Reason is surely teleological. — Leontiskos

And yet, when reasoning we do not all reach the same conclusions.

It is ordered towards truth. — Leontiskos

Quite often it is ordered toward defense or justification or persuasion, to what can be made to seem to be true rather than to demonstrate or determine what is true.

Thomists might like to think that the correct use of reason leads to the truth, but when there is doubt, an appeal to the authority of revelation sets things right. Even if reason is ordered toward the truth, it may not get us there.

Aristotle, of course, did not take recourse in revelation. But then again he did not rely on the authority of reason either. With regard to questions and problems, especially with regard to what is most fundamental, it becomes clear that reason can lead to aporia.

Even if we are ordered to truth it does not follow that what we say, even to ourselves, is what is true. It does not mean we even always want to know what is true.

The irony is that Aquinas' argument is ordered toward a conclusion that may be false.

gather you are asking about what happens at the point of death. — Banno

The question is perhaps as old as man.

The language "divided in two" is loaded with dualism. — Banno

It reflects the dualism that Socrates is responding to. Then as now the division of body and soul was common. As you say:

The common prejudice is that at death something leaves the body. — Banno

He uses the division of body and soul, and in doing so brings that belief into question.

I don't think that's right - rather the body stops doing stuff it once did. It no longer works in the same way. — Banno

That was observed. The question or questions, however, remain - what happens to the person? Socrates entertains two possibilities in the Apology -

1) The continued existence of the soul separate from the body
2) Oblivion. An endless, dreamless sleep.

In the Phaedo, however, he is silent about the second possibility. He does not state it explicitly, but the common assumption that underlies the first proves to be its own undoing. Socrates is not simply a soul attached for a time to some body. Socrates is a whole, a living being, that soon will no longer be alive. Soon Socrates will no longer be.

What is at issue here is not who said what. The philosophical issue is how we are to think about possibilities.

Socrates is this guy they know and love. This person they talk to and see engaged in conversation in the marketplace. What will happen to him when he dies?

It is easy to miss what Plato is up to here. The argument moves in two opposite directions.

The common assumption is that Socrates is attempting to persuade his friends that the soul is immortal. He thinks that for many such a belief is beneficial.

The philosopher, however, seeks the truth of the matter, to the extent that is possible. The second possibility of what happens to us when we dies is raised explicitly in the Apology, but here, as he is about to die, we must, so to speak, do the math. Rather than myths of rewards and punishment and reincarnation, we are confronted by the incoherence that arises when a single, unified person is divided in two and only one part of who he is is believed to endure.

Yes, you can.

Wittgenstein, however, is not attaching straw men. He is addressing problems that arose in his discussions with students and colleagues.

I mean individuation — Banno

Socrates presents the problem arithmetically in the Phaedo.

The overarching question of the dialogue is what will happen to Socrates when he dies. The concern is that the unity that is Socrates will be destroyed. In order to address this Socrates divides his unity into a duality, body and soul. It is by this division of one into two that he attempts to demonstrate his unity in death. If each is one then Socrates is two. But since he is neither the one (body) or the other (soul) then the two together must be a third.

How can there to be a logos or an account without a proper count? Is Socrates one thing or two or some third thing that arises from the unity of these two separate things?

PI 194 begins:

When does one have the thought that a machine already contains its possible movements in some mysterious way? Well, when one is doing philosophy.

and ends, as you quoted:

Though we do pay attention to the way we talk about these matters, we don’t understand it, but misinterpret it. When we do philosophy, we are like savages, primitive people, who hear the way in which civilized people talk, put a false interpretation on it, and then draw the oddest conclusions from this.

Between them we find:

And what lures us into thinking that? The kind of way in which we talk about the machine. We say, for example, that the machine has (possesses) such-and-such possibilities of movement; we speak of an ideally rigid machine which can move only thus-and-so.

Rather than give a false philosophical interpretation he is thinking like an engineer:

PI 193:

... We talk as if these parts could only move in this way, as if they could not do anything else. Is this how it is? Do we forget the possibility of their bending, breaking off, melting, and so on? Yes; in many cases we don’t think of that at all.

But it is not just the engineer who know such possibilities. The ordinary person familiar with machines knows this. Rather than the philosopher's ideal picture of a machine as something rigid, the ordinary picture of a machine is of something that will require maintenance and repair in order to move in the ways it was designed to.

[Although I am not prepared to pursue this line of inquiry, the picture of the universe as a machine supports the idea that the universe is deterministic. If, however, the universe is not an "ideally rigid machine" then we should not rule out chance.]

But my point was that perhaps there is a difference in kind. — schopenhauer1

The claim that there is a difference in kind between an organism and a computer program is quite different that the claim that there is a difference in kind between organisms. Even so, I suspect that with the continued advances in AI just where those differences lie may become less and less clear.

And the same goes for any other mental image (M) that one has; it is the image of (M) and of nothing else. — Luke

As I have said before, saying that a mental image of X is an image of X and nothing else, says no more than saying a physical image of X is an image of X and nothing else.

Or, the Eiffel Tower may be slightly different to how you imagined it, but you say it's exactly how you imagined it. — Luke

My point was, that would be a mistake. My mental image of the Eiffel Tower need not be an image of the Eiffel Tower.

Moreover, why suppose that a mental image is required in order to use the name "Eiffel Tower" correctly — Luke

You seem to have lost track of the argument. It is not required. The question is whether the mental image must of the Eiffel Tower and nothing else. You supported the claim that it must. I have been trying to provide examples of why that need not be the case.

Comparing my mental image to what I mistakenly think is the Eiffel Tower does not correct the problem.
— Fooloso4

You seem to be suggesting that you can "correct the problem" by comparing your mental image to (what you correctly think is) the Eiffel Tower. — Luke

Why would you think I am suggesting that when I said the opposite?

What object is being referred to at PI 389? — Luke

According to the interlocutor (and you(?)), whatever object the mental image is of is what the object is.

And the same goes for any other mental image (M) that one has; it is the image of (M) and of nothing else. — Luke

If M is the mental image then M is not the image of M. It is not a mental image of itself. It is not a mental image of a mental image.

If I have a mental image of N then it is my mental image of N. But this does not mean that my mental image of N, whatever N is, must be more similar to N than any picture.

We have been over all this before. Repeating the same points is getting us nowhere.

Not necessarily, because it depends on how you would conceive of, or define, "something". — Metaphysician Undercover

Do you conceive of, or define "you" and "we" as something?

Some years ago, when Lawrence Krauss published A Universe from Nothing: Why There Is Something Rather Than Nothing those who are well versed in both philosophy and physics were highly critical. They pointed out that his "nothing" was not nothing. Despite the title what he described is a universe from something,

I am agnostic as to whether AI will ever be conscious. It was not too long ago that it was generally believed that a computer program and associated hardware could pilot a car. Such a thing was thought to require consciousness.

If there is something, absolute nothingness is impossible. Last I checked, there is a whole lot of something, in fact, a whole lot of a lot of things. That there is something is a necessary condition for speculating about nothingness.

Father Copelston's Thomistic misreading of Spinoza — 180 Proof

Copleston is a good example of why we should not rely on secondary texts or comprehensive stories of the history of philosophy.

In my opinion, anyone using Copleston as the primary text for a philosophy course, even for an introductory level course, is guilty of a dereliction of duty.

One implication is the rejection of "kinds" in favor of degrees of difference.

Question 1: Do you take the book? Why or why not? — Count Timothy von Icarus

No. The cost is too high. There is nothing magical about a book that assures our ignorance. We already have such books.

Then why do you say the correction is made by linking the correct name to the object, instead of saying the correction is made by linking the correct mental image to the object? — Luke

How is the correction between the mental image and the object to be made? In the example of the Eiffel Tower I need to become aware that the mental image I have is the image of something else. Pointing to the object my mental image is an image of I might say: "See, this is the Eiffel Tower and my mental image looks just like it". Comparing my mental image to what I mistakenly think is the Eiffel Tower does not correct the problem.

If the correction is made by linking the correct name to the object, then there is a need to name the object. — Luke

In the example of the Eiffel Tower there is, but at PI 389 there is no confusion as to what object is being referred to, and so, no need to name it.

Therefore, the Eiffel Tower example does not show that sentence 3 is false, because sentence 3 does not name the object. — Luke

It is not an intrinsic feature of my mental image of the Eiffel Tower that it is the image of "this" (the Eiffel Tower) and of nothing else.

This correction is not made by comparing or associating a mental image with an object, but by comparing or associating a name with an object. — Luke

That is what I said:

A misnomer can be corrected by linking the correct name to the object. — Fooloso4

But what is at issue in not simply the name of the object. What is at issue is whether the mental image must be an image of "this".

Sentence 3 does not mention any names. Sentence 3 only makes an ostensive reference to this. — Luke

"This" refers to some object. At PI 389 there is only one object. There is no need to name it. The point of the example of the Eiffel Tower is not that the names are mixed up, but that the mental image I have is actually an image of something else, the Arc de Triomphe.

My mental image is not like its object. It is not an image of "this", that is, the Eiffel Tower.

Therefore, the objects are not correctly identified by comparing one's mental image to the object. — Luke

A misnomer can be corrected by linking the correct name to the object. If I am told that this object I am standing in front of is the Eiffel Tower then I can see that my mental image was not what I thought it was. What I was picturing was not the Eiffel Tower.

Wittgenstein's interlocutor says:

But it is an intrinsic feature of a mental image that it is the image of this and of nothing
else.

Your example shows why this is not true.

When they stand before the Eiffel Tower their mental image is of the Eiffel Tower, — Luke

Do you mean that when they see the Eiffel Tower they are actually seeing a mental image of the Eiffel Tower?

If they visit the stone arch they might think "Wow, so this is the Eiffel Tower". — Luke

And they would be mistaken. It is not the Eiffel Tower. The mistake can be corrected when the two objects are correctly identified.

If they have this mental image of what they think is an image of the Eiffel Tower and then visit the Eiffel Tower and Arc de Triomphe they might realize their mistake.
— Fooloso4

Again (assuming normal mental functioning), there will not be any mismatch between their mental image(s) and the object(s) they see in front of them, so what is the mistake? — Luke

The point of the example is that the mistake is corrected when the objects are in front of them. Before seeing them the mental image of the Eiffel Tower is a stone arch.


[Added: Years ago I visited my elementary school. It was much smaller than my mental image of it. I would have to kneel if I wanted to drink from the water fountain instead of having to stand on tip toes. The principle's office was just steps away from the first grade class, not the long endless walk it was when I was sent to the principle's office.]

Reason is able to apprehend the abstract ideal of "the best" and search for it. In this, it seeks to transcend what it currently is and become more in an outwards search. — Count Timothy von Icarus

This is the desire of reason.

Are you saying the mental object is a teapot but that my mental image is not of a teapot? — Luke

I am saying that the mental object is not a teapot. It is an image of a teapot. The mental object and mental image are the same thing.

But you said that the mental image is not of the object? — Luke

It is not of the object if:

If I mistakenly think that my mental image is of the Eiffel Tower — Luke

No comparison can be made between their mental image and the object that their mental image is of. — Luke

They can make the comparison. We can't. If they have this mental image of what they think is an image of the Eiffel Tower and then visit the Eiffel Tower and Arc de Triomphe they might realize their mistake.

If I mistakenly think that my mental image is of the Eiffel Tower, what does that have to do with a superlikeness? — Luke

It shows that the mental image need not be more like the object than a physical picture.

On my reading, I think that my mental image is of this (imagined or real) object before my mind and of nothing else. I cannot possibly mistake the content of this mental image — Luke

The mental image is not of the object before your mind. The mental object is the object before your mind. The mental object is an image of the same object that the picture is. The claim is that the mental image is more like this object than the physical picture is.

My (or the interlocutor's) inference is erroneous because the mental image is not a representation of the object. — Luke

Of course it is! Both the mental image and the physical image are images of the same object. The interlocutor is claiming that the mental image is more like that object than the physical image is.

It does make a difference, because you could be wrong. You might think you've taken a photo of the Eiffel Tower when you've actually taken a photo of the Arc de Triomphe. — Luke

The same can be said of a mental picture. I might think my mental image is of the Eiffel Tower when it is actually a mental image of the Arc de Triomphe.

If you want to compare 2 and 3 "on an equal basis" then, in order to remain faithful to the rest of the text, this should be done from a public perspective, not from a private one. — Luke

But that is the point. It cannot be done from a public perspective.

From a public perspective, and in accordance with my argument above, this would make sentence 2 true: — Luke

It doesn't. If a group of people are standing in front of the Statue of Liberty, they will agree that it is the Statue of Liberty. If I take a photo of it it will be a photo of the Statue of Liberty. If someone sees that photo and thinks it is a photo of something else they would be wrong.

But it isn't only up to you, and others may interpret it as something other than what it is "supposed to represent". — Luke

This is why the comparison between a mental image and a physical image is misguided.

I don't see why sentences 2 and 3 should be compared "on an equal basis". — Luke

What is being compared is the likeness of the image to the object. In 2 that comparison can be made. In 3 it cannot.

In the case of 2 the image "I make" may be seen by others as a picture of something else. In the case of 3 no such ambiguity arises because no one else can see the image. If they could, the same ambiguity might arise. The mental image is not a superlikeness.

You seem to read sentence 2 as being from the private perspective and sentence 3 as being from the public perspective, — Luke

No!

How can sentence 3 make any sense if a mental image cannot be seen by anyone (from the public perspective)? — Luke

Now you are catching on.

In that case, sentence 2 is true. Why do you say W rejects it? — Luke

If I draw a picture or take a photograph of X, it is not a picture of anything else. Whether someone thinks it is a picture of something else makes no difference. It is a picture of X.

Cannot see what? — Luke

The mental image.

A second person in involved in 2 but no one else can be involved in my mental image. If 2 and 3 are to be compared on an equal bases then a second person should not enter into the comparison.

Why do you say W rejects it? — Luke

a) The picture I draw of X it is an image of X. I know because I drew it.

b) My mental image of X is an image of X.

What is the difference between a and b with regard to being an image of X?

it is an observable tendency.
— Wayfarer

I'd say it is more of a tendentious observation. — Janus

Clever turn (around) of phrase.

Agree it might be a generalisation, but it is an observable tendency. — Wayfarer

The point is, theology and religion do not have exclusive rights to the "domain of values".

Why would you think that (2) the physical image I draw of X may not be an image of X, but (3) the mental image I have of X must be an image of X?

There is no parity here. In the first case, the picture I draw of X may look to you like something else, but in the second, it cannot look to you like something else because you cannot see it.

the possibility of intentionality sans physicality — wonderer1

A fatal abstraction.

I certainly don't beleive in these and do not see how an idea of 'the good' can be more than a human construction which changes over time, however useful and beneficial such a construction might be. — Tom Storm

I think the quote from Nietzsche cited above speaks to this:

Only man placed values in things to preserve himself—he alone created a meaning for things, a human meaning. Therefore he calls himself "man," which means: the esteemer.
To esteem is to create: hear this, you creators! Esteeming itself is of all esteemed things the most estimable treasure. Through esteeming alone is there value: and without esteeming, the nut of existence would be hollow
— Zarathustra, On the Thousand and One Goals

What matters is that things matter.

As soon as discussion turns to the qualitative dimension, the domain of values, then the response is 'Ah! You're talking religion.' — Wayfarer

That may be true in some cases but certainly not all. Above all, it should not be framed in terms of theism vs anti-theism.

For example on the thread Heidegger's Downfall I said the following:

[Stanley] Rosen said:

Nihilism is the concept of reason separated from the concept of the good.

...

Basic to the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle is the desire for and pursuit of the good. This must be understood at the most ordinary level, not as a theory but simply as what we want both for ourselves and those we care about. It is not only basic to their philosophy but basic to their understanding of who we are as human beings.

Phronesis, often translated as practical wisdom, is not simply a matter of reasoning toward
achieving ends, but of deliberation about good ends.

...

In more general terms, how severing reason from the good is nihilism can be seen in the ideal of objectivity and the sequestering of "value judgments". Political philosophy, for example, is shunned in favor of political science. The question of how best to live has no place in a science of politics whose concerns are structural and deal with power differentials.

In a thread on Nietzsche, How May Nietzsche's Idea of 'Superman' Be Understood ?, I said:

What is properly regarded as good or evil is historically contingent. At one historical stage the morality he sees as unhealthy was a means to man's self-overcoming, but it is no longer so.

This a a problem he addresses in "On the Use and Abuse of History" from Untimely Meditations. He addresses the problem of nihilism. Those who think he was a nihilist should read this. It is the reason the "child" is necessary for the three metamorphoses of the spirit in Zarathustra. If what is called "good" today was at some earlier time "bad" and may at some future time be called "bad", if, in other words, there is no universal, fixed and unchanging transcendent good and evil than this can lead to nihilism. Nihilism, the "sacred no" must be followed by a "sacred yes", but this is only possible if there is a kind of deliberate historical forgetfulness, a new innocence.

I also quoted the following in that thread:

Only man placed values in things to preserve himself—he alone created a meaning for things, a human meaning. Therefore he calls himself "man," which means: the esteemer.
To esteem is to create: hear this, you creators! Esteeming itself is of all esteemed things the most estimable treasure. Through esteeming alone is there value: and without esteeming, the nut of existence would be hollow
— Zarathustra, On the Thousand and One Goals

You stated earlier:

The point of PI 389 is to reject claims 1 -3
— Fooloso4 — Luke

As I have said, the three claims are part of the same argument. You can separate them as part of an analysis but you need to put them back together.

The claim at three is that it is an image of this. "This" is the object it is an image of. We cannot ignore the question of resemblance.

Your argument was that the meaning of "picture" is different between a mental picture and a physical picture
— Luke

Have I made that argument?
— Fooloso4

You have made that argument: — Luke

I should have been clearer. The picture and what it means are not the same. Whatever it might mean need not change if the picture is a mental rather than physical picture. If, however, I am talking about a picture, you might ask whether I mean a mental or a physical picture. Here the meaning of picture is different.

this is where faith comes in. — Janus

In Proverbs we are told that fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom. It is both a starting point and a terminus. The Biblical God is a willful God.

There is another sense, which is what I think you have in mind. Perhaps you intentionally left open the question of whether one comes to know or only feels they know a higher truth.

In general I agree, it is not all or nothing. But we also need to consider what it is that one is said to be wise about. Aristotle says, for example,

... we consider that the master craftsmen in every profession are more estimable and know more and are wiser than the artisans

(Metaphysics, 981a)

He goes on to say:

Thus it is clear that Wisdom is knowledge of certain principles and causes.

Since we are investigating this kind of knowledge, we must consider what these causes and principles are whose knowledge is Wisdom.

And to your point:

We consider first, then, that the wise man knows all things, so far as it is possible

(982a)

Which, according to you, neither Aristotle nor anyone else has ever had! — Wayfarer

Yes, that is my position. It is possible that I am wrong, that I do not recognize wisdom because I am not wise. By the same token, unless someone is wise they may be wrong when attributing wisdom to Aristotle or anyone else. Is there anyone here able to make that determination?

It is also hard to believe that you are reading him with sympathy — Leontiskos

He is not speaking from on high, does not possess divine wisdom, and is not pronouncing revealed truths for us to accept and spread.

To read him sympathetically is read him as he reads others, that is carefully, critically, and not to regard him as an unquestionable authority.

Blessed are those who do God's work.