The irony refers to the consequences of your interpretation. I read the following:

If we are using the word “know” as it is normally used (and how else are we to use it?), then
other people very often know if I’m in pain. (PI 246)

as a statement of fact. As we normally use the word "know" it does not mean that I cannot be misled or mistaken. Whether it is the pre-linguistic behavior of a baby or the verbal expression of pain, doing nothing and pleading ignorance won't hold water.

one in which the real Socrates is allowed to speak. — frank

For much of the dialogue he speaks on behalf of the city and its laws. He simply accepts these arguments. This is uncharacteristic. Taking the part of the city and says:

...you make such a habit of asking and answering questions. (50c)

but now he is silent. Two reasons for this might be, first, that he has deliberately avoided politics and so chose not take part in the making and changing of laws, and second, he is not a rhetorician.

...a rhetorician, might have a lot to say about the subversion of the law whereby judgements, once delivered, stand supreme. (50b)

Socrates' civic mindedness is evident, but he is not speaking in his own name, and this leaves open the question of the extent to which his own opinions coincide with that of city.

There's a tug-of-war going on about popular opinion. — frank

Athens was a democratic regime. Socrates was convicted by a majority decision. His low opinion of public opinion, raises questions about how wise he thought the city and its laws actually were. And yet Socrates defends the city and its laws and abides by them.

The second statement was intended to be ironic. Skepticism in the service of negligence.

Yes, this is how I am doing it.

How can you know the private sensations of another person just from their behaviour? — RussellA

The baby has been crying nonstop. Her fists are clenched, she cannot settle down, her breathing is not normal, and her facial expression is the same as it was that time I accidentally dropped her, and that time her brother hit her. But I try to ignore this. I am busy reading philosophy and have become convinced that I cannot know from the baby's behavior that she is in pain. I try feeding her but she won't eat. I change her diaper but that does not help.

It gets to the point where I can no longer ignore the crying. I call a friend who suggests I look online for signs that a baby is in pain. The description of a child in pain closely matches the behavior of my child, but I think: "How can you know the private sensations of another person just from their behaviour?" I concludes you can't. I cannot know the baby is in pain so do nothing. She'll stop eventually.

I think the Horan translation might be a better choice for the discussion, but you might find West's translation and notes worth reading and having. I will keep a copy beside me and compare it to Horan.

Another advantage of Horan is that quoting the text by copy and paste is much easier.

As part of a dive into normativity — frank

Perhaps you know that the name Crito comes from the Greek meaning "discern" or "judge". (This is noted in West's translation.)

Like pick a translation you like and set pace? — frank

.

I prefer the West translation from Four Texts on Socrates, but I cannot vouch for the security of any PDF copies of this translation.

David Horan's new translation of the dialogues might be a good choice. It has the advantage of being available free online.

In the general introduction he says:

I believe that I unconsciously adopted a method that Friedrich Schleiermacher describes in his great essay On the Different Methods of Translating. Here he subordinates the common designation of translations as being either “faithful” translations or “free” translations to a division that is more relevant to philosophic works. He writes:

“Either the translator leaves the writer in peace as much as possible and moves the reader toward him; or he leaves the reader in peace as much as possible and moves the writer toward him.”[1]

If I were to attempt to capture the overall aspiration of these translations, I would say that they aim to move the reader toward Plato rather than leaving the reader in peace and adjusting the writings of Plato, and his associated language, to conform with modern expectations.

I don't know what you have in mind in terms of moderating, but I look forward to participating.

I don't know where you are trying to go with any of this.

the pain you are referring to must be part of the language game, and therefore does depend on language. — RussellA

I may use language to refer to pain, but neither the experience of pain nor the expression of pain depend on language.

"Pain" is a word that has a meaning in the language game — RussellA

Pain and the word "pain" are not the same. We can know that a baby is in pain even though she has no words to express her pain. Her being in pain does not depend on a language game. It makes no sense to say that she is in pain but doesn't know it.

a modern reworking/revival of Gnostic mythos. — Tom Storm

Do you remember any of the parallels he drew?

I think of him as:

the Orange Messiah. — Fooloso4

In a private language it wouldn't make sense, as either "I am in pain" or "I am not in pain". — RussellA

As you say, either I am in pain or not, but whether it is the one or the other does not depend on language. If it were something that I can 'know' then it is something I might not know. If it makes no sense to say that I do not know if I am in pain then it makes no sense to say that I know I am in pain.

If I don't know if I am in pain then perhaps I should take an aspirin just in case. But then again, I might not be in pain so perhaps I don't need an aspirin after all.

PI 246.

This much is true: it makes sense to say about other people that they doubt whether I am in pain; but not to say it about myself.

Does it make sense to say "I don't know if I'm in pain"?

'Senses' is a term with two senses.

Trumpsters would like for this to be a case about free speech but it is not.

I’m just asking why you and Jack Smith don’t think it is the same. — NOS4A2

Just asking rather than answering my questions.

Jim Jordan and Rudy Giuliani did not storm the Capital. Neither did Trump.

My toothpaste fights cavities. In doing so it does not do what Jim Jordan, or Rudy Giuliani, or the insurrectionist mob did. Again, context matters.

Surely you don’t think Jim Jordan was bodyslamming people on the house floor, or that when he says Guillianni is a fighter, Rudy is handing out uppercuts to other lawyers. — NOS4A2

That is the point. What it means for Jim Jordan and Rudy Giuliani to fight is not the same as what it means for an angry mob to fight to prevent the certification of an election on the day and place when that process was taking place.

I think you know this and that is why you have avoided addressing my questions.

What is at issue is what Trump meant by those words. The situation in which he said those words is part of the linguistic context. See linguistic context:

Context is "a frame that surrounds the event and provides resources for its appropriate interpretation". It is thus a relative concept, only definable with respect to some focal event within a frame, not independently of that frame.

and this:

Contextomy refers to the selective excerpting of words from their original linguistic context in a way that distorts the source's intended meaning, a practice commonly referred to as "quoting out of context".

Trump uses the word “fight” numerous times in that speech. You can pick any one of them and we can try to discern whether he was being literal or figurative. Take your pick. — NOS4A2

In order to discern whether he was being literal or figurative he need to do the very thing you are attempting to avoid. When he says:

Jim Jordan and some of these guys, they're out there fighting. The House guys are fighting.

That means something different than telling an angry mob who had falsely been led to believe that the election was being stolen and they had to do something at that moment. And so, once again:

In what other way could the Trumpsters heading to the Capital have fought like hell? How else would they have attempted to "stop the steal"? Were they going there to "primary"? At that point in time how would "peacefully and patriotically mak[ing] your voices heard" be fighting like hell? What are the "very different rules" he told his followers they are allowed to play by as they fought that day? — Fooloso4

For instance, one of Jack Smith’s indictments abuses contextomy to an almost comical degree:

Finally, after exhorting that “we fight. We fight like hell. And if you don’t fight like hell, you're not going to have a country anymore,” the Defendant directed the people in front of him to head to the Capitol , suggested he was going with them, and told them to give Members of Congress the kind of pride and boldness that they need to take back our country — NOS4A2

This is a good example of you doing what you accuse others of. Context matters. In what other way could the Trumpsters heading to the Capital have fought like hell? How else would they have attempted to "stop the steal"? Were they going there to "primary"? At that point in time how would "peacefully and patriotically mak[ing] your voices heard" be fighting like hell? What are the "very different rules" he told his followers they are allowed to play by as they fought that day?

There is a significant difference between the rallies you cite and what Trump stood up on stage and encouraged his followers to do. You have not provided any evidence that those who protested against Trump were:

Clinton operatives paid to incite violence. — NOS4A2

Once again Trump and the Trumpsters are the innocent victims who did nothing wrong.

...rally-goers were getting beaten and berated by protesters, rioters, and Clinton operatives paid to incite violence. — NOS4A2

What evidence do you have of this?

... all divined from a mugshot and nowhere else. — NOS4A2

Nowhere else?

It is not clear whether your blindness and ignorance is feigned, willful, or as with so many Trumpists, an inability to see below the facade.

The mugshot attests to the power of images. How much time did Trump spend before his gold-plated mirror working on this latest image? And his followers have bought into it, in some cases literally. I don't know what he imagined this image would convey, but that is part of the power of images.

What I see is the image of a petulant old man/child wearing the latest shade from his changing make-up pallet and dyed comb over hairstyle, trying to put the orange man image in the past.

Although this in not the image he wants to convey, it is still successful in so far as the focus is on the image and not what lies behind the mask.

As the author Megan Garber puts it in the article quoted:

one more opportunity for brand building.

It will be interesting to see to what extent he will attempt to make the trial another brand building opportunity.

quote="NOS4A2;833962"]The persecution of one’s political opponents[/quote]

In that case why is it that other political opponents are not being "persecuted"? Why is he the only "innocent victim"? The thing is, this is not a good look for him. It makes him appear to be weak. The martyr is a role he is only willing to take so far. It is, however, a role his followers embrace because Trump has told them that they are the victims, and they believe they need a powerful leader like him to right the wrongs they suffer. They see every threat against Trump as a threat against them.

Their concern, like Trump's, is not for the fate of democracy, but their own personal advantage.

Does that makes sense? — NOS4A2

NO.

The prosecution does have the burden of proof. We do not. There is, for example, no burden for us to trust someone we suspect of being a con man until we are able to prove his guilt.

If we are on the jury the presumption of innocence means that we should decide whether someone is guilty on the basis of the evidence presented, not on whatever it is we may presume.

One standard that applies to those who prosecute in courts, but to no one else. Only they should presume innocence. Only they require the burden of proof. — NOS4A2

Are you claiming that those who are prosecuting should presume he is innocent? How does that work? Should they not look for or present evidence of his crimes because he cannot be guilty because he is presumed innocent?

Are you claiming that since we are not prosecutors we should not presume he is innocent?

One standard that applies to everyone including Trump.

Yup. That is why I said that NOS is conflating "much talk" with the judicial process.

The presumption of innocence means he has the right to defend himself against the charges in a court of law. That is exactly what is happening.

You seem to be conflating "much talk" with the judicial process. The presumption of innocence does not mean that he does not have to defend himself against the charges brought against him. It will be up to the court and not "much talk" to reach a determination as to whether he is innocent.

First, it must give an account of what fact it is
(about my mental state) that constitutes my meaning plus, not
quus. — frank

Here I think he is simply wrong. My mental state and whatever my meaning might be has no bearing on how to properly add numbers.

If our ability to follow rules correctly and consistently is not dependent upon the application of a privately held conceptual understanding of the rule (the justified mental fact), but can be explained in terms of training and conformity to standard practice, then what remains of the skeptical problem? — Fooloso4

It is reassuring to know that we have saved addition from Kripke's skeptic ... at least for the time being.

That there is no fact about which rule you were following. — frank

If what is being done is in accord with addition then it does not matter which rule one thinks they are following.

The fact that Kripke is able to make a distinction between addition and quaddition means that there is in fact a discernible difference. No arbitrary rule imposed under conditions that do not occur should lead to skeptical confusion.

It just so happened to favor one candidate, one party, some people, some states, at the expense of the rest. — NOS4A2

Yes, it just so happens that allowing more citizens to vote and have their ballots counted may favor one candidate. Trump's fear was that in this case it would favor Democrats, but that is how this representative democracy works.

So if up until we get to this number, which as far as we know no one has ever encountered, there is no discernible difference between plus and quus and puus. The practice is the same. What then is the skeptical objection?

He's asking for a fact that shows you've actually adhered to this practice as opposed to the practice of quaddition. — frank

As long as we are dealing with quantities less than this imaginary number that has not been dealt with before, then there are a multitude of rules we might invent that we could say are being adhered to. It is only when we encounter this number that we can say say that what follows is or is not arithmetic, for the rules of arithmetic do not allow that two positive integers added together will be less than either one.

There is more than one sense in which we say someone is following a rule. If I if I ask a child what the rule of counting is more than likely she cannot state a rule but will simply demonstrate how it is done by counting.

The challenge is to point to some fact — frank

...our ability to follow rules correctly and consistently is not dependent upon the application of a privately held conceptual understanding of the rule (the justified mental fact), — Fooloso4

...there was no rule following. If you disagree, he's asking you to prove it. — frank

Kripke's skepticism is based on his assumption that there must be some fact independent of and other than the fact of the practice of addition.

Wittgenstein's solution to the paradox at PI 201 is that addition is a public practice. Rather than Kripke's appeal to what addition means to an individual or what her intention is or how he interprets it, there is simply the rules of arithmetic that are applicable to all numbers.

201 ... For what we thereby show is that there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but which, from case to case of application, is exhibited in what we call “following the
rule” and “going against it”.

That’s why there is an inclination to say: every action according to a rule is an interpretation. But one should speak of interpretation only when one expression of a rule is substituted for another.

202. That’s why ‘following a rule’ is a practice. And to think one is following a rule is not to follow a rule. And that’s why it’s not possible to follow a rule ‘privately’; otherwise, thinking one was following a rule would be the same thing as following it.

Kripke poses the challenge:

Who is to say that this [quus] is not the function previously meant by '+'? (9)

The answer is simple: the rules of arithmetic. We either follow them correctly or we do not. When Kripke substitutes 'quus' for some cases of '+' he in not substituting one expression of a rule for another. Quus has no place in the rules of arithmetic. Kripke or his skeptic is not interpreting or misinterpreting the rules of arithmetic, he is disregarding them.

If our ability to follow rules correctly and consistently is not dependent upon the application of a privately held conceptual understanding of the rule (the justified mental fact), but can be explained in terms of training and conformity to standard practice, then what remains of the skeptical problem?

The argument presented holds for divine absence and non-existence as well.

How best to work with and cultivate a rebellious, anarchic, and anti-methodical temperament? — Moliere

I have developed a method for that ...

Seriously, I'l start with a point of clarification: by cultivate I mean manage, that is, not allow it to grow or increase uncontrolled.

Touching on the question raised by @Tobias, the dialogic nature of philosophy means that one should not simply accept or reject the work of the philosophers, but rather to remain open to what they might teach us, and to the possibility that there may be questions without answers and problems without solutions.

My thinking reflects my character or temperament and includes the idea that rather than attempting to exclude such idiosyncrasies they should be recognized and admitted as being at the heart of what philosophy is for me. This is not to say that they should be accepted as whatever they are, but rather as material to work with, to alter and develop. The goal is not some abstract ideal of universal objectivity but self-knowledge.

Here I would emphasize the productive aspect of knowledge - to make or produce. We must work with what we have. The question arises as to how best to work with and cultivate my rebellious and anarchic, anti-methodical temperament.

What is 'free and open enquiry'? — Tobias

It is a kind of play that is not determined in advance by how one should play. Some might object that wandering about is not productive, but where one might go and where it might lead and what one might find along the way has its own beauty.