It's any interpretation of Plato that fills in the blanks in a certain way. — frank

What is that "certain way" of filling in the blanks?

I did not take it as an insult. It is because neoplatonism is not singular that I asked what elements of neoplatonism you find in what I said.

What you've expressed is a brand of neo-platonism. That's fine, but do identify it as such. Intellectual honesty would demand that. — frank

I am surprised to hear that. What elements of neo-platonism do you find?

Is it fair to say that goodness can be understood as an expression/instantiation of unified wholeness ... — Tom Storm

In the Republic Socrates says:

The good is not the source of everything; rather it is the cause of things that are in a good way, while it is not responsible for the bad things. (379b)

Since bad things are part of the whole of what is, the Good and the Whole cannot be the same.

Why the Good cannot be known

Thanks Tom. Good to hear. I put a lot of time and effort in and sometimes wonder if anyone is even reading.

For anyone that might be interested, the post is mostly excerpts from a few different forum threads I started.that provide greater textual analysis and support.

Socratic Philosophy

Plato's Metaphysics

Timaeus

Phaedo

The Forms are said to be the things themselves of which things in the visible world are images, but what do we know of Forms beyond what we are told? Have any of us seen the Forms themselves with the mind itself, or do we only imagine what they might be? In none of the dialogues is there anyone who has seen the Forms and is able to give an account of their experience, There are only questionable stories of what we see when we are dead.

In the Phaedo Socrates calls the hypothesis of Forms “safe and ignorant” (105c). In addition to the Forms, he later recognizes the necessity of admitting physical causes such as fire and fever (105c). As to the causal relationship between Forms and sensible things, he says:

I simply, naively and perhaps foolishly cling to this, that nothing else makes it beautiful other than the presence of, or the sharing in, or however you may describe its relationship to that Beautiful we mentioned, for I will not insist on the precise nature of the relationship, but that all beautiful things are beautiful by the Beautiful. (100e)

In the Philebus Plato introduces what Aristotle refers to as the indeterminate dyad, the limited (peras) and unlimited (apieron). Contrary to the fixed, unchanging nature of the Forms, indeterminacy is an ineliminable element of Plato’s metaphysics.

Plato’s metaphysics is not systematic. It is problematic. It raises questions it cannot answer and problems that cannot be resolved. It is important to understand that this is a feature not a defect or failure.

Plato’s concern is the Whole. Forms are not the Whole. Knowledge of the Forms is not knowledge of the whole.

These dyads include:

Limited and Unlimited

Same and Other

One and Many

Rest and Change

Eternity and Time

Good and Bad

Thinking and Being

Being and Non-being

Each side stands both together with and apart from the other. There is not one without the other.

Ultimately, there is neither ‘this or that’ but ‘this and that’. The Whole is not reducible to One. The whole is indeterminate.

And yet we do separate this from that. Thinking and saying are dependent on making such distinctions.

We informally divide things into kinds. Forms are kinds.

Forms are both same and other. Each Form is itself both other than the things of that Form, and other than the other Forms.

The Forms are each said to be one, but the Forms and things of that Form are an indeterminate dyad, one and many.

The indeterminate dyad raises problems for the individuality and separability of Forms. There is no “Same itself” without the “Other itself”, the two Forms are both separable and inseparable.

Socrates likens the Forms to originals or paradigms, and things of the world to images or copies. This raises several problems about the relation between Forms and particulars, the methexis problem. Socrates is well aware of the problem and admits that he cannot give an account of how particulars participate in Forms.

Things are not simply images of Forms. It is not just that the image is distorted or imperfect. Change, multiplicity and the unlimited are not contained in unchanging Forms.

The unity of Forms is subsumed under the Good. But Socrates also says that the Good is not responsible for the bad things. (Republic 379b)

The Whole is by nature both good and bad.

The indeterminate dyad Thinking and Being means that Plato’s ontology is inseparable from his epistemology.

Plato’s ontology must remain radically incomplete, limited to but not constrained by what is thought.

The limits of what can be thought and said are not the limits of Being.

The Timaeus introduces three kinds:

… that which comes to be, that in which it comes to be, and that from which what comes to be sprouts as something copied. And what’s more, it’s fitting to liken the receiver to a mother , the ‘from which’ to a father, and the nature between these to an offspring (50d).

Like intelligible things, the chora always is. But unlike intelligible things, it is changeable. (52a) Unlike sensible things it does not perish. Befitting its indeterminacy, the chora does not yield to simple definition.

Metaphysics for Plato was speculative and contemplative play, a form of poiesis, the making of images of the whole and parts. Without knowledge of beginnings that are forever lost to us he is saying that we cannot take any of this too seriously as true accounts. But that is not to say that we should not take such play seriously.

It may appear as though the Timaeus is a departure for Plato, but it is consistent with Socratic skepticism. An indeterminate world, one where chance and contingency play a role, is a world that cannot be known. An indeterminate world of chance and contingency is one where the unknowable, the mystical dimension of life, is not flattened and destroyed.

The idea that my soul can attain divine knowledge ... — introbert

In the Phaedo Socrates calls Forms hypothesis. In the dialectic of the Republic too the Forms are hypothetical, and remain so unless or until one is able to free themself from hypothesis. In the dialogue Socrates is clear in stating that he has not done so.

In none of the dialogues do we find someone who has attained divine knowledge. Philosophy is, according to the Symposium, the desire for wisdom. The philosophers in the Republic, who rule because they are divinely wise, are shadows on the cave wall. The Forms too, images on the cave wall. Irony indeed!

First off, you need to learn the difference between language meaning and language use. — Zettel

Where do you imagine the meaning of words comes from if not the use of words?

if you disagree with my given definition of "knowledge", you need only take issue and offer opposing reasoned argument or evidence. — Zettel

Are you really unaware that this is what I have been doing?

I have already stated who I recognize as a philosopher. — Zettel

You recognize Wittgenstein as a philosopher and yet you seem unaware of what he says about meaning and use. In addition you seem unaware that both the early and later Wittgenstein rejected the idea that philosophy is about:

... that which is empirically verified. — Zettel

Contrary to what is empirically verified he says:

Man has to awaken to wonder - and so perhaps do peoples. Science is a way of sending him to sleep again.(Culture and Value)

Working in philosophy -- like work in architecture in many respects -- is really more work on oneself. On one's own conception. On how one sees things. (And what one expects of them.) (CV, 24)

His concern is not with knowledge of the world but with oneself, on seeing, most importantly with seeing aspects and aspect blindness. It is not about an awareness of what is but rather on how one sees what is. Aesthetics remains a central concern. It is not theoretical but experiential.

As he says:

… our investigation is directed not towards phenomena, but rather, as one might say, towards the ‘possibilities’ of phenomena. (PI 90)

Your etymological shift says nothing as regards my OP or any point made. — Zettel

The etymological shift was yours:

Etymologically, "love" at time and context of ancient Greek philosophy meant "regard" or "appreciation". — Zettel

If "knowledge" is anything other or more than "awareness of what is", you need only say so and why. — Zettel

To determine the meaning of a term we should attend to its use. Put differently , in order to gain knowledge of what knowledge is, we must have an awareness of the use of the term. But you have ignored what knowledge is except in so far as it supports your claims. Contrary to the concerns and interests of philosophers for over two thousand years, you claim that:

philosophy deals only with knowledge of the world, not with self-knowledge, — Zettel

Perhaps some traction might be gained by you telling us who you do recognize as philosophers.

by knowledge I mean awareness of "what is" — Zettel

What you mean by knowledge is not the same as what the term has meant throughout its history. The same goes for the terms philosophy and wisdom.

Etymologically, "love" at time and context of ancient Greek philosophy meant "regard" or "appreciation". — Zettel

According to Liddell-Scott φίλος(philos) means loved, beloved, dear.

It is odd that you reject the way the term philosophy was actually used at time and context of ancient Greek philosophy while appealing to a questionable alleged etymology of φίλος. It is also odd that you neglect the other half of the term, that is, σοφῶς (sophos).

philosophy deals only with knowledge of the world, not with self-knowledge — Zettel

This is by your own lights:

more unsupported sentiment in lieu of reasoned counter. — Zettel

If Plato's writings count as philosophy then it is evident that philosophy deals with self-knowledge.

Please explain how metaphysics is philosophy when philosophy means "love of wisdom" — Zettel

What does love of wisdom mean? Can you provide an answer that is more than unsupported sentiment?

Are metaphysical doctrines such as aesthetics and ethics really "branches" of philosophy ... — Zettel

Aesthetics and ethics and doctrines about aesthetics and ethics are not the same. A way of looking and seeing, and a way of being or living are experiential not discussive.

Wisdom requires knowledge — Zettel

By knowledge I take it you mean what is:

ponderable, falsifiable, empirically verifiable — Zettel

This is an aspect of knowledge. It does not cover such things as self-knowledge. Knowledge and knowledge claims are not the same. There are aspects of knowledge that are experiential not discussive.

It does not follow from the claim that metaphysics is not knowledge that metaphysics is not philosophy. Love of wisdom and love of knowledge are not the same.

I know you don't believe in an information-dystopia, but you described its workings beautifully. — god must be atheist

I do recognize that there is a problem. I also agree that this is not a new problem. A troubling new development, however, is "deep fakes". This technology raised serious questions about the reliability of recorded evidence.

What I got from your post that is of concern to me is that attaining that truth via information by the media is an epistemological nightmare. Did you not say that, too? — god must be atheist

I am not arguing in favor of a skeptical nightmare. What I am arguing is that more information is not the solution to misinformation because that additional information too may be misinformation. What is needed is more reliable information, more factual information.

it doesn't seem to have held anyone back yet. — Isaac

The issue under discussion is whether there should be deterrents. The effectiveness of deterrents remains to be seen.

What different system do you imagine can be put in place to establish the falsity of a claim before it is published (and the damage done)? — Isaac

Legal action cannot undo what has been done but when sources are held legally responsible and fines significant then they will be more cautious and diligent in establishing the truth of their accusations and allegations.

Presupposing that man is fallible leads me to conclude that he should not have the power to determine and enforce what only the infallible ever could. — NOS4A2

Fox News is being sued for false allegations against Dominion Voting Systems. The power to determine that they repeatedly and knowingly lied does not require infallibility. Freedom of speech in an inadequate defense. The damage has been done but something can be done to curtail future abuses. But perhaps you regard this as an abuse of power, that Fox should be free to deceive the public with impunity.

I think yours is an unassailable opinion — god must be atheist

It pleases me that you think my opinion is unassailable, so I am somewhat reluctant to say that what you attribute to me is not my opinion. My point is that the truth is a standard that must be protected. Absolute freedom of speech does not protect truth and may threaten it.

My point is that it is unjust and illogical to deny the right to to receive and impart information to all people at all times when only some people at some times are prone to accept it. — NOS4A2

Do you accept that not all "information" is fact based? What if such "information" is used to falsely and unjustly accuse a group of people, thus leading to exclusion or persecution of those people?

For this we need more information, more data, more debate, more education, more transparency, not less of it. — NOS4A2

You offer up education as part of the solution, but it is often part of the problem. Formal education is :

a group of people to tell them what is true or false — NOS4A2

More often than not, led by a government or church. Education is often used to perpetuate prejudices. It is a form of censorship. It is a point of contention as to who decides what is and is not to be taught.

More data is not helpful when we are already confronted with more data that we can process and evaluate. When the data provided includes a preponderance of lies and falsehoods we don't need more data but more data that is correct and much less that is not.

Corporations are a main source of information, but as a corporate entity some news sources are far more concerned with profit and power than with truth. But we must rely on these sources. To say that people need to figure it out for themselves is to kick the can down the road. Most people rely on a limited number of sources for information. While they bear some responsibility for how well they are informed, the sources of provide the news also bear some responsibility for correctly informing their viewers.

I am pistically atheist and epistemically agnostic. Lacking knowledge I make no claims about gods but I am not uncertain in terms of what I believe and how I live.

It doesn’t follow that because someone reads something he invariably accepts it. — NOS4A2

What do you hope to gain by refuting a claim I did not make? Not everyone who has watched Tucker Carlson invariably accepts whatever he says, but the fact of the matter is this that many do.

There are countless other solutions to misinformation ... — NOS4A2

Such as? Suppose the tobacco industry launched a new campaign falsely telling people that the latest and most accurate scientific research has determined that cigarettes not only do not cause any harm but that they promote good health in children and adults. Is this a matter of "State Truth"? What are just a few of the many solutions? Or do you think no solutions are necessary because free speech should be absolute?

If someone finds your personal financial and health information, should they be allowed to make it public? What about other personal information such as your viewing and purchasing habits? What if they perpetuate lies instead if that information is not interesting enough?

Do you accept everything you read? — NOS4A2

It is not a question of what I do or do not accept, but of what is widely accepted. By putting it in these terms you have demonstrated why thinking in terms only of individuals leaves a political or social blind spot

So if me arguing that everyone should have the same right as Article 19 of the UNDHR is a blind, question begging ideology ... — NOS4A2

Article 19 says nothing about deliberate misinformation. Article 29 does say:

2. In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.

If misinformation leads to people acting in a way that interferes with the rights and freedoms of others then there are limits on such speech. What is blind and a question begging ideology is not the protection of free speech but the inability to see that it must have limits. The failure to set such limits can lead directly to actions that destroy the rights and freedoms of others.

. Even the juxtaposition evident in this thread between performer and audience has a corrupting influence. — Banno

Performer and audience typically occupy different positions, separated by a stage, and subject to rules of etiquette that vary with musical style. In some cases audience participation is encouraged but in others frowned upon.

A recording, especially a studio recording, separates performer from audience. In both cases they are at a distance, but some musicians feed off the energy of the audience.

I would not go so far as to say it is a perversion, but agree with the point that the division is not essential to music, and that something is lost when the practice of music making is left to specialists. On the other hand, only specialists are capable of playing some music. With few exceptions years of dedicated study and practice are necessary to play this music competently.

Writing and making music overlaps with but is not the same thing as entertainment. There may be original music we have never heard because it lacks what is regarded as entertainment value. Making music and listening to or purchasing music are not the same.

The demand for originality is a questionable value. Authenticity can suffer from the desire for originality.

Free speech is given lip-service but rarely is it followed to its logical conclusion: free speech absolutism. — NOS4A2

An extreme conclusion without exception is not a logical conclusion.

Should deliberate misinformation be accepted? Arguing that we have or should such a "right" is a blind, question begging ideology.

I haven't yet been able to clearly see the cash value, the pragmatic upshot, the real, concrete effect that embracing or rejecting historicism would have on the discipline, including how it interacts with these supposedly marginalised views. — Welkin Rogue

What is it that one is embracing or rejecting about historicism? Schuringa's claim is that:

... it is constitutionally averse [to] an examination of the social and political forces that have shaped it.

An examination of social and political forces is not historicism.

To some extent this is already going on. For example, the expanding field of 'conceptual engineering' within analytic philosophy isn't interested in eternally true conceptual analyses, but rather in the possibility, problems and principles that should guide change in our concepts and meanings. — Welkin Rogue

What is it that characterizes this as being "within analytic philosophy"?

[Edit] If the focus on concepts is what characterise analytic philosophy then Schuringa's criticism stands. Philosophy, according to the alternatives, may involve but is not limited to conceptual analysis.

Consider a thought experiment: imagine that philosophers in the analytic tradition concluded that reason is historical. How would that change what they do? — Welkin Rogue

There are several questions that must be addressed:

What presuppositions inform the conclusion that reason is historical? Does the movement of history have a direction? Does it have a logic? Do we shape history or are we shaped by it? How one answers these and other questions about history determines how analytic philosophy might have looked.

There is also the question of who is or is not an analytic philosopher. Is the early Wittgenstein within that tradition? Given that he claimed that the most important things lie beyond the logical structure of the world, what is most important is not subject to analysis. Is the later Wittgenstein with his emphasis on forms of life and seeing aspects within that tradition or outside of it attempting to untangle the knots of confusion it ties itself in? Is Rorty's use of pragmatism and continental philosophy an expansion of or a step outside the tradition?

What bearing does the conclusion that reason is historical have on the concept of truth? Does truth remain unchanging? Do the efforts of analytic philosophy move ever closer to an approximation of truth or does the concept of truth change?

I am talking about historically embedded reason. — Welkin Rogue

Do you see this as being at odds with the history of analytical philosophy? Did Moore or Russell or Frege see it this way?

I think you mean: we shouldn't pretend that we are using such reason. — Welkin Rogue

I do not wish to quibble, but it is the concept of reason that is in question, of what philosophers understand themselves to be doing and striving for when reasoning. This, as I understand it, is the reason for the disregard for history.

I still don't know why you think any of this matters. — Welkin Rogue

It is at issue for the article you cited and for your question of whether analytic philosophy needs affirmative action.

When you talk about the mathematical model of reason, I suppose you're talking about using deductive proofs. — Welkin Rogue

This is a long topic that I can only touch on. First it should be recognized that mathematics itself underwent a radical change. Jacob Klein discusses this in "Greek Mathematical Thought and the Origins of Algebra". The change has to do with the symbolic, abstract, conceptual nature of modern mathematics. The change, as can most clearly be seen in physics, is from dealing with concrete tangible things to conceptual abstractions. With Descartes mathematical reason promises to solve for any unknown, and man, a "thinking thing" moves ever closer to perfection. Reason, properly used according to Descartes, leads to indubitable, necessary certainty.

If deductive proofs work in mathematics (e.g., geometry), then I don't see why they wouldn't work in philosophy. — Welkin Rogue

What are the necessary truths in philosophy derived from deductive proofs?

I don't really care about labels here. — Welkin Rogue

If we ignore the labels your proposal seems to be that more diversity is needed in philosophy. But this is quite different than saying more diversity is needed in analytic philosophy.

(3) analytic philosophy is anti-historicist for historical reasons... — Welkin Rogue

I don't think it is anti-historicist but ahistorist, It is not analytical philosophy but its domination that is historical. The assumption that truth is timeless predates analytical philosophy. But analytic philosophy is not monolithic.

but still think that we should use the reason we have to decide which ideas to go with. — Welkin Rogue

Reason as it was understood by ancient philosophy is not the same as reason based on the modern mathematical model. Reason has not yielded the kind of agreement and certainty we find in mathematics. Yes, we should use reason, but not the timeless, abstracted, apodictic, mathematical
model of reason

How different does analytic philosophy really look if we interpret these critiques correctly... if historicism is taken seriously and even embraced? — Welkin Rogue

We run into the problem of whether the work of this or that philosopher can still be considered analytical philosophy. While I think that such labels may have some use, it is limited and ultimately counterproductive. We might argue whether someone like Rorty was simply working within and expanding analytical philosophy. How useful is it to attempt to draw clear lines between analytical, pragmatist, and continental philosophy?

My point is that we should restore the marketplace, not close it down. — Welkin Rogue

The article ends by saying:

But still, it cannot help but spew these insights back out in a strangely deformed shape: as moves in the liberal marketplace of ideas that those thinkers precisely seek to subvert and close down.

What is it that these thinkers seek to subvert and close down? As I read it, it is not the marketplace of ideas but rather the liberal marketplace, with its "self-imposed constrictions" that deform the insights of those whose philosophical work is outside the bounds of analytic philosophy.

Schuringa does not think that divergent ideas can simply be accommodated for within the framework of analytic philosophy. He points to:

... the strange convulsions that analytic philosophy is currently going through in its attempts to incorporate the insights of critical race theorists and feminists.

Rather than attempts to fit them into the mold, they call for the mold to be broken. This does not mean to put an end to an exchange of ideas but rather to break free of the idea that ideas occur in some rational space, by autonomous rational beings, in abstraction from time and place.

Like they don't understand that the job of every politician is to deceive the public. — Tzeentch

This is facile. While all statesmen are politicians not all politicians are statesmen. The job of the statesman is not to deceive, but circumstances may require deception in some form or other. This is a general remark and does not bear directly on either the case of Trump or Biden.

Tell me if I read you right... — Welkin Rogue

Schuringa is using the term liberal in the classical sense of liberalism, that is, autonomous individualism, social atomism. He argues that the dominance of analytic philosophy:

... cannot be explained by the “force of ideas” alone, but must be understood in terms of the political climate that reigned in the United States, beginning in the 1940s.

It is not as if there was a marketplace of ideas in which all are welcome to display their wares and most buyers chose analytic philosophy because they had shopped and determined that it is the best alternative. Analytic philosophy came to dominate because it was, so to speak, the only thing that was safe for sale in the marketplace.

With regard to self understanding in both the sense of human being and philosophical practice, when analytical philosophy finally began, with Rawls, to address political philosophy:

The very viability of individuals deliberating in such a power vacuum was never considered.

In other words, liberalism's understanding of individuals acting as autonomous ration agents was just assumed as established and beyond question. We are not autonomous ration beings, we are historically situated social beings.

Completeness is easy, consistency, not so much. — Banno

I think the opposite is true. In its striving for consistency analytic philosophy abstracts from the messiness of life. The idea that philosophy is a "view from nowhere" or has as its primary concern the clarification of concepts or an analysis of language, strikes me as narrow and impoverished.

As an alternative to both analytic and continental philosophy I prefer Socratic philosophy, zetetic scepticism and the examined life. Consistency exists only to the extent that life and reflection on life is consistent.

Yeah what does that mean though? I didn't get that. — Welkin Rogue

It means that the assumption that there is a free marketplace of ideas shaped by unconstrained autonomous individuals is wrong. The changes that we see are not the result of internal dialogue but of social and political pressures that exert pressure to hire "outsiders" who are accepted by some but despised by others.

It has not been my experience over a long career both inside and outside academia that members of philosophy departments are for the most part open minded. To the contrary, they stake their claim, plant their flag, and circle the horses.

Greater diversity is not the result an open exchange of ideas. Today there is a troubling increase of censorship by politicians and activists of various stripes and persuasions. Administrators call the shots and their primary interest is profit driven.

Lack of tenure track jobs plays a role as well and inflames the political infighting. When a position opens up what camp the candidate falls into is an important consideration. In addition, more and more jobs are being filled by adjuncts who have little or not control over what they teach. They don't make waves.

The liberal attitude is part of the problem. It is based on the fiction of autonomous individuals. More and more academic freedom has become a fantasy. The ivory tower is a fantasy. As Schuringa argues, analytic philosophy is not "above history and politics".

There is much to be said in response, but will limit it to a few remarks. They are not intended to argue against but to elaborate on what you said.

In contrast to the abstract nature of much of contemporary philosophy as well as Plato's own abstractions, it should be emphasized just how rooted his work is in our everyday life and concerns.

What he means by ἀνάγκης or necessity is not what we typically think of as necessity. What is by necessity is without nous or intellect. It covers such things as physical processes, contingency, chance, motion, power, and the chora. That evil is a necessity means it is without intelligible explanation.

The place of mortal men is not the place of the gods where good and evil are separate "Forms".

The passage from Theaetetus continues:

Therefore we ought to try to escape from earth to the dwelling of the gods as quickly as we can, and to escape is to become like God ...

But this is the exact opposite of what this escape is. To escape our place is to die, and to die is not to be like the immortal gods.

In contrast to the question of why Socrates did not attempt to escape death, here and elsewhere (Phaedo) he proposes we escape life "as quickly as we can". But of course this is not to be taken literally. It is evident that at age 70 he did not take this advice literally. In any case, this raises doubts about martyrdom. And in the Phaedo he raises doubts about hims motivation being suicide because he says it is prohibited.

The dialogue ends with Socrates saying he must go to answer the charges against him.

Or am I missing something in this line of criticism? — Welkin Rogue

Unless I am missing something I did not read the article as a call to action. It is descriptive and critical rather than prescriptive. The central criticism is of:

... the classical liberal idea of the autonomous rational individual as the fundamental unit of society.

Schuringa rejects analytic philosophy's self-understanding as being above history and politics, and that it operates in an imagined free marketplace of ideas.

It is the insights of those who do not operate freely within this marketplace that he points to. Those who recognize that:

... relations of power structure the marketplace before anyone has even entered it.

The result of attempts to accommodate diversity within the marketplace is that it:

spew these insights back out in a strangely deformed shape

What does it mean for those thinkers to "subvert and close down this marketplace"? As long as the assumption that there is a free marketplace of ideas is not called into question a call for affirmative action will only yield strangely deformed products of rather than real alternatives to the marketplace.

I think one question that must be asked is: where is the marketplace of ideas to be found? Will it remain primarily in academia or will media sources become increasingly influential? Will anti-liberal political and economic forced increasingly shape both academia and media?

I think Plato the puppet-master is well aware that there will always be those who fool themselves into believing that having read about the cave that they have thereby escaped it.

It should be noted that there are several stages on the road to freedom from the cave. The image of a transcendent reality outside the cave remains a shadow on the cave wall. Perhaps the best we can do is to become aware of the image-makers, those who shape our opinions, and not mistake our images of the truth for the truth itself.

@Shawn As to the question of martyrdom and guilt, escape from the cave is escape from the city. Socrates was a citizen of the city in the double sense of place or Chora.

The term chora in its original sense means the territory outside the city proper. The Phaedrus is the only Platonic dialogue in which Socrates appears outside the city. In the country he says he has nothing to learn (230d). I will leave the question of whether he could or did learn anything "from the trees" open.

Socrates is atopos, out of place. With regard to the city proper he is out of place because his thinking is cosmopolitan rather than provincial. But outside the city proper he is also out of place. On the one hand he demonstrates his allegiance to the city of Athens, but on the other his philosophical practice is transgressive. This inbetweenness is characteristic of Plato's chora.

The city in its broadest and most general sense is society, the space of human life, our place. In this sense it is not this city or that city, not Athens or Sparta, in which we might find our place. But this place is neither here nor there. At its heart is an indeterminacy. We can argue in favor of or against his choice and why he made it without coming to a clear conclusion. One thing is clear, however, he acted decisively. The ambiguity of life did not lead him to paralysis. However much they may be at odds we must both reason and act.

He did not live his life in fear of or avoidance of death. Here too, however much they are at odds with each other, it is not simply a choice of one or the other. In his jail cell as he is about to die Socrates says:

Other people may well be unaware that all who actually engage in philosophy aright are practising nothing other than dying and being dead. (Phaedo 64a)

Alongside the dyads of reason and action and life and death is the dyad of comedy and tragedy. We should not miss the comic element in the above statement to his friends about philosophy and death.

What do you think? — 180 Proof

I think Murdoch speaks for herself and not for philosophy or poetry. In the video she is quoted as saying

... the aim of philosophy is to clarify and the aim of literature is to mystify.

(3:54)

While I think it is certainly true that Plato attempts to clarify, I think it also true that part of what he attempts to clarify is the ontological and epistemological mystery. Not in order to demystify but to allow the mystery to stand. Mystikos in the Greek sense of secret, not revealed or disclosed or known. Plato plays on the double sense of hidden/revealed and uninitiated/ initiated. In the Republic the philosophers are philosophers because they have undergone a transcendent and transformative experience. But this imagined philosopher is at odds with Socrates, who knows that he does not know, as well as with the characterization of the philosopher in the Symposium as one who desires to be wise but is not. The Socratic philosopher is one who pursues but does not possess wisdom beyond the human wisdom of knowing he or she is ignorant.

Looked at from the side of poetry or literature, I think it questionable that it is to be read:

... only or principally as 'literature' – for their literary qualities. — 180 Proof

It should be kept in mind that at the Plato lived the poets were the primary source of public education. They serves not simply to entertain but to educate. A fundamental question for Plato is, who will be the educators? In terms of the cave, who are the puppet-masters? Plato took seriously what the poets said about men and gods.

Murdoch says that philosophy should develop a moral or philosophical psychology that provides the terms in which to understand and characterize the substantial self to which she gives center stage, displacing the existentialist/analytic (which she sometimes calls “existentialist-behavioristic”) freely choosing will. (SEP Iris Murdoch)

Such philosophical psychology can be found both in Plato and the Greek poets.

As I understand it, Plato's concern was not simply to draw the battle lines in the quarrel between the philosopher and the poet as to present a philosophical poiesis. To this end he made full use of the imagination and its images, including the images of the cave, the divided line, and the philosopher.

Along the same lines, he does not simply take sides in the quarrel between philosophy and sophistry. He makes use of sophistic arguments when we thinks it appropriate in order to persuade. Not in order to make the weaker argument stronger, as the sophist does, but to arrive at the argument that is on its own merits stronger. It is here, with regard to persuasion, that his suspicion of both poetry and sophistry lies.

Both poetry and sophistry are philosophy's competitors in the task of persuasion and education. In addition, he competes against the politicians and theologians, creating his own city, albeit only in speech. A city in which the philosopher rules, in which the sophist (Thrasymachus) is tamed and made an ally, in which the philosopher is the myth maker, and the gods are replaced by the Good.

As to the education of the philosopher - escape from the cave means to free oneself from all puppet-masters, all makers of images, be they poets, sophists, politicians, theologians, and even philosophers.

Reading the Dialogues as Fiction. — Amity

The Greek term is transliterated "poetry". The root of the word poiesis means to make. Here it is the making of images in words. It connotes both the image of the philosopher Socrates and the philosopher as an image maker.

In the Apology Socrates was accused of making new gods.

Lest we regard this as a quaint outmoded notion of philosophy, Wittgenstein said:

Philosophy ought really to be written only as a form of poetry. — Culture and Value, 24

Plato indicates that even then the issue of the relationship between philosophy and poetry was old;

...there is an old quarrel between philosophy and poetry — Republic 607b