I don't think we have any common ground from which to proceed, so vaya con dios! — frank

The common ground is Plato's texts. Something you have avoided citing. The real problem seems not to be that there is no common ground but that the dialogues do not give you grounds to support your claims.

since it's about the Soul, — frank

As quoted above, the argument is about "all things which come to be". If the soul comes to be then the soul perishes. If all things that come to be come from their opposite then what is the opposite of soul that it comes to be from?

I don't know what you're asking. — frank

You told me you would tell me how you have always done it:

Yes. And then there's my all time favorite Platonic argument: the Cyclic Argument, which shows that there can be no "bigger" without the preceding "smaller".

So tell me how you resolve this, and I'll tell you how I've always done it. — frank

... take all animals and all plants into account, and, in short, for all things which come to be, let us see whether they come to be in this way, that is, from their opposites ... Let us examine whether those that have an opposite must necessarily come to be from their opposite and from nowhere else, as for example when something comes to be larger it must necessarily becomelarger from having been smaller before. [emphasis added] (70e)

I'll tell you how I've always done it. — frank

Your turn

But the suggestion is not that we arrive at the idea of equality by seeing empirical objects of equal size, because empirical objects are not absolute, which the idea of equality is. — Wayfarer

Right. But as I said, I don't find the argument persuasive. The question is whether we would see things as equal if we did not have the idea (eidos, Form) of equality. According to the Divided Line mathematical knowledge of geometric figures comes from making images of them. These imperfect images give us adequate if imperfect knowledge of what a circle or square is. The point is made that they do not have knowledge of the circle itself and the square itself. It is eikasia and dianoia, images and reason, from which mathematical knowledge is derived.

Physical things.

The argument refers to things not Forms. What is bigger comes from what is smaller.

From the Phaedo:

Now it seems to me that not only Bigness itself is never willing to be big and small at the same time, but also that the bigness in us will never admit the small or be overcome, but one of two things happens: either it flees and retreats whenever its opposite, the Small, approaches, or it is destroyed by its approach. (102 d-e)

I suggest you're not finding it persuasive for the reason that the empirical philosophers always give in such instances - that it is derived from experience. The counter to that is that we already have to have the conception of Equals to arrive at such judgements. — Wayfarer

The argument is that equal things remind us of "the equal itself". That we get knowledge of the equal from things:

Whence did we derive the knowledge of it? Is it not from the things we were just speaking of? Did we not, by seeing equal pieces of wood or stones or other things, derive from them a knowledge of abstract equality, which is another thing? (74b)

Rather than looking at it in terms of empiricism, I look at it in terms of practice. A carpenter determines that two boards are of equal length. If they are not then one will either not fit or be too loose. A merchant puts things on a scale. They are of equal weight or not. They either balance or not. Rather than thinking of it in terms of equality they might be thought of in terms of bigger and smaller or the same.

In accord with the argument from recollection we are reminded of the Forms Bigger and Smaller or Same and Different. The problem is that if each Form is one, singular and distinct, then we must confront the problem of dyads. Bigger is unintelligible without smaller, same is not intelligible without different. So too, equal cannot be separated from unequal.

But underlying its emergence is a much more significant switch: from using Plato as a source of ideas to think with to treating him as an object of study. — Christopher Rowe

My reading of Plato is informed by the idea of the reader as active participant, to think along with what is said, to take into consideration who he is talking to as well as the setting or circumstances, to raise objections, to work out implications, in a word, to think.

We should take seriously the fact that Plato is only mentioned in a few places in the dialogues and never speaks. We should not be too quick to assume that what Socrates or anyone else says represents Plato's own opinion. He is intentionally once removed. In the Phaedo it is reported that Plato was absent. The thoughtful reader will consider the significance of this.

There was some discussion of Equals

[Added]

I don't find the argument persuasive. Socrates says he is not talking about one thing being equal to another (74a), but I think that is where we get the idea from. We can see that one thing is larger than or more than another. The less the difference the closer they come to being equal.

This is a good overview.

Sure frank. You claim that my interpretation is a brand of neoplatonism, but when you cannot support that claim you say it is a moot point. If it is a moot point then why make the claim?

I think it odd that you think that in offering an interpretation I must "admit" that it is an interpretation. What else could it be? What does the qualification "personal" mean here?

What is at issue in interpreting Plato, for reasons I cited above, is how closely the interpretation tracks to the text. How well it makes sense of the particulars and fits them together to form the whole. Whether one comes to a better understanding of what Plato is saying. Whether it helps you see things that went unnoticed. Whether the interpretation helps you see it in a new light,

But, it should go without saying, this is not the only way to interpret a text or even a Platonic text.

That's the point I was making. — frank

You have made one point that I agree with:

Let's drop it, now — frank

And one that I partially agree with:

... we've [you've] derailed the thread long enough [much too long] — frank

This makes no sense. You claimed that my interpretation is a brand of neoplatonism. You have not been able to make an argument in defense of that claim. Now you claim it's a moot point. It is not a moot point, unless by moot you mean nonsense.

But any novel interpretation could be labeled "a brand of neoplatonism.". — frank

You could label it this way, but who else labels it this way? Unless you can cite this as established usage by historians it means no more than that you can label anything any way you want.

An academic approach to Plato would not settle in any one interpretation, but would just explain what we know about the times and the various ways Plato has been interpreted since. — frank

An essential part of contemporary Plato scholarship includes not only how he has been interpreted but how he is being interpreted. Arguments are made in favor or against various interpretive claims but nothing is settled.

Contrary to anything being settled I have repeatedly pointed to the indeterminacy, the openendness, the aporia of Plato's work.

Your approach to Plato is like the theological approach where you're using your own intuitions to guide you in arriving at a meaning. In particular, this is a Protestant approach. — frank

I do not use intuitions, I investigate hunches and possibilities to see whether they are supported by the text and help make sense of it. If they don't I try something else to help me make sense of the text. There is nothing "theological" or "Protestant" about this approach.

But I'm sure you agree that each of us needs to be honest and say, "This is my interpretation." — frank

Again you raise the issue of honesty. Why? Of course my interpretation is my interpretation!

In the Phaedrus Socrates compares the well written work to a living animal with each part having a function working together to form a whole. This tells us how a well written work should be read - as a whole, with each part having its function working together in a particular way to form that whole. On the assumption that the Platonic dialogues are well written works, Plato himself tells us how they are to be read.

So any interpretation of Plato that presents a cohesive narrative is neoplatonist?

It's any interpretation of Plato that fills in the blanks in a certain way. — frank

What is that "certain way" of filling in the blanks?

I did not take it as an insult. It is because neoplatonism is not singular that I asked what elements of neoplatonism you find in what I said.

What you've expressed is a brand of neo-platonism. That's fine, but do identify it as such. Intellectual honesty would demand that. — frank

I am surprised to hear that. What elements of neo-platonism do you find?

Is it fair to say that goodness can be understood as an expression/instantiation of unified wholeness ... — Tom Storm

In the Republic Socrates says:

The good is not the source of everything; rather it is the cause of things that are in a good way, while it is not responsible for the bad things. (379b)

Since bad things are part of the whole of what is, the Good and the Whole cannot be the same.

Why the Good cannot be known

Thanks Tom. Good to hear. I put a lot of time and effort in and sometimes wonder if anyone is even reading.

For anyone that might be interested, the post is mostly excerpts from a few different forum threads I started.that provide greater textual analysis and support.

Socratic Philosophy

Plato's Metaphysics

Timaeus

Phaedo

The Forms are said to be the things themselves of which things in the visible world are images, but what do we know of Forms beyond what we are told? Have any of us seen the Forms themselves with the mind itself, or do we only imagine what they might be? In none of the dialogues is there anyone who has seen the Forms and is able to give an account of their experience, There are only questionable stories of what we see when we are dead.

In the Phaedo Socrates calls the hypothesis of Forms “safe and ignorant” (105c). In addition to the Forms, he later recognizes the necessity of admitting physical causes such as fire and fever (105c). As to the causal relationship between Forms and sensible things, he says:

I simply, naively and perhaps foolishly cling to this, that nothing else makes it beautiful other than the presence of, or the sharing in, or however you may describe its relationship to that Beautiful we mentioned, for I will not insist on the precise nature of the relationship, but that all beautiful things are beautiful by the Beautiful. (100e)

In the Philebus Plato introduces what Aristotle refers to as the indeterminate dyad, the limited (peras) and unlimited (apieron). Contrary to the fixed, unchanging nature of the Forms, indeterminacy is an ineliminable element of Plato’s metaphysics.

Plato’s metaphysics is not systematic. It is problematic. It raises questions it cannot answer and problems that cannot be resolved. It is important to understand that this is a feature not a defect or failure.

Plato’s concern is the Whole. Forms are not the Whole. Knowledge of the Forms is not knowledge of the whole.

These dyads include:

Limited and Unlimited

Same and Other

One and Many

Rest and Change

Eternity and Time

Good and Bad

Thinking and Being

Being and Non-being

Each side stands both together with and apart from the other. There is not one without the other.

Ultimately, there is neither ‘this or that’ but ‘this and that’. The Whole is not reducible to One. The whole is indeterminate.

And yet we do separate this from that. Thinking and saying are dependent on making such distinctions.

We informally divide things into kinds. Forms are kinds.

Forms are both same and other. Each Form is itself both other than the things of that Form, and other than the other Forms.

The Forms are each said to be one, but the Forms and things of that Form are an indeterminate dyad, one and many.

The indeterminate dyad raises problems for the individuality and separability of Forms. There is no “Same itself” without the “Other itself”, the two Forms are both separable and inseparable.

Socrates likens the Forms to originals or paradigms, and things of the world to images or copies. This raises several problems about the relation between Forms and particulars, the methexis problem. Socrates is well aware of the problem and admits that he cannot give an account of how particulars participate in Forms.

Things are not simply images of Forms. It is not just that the image is distorted or imperfect. Change, multiplicity and the unlimited are not contained in unchanging Forms.

The unity of Forms is subsumed under the Good. But Socrates also says that the Good is not responsible for the bad things. (Republic 379b)

The Whole is by nature both good and bad.

The indeterminate dyad Thinking and Being means that Plato’s ontology is inseparable from his epistemology.

Plato’s ontology must remain radically incomplete, limited to but not constrained by what is thought.

The limits of what can be thought and said are not the limits of Being.

The Timaeus introduces three kinds:

… that which comes to be, that in which it comes to be, and that from which what comes to be sprouts as something copied. And what’s more, it’s fitting to liken the receiver to a mother , the ‘from which’ to a father, and the nature between these to an offspring (50d).

Like intelligible things, the chora always is. But unlike intelligible things, it is changeable. (52a) Unlike sensible things it does not perish. Befitting its indeterminacy, the chora does not yield to simple definition.

Metaphysics for Plato was speculative and contemplative play, a form of poiesis, the making of images of the whole and parts. Without knowledge of beginnings that are forever lost to us he is saying that we cannot take any of this too seriously as true accounts. But that is not to say that we should not take such play seriously.

It may appear as though the Timaeus is a departure for Plato, but it is consistent with Socratic skepticism. An indeterminate world, one where chance and contingency play a role, is a world that cannot be known. An indeterminate world of chance and contingency is one where the unknowable, the mystical dimension of life, is not flattened and destroyed.

The idea that my soul can attain divine knowledge ... — introbert

In the Phaedo Socrates calls Forms hypothesis. In the dialectic of the Republic too the Forms are hypothetical, and remain so unless or until one is able to free themself from hypothesis. In the dialogue Socrates is clear in stating that he has not done so.

In none of the dialogues do we find someone who has attained divine knowledge. Philosophy is, according to the Symposium, the desire for wisdom. The philosophers in the Republic, who rule because they are divinely wise, are shadows on the cave wall. The Forms too, images on the cave wall. Irony indeed!

First off, you need to learn the difference between language meaning and language use. — Zettel

Where do you imagine the meaning of words comes from if not the use of words?

if you disagree with my given definition of "knowledge", you need only take issue and offer opposing reasoned argument or evidence. — Zettel

Are you really unaware that this is what I have been doing?

I have already stated who I recognize as a philosopher. — Zettel

You recognize Wittgenstein as a philosopher and yet you seem unaware of what he says about meaning and use. In addition you seem unaware that both the early and later Wittgenstein rejected the idea that philosophy is about:

... that which is empirically verified. — Zettel

Contrary to what is empirically verified he says:

Man has to awaken to wonder - and so perhaps do peoples. Science is a way of sending him to sleep again.(Culture and Value)

Working in philosophy -- like work in architecture in many respects -- is really more work on oneself. On one's own conception. On how one sees things. (And what one expects of them.) (CV, 24)

His concern is not with knowledge of the world but with oneself, on seeing, most importantly with seeing aspects and aspect blindness. It is not about an awareness of what is but rather on how one sees what is. Aesthetics remains a central concern. It is not theoretical but experiential.

As he says:

… our investigation is directed not towards phenomena, but rather, as one might say, towards the ‘possibilities’ of phenomena. (PI 90)

Your etymological shift says nothing as regards my OP or any point made. — Zettel

The etymological shift was yours:

Etymologically, "love" at time and context of ancient Greek philosophy meant "regard" or "appreciation". — Zettel

If "knowledge" is anything other or more than "awareness of what is", you need only say so and why. — Zettel

To determine the meaning of a term we should attend to its use. Put differently , in order to gain knowledge of what knowledge is, we must have an awareness of the use of the term. But you have ignored what knowledge is except in so far as it supports your claims. Contrary to the concerns and interests of philosophers for over two thousand years, you claim that:

philosophy deals only with knowledge of the world, not with self-knowledge, — Zettel

Perhaps some traction might be gained by you telling us who you do recognize as philosophers.

by knowledge I mean awareness of "what is" — Zettel

What you mean by knowledge is not the same as what the term has meant throughout its history. The same goes for the terms philosophy and wisdom.

Etymologically, "love" at time and context of ancient Greek philosophy meant "regard" or "appreciation". — Zettel

According to Liddell-Scott φίλος(philos) means loved, beloved, dear.

It is odd that you reject the way the term philosophy was actually used at time and context of ancient Greek philosophy while appealing to a questionable alleged etymology of φίλος. It is also odd that you neglect the other half of the term, that is, σοφῶς (sophos).

philosophy deals only with knowledge of the world, not with self-knowledge — Zettel

This is by your own lights:

more unsupported sentiment in lieu of reasoned counter. — Zettel

If Plato's writings count as philosophy then it is evident that philosophy deals with self-knowledge.

Please explain how metaphysics is philosophy when philosophy means "love of wisdom" — Zettel

What does love of wisdom mean? Can you provide an answer that is more than unsupported sentiment?

Are metaphysical doctrines such as aesthetics and ethics really "branches" of philosophy ... — Zettel

Aesthetics and ethics and doctrines about aesthetics and ethics are not the same. A way of looking and seeing, and a way of being or living are experiential not discussive.

Wisdom requires knowledge — Zettel

By knowledge I take it you mean what is:

ponderable, falsifiable, empirically verifiable — Zettel

This is an aspect of knowledge. It does not cover such things as self-knowledge. Knowledge and knowledge claims are not the same. There are aspects of knowledge that are experiential not discussive.

It does not follow from the claim that metaphysics is not knowledge that metaphysics is not philosophy. Love of wisdom and love of knowledge are not the same.

I know you don't believe in an information-dystopia, but you described its workings beautifully. — god must be atheist

I do recognize that there is a problem. I also agree that this is not a new problem. A troubling new development, however, is "deep fakes". This technology raised serious questions about the reliability of recorded evidence.

What I got from your post that is of concern to me is that attaining that truth via information by the media is an epistemological nightmare. Did you not say that, too? — god must be atheist

I am not arguing in favor of a skeptical nightmare. What I am arguing is that more information is not the solution to misinformation because that additional information too may be misinformation. What is needed is more reliable information, more factual information.

it doesn't seem to have held anyone back yet. — Isaac

The issue under discussion is whether there should be deterrents. The effectiveness of deterrents remains to be seen.

What different system do you imagine can be put in place to establish the falsity of a claim before it is published (and the damage done)? — Isaac

Legal action cannot undo what has been done but when sources are held legally responsible and fines significant then they will be more cautious and diligent in establishing the truth of their accusations and allegations.

Presupposing that man is fallible leads me to conclude that he should not have the power to determine and enforce what only the infallible ever could. — NOS4A2

Fox News is being sued for false allegations against Dominion Voting Systems. The power to determine that they repeatedly and knowingly lied does not require infallibility. Freedom of speech in an inadequate defense. The damage has been done but something can be done to curtail future abuses. But perhaps you regard this as an abuse of power, that Fox should be free to deceive the public with impunity.

I think yours is an unassailable opinion — god must be atheist

It pleases me that you think my opinion is unassailable, so I am somewhat reluctant to say that what you attribute to me is not my opinion. My point is that the truth is a standard that must be protected. Absolute freedom of speech does not protect truth and may threaten it.

My point is that it is unjust and illogical to deny the right to to receive and impart information to all people at all times when only some people at some times are prone to accept it. — NOS4A2

Do you accept that not all "information" is fact based? What if such "information" is used to falsely and unjustly accuse a group of people, thus leading to exclusion or persecution of those people?

For this we need more information, more data, more debate, more education, more transparency, not less of it. — NOS4A2

You offer up education as part of the solution, but it is often part of the problem. Formal education is :

a group of people to tell them what is true or false — NOS4A2

More often than not, led by a government or church. Education is often used to perpetuate prejudices. It is a form of censorship. It is a point of contention as to who decides what is and is not to be taught.

More data is not helpful when we are already confronted with more data that we can process and evaluate. When the data provided includes a preponderance of lies and falsehoods we don't need more data but more data that is correct and much less that is not.

Corporations are a main source of information, but as a corporate entity some news sources are far more concerned with profit and power than with truth. But we must rely on these sources. To say that people need to figure it out for themselves is to kick the can down the road. Most people rely on a limited number of sources for information. While they bear some responsibility for how well they are informed, the sources of provide the news also bear some responsibility for correctly informing their viewers.

I am pistically atheist and epistemically agnostic. Lacking knowledge I make no claims about gods but I am not uncertain in terms of what I believe and how I live.