Reading aaaaaalllllll the way to the end of your huge post it would seem that you are in agreement that Wittgenstein denies that Moore knows, while citing an argument that Wittgenstein did not appeal to.

But Wittgenstein denies that Moore does know

Then do it. Defend either of those two claims. — Leontiskos

Apparently, you are trying to walk back your claim that:

You are making things up left and right — Leontiskos

You are doing everything you can to distance yourself from that claim.

Acts, as quoted and referenced, says that Stephen spoke blasphemous words against Moses and against God. To speak blasphemous words against Moses means to speak against the Laws of Moses.

In Luke we find:

The Pharisees and the teachers of the law began thinking to themselves, “Who is this fellow who speaks blasphemy? Who can forgive sins but God alone?”

(5:21)

Jesus response is:

But I want you to know that the Son of Man has authority on earth to forgive sins.

(5:24)

This is fully in accord with what I said above:

the term 'divine' did not mean that someone who was called divine is a god, but rather has an important relationship to God. A son of God, for example. — Fooloso4

You seem to have missed the larger picture. The Gospel accounts are not historical accounts. They are polemical. They accuse the Jewish leaders of bearing false witness, including charges of blasphemy. And, as is evident in Acts, this meant blasphemous words against the Law. The division between the Jewish followers of Jesus and those who came to be known as Christians who did not follow the Law begins with Paul. Acts is attributed to Luke, who was Paul's companion. The accusation of blasphemy, according to this story was false. To bear false witness is not to give an accurate historical account.

I just finished listening to PBS "On the Media". They were discussing this. Pool, Rubin and others claim that they did not know the money for their propaganda platforms was coming from Russia. But this much is clear - they made a lot of money and it is not difficult to trace it back to the source. But why look a gift horse in the mouth when it is offering you so much money, even if it is a Trojan horse?

Regarding the question of how much influence they have :

Forbes is a good place to start:

Benny Johnson, who has more than 6.6 million followers across YouTube, X and Instagram, was described by the Washington Post in 2015 as the "king of viral political news”

The host of the "The Rubin Report” YouTube channel with 2.45 million subscribers as of Thursday

Because your question, "What is the propositional justification?", is odd, since both Moore and Wittgenstein point out that there is no propositional justification... — Banno

And yet you say:

Wittgenstein would have us use "know" only in situations where there is an explicit justification that can be given, in the form of a proposition, for the belief in question. — Banno

There's always going to be a certain amount of cultural relativism. — Sam26

Yes, but how much? A house does not support its foundation (248). The axis (152) is not a foundation and is not in need of a foundation.

Feel free to defend either of these two claims. The second claim is more truly <It was considered blasphemy to claim to be the messiah>. — Leontiskos

I point to sources that support what you claim I made up, The fact is, I did not. If you were arguing in good faith you would admit that. I would accuse you of arguing in good faith when you made the accusation, but giving you the benefit of doubt it could have simply been ignorance.

My post began:

First, the accusation of blasphemy covers a great deal more than a claim to divinity. — Fooloso4

This is true. The term means, as quoted above, reviling God. Convicting Jesus for blasphemy is not evidence for Jesus' claim to divinity. See, for example, Acts 6:11:

Then they suborned men, who said, We have heard him speak blasphemous words against Moses, and God.

According to the commentary at Bible Study tools:

... that is, against the law of Moses, and so against God, who gave the law to Moses, as appears from ( Acts 6:13 ) the blasphemous words seem to be, with respect to the ceremonial law, and the abrogation of it, which Stephen might insist upon, and they charged with blasphemy; see ( Acts 6:14 )

Well, you and I differ substantively on our readings. — Banno

That can happen when you ignore parts of the text that have direct bearing on the issue. Rather than identify the propositional justification at 3 and 7 you ask about 10, as if what is true in one case must be true in all

But let's look at 10:

I know that a sick man is lying here? Nonsense!

This has nothing to do with proposition justification of a knowledge claim because Wittgenstein denies that it is a proper use of the term 'know'. What is at issue is the occasion on which this proposition "I know" is used, not a proposition that justifies it.

Your claim again was:

Wittgenstein would have us use "know" only in situations where there is an explicit justification that can be given, in the form of a proposition, for the belief in question. — Banno

The belief in question is that there is a sick man lying there. What is the proposition that justifies that belief? Or, more to the point, where is the need for justification?

... one thinks that the words "I know that..." are always in place where there is no doubt, and hence even where the expression of doubt would unintelligible.

There is no fixed point, but there are fixed points within given contexts. — Sam26

So, cultural relativism?

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/930609

You are making things up left and right, and I see no reason to reply to such bizarre and unsubstantiated ideas. — Leontiskos

Let's go point by point:

1.From My Jewish Learning

Blasphemy means reviling God. In Hebrew it is known as birkat hashem, literally “blessing [euphemism for cursing] the Name [of God].” The one guilty of this offense is called a megaddef (blasphemer) ...

It is, however, none too clear what exactly is involved in the offense. Does it mean to insult God, or does it mean to curse God?

According to the Gospels of Matthew (26: 63-6) and Mark (14: 53-64) Jesus was tried by the Sanhedrin on a charge of blasphemy, but New Testament scholars have puzzled over both the question of the historicity of the event and the precise nature of the offense.

Then the whole assembly rose and led him off to Pilate. 2 And they began to accuse him, saying, “We have found this man subverting our nation. He opposes payment of taxes to Caesar and claims to be Messiah, a king.”

(Luke 23:1-2)

To subvert the nation is to deny its laws. The second part supports what I said in 4.

2. [As it turns out Jews also sometimes thought that a human could become divine. [/quote] Bart Ehrman

3.

Towards the end of the accounts of all four canonical Gospels, in the narrative of the Passion of Jesus, the title "King of the Jews" leads to charges against Jesus that result in his crucifixion.

(Jesus, King of the Jews -Wikipedia)

This also helps explain why the Roman authorities would get involved. Jesus vs Caesar.

4. See 1 above.

You are arguing that Wittgenstein does not think knowing requires propositional justification? — Banno

Do the examples cited require propositional justification? If so, what is it?

His presentation of a foundation is nothing like traditional foundationalism. — Sam26

I agree, but when he says, as you quoted:

At the foundation of well-founded belief lies belief that is not founded .

It is analogues to the axis of our propositions at 152:

152. I do not explicitly learn the propositions that stand fast for me. I can discover them
subsequently like the axis around which a body rotates. This axis is not fixed in the sense that
anything holds it fast, but the movement around it determines its immobility.

and:

248: 'I have arrived at the rock-bottom of my convictions. And one might almost say that these foundation-walls are carried by the whole house.

But, of course, as he knew quite well, a house does not support its foundation. The point is, there are no indubitable foundations.

305. Here once more there is needed a step like the one taken in relativity theory.

Just as there is no fixed point from which we can observe the motion of the universe, there is no fixed foundation for our knowing.

"At the foundation of well-founded belief lies belief that is not founded (OC 251, 252, and 253)."

Again, these endpoints seem to be foundational. — Sam26

Anti-foundational foundations?

Probably the most basic evidence for Jesus' claim to divinity is the fact that the Jewish authorities arranged to have him executed for blasphemy.* Someone who does not understand the Jewish context of the New Testament should presumably start there. — Leontiskos

Good advice. Let's look closer:

First, the accusation of blasphemy covers a great deal more than a claim to divinity. To break the Law is blasphemy. Jesus claimed to have fulfilled the Law. The Jewish authority did not agree. Much of what he did could be considered breaking the Law. Clearly the question of the Law was of central importance. Second, the term 'divine' did not mean that someone who was called divine is a god, but rather has an important relationship to God. A son of God, for example. Third, is the political problem. A "king of the Jews" would have authority over the Jewish leaders. This is not something they would accept. Fourth, related to the others, is the claim to be the Messiah. The Messiah is divine but is not God.

Wittgenstein would have us use "know" only in situations where there is an explicit justification that can be given, in the form of a proposition, for the belief in question. — Banno

Let's look at a few examples:

3. If e.g. someone says "I don't know if there's a hand here" he might be told "Look closer". - This possibility of satisfying oneself is part of the language-game. Is one of its essential features.

What is the propositional justification? As I read it, he intends the opposite. Looking and seeing does not require propositional justification. But, of course, as he knows, "look closer" does not satisfy the skeptic who questions the existence of what is seen.

7. My life shows that I know or am certain that there is a chair over there, or a door, and so on. - I tell a friend e.g. "Take that chair over there", "Shut the door", etc. etc.

Sit. Open the door. It is in such cases a matter of acting and doing not of saying. We know how to sit or open doors, but knowing that there is a chair or door in not a matter of knowing how. Justification does not even enter the picture.

90. "I know" has a primitive meaning similar to and related to "I see" ("wissen", "videre"). And "I
knew he was in the room, but he wasn't in the room" is like "I saw him in the room, but he wasn't
there". "I know" is supposed to express a relation, not between me and the sense of a proposition
(like "I believe") but between me and a fact.

This is related to 3: "look closer".

The passage continues:

So that the fact is taken into my consciousness. (Here is the reason why one wants to say that nothing that goes on in the outer world is really known, but only what happens in the domain of what are called sense-data.) This would give us a picture of knowing as the perception of an outer event through visual rays which project it as it is into the eye and the consciousness. Only then the question at once arises whether one can be certain of this projection. And this picture does indeed show how our imagination presents knowledge, but not what lies at the bottom of this presentation.

This is the source of modern skepticism. What Descartes calls the problem of judgment.

20. "Doubting the existence of the external world" does not mean for example doubting the
existence of a planet, which later observations proved to exist.

This is what Moore misses. If one doubts the existence of the external world then one would doubt the existence of something in that world - a planet or a hand. A theory of perception inserts itself" between me and a fact", leading to doubt and the demand for justification

Except the fact is he did not say this.

Rather than getting hung up on statements like "here is a hand", I think it would have been more effective to follow the example of Zen Master Lin-chi and hold out his hand so the skeptic could see it and then smack him.

This was his method of dealing with those:

... clinging to words, clinging to phrases ...

Empirical facts are fluid, they can change their truth value. — Joshs

How does this relate to the fact of our having been on the moon or having hands?

It is his treatment of his certainty as an empirical fact rather than as a tacit commitment to a set of practices that hold together facts. — Joshs

His having a hand is a commitment to a set of practices? The fact is, he either has a hand or he does not. This may be "fluid" in so far as his hand might be cut off, and then the fact is he doesn't have a hand any longer.

There are practice which involve having or using our hands, but this is not a commitment to a set of practices. The practices follow the fact that we have and use hands. Without hands the set of practices would no longer exist.

It is not one or the other, either the fact "alone" of landing on the moon "or" the system underlying the fact. We would remain doubtful if we were not made aware of the fact and we would remain doubtful if it could not be justified within the system

As to Moore, it is not his certainty that is at issue, but whether this is an adequate response to the skeptic. Unless someone has a prior commitment to some philosophical position that puts it into doubt, the response to Moore saying "this is my hand" would be to be as certain of it as he is. My dog does not require a system underlying the fact that this is my hand:

359. But that means I want to conceive it as something that lies beyond being justified or unjustified; as it were, as something animal.

That this is a hand is in no need of justification. No need for a system of convictions underlying that fact.

475. I want to regard man here as an animal; as a primitive being to which one grants instinct but not ratiocination. As a creature in a primitive state. Any logic good enough for a primitive means of
communication needs no apology from us. Language did not emerge from some kind of
ratiocination [Raisonnement].

467. I am sitting with a philosopher in the garden; he says again and again "I know that that's a
tree", pointing to a tree that is near us. Someone else arrives and hears this, and I tell him: "This
fellow isn't insane. We are only doing philosophy."

At 108:

If we are thinking within our system, then it is certain that no one has ever been on the moon.

Much had to change within the system for it to be certain that someone has been on the moon. This includes having landed on the moon and our being aware of it. It the moon missions had been kept secret we might know that the science had changed enough that it might be possible but there would still be good grounds to doubt that anyone has ever been on the moon.

It is not either the fact or the system of grounds underlying the fact.

riverbed’s bedrock ( what is. beyond doubt) — Joshs

Saying the riverbed's bedrock is not the same things as saying:

The riverbed is bedrock. — Joshs

I suspect that his use of the river analogy intentionally points back to Heraclitus. He says, for example::

97. The mythology may change back into a state of flux, the river-bed of thoughts may shift. But I distinguish between the movement of the waters on the river-bed and the shift of the bed itself;
though there is not a sharp division of the one from the other.

The mythology is our world picture (95). That the riverbed of thought can change back into a state of flux means that it is not entirely stable or unchanging. It may not be doubted at some given point in time, but consider his example of being on the moon. It was not too long ago that the proposition: Man has never been on the moon, was beyond doubt. Although there are still some who doubt it, it is part of our scientific world picture that man has been on the moon. It is beyond doubt that we have been there. As before it was beyond doubt that we were not.

Of course they are true or false. Wittgenstein isnt denying this. — Joshs

Right, Wittgenstein is not, but you said:

hinge propositions, forms of life and language games are neither true nor false. — Joshs

If the only example he gives of a hinge propositions is true, then at least some hinge propositions are true.

The riverbed is bedrock. — Joshs

Bedrock is not made partly of sand:

OC 99. And the bank of that river consists partly of hard rock, subject to no alteration or only to an
imperceptible one, partly of sand ...

The spade may turned when digging in a river-bank, unless it hits a rock, but a rock is not bedrock.

The river-bank analogy refers to empirical propositions (96), Bedrock occurs once (498) and refers to what is beyond doubt.

Where does this article discuss mathematical propositions?

The riverbed is not bedrock. It changes, sometimes slowly and other times rapidly. The axis around which a body rotates is not bedrock and is not held fast by bedrock.

Once again, you assume as answered what is in question. Whatever you might take his "general thinking" to be, he calls 12+12=144 a proposition and nowhere does he claim that it is neither true or false.

Mathematics is certainly a part of our form of life and mathematics does have its language games, but this does not mean that mathematical propositions are neither true nor false. The bridge would collapse if the calculations are wrong. We would not have landed on the moon if the calculations were wrong. Building bridges and moon landings are part of our form of life, but unlike our form of life the mathematical propositions are not arbitrary or t.a matter of convention or agreement.

most philosophers use the term to refer to this kind of proposition (hinge, bedrock, foundational, basic, all mostly refer to the same thing). — Sam26

Your assumption that these are all terms referring to the same thing is questionable. The only thing that turns on bedrock, as Wittgenstein says, is the spade.

A hinge is not a foundation:

OC 152.

I do not explicitly learn the propositions that stand fast for me. I can discover them
subsequently like the axis around which a body rotates. This axis is not fixed in the sense that
anything holds it fast, but the movement around it determines its immobility.

Where does he make the claim that we do not dispute 12+12=144 but it is not true or false that 12+12=144?

Engineering calculations do not depend on lack of dispute.

The term 'hinge' occurs three times in On Certainty.

341. That is to say, the questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some
propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn.

343. But it isn't that the situation is like this: We just can't investigate everything, and for that reason we are forced to rest content with assumption. If I want the door to turn, the hinges must stay put.

655. The mathematical proposition has, as it were officially, been given the stamp of
incontestability. I.e.: "Dispute about other things; this is immovable - it is a hinge on which your
dispute can turn."

The third is the only example explicitly called a hinge. It is both a proposition, and true.

Have you now reduced a historical question to an exegetical question? — Leontiskos

It is about the meaning of a term and how that meaning changed when interpreted by pagan ears. That change can be seen by looking at the relevant texts. This is a historical question.

The number of ex-Protestants in this thread is not coincidental. — Leontiskos

This is anachronistic.

Paul incorporates Jesus into the Hebrew Shema in places like 1 Corinthians 8:4-6. — Leontiskos

The passage makes a distinction between the one God, the Father, and the one Lord, Jesus Christ. This distinction is not present in the Shema. In the Shema God is the Lord. If, as a Jew, Jesus recited the Shema he was not praying to himself. I seems highly likely that he would have been appalled to learn anyone would claim that the son is the father. That God is two and not one. The same goes for Paul.

the image of God in 2 Corinthians 4 — Leontiskos

An image is not the thing it is an image of. Your image in a picture or mirror is not you.

The passage says:

God’s glory displayed in the face of Christ.

(4:6)

All of mankind is God's image:

Then God said, “Let us make man in our image, after our likeness.

(Genesis 1 :26)

the name of God in Philippians 2. — Leontiskos

Are you referring to this passage:

God did highly exalt him, and gave to him a name that [is] above every name

(9)?

God did not gave himself a name or exalt himself. The passage refers not to God himself but to Jesus.

Here again a distinction is made between God the Father and Jesus the Lord

You completely miss what is at issue in my criticism. Moral deliberation is not about accepting or abandoning or rejecting stipulated principles. It not not about moral principles.

You claimed that:

it is an inquiry into whether a justification for self-defense is consistent with certain axioms. — Leontiskos

It any of those so called axioms is abandoned or rejected then they are not axiomatic. This supports the claim that moral deliberation is not axiomatic.

The one who is engaged in the attempt to formulate and justify rules is not engaged in mere rule-following. — Leontiskos

Right! The attempt to formulate and justify rules is not based on rules. Or, in other words, moral deliberation must rest on something other than principles.

No, it is an inquiry into whether a justification for self-defense is consistent with certain axioms. — Leontiskos

These axioms are the moral principles stipulated in the OP. It is, then, not an inquiry into the justification of self-defense, but of self-defense under certain principles or axioms. Moral inquiry, however, is not limited by certain so called axioms. It includes the question of whether certain assumptions should be regarded as true. The three principles specified are not, as the OP calls them, "facts". They are assumptions that can and should be called into question.

When Bob Ross says:

Given the following stipulations, I am wondering if there is a way to salvage the principle of self-defense ... — Bob Ross

He gets it exactly backwards. The question is whether the stipulated claims can be salvaged in light of the need for self-defense. Calling "the principle of self-defense" into question too, is an indication of why moral deliberation based on principles that turn out to be questionable, as the three specified principles are, should be called into question.

Moral principles are part of moral deliberation, and thinking to them and through them is part of ethics. — Leontiskos

There is a difference between deliberating and rule following. There is a difference between an appeal to a moral principle and an ethics that has as its goal a system of principles. There are good reasons why many philosophers have abandoned rule based principles and returned to some form of virtue ethics.

The attempt to set up a comprehensive set of rule based principles must deal with exceptions and the need for further rules regarding exceptions. The set becomes more and more unwieldy as exceptions accrue and are compounded.

By analogy, there may be some useful principles to keep in mind when playing chess, but no set of rules that can tell you what to do in every situation. There are cases where following a genera rule will not lead to favorable results. Cases where the rule should not take precedence over other considerations, and no rule that covers when that is the case.

... if you think that inquiring into the rationale for justified self-defense is seeking "one-size-fits-all answers." — Leontiskos

It is not a matter of inquiring into the rationale for justified self-defense but, as the OP makes clear, of self-defense under the constriction of certain stipulated moral principles.

Thanks my friend. If I recall correctly we also discussed during this or another conversation the meaning of the kingdom being at hand. This can be taken to mean, as it often is, soon to be, but alternatively as already here, within our reach. Paul and his followers believed that the end was near, about to happen at any moment and that it was a cosmic or geo-political event, rather than a matter of personal transformation.

The picture is further complicated by differing beliefs in resurrection, whether this would be spiritual or physical. The Gospel of Thomas says nothing about resurrection. In addition, various notions regarding the messiah. Whether this was to be a victory of the Jews over their enemies or a new world order or personal salvation.

In any case, what is clear as that the OP's question about Christianity being false is ill-formed.

You think the establishment gives two shits about climate or pollution? — Tzeentch

The "establishment" is a nebulous term. There are elected and appointed officials who are active in their support on the environment. They are as much a part of the "establishment" as those who are indifferent or opposed. The "establishment" is not one side or the other.

Yes.

As I understand it, this was the genius of at least one strand of early Christianity guided by inspiration, the witnessing of the indwelling of spirit. It was all but destroyed by the Church Fathers. To this day it is vehemently denied by those Christians who desire to be led, to be told what to believe by other men claiming the mantle of divine authority.

You have mentioned before the Gospel of Thomas and the idea that the kingdom is within. If this is believed then, as the Church Fathers feared, one cannot be subject to their authority.

It should be obvious to anyone who understands what phronesis is that it involves thinking through ethical questions. Thinking through ethical questions, however, does not mean the attempt to find abstract, universalizable, one size fits all answers that can be appealed to in lieu of moral deliberation.

Why? — wonderer1

I think it is an important question, but do not think it is for the purpose you suggest.

I will address this generally, whether or not it applies in this case:

I think the reason is the desire to arrive at clear answers where none are available. It is, however, in my opinion, misdirected. Ethics is not a matter of discovering or inventing equations or formulas or exceptionless rules that can be applied to whatever situation that arises. It is, as Plato and Aristotle knew, a matter of phronesis, of good judgment. It is pragmatic, involves compromises, and may not yield agreed upon or totally satisfactory results. The desire for wisdom becomes foolishness when we attempt to abstract from the confusion and messiness of life.

Many more are under the impression that there are no good historical or theological reasons to hold that Mormons are not Christians. I hope your post was not yet another non sequitur argument for that idea. — Leontiskos

? I have not said anything about Mormons. I pointed to the early Jesus movement prior to the establishment of the Catholic Church and the First Council of Nicaea.

Paine was responding to Art48, and there is no evidence at all that he was limiting Christianity to Nicean or Chalcedonian Christianity. — Leontiskos

That is correct. I did not say or imply that the examples I pointed to are the only cases. I don't know how you would reach this conclusion. Yet another non sequitur argument!

it is a very late phenomenon for self-identified Christians to identify Jesus as a mere man. — Leontiskos

This is simply not true. This is why I pointed to the use of the term son in the Hebrew Bible. It is used many times both in the singular and plural. It often refers to kings and rulers and never means a god.

The plural can be found in Exodus:

Thus saith the LORD, Israel is my son, my firstborn.

(4:22)

All of the disputes among early Christians were about what sort of non-mere man Jesus was. — Leontiskos

As I said:

Under pagan influence the Hebrew בן (bên) came to take on different meanings. — Fooloso4

"Mere man" is ambiguous. The traditional Jewish notion of a messiah is a man not a deity. A man with a mission from God is still a man. An exception man is still a man. The disciples, Paul, and other Jewish followers did not believe that Jesus was a god.

In Paul we find the idea that resurrected bodies are "spiritual bodies", sōma pneumatikos. As a resurrected body Jesus would no longer be a physical body. This holds for all men who have been saved and will be resurrected. Not "mere men", but men none the less.

Looking over the vast range of what "Christianity" has come to mean for different persons over centuries of life, the common insistence amongst the different groups that only one way is correct has become more 'universal' than any particular set of creeds, liturgy, or view of the world reflected in each iteration. — Paine

It seems that many here are under the mistaken impression that Christianity is and always was monolithic. The Church Fathers were were perhaps the first to change what was a pluralistic movement into a unified Church with "official doctrines and practices. They never did quite succeed.

Early on it was believed that Jesus was a messianic rabbi, a son of God, not "The Son". Under pagan influence the Hebrew בן (bên) came to take on different meanings. The First Council of Nicaea attempted to settle the dispute over the nature or ontological status of Jesus. The controversy has never been resolved, but the majority of bishops backed by the emperor Constantine accepted the position that Jesus is homoousios, the same in essence as God. "Full God". Christians were and some still at divided on this question. Others believe that Jesus was deified, something others are also capable of becoming. Still others believe he was "just a man", but not just any man. And here we find various stories within Christianity of this man and his significance.

As I noted, if you want to start a new thread, I will participate. — T Clark

So, you attack Rorty and retreat. You make claims about poetry but will not say what you think is the proper use of the term poetry, It is not up to me to start a new thread so you can defend your unsubstantiated claims.