Josh quotes Heidegger and was asked to explain the quote:

“In Being and Time, Being is not something other than time: "Time" is a preliminary name for the truth of Being, and this truth is what prevails as essential in Being and thus is Being itself.”(What is Metaphysics)
— Joshs

What does it mean for time to be the preliminary name for the truth of Being? — Fooloso4

In response he said:

The unitary structure of the three ecstasies, future-present-having been, determines the ‘is’, the essence, the Being of being as this structure of transit. — Joshs

Now the first statement can and should be explained simply and clearly. The second does not do that, and no attempt to clarify it is made.

Instead of offering an explanation you choose obfuscation by introducing a "background". A background to what? The statement in question? Nope:

As Dreyfus might put, there are assumptions too deep for tears, which aren't even articulate, so that 'assumptions' is a metaphor for something 'stupider' like a competence. — plaque flag

Instead of attempting to make Heidegger's statement more understandable, you cover it over, shroud it under a "background". As if, "you can't get there from here".

To determine if it’s even approaching truth would require some clear quotations from the texts and a lot of analysis. — Mikie

Not something you are likely to see Heidegger fans here doing.

But as for what being is? Heidegger, as far as I’ve seen, never really says. — Mikie

I don't think he ever is honest enough to come out and say it. Being is God. The problem is, on the one hand, the layers of meaning that have piled on, and, on the other, what he is actually saying looses its aura of profundity and mystery. He does, however, give us some clues in his references to the gods in Heraclitus and Parmenides.

This is iffy. It's either a tautology or missing the point. — plaque flag

It is helpful to keep track of the argument. What does any of this have to do with the Josh's statement and my response about simplicity and clarity? You quoted Nietzsche approvingly regarding clarity,
gave @fdrake a thumbs up and said:

Always a fair request, no matter the dense philosopher... — plaque flag

when he asks for the same thing about the same statement. But then tell me I am missing the point?

i suspect you aren’t too crazy about Foucault , Rorty, social constructionism, Derrida, Deleuze, Nietzsche or Husserl either when it comes to ethics. — Joshs

Name dropping does not answer the question.

... as if the ossified old school notion of respectable philosophy requires it to check off all the usual categories such as metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, aesthetic and logic. — Joshs

None of this has anything to do with what I have said or with what or how I think.

The fact is none of these writers is lacking an ethical impetus in their work in the most fundamental sense of the term. — Joshs

That's nice, but I am asking about Heidegger.

How does this relate to the social? The political? The ethical?

Is there a recognition of responsibility to and for others?

There seems to be an unstated and essentially unargued claim that philosophical works may be dismissed if their authors fail to meet a heightened standard of morality. — Arne

It was unstated and not argued because that is not my position. I have read Heidegger. I have used his work when teaching. I think he should be read if for no other reason than his considerable influence.

But that does not render invalid everything he has to saying about the meaning of being. — Arne

I agree and have said nothing to the contrary. As I suggested in another post, we can put his involvement with the Nazis aside for a moment and look at two related issues. The first is what his contribution to ethics might be. I don't see anything in his discussion of care that applies to ethics. Or the concern for human life except with regard to the question of Being. The second is how we are to understand es gibt.

This post on the question of the good and values and this on history and es gibt, what comes to be and the call to hearken to Being.

no register for taking responsibility — Paine

I agree.

I don't know if he was just unable to admit he was wrong and take responsibility or if he thought he did nothing wrong either because he thought what he did was right or if he thought he was answering the call of Being and thus acting resolutely.

I give Heidegger a pass. He has earned it. I am talking about the unwillingness or inability of some members here to attempt to clarify and explain things. The problem is when one attempts to do so the gaps in understanding as well as misunderstandings become clear.

One could care very much about being a good Nazi. — Arne

Isn't that the problem? Heidegger's 'care' does not answer the question raised:

Is there a concern for the human things in this more originary thinking? — Fooloso4

Is care about being a good Nazi compatible with caring about human beings?

This is the problem ... — plaque flag

The problem is hiding behind jargon and frictive words that produce heat without light.

Background is everything. — plaque flag

The background can be sketched, as simply and clearly as possible. Thinking and speaking simply and clearly is very difficult. Hiding behind words is easy but lacks probity. The most insidious part is that one's lack of understanding never reaches the surface.

One [[i]das Man[/i]] may well assume such a thing, and that B&T is trying to do the same kind of thing as Chicken Soup for the Soul. — plaque flag

And one might assume the former without the latter. Why reduce the concern for human things to a nostrum?

So says one such ventriloquist dummy telling us how it is ? — plaque flag

I make no grandiose claims about Being.

We find in our struggle to talk about what is — plaque flag

What's the point? Are you making excuses for not being able to explain Heidegger? Or anything at all? Are you attempting to free yourself for

offensive creativity — plaque flag

?

Spinning dross is not an adequate substitute for not paying attention to what is said and struggling to understand it.

More essential than instituting rules is that man find the way to his abode in the truth of Being. — ibid. 262

A ponderous way of saying he's lost.

It can be a long time between trains. — Paine

Waiting for Begot.

One might assume that with the term 'care' (Sorge) Heidegger has human well being first and foremost in mind. That is not the case.

The analytic of Dasein, which is proceeding towards the phenomenon of care, is to prepare the way for the problematic of fundamental ontology the question of the meaning of Being in general. (227)

His concern with human being is with regard to Dasein as the being that discloses Being. His concern is not the human condition, as the term is commonly used, but the question of Being.

To care belongs not only Being in-the-world but also Being alongside entities within-the-world.

Not humans or even sentient beings but entities. Man seems to be of concern only in so far as he is the ventriloquist dummy of Being.

Are you suggesting that there are definitions of philosophy ... — Arne

I try to avoid definitions of philosophy.

...the practice of which would require one to be a good person? — Arne

Rather than a requirement, a practice that aims at being good and living well.

And is a focus upon being somehow outside the realm of the "Socratics?" Certainly Plato had his ontology. — Arne

I am not sure I understand the question. As I see it, Plato was a Socratic philosopher. A concern for the human things does not preclude ontology. Concerns for knowledge are not separate from concerns for the knower. The centrality of the question of the good is not about claims such as this is the best possible world, but rather about how the mind, in accord with the hypothesis of the Forms, orders and makes sense of things.

Would one have to be just in order to inquire in to "justice?" — Arne

No. Sophists then and now do this.

I suspect many who condemned Socrates to death sincerely considered themselves just and were considered by many fellow Athenians to be so. — Arne

Good point, but they were not inquiring into the question of justice. They had their opinions about it and felt it was a threat to question them.

Is there a concern for the human things in this more originary thinking? Where do we see it?

Would someone with little or no background in Heidegger understand this? What does the truth have to do with this?

he leaves us with only questions and a promise for answers in a division III which was never produced. — Joshs

Why?

“In Being and Time, Being is not something other than time: "Time" is a preliminary name for the truth of Being, and this truth is what prevails as essential in Being and thus is Being itself.”(What is Metaphysics) — Joshs

What does it mean for time to be the preliminary name for the truth of Being?

Do you have to be a good person to be a good philosopher? — Arne

That depends on what you take the practice of philosophy to be about.

We need to look not only as what is said but at what isn't said, that is, what is neglected.

The Socratic philosopher's concern is first and foremost the human things, the inquiry into the just, the beautiful or noble, and the good.

Heidegger's concern is first and foremost Being.

The world is running low on reasons not to read, not to think. Let's burn some books for Jesus and Apple Pie, boys ! — plaque flag

When I taught Introduction to Philosophy I would sometimes use Time and Being. What did not change from semester to semester was the use of primary texts and a degree of close reading appropriate to introductory level courses. I did not bring up his Nazi affiliation.

I think a case was made, which goes something like this: — Joshs

It was not made here. Let's put aside the problem of Nazism for a moment. The issue is his treatment of history, of es gibt, of an uncritical acceptance of "what is given to thought", and his identification of Dasein with the Volk, the Blut und Boden, the blood and soil, as well as the special place of the language of the German people.

The work doesn't need me to defend it though — plaque flag

And that is fortunate. If it did it would not outlast us.

A critical reading of Heidegger is not a rejection of Heidegger. It is not an argument to not read Heidegger. Just the opposite, to read him and read him closely and carefully. It is not to sweep under the rug what is not understood as metaphor.

“Temporalizing does not mean a "succession" of the ecstasies. The future is not later than the having-been, and the having-been is not earlier than the present. “Dasein "occurs out of its future"."Da-sein, as existing, always already comes toward itself, that is, is futural in its being in general." Having-been arises from the future in such a way that the future that has-been (or better, is in the process of having-been) releases the present from itself. We call the unified phenomenon of the future that makes present in the process of having been temporality.”(Being and Time) — Joshs

@plaque flag

Earlier I asked for an explanation. I followed up with some questions intended to focus on what is at issue and what is not.

Heidegger is talking about time as it relates to Dasein and the disclosure of Being. The disclosure takes place in or through time but this is not the same as what happens day by day or in what is recorded in history books. It is not about objects in the world or what happens to me or someone else in their past.

Having been refers to the history of Being. To what was disclosed, what was hidden, and what was forgotten. Heidegger returns to the first disclosure of Being through Greek philosophy in order to think what was left unthought. Having been is not earlier than the present in for far as it is still present in order for Dasein to think what was left unthought.

Frankly, I find this kind of thing childish. — plaque flag

An evasive response. All this was discussed earlier. I won't repeat it. Heidegger sings a siren song, the dark side of Doris Day, Que sera, sera, whatever will be will be. It is the acceptance of a future that was ours to see.

Yes, I just noticed that. Before discussing the lecture let's back up a little. The question arose as to whether he was using temporal terms metaphorically. You cited the statement: Dasein is time as an example.

From a quick preliminary reading of the lecture: He is not talking about what man is but how he is. Time is dasein's way of being.

The lecture ends:

What is time? became the question: Who is time? More closely: are we ourselves time? Or closer still: am I my time? In this way I come closest to it, and if I understand the question correctly, it is then taken completely seriously. Such questioning is thus the most appropriate manner of access to and of dealing with time as in each case mine. Then Dasein would be: being questionable.

How we are to be is being questionable. Dasein's way of being is open to possibilities. In the lecture he insists on the indeterminacy of the past and the certainty of the future as death. The indeterminacy of the past means we must return to the past, for it is the way to the future.

Yes, of course. Yes, you would. — plaque flag

Yes, of course he said Dasein is time? Where?

Yes, I would ask for a reference so I could read it in context? Guilty as charged!

Is there a connection between temporality and the Nazisms? Is it not what the future brought forth? Is it not something es gibt?

Dasein is time. — plaque flag

Does he say that? Why not Being and Dasein? I would have to read it in context before saying more.

Haven't you read the guy ? — plaque flag

I have read some things, but I don't recall reading anything that would make me think he was talking metaphorically.

Just to be clear, Heidegger and my creative misreading are both using temporal terms with different intensities of metaphoricity. — plaque flag

I don't see how a deliberate misreading can make anything clear. Does he use temporal terms metaphorically?

You are leaving out the autonomy project. — plaque flag

How does this fit with the past governing our self-interpretation?

.

There is a direct connection between his concept of time and his acceptance of Nazism and its atrocities. He called it "hearkening to Being".

In Joshs explanation he is talking about objects determining each other.

You say:

What we have been is also the very language and conceptuality which we 'are' by default ... — plaque flag

In what sense is what I have been the language and conceptuality I am? If I was dropped on my head as a baby is what happened language and conceptuality? If was neglected and malnourished and ate lead paint how is that language and conceptuality?

and which we must use (there are no other tools) in order to critique this past itself, — plaque flag

If this was my past then I would not have this tool. My ability to develop language would not have developed. And yet, without being able to critique my past I would still have a past.

this past that leaps ahead, governing our self-interpretation today and what is possible for us tomorrow. — plaque flag

I think this happens to some degree but what was need not determine what we will be. If our past governs our self-interpretation then what is to be gained by trying to educate and improve ourselves?

How is this physically possible?

The future is not later than the having-been, and the having-been is not earlier than the present. — Joshs

In what way is what happened 1,000 years ago not prior to what will happen 1,000 years from now?

How close together in time do the ecstasies have to be for the present to influence the past?

In what way is an object that was affected by what now is?

To tell you the truth I was a bit disappointed that there was not more response at that time.

The link brings you to my first post. I trust you will be able to look passed the noise, but after that settled down there were some questions that were helpful.

The project known as humanism is that of us becoming gods. — plaque flag

According to Genesis we are already gods, although that was not the intention and not a task we were ready to take on. A responsibility that god took from us when it became clear that nothing man set out to do would be impossible for them (Genesis 11). What was stolen from them was stolen back by the thinkers of Enlightenment Humanism and the goal of a universal language.

Can you explain this in your own words?

DJ Grab 'em by the Pussy, who constantly seeks to have legal matter decided in the court of public opinion, now seeks to have a trail against him for rape postponed because of pretrial publicity. Of course he has for years publicly addressed the allegation by E. Jean Carroll but what is different, according to his lawyers, is the “deluge of prejudicial media coverage”. What prejudicial media coverage? Coverage of the indictment against him by the Manhattan DA.

In Dennett's view, scientific method must be truly universal in scope - whatever can't be included in it, is either not worth knowing about, or unknowable. Notice that this basically assumes that science is capable of being all-knowing - the literal meaning of 'omniscient' - in respect of human nature. — Wayfarer

I don't read it that way. He asks:

Can the standard methods be extended in such a way as to do justice to the phenomena of human consciousness? Or do we have to find some quite radical or revolutionary alternative science? — Daniel Dennett, Who's on First?

As to the first question, I see no reason to curtail research working toward that end. As to the second, it asks what we would have to abandon to make way for this alternative.

Whether or not the standard methods of science will do justice to the phenomena of human consciousness is not something we are in a position to know. Perhaps Dennett overestimates what science is capable of, perhaps you underestimate. Either way, I see no good reason not to continue with scientific inquiry.

I fully endorse and 'live within,' the 'my world that IS mine alone,' as you depict it in the above quote BUT it is not solipsistic! — universeness

This is Wittgenstein's term.

There are other worlds/universe's, currently, over 8 billion of them and I can join in common cause with as many of them as possible. — universeness

He came to see this. In the Tractatus he regarded language as transcendental, determined by the logical scaffolding that supported both language and the facts of the world. He later rejected this notion and came to see language as social and about more than facts.

All of these in whose eyes though ? — plaque flag

And their eyes were opened and they became like one of us.

Some years ago I participated in a discussion of the Tractatus. I ended up going through a lot of it, making connections. Not quite the annotated work you asked about but it might held give you a better idea of where he is going as he moves through the text.