Yes, I just noticed that. Before discussing the lecture let's back up a little. The question arose as to whether he was using temporal terms metaphorically. You cited the statement: Dasein is time as an example.

From a quick preliminary reading of the lecture: He is not talking about what man is but how he is. Time is dasein's way of being.

The lecture ends:

What is time? became the question: Who is time? More closely: are we ourselves time? Or closer still: am I my time? In this way I come closest to it, and if I understand the question correctly, it is then taken completely seriously. Such questioning is thus the most appropriate manner of access to and of dealing with time as in each case mine. Then Dasein would be: being questionable.

How we are to be is being questionable. Dasein's way of being is open to possibilities. In the lecture he insists on the indeterminacy of the past and the certainty of the future as death. The indeterminacy of the past means we must return to the past, for it is the way to the future.

Yes, of course. Yes, you would. — plaque flag

Yes, of course he said Dasein is time? Where?

Yes, I would ask for a reference so I could read it in context? Guilty as charged!

Is there a connection between temporality and the Nazisms? Is it not what the future brought forth? Is it not something es gibt?

Dasein is time. — plaque flag

Does he say that? Why not Being and Dasein? I would have to read it in context before saying more.

Haven't you read the guy ? — plaque flag

I have read some things, but I don't recall reading anything that would make me think he was talking metaphorically.

Just to be clear, Heidegger and my creative misreading are both using temporal terms with different intensities of metaphoricity. — plaque flag

I don't see how a deliberate misreading can make anything clear. Does he use temporal terms metaphorically?

You are leaving out the autonomy project. — plaque flag

How does this fit with the past governing our self-interpretation?

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There is a direct connection between his concept of time and his acceptance of Nazism and its atrocities. He called it "hearkening to Being".

In Joshs explanation he is talking about objects determining each other.

You say:

What we have been is also the very language and conceptuality which we 'are' by default ... — plaque flag

In what sense is what I have been the language and conceptuality I am? If I was dropped on my head as a baby is what happened language and conceptuality? If was neglected and malnourished and ate lead paint how is that language and conceptuality?

and which we must use (there are no other tools) in order to critique this past itself, — plaque flag

If this was my past then I would not have this tool. My ability to develop language would not have developed. And yet, without being able to critique my past I would still have a past.

this past that leaps ahead, governing our self-interpretation today and what is possible for us tomorrow. — plaque flag

I think this happens to some degree but what was need not determine what we will be. If our past governs our self-interpretation then what is to be gained by trying to educate and improve ourselves?

How is this physically possible?

The future is not later than the having-been, and the having-been is not earlier than the present. — Joshs

In what way is what happened 1,000 years ago not prior to what will happen 1,000 years from now?

How close together in time do the ecstasies have to be for the present to influence the past?

In what way is an object that was affected by what now is?

To tell you the truth I was a bit disappointed that there was not more response at that time.

The link brings you to my first post. I trust you will be able to look passed the noise, but after that settled down there were some questions that were helpful.

The project known as humanism is that of us becoming gods. — plaque flag

According to Genesis we are already gods, although that was not the intention and not a task we were ready to take on. A responsibility that god took from us when it became clear that nothing man set out to do would be impossible for them (Genesis 11). What was stolen from them was stolen back by the thinkers of Enlightenment Humanism and the goal of a universal language.

Can you explain this in your own words?

DJ Grab 'em by the Pussy, who constantly seeks to have legal matter decided in the court of public opinion, now seeks to have a trail against him for rape postponed because of pretrial publicity. Of course he has for years publicly addressed the allegation by E. Jean Carroll but what is different, according to his lawyers, is the “deluge of prejudicial media coverage”. What prejudicial media coverage? Coverage of the indictment against him by the Manhattan DA.

In Dennett's view, scientific method must be truly universal in scope - whatever can't be included in it, is either not worth knowing about, or unknowable. Notice that this basically assumes that science is capable of being all-knowing - the literal meaning of 'omniscient' - in respect of human nature. — Wayfarer

I don't read it that way. He asks:

Can the standard methods be extended in such a way as to do justice to the phenomena of human consciousness? Or do we have to find some quite radical or revolutionary alternative science? — Daniel Dennett, Who's on First?

As to the first question, I see no reason to curtail research working toward that end. As to the second, it asks what we would have to abandon to make way for this alternative.

Whether or not the standard methods of science will do justice to the phenomena of human consciousness is not something we are in a position to know. Perhaps Dennett overestimates what science is capable of, perhaps you underestimate. Either way, I see no good reason not to continue with scientific inquiry.

I fully endorse and 'live within,' the 'my world that IS mine alone,' as you depict it in the above quote BUT it is not solipsistic! — universeness

This is Wittgenstein's term.

There are other worlds/universe's, currently, over 8 billion of them and I can join in common cause with as many of them as possible. — universeness

He came to see this. In the Tractatus he regarded language as transcendental, determined by the logical scaffolding that supported both language and the facts of the world. He later rejected this notion and came to see language as social and about more than facts.

All of these in whose eyes though ? — plaque flag

And their eyes were opened and they became like one of us.

Some years ago I participated in a discussion of the Tractatus. I ended up going through a lot of it, making connections. Not quite the annotated work you asked about but it might held give you a better idea of where he is going as he moves through the text.

My world is a private language? — Tom Storm

Logic underlies both the facts of the world and language. Language represents states of affairs.

Why can't the man simply write clearly? Why the fucking riddles and bloody obtuse prose style? — Tom Storm

It certainly seemed that way to me when I first read him. It took me a lot of time and work to see that there is a clarity to his style.

The motto attached to the Tractatus says in translation:

... and whatever a man knows, whatever is not mere rumbling and roaring that he has heard, can be said in three words.

Of course he says a lot more than three words, but like his work in architecture what he says is without ornament. In the preface he says:

The whole sense of the book might be summed up in the following words: what can be said at all can be said clearly, and what we cannot talk about we must pass over in silence.

He links what a man knows to what is heard or said. The penultimate statement of the Tractatus is:

He [that is, "anyone who understands me] must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world aright. (6.54)

What one who understands him gets from the book is a way of seeing in distinction from something said to be known.

... the gods themselves must conform to human values. — plaque flag

For Homer and Hesiod the gods were willful and capricious. Plato demoted the gods, but I think would would argue that it was not to conform to human values but to the just, the beautiful or noble, and the good. At the same time rather than conform to human values as they were shaped by the poets he sought to reform or transform human values. The Euthyphro is a key text in this regard.

This leads to Feuerbach and others grasping that the divine predicates are of course just the kinds of things we humans like, so that God is an idealized human (and a tribal god is an idolized tribe member, which would not be a human in our nowcommon global or generic sense.) — plaque flag

The question in the Euthyphro is: what is piety?

Socrates proposes that the pious is what is just. (11e) The gods as well as men are to be held to the standard of the just.

Given the role an ethical system might have on the suffering of conscious creatures can we say they are precisely the same thing? — Tom Storm

The Tractatus is a rejection of ethical systems.

This one is like trying to make sense of the Tao Te Ching. — Tom Storm

He makes a distinction between the world and my world. The world is the world of facts. He denies any values in the world of facts. (6.41)

I am my world. (The microcosm.) (5.63)

My world is solipsistic. It is mine alone. It is the world as I see it. As I experience it.

5.632:
The subject does not belong to the world but it is a limit of the world.

5.633:
Where in the world is a metaphysical subject to be noted?
You say that this case is altogether like that of the eye and the field of sight. But you do not really see the eye.
And from nothing in the field of sight can it be concluded that it is seen from an eye.

This explains in what sense the world becomes a completely different world. How the world of the happy man is a different one from that of the unhappy man. The facts of the world do not change, but how I experience it does. To be happy is to be in accord with the world, to not set one's will against the world.

I need to follow this up. — Tom Storm

Here are some relevant statements from the Tractatus:

6.41:
In the world everything is as it is, and everything happens as it does happen: in it no value exists—and if it did exist, it would have no value.
What makes it non-accidental cannot lie within the world, since if it did it would itself be accidental.
It must lie outside the world.

6.42:
So too it is impossible for there to be propositions of ethics.
Propositions can express nothing that is higher.

6.421:
It is clear that ethics cannot be put into words.
Ethics is transcendental.
(Ethics and aesthetics are one and the same.)

6.422:
There must indeed be some kind of ethical reward and ethical punishment, but they must reside in the action itself.
(And it is also clear that the reward must be something pleasant and the punishment something unpleasant.)

6.43:
If the good or bad exercise of the will does alter the world, it can alter only the limits of the
world, not the facts—not what can be expressed by means of language.
In short the effect must be that it becomes an altogether different world. It must, so to
speak, wax and wane as a whole.
The world of the happy man is a different one from that of the unhappy man.

There seem to be two different definitions of definitions at play. The first is a matter of making clear what one means by a term. The second is to set the boundaries of a concept. Roughly, the first tells us what someone means when she says "X". The second tells us what "X" is. It is often the case that on the road from the former to the latter we hit a road block, an aporia.

I remember once talking to an emeritus professor of religion and Nietzsche came up. — Tom Storm

Once for exams I had to defend Nietzsche in front of a bunch of Jesuit priests at Boston College. It was a long time ago. I don't recall what I said, but they seemed satisfied or maybe just placated. To my advantage, they are the bad boy trouble makers of the Catholic Church. I think I probably argued along the lines of seeing his attack on Christianity as something for Christian critical self-examination.

Descartes is up next on my re-read list, so once I finish that I may be able to answer some of the questions you pose. — Manuel

It has been a while since there has been a thread on Descartes. Looking forward to hearing what you have to say. What will you be reading?

Can those immersed in the philosophical tradition tell me if aesthetic reasoning is used to justify positions on morality and meaning? — Tom Storm

In the Tractatus Wittgenstein treated morality as an aesthetic rather than intellectual matter. A matter of what one sees and experiences, of how one stands in relation to the world.

it is kind of nebulous — Manuel

I think it is important to consider Descartes' rhetoric. He uses the terms 'I', soul, and self interchangeably.

As he explicitly states, Descartes removes himself from the world for the purpose of his Meditations.

The "I" is a mark of mind ... — Manuel

As I understand him, it is not a mark but the thing that thinks. The 'I' asserts itself. Claims its place and authority.

The issue for me is, was he aware, maybe inexplicitly, that the self is a creation of the mind ... — Manuel

Does he make this distinction between self and mind?

The "I" is a construct, I am re-reading Descartes soon, but I believe he was aware of this. — Manuel

The 'I' is the usurper of the Church's authority. The 'I' is the thing that thinks, that reasons, that chooses, that decides, and wills.
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In Socrates' defense he was not looking for definitions but accounts, and this for the sake of inquiry.

For example, in Plato's Republic Socrates defines justice as minding your own business. A deeply ironic definition.

We all have some sense of what justice means. What Socrates is asking is that we go further. The problem is not resolved by definition. Whatever definition is proposed we can always ask whether this is what justice is? Does this determine what is and is not just in a particular case?

Don't try to bring science in the woo woo land of your definitions sir. — Nickolasgaspar

I know that Gaspar has been banned, but I would like to point out that I have not provided any definitions. My point is simple: there is no consensus on any definition, including his own.

This does not mean I endorse "woo". I am agnostic, but I suspect that whatever progress is made it will be through the study of living organisms.

Here is Gaspar's definition:

Again, when a definition is based on the description of the phenomenon...there is consensus. i.e. "Consciousness is an arousal and awareness of environment and self, which is achieved through action of the ascending reticular activating system" this is a description based on what we can objectively verify as the phenomenon to be conscious. — Nickolasgaspar

Note how he slips from a phenomenal description to a causal theory.

Gaspar points to Mark Solms as an authority. This is what Solms says in a podcast about the reticular activating system and consciousness.

If it is present there is good reason to believe the creature is conscious, but:

not only is it possible through convergent evolution that there may be some other mechanism other than the reticular activating system which also makes a creature capable of consciousness. Not only is it possible and plausible its even more so possible and plausible that there is some sort of proto reticular activating system, some sort of primordial arrangement that precedes the evolution of the reticular activating system which may have given rise to some form of proto consciousness interestingly in the mammalian brain stem and the vertebrate brain stem.
...
There may also be entirely different arrangements ... the nervous system of the octopus ...

I constantly post the link of the definition I use so you have no excuse — Nickolasgaspar

Once again, there is no consensus on the definition of the terms. Without such consensus the claim remains ambiguous.

It is ironic that you say:

trying to hide behind vague and undefined terms — Nickolasgaspar

when you make claims about these undefined terms. Giving a definition does not settle anything.

Don't take my word for it. Anil Seth says:

Despite a revival in the scientific study of consciousness over recent decades, the only real consensus so far is that there is still no consensus.

Is he wrong? If some neuroscientists say that consciousness is X and others Y and still others Z, how are we to evaluate your claim? It is not the case that consciousness is what you define it to be because you have defined it that way. What it is remains ambiguous.

I have posted many times a specific scientific definition of the term. — Nickolasgaspar

First of all, it is two terms. Second, your posting a definition of one of them, even a scientific definition, does not mean that the terms are not ambiguous. Contrary to what you may believe, there is no widespread scientific agreement as to what either consciousness or the self is. No consensus on a scientific definition of consciousness and no scientific definition of the self.

I think this overstates the case. The first quoted passage seems to argue against your claim. There are two parts, where we begin and where we aim to end:

In philosophy one must not imitate mathematics by starting from a definition ...

... In a word, in philosophy the definition, as involving rigorous distinctness, must con­clude rather than begin the work. — Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B758

If the definition concludes the work then surely it has a place.

Our consciousness is the author of our self. — Nickolasgaspar

Claiming the one conceptually ambiguous concept is the author of another conceptually ambiguous concept gets us nowhere, and fast.

Pistis - trust. On the divided line is trust in 'things' around us.

Noesis - knowledge of things that are as they are.

Doxa - opinion or belief. It does not appear on the divided line.

"Then it will be acceptable," I said, "just as before, to call the first part knowledge, the second thought [Dianoia], the third trust, and the fourth imagination; and the latter two taken together, opinion, and the former two, intellection. And opinion has to do with coming into being and intellection with being; and as being is to coming into being, so is intellection to opinion; and as intellection is to opinion, so is knowledge to trust and thought to imagination ..."

(Republic (533e -534a)

The will of God means either the will of man vested by man with absolute authority, or what happens beyond our ability to comprehend, as in the story of Job.

Dude, psychologising Plato is a big ask — unenlightened

It is not a matter of psychologising but contextualizing. The Republic is a political dialogue. Politics of the soul and politics of the city. In both there is the importance of education.

"Next, then," I said, "make an image of our nature in its education and want of education, likening it to a condition of the following kind. See human beings as though they were in an underground cavelike dwelling ..."

(514a)

Images play a central role in this image of our education. The images on the cave wall are shadows of puppets. What the cave dwellers see are the images created by the puppet masters. They are the poets, the makers (the Greek poiesis means to make) of images. The poets were the educators. Through their images of gods and men, they were teachers of what is just and noble and good.

The Greek term for Form is eidos. It is transliterated in English as idea. Eidos also means the shape or look of something, what something looks like. The poets or image makers give us our ideas of what it looks like to be just or noble or good.

Plato too is an image maker. A poet in competition with the others to shape the images we see, that is, to shape our opinions. With his play of images the Forms play another role. The philosopher seeks to know not simply what something looks like but what it is. This is the escape from the cave of opinion.

The image of knowledge of the just itself, the beautiful itself, and the good itself, remains just that, an image. Something to aspire to. We do not escape the world of opinion but we can be aware of the opinion makers and that we live in a world of opinion. We can discuss what things look like to us and why this opinion is better than that without mistaking our opinions for truth and knowledge.

Why do you think he does that? In other dialogues he says something different.