Berkeley leapt on this to deny that any such thing existed. Probably rightly. Effectively physics identified substance in terms of mass and extension (Locke's "primary qualities), which didn't help Cartesian dualism at all. Ryle is simply substituting "categories" in place of "substance", shifting the issue from one of metaphysics to one of language. What is at stake is the idea that the mind is an entity that exists in its own right, independently of physical objects.

What I am suggesting is that Descartes' mistake was not categorical in the sense of failure to recognize differences between fixed categories, but rather his mistake resulted from the application of the framework of the categories of his time. — Fooloso4

If that was all that was at stake, I would want to argue that one could not expect Descartes to think in any other way than in terms of the concepts available in his time. But Cartesian Dualism survived, so the issue survives, and Ryle's target is not just a change in ways of thinking.
Remember, for many people Dualism is the basis for survival after death, so you could argue that, for them, it is a question of life and death and even the existence of God. (Berkeley realized this and tired to stop the rot.)

There are not fixed logical types of thinking. — Fooloso4

Well, Ryle argues that there are not a fixed number or type of categories, so he's pretty much on your page. (See pp. 8 (last line of page) to 11.)

This is my first time reading Ryle. I took it as an opportunity to fill in some gaps. To read some things I had intentionally neglected. My comments and questions are intended as a mode of inquiry. — Fooloso4

.
I believe and hope that you won't regret filling in this gap - whether you agree with him or not.

Perhaps this will become clear as I continue reading, but from the first lecture I do not see where he makes a distinction between public and private or how it comes into play. — Fooloso4

Yes. In a sense, he's speaking metaphorically - there's a lot of metaphors in his writing. He means that only specialists use the "private" concepts, whereas everybody, including specialists, uses "public" concepts. He's just trying to carve out a field for philosophy, which is still trying to recover from the sciences spinning off as independent disciplines.

It (biophysics) studies living organisms as biological systems, but makes use of the principles and methods of physics. — Fooloso4

Yes, that's a good way of putting it. But the subject matter of biology differs in important ways from the subject matter of physics, and applying only the methods of physics would ignore what makes living systems different from non-living systems. The methods of physics do not allow that distinction to appear. That's where the category question comes in. But he takes for granted that there is some such distinction to be drawn and that was contested then and still is.

Having said all of that, it is reasonable to notice that much has changed in ideas about inter-disciplinary studies since his time. The attempt to establish a field for philosophy at the foundations of the sciences and between the sciences attracted the attention of the specialists who rightly pointed out that specialist knowledge was required to discuss those issues and decided they could discuss them themselves. So philosophy of science, mathematics, etc have become sub-specialisms "between" philosophy and science and inter-disciplinary discussions are mostly dealt with between specialists without the benefit of philosophical intervention. So his remark that "These inter-theory questions are not questions internal to those theories." were not inappropriate at the time, but need heavy qualification now. To be fair, he recognizes the issue, at least partly on p. 12. But there, he also maintains his claim on the public concepts.

Bella fekete

“ That's a very good characterization, from Ryle's point of view. The key is that Descartes thought in terms of different "substances" which is how people thought about this issue. One problem about this way of thinking is that there was never a satisfactory characterization (definition) of that term. Famously (as I expect you know), Locke was reduced to saying that substance was "something, I know not what". Berkeley leapt on this to deny that any such thing existed. Probably rightly. Effectively physics identified substance in terms of mass and extension (Locke's "primary qualities), which didn't help Cartesian dualism at all. Ryle is simply substituting "categories" in place of "substance", shifting the issue from one of metaphysics to one of language. What is at stake is the idea that the mind is an entity that exists in its own right, independently of physical objects.”

Such categorical shifts became necessary, to intentionally short cut the progress of evolving sciences, and so, short cuts indicated this inverse , axiomatic connection, perhaps felt to be of an essential meaningful process later on.

These ‘cuts’ signify the virtually created meaning after the fact

Just mentioning and cut away as anyone ‘s comprehension can not sway from a hardly conscious recollection.

Banno

↪Fooloso4

Well, earlier in the paragraph is writ: "I have said that when intellectual positions are at cross-purposes in the manner which I have sketchily described and illustrated, the solution of their quarrel cannot come from any further internal corroboration of either position." It is apparent that biology and physics, melded into biophysics, are not at cross-purposes. It seems to me somewhat crude to take the one example to undermine Ryle's point when there are others at hand that serve him better. We might better understand his work if we are a bit more charitable.

The SEP article I linked shows the history of the approach Ryle adopted, presenting numerous examples where "intellectual positions are at cross- purposes", so it's not as if this never happens. Spotting category mistakes is part of the analytic toolkit.

Isn't launching into a criticism based on a single example from the introduction somewhat premature? The danger is that we trot out the pat rejoinders rather than pay attention to the text at hand. If it is your first time reading Ryle, then let's read Ryle.

Fooloso4

The key is that Descartes thought in terms of different "substances" which is how people thought about this issue. — Ludwig V

The term 'substance' is problematic, but as you indicate it was not a problem unique to Descartes. Does Ryle others who use the term of making a category mistake? From what I cited above it does not seem that the category mistake was the use of the term.

Remember, for many people Dualism is the basis for survival after death — Ludwig V

Yes, but this predates Descartes. He makes use of accepted duality of soul and body in order to say something substantially (pun intended) different.

Well, Ryle argues that there are not a fixed number or type of categories, so he's pretty much on your page. (See pp. 8 (last line of page) to 11.) — Ludwig V

That the logical types or categories are not fixed in number is not the same thing as their being fixed, at least to the extent that biology and physics are different logical types.

I quoted from these pages above. Page 12 too.

I believe and hope that you won't regret filling in this gap - whether you agree with him or not. — Ludwig V

No regrets.

He means that only specialists use the "private" concepts — Ludwig V

Got it.

But the subject matter of biology differs in important ways from the subject matter of physics, and applying only the methods of physics would ignore what makes living systems different from non-living systems. The methods of physics do not allow that distinction to appear. — Ludwig V

This is why I asked earlier:

Consider, for example, is the question regarding the determining factors between what is living and what is not a biological or a philosophical question? Is the question itself problematic because we lack the conceptual clarity this distinction presupposes? Is it exasperated by the assumption that there are conceptual and categorical boundaries to disciplinary domains? Does the question of life itself contain a category mistake in boundary cases? — Fooloso4

I would not rule out the possibility that physics might contribute to this at some point.

Fooloso4

It seems to me somewhat crude to take the one example to undermine Ryle's point when there are others at hand that serve him better. We might better understand his work if we are a bit more charitable. — Banno

As I said in a response to Ludwig:

My comments and questions are intended as a mode of inquiry. — Fooloso4

[Added. Quoting Ryle]

"I have said that when intellectual positions are at cross-purposes in the manner which I have sketchily described and illustrated, the solution of their quarrel cannot come from any further internal corroboration of either position." — Banno

And why is that? You do not say. He does. As I understand it, it is because the solution is to be found by navigating the "public road" rather than the "private road" (@Ludwig V I should have picked up on that) of physics or biology. And so he concludes:

These inter-theory questions are not questions internal to those theories. They are not biological or physical questions. They are philosophical questions.

As the saying goes, paths are made by walking. His claim that:

The kind of thinking which advances biology is not the kind of thinking which settles the claims and counter-claims between biology and physics.

(13)

This is questionable. Questioning something when and where it appears is not premature. When you claim that doing so "undermines Ryle's point", you sound like the Christian faithful who dare not question the Bible. The fact of the matter is, questioning is an effect and well regarded mode of seeking understanding. It does not undermine the text unless it is one's intent to do so. I do not.

If it is your first time reading Ryle, then let's read Ryle. — Banno

A surprising comment coming from someone who responds to my questions taken directly from the text by citing the SEP instead of the text.

The danger is that we trot out the pat rejoinders rather than pay attention to the text at hand. — Banno

Indeed! Glad to see you have gotten around to paying a bit of attention to the text.

Banno

And why is that? You do not say. — Fooloso4

The quote is Ryle, not I; so it's not I who does not say. One charitably presumes that here, in the first chapter, he is setting a direction, on which he continues in the remainder of the book.

There's something disingenuous about launching into a critique in your first post. You seem to be treating an introductory remark as if it were the whole proposal.

But further, your critique looks misplaced.

Ryle is making his own version of category mistake when he attempts to cleanly and neatly divide things along the lines of categories, as if cutting along the inherent joints of things rather than in conformity to some disciplinary practice. — Fooloso4

It seems from this that you think making a category error as carving stuff up wrong. I hope it's clear from the SEP article that it's more about taking a term from one category and misapplying it in another. It's not failing to clearly differentiate between colour and texture, but "the number two is blue". The "pat rejoinder" is to attempt to apply Ryle's own processing to himself, while apparently misunderstanding what that process is.

We might here agree to set aside these relatively pedantic issues and continue with the next lecture.

Reading Gilbert Ryle's "Dilemmas"

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