I can tell myself or someone else that the self is a myth but the myth may be that the self is a myth.

Who or what is it tells me this and who or what is it being told to when I hear and think about this? Is "I" and "me" and "myself" something other than my self?

If the self is a myth then what remains when the myth of the self is rejected?

My intention was only to relay some information and context that has changed my perspective on AI as a whole. — Bret Bernhoft

Do you mean this:

One of these individuals claims to have made contact with some sort of super-intelligence; something far beyond our humanity and our tools. — Bret Bernhoft

Apparently you believe this individual, but why should we? People make all kinds of claims. Alien intelligence is a recurring theme.

If humanity does make contact with a higher intelligence ... — Bret Bernhoft

According to you and this individual we already have.

what sort of philosophical implications does that have for humanity? — Bret Bernhoft

If all we know is that this higher intelligence exists and makes contact with us, then we cannot draw any philosophical implications. If it is so far advanced will we be able to understand it if it is light years ahead of us? It being intelligent tells us nothing about what its intentions toward us will be.

Does vocabulary have negative connotations? — javi2541997

Yes.

Or are some people recklessly using language? — javi2541997

It is not either/or. The careful use of language does not result in a language free of connotations.

If something cannot be experienced and cannot be exactly defined, then we should not speculate about it. — ClayG

Too late. Claims about Heaven are part of our cultural history. It is not simply a matter of fact but of belief, or how people both in the past and present understand life and themselves, with an eye to their future.

This is all to say, that to speculate about something, we either need to be able to experience it or have an exact a priori definition of it. — ClayG

And yet, your proclamation has not and will not stop people from speculation about any number of things. One name for doing just that is 'metaphysics'.

More clearly, the philosopher using Hegel’s model does not have to struggle against it, like they would have to with the traditional model, to find a synthesis of both views. — ClayG

It is not clear whether you are interested in discussion Hegel or just looking to reconcile differences. With regard to Hegel, he is very critical of what you are proposing. From the preface to the Phenomenology. It is:

#7:
... to take what thought has torn asunder and then to stir it all together into a smooth mélange, to suppress the concept that makes those distinctions, and then to fabricate the feeling of the essence.
...
What it wants from philosophy is not so much insight as edification. The beautiful, the holy, the eternal, religion, and love itself are all the bait required to awaken the craving to bite. What is supposed to sustain and extend the wealth of that substance is not the concept, but ecstasy, not the cold forward march of the necessity of the subject matter, but instead a kind of inflamed inspiration.
...
Spirit has shown itself to be so impoverished that it seems to yearn for its refreshment only in the meager feeling of divinity ... That it now takes so little to satisfy spirit’s needs is the full measure
of the magnitude of its loss.

The movement of Geist (Spirit/Mind) is the movement of the whole to its self-realization. It is the working out of the internal logic of the concept.

#12:

... the whole which has returned into itself from out of its succession and extension and has come to be the simple concept of itself.

Returning into itself is to become what from the beginning it is to be. Each stage of this new whole no matter how different it is from earlier stages is not a move away from but within itself, adding to the completion of itself.

The actuality of this simple whole consists in those embodiments which, having become moments of the whole, again develop themselves anew and give themselves a figuration, but this time in their new element, in the new meaning which itself has come to be.

The moments in the development of spirit do not understand themselves and are not understood by subsequent moment until this moment when it has come to the simple concept of itself. It is in this new element that each of those moments is understood anew as part in the development of the whole.

I thought you studied Heidegger ? Doesn't everyone know at least this part ? — plaque flag

I am aware of your penchant and fondness for tangent, but try not to mistake your tangential excursions for something that has anything to do with the issue under discussion. If you want to take my question about what someone with little or no background in Heidegger would understand about a statement that was supposed to explain another statement as an opportunity to talk about the background of a text then go ahead, but don't mistake the one for the other.

In my opinion philosophy is a practice. "Philosophies" are opinions. My practice is informed by Socratic skepticism, knowledge of my ignorance and how best to live knowing I do not know. The interpretation of the work of the philosophers is central to my practice. The purpose of which is not simply to know what they think or even how they think, but for me to think with and against them.

But the problem of how best to live is not answered by reading books. Also central to my practice is self knowledge and the examined life. What is required is honesty with myself about myself and the willingness to work on what I think and see and say and do.

Two additional reasons why I think it important to put things in my own words.

First it is not always clear that we understand the terminology in the same way. We use Heidegger's or some other author's words but that does not mean we understand the concepts in the same way.

Second, putting things in my own words forces me to think through and articulate what I think is meant by a statement. What may seem clear to me upon reading it may turn out to need further work on my part if I am to understand it.

... à la "the holy ghost" or dao, no? — 180 Proof

Given his claim that philosophy is occidental then not dao. Or at least not until he cloaked it in a chiton.

Das Heilige Geist via Hegel and Holderlin is on target.

As with the question of Being, he strives to keep the questioning going. I suspect that if asked what he believes he would deflect and say that what is important is not his beliefs but thinking.

It has been a long time since I read Heidegger. I am probably also be in need of a refresher.

I don’t recall Heidegger ever talking about, let alone believing in, the notion of providence. — Mikie

I don't either. It was meant to be suggestive. It is not something I have looked into.

So I’m still not sure why you’re convinced he sees being as God. — Mikie

I am not convinced. In fact when I wrote it I considered adding that I would not insist that this is correct. This paper might be of interest. In addition, there is the Der Spiegel interview:

If I may answer briefly, and perhaps clumsily, but after long reflection: philosophy will be unable to effect any immediate change in the current state of the world. This is true not only of philosophy but of all purely human reflection and endeavor. Only a god can save us. The only possibility available to us is that by thinknig and poetizing we prepare a readiness for the appearance of a god, or for the absence of a god in [our] decline, insofar as in view of the absent god we are in a state of decline.
...
We can not bring him forth by our thinking. At best we can awaken a readiness to wait [for him].
...
It is not through man that the world can be what it is and how it is -- but also not without man. In my view, this goes together with the fact that what I call "Being" (that long traditional, highly ambiguous, now worn-out word) has need of man in order that its revelation, its appearance as truth, and its [various] forms may come to pass.

Temporality is the unfolding of Being, of what is present and what remains concealed in and through the space or openness of time. It is not simply the linear sequence of moments from what was but no longer is to what is to what will be but is not yet.

In what is present and what is thought there remains something that does not yet come to presence and is not thought. This is why Heidegger returns to the Greeks, to uncover and bring to light possibilities that had at that time remained concealed. Truth, or in Greek aletheia, is to bring out of concealment, to disclose.

The future is present in the sense of possibilities. We are oriented to the future in that we plan and act and hope for what might come to be. Man, or Dasein, is the disclosive being. That is, man plays a role in what comes to be and how it is thought, as well as what is remains concealed from man.

The past remains present insofar as our language and conceptual frameworks were here before us and we think within and strive to think beyond them.

Helpful. Thanks.

I will be posting my explanation soon.

Your definition of ‘simply and clearly’ is circular. — Joshs

If I explain the statement to someone and as a result they can now make sense of it, that is not circular.

He’s pretty clearly un-Christian. — Mikie

This is what I was referring to as "layers of meaning". He can't use the term without the association with some concept and meaning being attached to it.

... god as uncreated substance is simply more substance ontology — Mikie

Right. The term has a lot of baggage, including the idea of God as a being. Tillich picks up on this. Rather than a supreme being he says that God is the ground of being.

I think that Heidegger remained open to and accepting of what comes to be because he retained belief in the notion of providence.

Josh quotes Heidegger and was asked to explain the quote:

“In Being and Time, Being is not something other than time: "Time" is a preliminary name for the truth of Being, and this truth is what prevails as essential in Being and thus is Being itself.”(What is Metaphysics)
— Joshs

What does it mean for time to be the preliminary name for the truth of Being? — Fooloso4

In response he said:

The unitary structure of the three ecstasies, future-present-having been, determines the ‘is’, the essence, the Being of being as this structure of transit. — Joshs

Now the first statement can and should be explained simply and clearly. The second does not do that, and no attempt to clarify it is made.

Instead of offering an explanation you choose obfuscation by introducing a "background". A background to what? The statement in question? Nope:

As Dreyfus might put, there are assumptions too deep for tears, which aren't even articulate, so that 'assumptions' is a metaphor for something 'stupider' like a competence. — plaque flag

Instead of attempting to make Heidegger's statement more understandable, you cover it over, shroud it under a "background". As if, "you can't get there from here".

To determine if it’s even approaching truth would require some clear quotations from the texts and a lot of analysis. — Mikie

Not something you are likely to see Heidegger fans here doing.

But as for what being is? Heidegger, as far as I’ve seen, never really says. — Mikie

I don't think he ever is honest enough to come out and say it. Being is God. The problem is, on the one hand, the layers of meaning that have piled on, and, on the other, what he is actually saying looses its aura of profundity and mystery. He does, however, give us some clues in his references to the gods in Heraclitus and Parmenides.

This is iffy. It's either a tautology or missing the point. — plaque flag

It is helpful to keep track of the argument. What does any of this have to do with the Josh's statement and my response about simplicity and clarity? You quoted Nietzsche approvingly regarding clarity,
gave @fdrake a thumbs up and said:

Always a fair request, no matter the dense philosopher... — plaque flag

when he asks for the same thing about the same statement. But then tell me I am missing the point?

i suspect you aren’t too crazy about Foucault , Rorty, social constructionism, Derrida, Deleuze, Nietzsche or Husserl either when it comes to ethics. — Joshs

Name dropping does not answer the question.

... as if the ossified old school notion of respectable philosophy requires it to check off all the usual categories such as metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, aesthetic and logic. — Joshs

None of this has anything to do with what I have said or with what or how I think.

The fact is none of these writers is lacking an ethical impetus in their work in the most fundamental sense of the term. — Joshs

That's nice, but I am asking about Heidegger.

How does this relate to the social? The political? The ethical?

Is there a recognition of responsibility to and for others?

There seems to be an unstated and essentially unargued claim that philosophical works may be dismissed if their authors fail to meet a heightened standard of morality. — Arne

It was unstated and not argued because that is not my position. I have read Heidegger. I have used his work when teaching. I think he should be read if for no other reason than his considerable influence.

But that does not render invalid everything he has to saying about the meaning of being. — Arne

I agree and have said nothing to the contrary. As I suggested in another post, we can put his involvement with the Nazis aside for a moment and look at two related issues. The first is what his contribution to ethics might be. I don't see anything in his discussion of care that applies to ethics. Or the concern for human life except with regard to the question of Being. The second is how we are to understand es gibt.

This post on the question of the good and values and this on history and es gibt, what comes to be and the call to hearken to Being.

no register for taking responsibility — Paine

I agree.

I don't know if he was just unable to admit he was wrong and take responsibility or if he thought he did nothing wrong either because he thought what he did was right or if he thought he was answering the call of Being and thus acting resolutely.

I give Heidegger a pass. He has earned it. I am talking about the unwillingness or inability of some members here to attempt to clarify and explain things. The problem is when one attempts to do so the gaps in understanding as well as misunderstandings become clear.

One could care very much about being a good Nazi. — Arne

Isn't that the problem? Heidegger's 'care' does not answer the question raised:

Is there a concern for the human things in this more originary thinking? — Fooloso4

Is care about being a good Nazi compatible with caring about human beings?

This is the problem ... — plaque flag

The problem is hiding behind jargon and frictive words that produce heat without light.

Background is everything. — plaque flag

The background can be sketched, as simply and clearly as possible. Thinking and speaking simply and clearly is very difficult. Hiding behind words is easy but lacks probity. The most insidious part is that one's lack of understanding never reaches the surface.

One [[i]das Man[/i]] may well assume such a thing, and that B&T is trying to do the same kind of thing as Chicken Soup for the Soul. — plaque flag

And one might assume the former without the latter. Why reduce the concern for human things to a nostrum?

So says one such ventriloquist dummy telling us how it is ? — plaque flag

I make no grandiose claims about Being.

We find in our struggle to talk about what is — plaque flag

What's the point? Are you making excuses for not being able to explain Heidegger? Or anything at all? Are you attempting to free yourself for

offensive creativity — plaque flag

?

Spinning dross is not an adequate substitute for not paying attention to what is said and struggling to understand it.

More essential than instituting rules is that man find the way to his abode in the truth of Being. — ibid. 262

A ponderous way of saying he's lost.

It can be a long time between trains. — Paine

Waiting for Begot.

One might assume that with the term 'care' (Sorge) Heidegger has human well being first and foremost in mind. That is not the case.

The analytic of Dasein, which is proceeding towards the phenomenon of care, is to prepare the way for the problematic of fundamental ontology the question of the meaning of Being in general. (227)

His concern with human being is with regard to Dasein as the being that discloses Being. His concern is not the human condition, as the term is commonly used, but the question of Being.

To care belongs not only Being in-the-world but also Being alongside entities within-the-world.

Not humans or even sentient beings but entities. Man seems to be of concern only in so far as he is the ventriloquist dummy of Being.

Are you suggesting that there are definitions of philosophy ... — Arne

I try to avoid definitions of philosophy.

...the practice of which would require one to be a good person? — Arne

Rather than a requirement, a practice that aims at being good and living well.

And is a focus upon being somehow outside the realm of the "Socratics?" Certainly Plato had his ontology. — Arne

I am not sure I understand the question. As I see it, Plato was a Socratic philosopher. A concern for the human things does not preclude ontology. Concerns for knowledge are not separate from concerns for the knower. The centrality of the question of the good is not about claims such as this is the best possible world, but rather about how the mind, in accord with the hypothesis of the Forms, orders and makes sense of things.

Would one have to be just in order to inquire in to "justice?" — Arne

No. Sophists then and now do this.

I suspect many who condemned Socrates to death sincerely considered themselves just and were considered by many fellow Athenians to be so. — Arne

Good point, but they were not inquiring into the question of justice. They had their opinions about it and felt it was a threat to question them.

Is there a concern for the human things in this more originary thinking? Where do we see it?

Would someone with little or no background in Heidegger understand this? What does the truth have to do with this?

he leaves us with only questions and a promise for answers in a division III which was never produced. — Joshs

Why?

“In Being and Time, Being is not something other than time: "Time" is a preliminary name for the truth of Being, and this truth is what prevails as essential in Being and thus is Being itself.”(What is Metaphysics) — Joshs

What does it mean for time to be the preliminary name for the truth of Being?

Do you have to be a good person to be a good philosopher? — Arne

That depends on what you take the practice of philosophy to be about.

We need to look not only as what is said but at what isn't said, that is, what is neglected.

The Socratic philosopher's concern is first and foremost the human things, the inquiry into the just, the beautiful or noble, and the good.

Heidegger's concern is first and foremost Being.

The world is running low on reasons not to read, not to think. Let's burn some books for Jesus and Apple Pie, boys ! — plaque flag

When I taught Introduction to Philosophy I would sometimes use Time and Being. What did not change from semester to semester was the use of primary texts and a degree of close reading appropriate to introductory level courses. I did not bring up his Nazi affiliation.

I think a case was made, which goes something like this: — Joshs

It was not made here. Let's put aside the problem of Nazism for a moment. The issue is his treatment of history, of es gibt, of an uncritical acceptance of "what is given to thought", and his identification of Dasein with the Volk, the Blut und Boden, the blood and soil, as well as the special place of the language of the German people.

The work doesn't need me to defend it though — plaque flag

And that is fortunate. If it did it would not outlast us.

A critical reading of Heidegger is not a rejection of Heidegger. It is not an argument to not read Heidegger. Just the opposite, to read him and read him closely and carefully. It is not to sweep under the rug what is not understood as metaphor.

“Temporalizing does not mean a "succession" of the ecstasies. The future is not later than the having-been, and the having-been is not earlier than the present. “Dasein "occurs out of its future"."Da-sein, as existing, always already comes toward itself, that is, is futural in its being in general." Having-been arises from the future in such a way that the future that has-been (or better, is in the process of having-been) releases the present from itself. We call the unified phenomenon of the future that makes present in the process of having been temporality.”(Being and Time) — Joshs

@plaque flag

Earlier I asked for an explanation. I followed up with some questions intended to focus on what is at issue and what is not.

Heidegger is talking about time as it relates to Dasein and the disclosure of Being. The disclosure takes place in or through time but this is not the same as what happens day by day or in what is recorded in history books. It is not about objects in the world or what happens to me or someone else in their past.

Having been refers to the history of Being. To what was disclosed, what was hidden, and what was forgotten. Heidegger returns to the first disclosure of Being through Greek philosophy in order to think what was left unthought. Having been is not earlier than the present in for far as it is still present in order for Dasein to think what was left unthought.

Frankly, I find this kind of thing childish. — plaque flag

An evasive response. All this was discussed earlier. I won't repeat it. Heidegger sings a siren song, the dark side of Doris Day, Que sera, sera, whatever will be will be. It is the acceptance of a future that was ours to see.

Yes, I just noticed that. Before discussing the lecture let's back up a little. The question arose as to whether he was using temporal terms metaphorically. You cited the statement: Dasein is time as an example.

From a quick preliminary reading of the lecture: He is not talking about what man is but how he is. Time is dasein's way of being.

The lecture ends:

What is time? became the question: Who is time? More closely: are we ourselves time? Or closer still: am I my time? In this way I come closest to it, and if I understand the question correctly, it is then taken completely seriously. Such questioning is thus the most appropriate manner of access to and of dealing with time as in each case mine. Then Dasein would be: being questionable.

How we are to be is being questionable. Dasein's way of being is open to possibilities. In the lecture he insists on the indeterminacy of the past and the certainty of the future as death. The indeterminacy of the past means we must return to the past, for it is the way to the future.