In the first sentence of the Examination of Conscience:

... conformity with, or deviation from, the moral law.

Here the moral law is established. The examined life for Socrates does not assume an established moral law. It inquires as to what one should do.

Naikan is about another person not oneself.

The High Performance Planner. Looks like slick marketing to get with the program and become successful.

According to the Introduction of Question Yourself Questions:

Questions give you a chance to find your own answers. I make no pretense that the questions in this book are a complete guide to anything. They are the first step ...

The questions asked in the book may be helpful but it is no substitute for living the examined life.

For example, the contradiction in the dictom "An eye for an eye" versus "Turn the other cheek" is such a fundamental one I don't see how the two could ever be reconciled. — Tzeentch

An eye for an eye comes from Exodus 21:24. The paragraph begins, "If people are fighting ...". An eye for an eye means that under the law punishment and compensation should be proportional, that no more than an eye should be taken for the loss of an eye.

Turn the other cheek can be interpreted to mean, do not fight and do not seek punishment or compensation for wrong done to you. There is no contradiction here.

Is wisdom morally neutral? — TheMadFool

Is it wise to treat your enemies as you would your friends?

Rhetoric is about getting things done, — tim wood

The passage is not about how one lives. It is about how one appears to be in order to persuade. One need not have good will, only give the impression of having good will.

"As a result, Nietzsche claims that nihilism is the devaluation of the highest values caused by the death of God"
https://brill.com/view/journals/fphc/11/2/article-p298_11.xml — Ross

You would do well to quote Nietzsche directly. See, for example, The Three Metamorphoses, in Zarathustra.

Nothing radical, just straight-up Aristotle. The good man makes a good speech, and among the ways to tell are his manifesting αρέτε, φρονέισις, ευνοία, good character, good judgment, good will. (Rhetoric, 1378a - 6.) — tim wood

This is the other passage I thought you might be referring to. Rhetoric is about what is said, not what is done. In order to be persuasive he must give the impression of possessing αρέτε, φρονέισις, ευνοία.
Whether or not he does is not at issue, except to the extent that the audience might question whether he does.

But what does it matter whether Jesus said exactly what's in the gospels. — Ross

I was responding to this:

If one wants to know about Christianity, one first needs to strip off all the things notable Christians have said that is in direct contradiction to the teachings of Jesus Christ. One is interested in Christianity after all, and not Paulinism or Johnism. — Tzeentch

It may matter for different reasons. For some Jesus is the voice of authority, for some human and or others divine, and so, if he said something or not makes a difference for them. But of course, if they think he said it and he didn't, well then, some assumptions may need to be questioned.

I think Nietszche was correctly worried about humanity sinking into Nihilism and despair with "The Death of God" — Ross

It is Christianity itself that led to nihilism according to Nietzsche. But this is the way of all self-overcoming. If not Christianity then whatever the dominant beliefs and practices were would eventually be negated.

Because we may never know for sure, it is up to each to look at the evidence and arguments and decide what they believe. — Tzeentch

The problem of evidence is that there is no evidence. We do not know what Jesus taught. We can date the gospels and note significant differences, but we cannot determine how any of them relate to whatever it is that Jesus might have taught. The stories take on a life of their own. In addition, the canonical gospels are only a part of what was written.

And the third, eunoia, the good will. — tim wood

I would like to hear more. It raises some questions.

Should one have good will toward his enemies? Doesn't phronesis include the ability to discern between those who have good will to us and those who are our enemies?

If one wants to know about Christianity, one first needs to strip off all the things notable Christians have said that is in direct contradiction to the teachings of Jesus Christ. One is interested in Christianity after all, and not Paulinism or Johnism. — Tzeentch

How can we know what the teaching of Jesus are and what are the teachings attributed to him? While I think we can identify the influence of Paul and John, it is questionable that what is left are the teachings of Jesus rather than of those who were inspired by and may or may not have understood him. Those who may or may not have addressed their own concerns rather than his. Those who could not accept the failure to fulfill the promise and created their own mythologies, blending them with beliefs of death and resurrection. Those who saw the promise of the Messiah through pagan eyes, who deified a man.

There are two Greek terms that are fundamental to virtue ethics. Neither has a single word for word translation. The first is arête. It is often translated as virtue but does not have the meaning that virtue has come to carry. It means excellence. Human virtue is the attainment of the highest of what we are by nature capable of.

The second term is related to the first. Phronesis is translated as practical wisdom, prudence, discernment. The greater the excellence of a human being the more capable they are of assessing a situation and acting in a way that is wise.

We are by nature social animals. Phronesis it then not simply a matter of deciding what is best for me to the exclusion of others. My choices and actions must take into consideration the good of others.

I would very much like to believe that there is a wisdom that is beyond and above socioeconomic success, a wisdom that is worth more than socioeconomic success, a wisdom that trumps socioeconomic success. But I am afraid, sincerely afraid, that there is no such wisdom, and that socioeconomic success is as good as life gets. — baker

What is the connection between wisdom and socioeconomic success? Is someone wise to be born into inherited wealth? Is someone unwise if because of circumstances beyond their control they are no longer socioeconomically successful? Perhaps wisdom has more to do with how one lives whether one is socioeconomically successful or not.

How does one measure the worth of wisdom? Perhaps it is the other way around, that wisdom is the measure of worth.

And yet all ideas of the "examined life" are prescriptive. — baker

If the examined life is prescriptive then there is no need to examine, just do what is prescribed. And yet, some will ask about what is prescribed - Is what is prescribed what is best? Are there other prescriptions that are at odds with these?

There exist lists of questions one _should_ ask oneself in order to "examine one's life". — baker

There are? What is on those lists? Where can they be found? Are the questions unquestioned?

to ‘love God’ — Possibility

The passage from Matthew is taken from Deuteronomy 6.5. It follows the passage known in Judaism as the "Shema", from the first word of 6.4, meaning hear:

Hear, O Israel: The LORD our God, the LORD is one.

It goes on to say:

Do not follow other gods, the gods of the peoples around you

for the LORD your God, who is among you, is a jealous God and his anger will burn against you, and he will destroy you from the face of the land. (6:14-15)

Matthew poses the problem: if the Messiah is the son of David then, citing Psalm 110:

‘The Lord said to my lord, “Sit at my right hand, until I put your enemies under your feet”’?

how can David call him lord if he is his son?

This is fraught with problems. The term 'lord' is being used to translate two different terms, first Yahweh and second Adonai. Both terms are used as names for God, but Adonai is also used to mean a king. Why was no one able to make the distinction and why did no one dare to ask him more questions? Perhaps it has something to do with the difference between the claim of being the son of David and the son of God. Perhaps this has something to do with God being one. Perhaps their not daring to ask more questions is meant to indicate that we should not dare ask more questions.

There is another issue here. In what way is one to love God? The answer is given in what is here referred to as the second commandment:

And a second is like it: ‘You shall love your neighbor as yourself.’

It is in the second being like the first that he answers the question of how God is to be loved, that is, by loving your neighbor. This raises the question, again going back to Deuteronomy: "Is your enemy your neighbor?" As we see, Christians are no less likely to distinguish between "us and them" than anyone else.

He is not speaking thusly to everyone who voted for his acquittal; only to those few who notice that, by repetition, he is reminding them of the spuriousness of the traditional tales of the afterlife. — Leghorn

I think he is addressing both those who recognize or will come to understand that these are things said rather than things known, and those who will believe they are things known because they are things said.

The latter is a salutary teaching. Believing it is true promotes justice in the soul and the city. Those who are philosophical by nature, however, desire the truth. But, as Socrates points out in the Republic:

the best natures become exceptionally bad when they get bad instruction (491e).

That these are things said and not the truth is a truth suitable only to those who are of the best natures and have been properly educated through an education that includes such salutary tales.

The possibility that "death is like being nothing" presents both an ethical and existential problem. Plato deals with the first in the Republic where Socrates argues that justice is a matter of the health of the soul rather than a calculus of rewards and punishments. He deals with the second in the Phaedo, where Socrates attempts to charm away childish fears of death. (77e) In doing this he appeals to "things said" as well as his own myths. But none of these myths say what will happen to Socrates or you or me. They take the part as the whole.

The focus is on oneself, on self-examination. One cannot do more than they are willing and capable of doing. Self-deception is a problem and includes a lack of awareness of the deception.

The examined life is not prescriptive. One can follow some set of rules or standards, but what is their origin? Is there a realm of moral truths? Did you discover them on your own? If so, how? Can you know you got it right? Or are they what you are told by some authority? Is obedience to them a rejection of the examined life? Doesn't the examined life include an examination of standards? Does that examination come to an end when one is satisfied that they now have the answer? Or should that satisfaction be examined too?

Unless one is omniscient, or gifted with enormous self-confidence, then how can one possibly know what is truly, objectively good? — baker

This is the fundamental problem of Socratic philosophy. We do not have knowledge of the good itself. And yet, we all desire what is good for us, even if we do not know what that is. (Republic 505d) The Socratic task is to the best of our abilities to determine what is best knowing that what seems to be best may not be what is best.

Plato puts a great deal of emphasis on the nature of a person. But this alone is not enough:

the best natures become exceptionally bad when they get bad instruction (491e).

To this end, the education of the guardians of the city, from which the philosopher-kings will be found, is primarily in gymnastics and music. (376e)

The question of the good is best addressed, to the extent it is possible, by becoming good, that is, by the development of a soul that is just and beautiful (well proportioned). But, of course, we do not have the standard by which to measure the extent to which we are good. The desire to know the good in order to be good and live a good life, seems to be the best guide available to us.

"Metaphysics in its classic sense has always been understood to be the rational investigation of the eternal order. — Wayfarer

The rejection of an eternal order and the claim that:

'neo-Darwinian materialism’ is the ‘official doctrine’ of the mainstream academy; that we’re products of an evolutionary process that is wholly natural and presumably governed by physical laws without reference to anything beyond that. — Wayfarer

are two very different things. That there is an eternal order is an assumption that should be questioned. That we can know that the order we observe is eternal should be questioned.

See Nietzsche's On the Use and Abuse of History for Life, how second natures become first natures. Existentialism does not fall on one side or the other of natural/supernatural, physical/metaphysical. In general, contemporary philosophers who see history and culture as fundamental to human being do not fall on one side or the other.

The cultural context we’re all in is that ‘neo-Darwinian materialism’ is the ‘official doctrine’ of the mainstream academy; that we’re products of an evolutionary process that is wholly natural and presumably governed by physical laws without reference to anything beyond that. — Wayfarer

It is significant that you start this statement with "cultural context" because a cultural context is not a product of an evolutionary process. Although it would not be possible without evolution, it is not wholly natural, in so far as it is the result of human activities. This is not to say that it is thereby metaphysical or supernatural but rather that the divisions natural/supernatural and physical/metaphysical fail to account for the cultural histories of human beings.

Socrates as many as four times reminds us that these are things only said, implying that they are not necessarily so. — Leghorn

Whether or not they are so is not addressed. This stands in stark contrast to Socrates standard practice of questioning what is said. It is left as one of two possibilities. The other is that :

it is like being nothing — Leghorn

The possibility that it is like being nothing is raised prior to what accords with things said. In the Phaedo, where Socrates attempts to charm away their childish fears of death (77e) this possibility is not raised at all. All the arguments are designed to demonstrate the immortality of the soul, but, of course, they fail.

As long as one assumes that Socrates' efforts are simply to discover the truth of things, the truth of his efforts will not be discovered.

Let us also think in the following way how great a hope there is that it [death] is good. — Leghorn

His efforts are, in part, to persuade, to give his listeners hope that death is good, but if it turns out that the things said are true, then it is good only for the souls of those who are good. And yet, what might be good for their soul is not necessarily what is good for them. Socrates the man is not a disembodied soul.

"Scientists" is an infelicitous translation, Pangle has "men considered wise by young people". (890) This explains why the poets are included. Things are complicated by this:

What pertains to the ancients should be left alone and bid good-bye ... but what pertains to our new and wise men must be accused in so far as it responsible for bad things. (886d)

Surely the ancients include the poets Hesiod and Homer. Should they be included in those:

who maintain that the height of justice is to succeed by force — Plato, Laws 890,translated by R.G. Bury

or excluded because they are among the ancients? To put it differently, does the fault lie with atheists? They after all were the primary source of stories about the gods.

The observation was directed toward how we are using the terms of "atheist versus theist" in my reply to Leghorn ... — Valentinus

If I understand you correctly, I agree. In the Apology Socrates points to different ways in which the term atheist is used as an accusation. In addition, I don't think belief in gods requires the immortality of the soul. In fact, a common distinction was made between mortal men and immortal gods.

The way we use the terms to affirm or deny what is believed by an individual to be true is going to have trouble in a land where the line between Olympian Gods and a rational Creator has not been clearly drawn. — Valentinus

This is part of what Socrates was ensnared in. A rational Creator is not the gods of the city. It is an innovation. The accusation of atheism would in one sense of the term be accurate.

...the caveat that what counts as a model of the divine will become more difficult to identify. — Valentinus

Two comments: First, it is generally the Biblical God who is identified with will, with the Greeks emphasizing intellect. Second, there are some theologians, both ancient and modern, who either eschew any such description (negative or apophatic theology) or reject and kind of personification or anthropomorphism (Tillich, the ground of being).

Pardon me if I don't respond to any responses for a while. I am giving my laptop to somebody else for a few weeks. I need to explore other regions of the soul. — Valentinus

Be well.

There is, however, no methodological transition from dialectic to knowledge of the Forms. (Republic 511b).
— Fooloso4
Would it be because the mind cannot see itself? Reason cannot reason reason itself. — Corvus

It is because the Forms cannot be grasped by reason. They are not objects of reason.

It sounds like what we have sorted out as materialist or not in our modern lexicon is not a deal breaker to accepting the divine for Plato. — Valentinus

By the divine do you mean the intelligible soul?

The Athenian says:

If soul does drive the sun around ...

Whether or not it does is an open question. In Anaxagoras' account Nous orders all things but he holds that the sun and moon are rocks. Why does the Athenian propose that the sun is driven by its own soul? Is there some concern with autonomy? Some problem with a separate Mind that imposes order? Is this related to the political order and the imposition of laws?

Plato was also a dualist I gather. The material world we live now is a shadow of the true world of Idea. — Corvus

This is a pretty common view, but not one I share. Socrates says the Forms are hypotheticals, the way in which his mind organizes the world according to kinds. They are, literally, what is placed under the unstable objects of the world, in order to understand the world as stable and unchanging. There is, however, no methodological transition from dialectic to knowledge of the Forms. (Republic 511b). The myth of recollection requires acceptance or rebirth. One problem is just when one is supposed to have gained such knowledge, in which past life, and how was it possible then?

The Forms are said to be what sensible things are images of, but they are themselves images, what Socrates imagines knowledge must be:

But you would no longer be seeing an image of what we are saying, but rather the truth itself, at least as it looks to me. Whether it really is so or not can no longer be properly insisted on. (533a)

Prishon says: "Yes! How the f. did you know?" — Prishon

Prishon must know himself/herself. Way ahead of the rest of us on his Socratic quest.

The forms can never be known. — Prishon

I would say that they are not known. That they are is not known. What they are is not known. To ask what they are is problematic because they are supposed to be the answer to the question "what?". This amount to asking "what is what" as John Sallis has pointed out.

Prishon must correct. With forms he probably meant solids. — Prishon

Perhaps you could ask.

The Platonic forms are materializations of the corresponding eternal forms in Platonic heaven. — Prishon

I don't know what this means. The Platonic forms are eternal forms, or so the hypothesis states.

Math describes them exactly but it doesn't privide an image of the forms — Prishon

According to Plato, it is not the objects themselves with which the mathematician deals but their images, that is, drawings or diagrams.

First, although there is some disagreement, mathematical objects, including Platonic solids, are not Forms. See above: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/585928 Second. they are, literally, fundamental to the cosmogony of the Timaeus. They are the mathematical or eidetic models of the elements fire, water, air, and earth.

No matter where I looked, the platonic forms were not found. Now I am guessing, they could be my intuition or pure reason. — Corvus

The Forms are hypothetical. In the Phaedo Socrates says:

... I feared that my soul would be altogether blinded if I looked at things with my eyes and tried to grasp them with each of my senses. So I thought I must take refuge in discussions and investigate the truth of beings by means of accounts [logoi] … On each occasion I put down as hypothesis whatever account I judge to be mightiest; and whatever seems to me to be consonant with this, I put down as being true, both about cause and about all the rest, while what isn’t, I put down as not true.” (99d-100a)

The Forms are an attempt to make sense of the world. In the Republic Socrates will tell a tale of the philosopher who escapes the cave and ascends to the sight of the Forms. But Socrates also indicates that he has had no such experience. Here too the Forms are hypothetical not things known. In the Republic we also find the promise of dialectic being able to move beyond hypothesis by the use of hypothesis. But nowhere in any of Plato's dialogues does he identify anyone, either an historical individual or a fictional character, whose journey ends in knowledge of the Forms. The journey always ends in aporia.

The law is arbitrary and and does not fit with the Timaeus — Valentinus

This is related to the problem of the uncompleted task of the Timaeus, explaining how cosmogony leads to the city.

... it defends the existence of gods by demanding a certain view of the natural world ... — Valentinus

I take it you mean this:

For the result of the arguments of such people is this,—that when you and I try to prove the existence of the gods by pointing to these very objects—sun, moon, stars, and earth—as instances of deity and divinity, people who have been converted by these scientists will assert that these things are simply earth and stone, incapable of paying any heed to human affairs, and that these beliefs of ours are speciously tricked out with arguments to make them plausible. (886d-e)

The concern here seems to be twofold, first, the implications of the scientific view rather than the truth of it. This is the problem Socrates points to with Anaxagoras. Second, a proper account of the gods, theology, must take into account the human good. This is what Leo Strauss refers to as the theologico-political problem.

In the Laws, starting from 885b, Plato argues that the legislation of piety requires declaring that the soul was created prior to all other things as the explanation for natural causes. — Valentinus

A few points should be noted. First, they are making laws. The law itself is not natural. The city itself is not natural. Second, in the Timaeus neither the world soul nor the human soul was created first. As things made they are not eternal. Timaeus' speech was to be made for the purpose of seeing the Republic at war, that is, in action. A task that is left incomplete.

The craftsman, "the poet and father" (28e) is himself the work of Timaeus' poetry. The craftsman says he is "craftsman and father" of the gods who make gods. (41a) The craftsman of the craftsman, Timaeus, is the craftsman of the gods. But Timaeus himself is the work Plato and his poetry.

...in accordance with the things said... — Leghorn

For if one who arrives in Hades, released from those here who claim to be judges, will find those who are judges in truth ... — Leghorn

In other words, only the dead can judge the truth of death, but they are dead and, if death is like a dreamless sleep, then they cannot judge either. So how are we to judge whether the truth is in accordance with things said? Once again, Socrates points to our ignorance. The things said, are just that, things said. We cannot advance from the things said to the truth of what is said. Once again, we are led to aporia.

A distinction needs to be made between the discussion of mathematical objects in the works of Plato and mathematical objects as they are thought of by mathematical Platonists.

Aristotle claims that Plato regarded them as intermediates, between Forms and sensible things.

Further, apart from both the perceptibles and the Forms are the objects of mathematics, he says, which are intermediate between them, differing from the perceptible ones in being eternal and immovable, and from the Forms in that there are many similar ones, whereas the Form itself in each case is one only. ( Metaphysics 987b14-18)

One issue of contention is the ontological status of these intermediates. Another is the relationship of intermediates to Forms. An insightful discussion of this and the importance of mathematical objects and the limits of logos for Plato's philosophy can be found here:

https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/9a77/b70f6a93af7cc665bbac3fc64e5bfaffd1c6.pdf

From the article:

... the pure arithmetical units and perfect geometric exemplars hinted at in the Divided
Line passage or at Philebus 56d-e are, in fact, not onta at all. Rather, they are the way Forms appear, or are thought and related to, in the medium of mathematical διάνοια – a medium by its very nature incapable of thinking Forms directly.

Timaeus said:

With regard to everything it is most important to begin at the natural beginning. (29b)

The problem, of course, is where to begin.

For every natural beginning is there something that stands outside that beginning? Must the story begin: "In the beginning ..." or, perhaps more accurately translated, "To begin ..."? In this story the backstory is presumed to be beyond our reach. This beginning, and all others that begin with some agent that begins, begins at the end. It begins with the consequence of some cause, something without which things could not be or could not be as they are.

If, instead, we begin with what is most simple or elemental, then we begin in some way as Dennett proposes, at the bottom, and work our way up. How complexity emerges from simplicity, how consciousness, for instance, could emerge from things that are not conscious, should not be taken as a refutation, but as what must be explained starting at the beginning. That we have not yet been able to do this is in no way an indication that it cannot be done.

But your statement is unsubstantiated: since we do not know what Socrates actually said, how can you say that Plato and Xenophon didn’t faithfully portray his defense? — Leghorn

I am referring to their Socratic apologies compared to their Socratic dialogues, Socrates in a public, legal forum versus Socrates in private conversation.

Does Plato’s portrayal contradict Xenophon’s? — Leghorn

There are differences.

do you assert that distancing yourself from something is the same thing as denying it? — Leghorn

As to whether the sun was a rock, he neither affirms nor denies it. As to whether Anaxagoras' Mind is a cause, he found it problematic. Anaxagoras' explanation did not show how Mind order each thing in a way that is best. (Phaedo 97b-d)

I believe this fact indicates he may have believed something similar to what Anaxagoras taught. — Leghorn

The passage from the Phaedo is a prelude to Socrates "second sailing", which he calls his safe answer, the hypothesis of Forms. He shifts from Mind to his own mind.(99d-100a) He arranges things according to kind. That it is best that they be this way, either as a way of understanding things or as things are, is something he does not show. As to the relationship between a Form and a thing of that Form he says he cannot insist on the nature of that relationship. (100e). Later he recognizes the need to reintroduce physical causes. He calls the safe answer, his hypothesis of the Forms ignorant. (105b-c)

This statement leaves me very perplexed, since we only know Socrates’ defense of himself from Plato’s and Xenophon’s accounts of it. — Leghorn

Right. That is why I said, in their accounts of the trial. We do not know what he actually said, but we do know that both Plato and Xenophon defended him in their works after their Apologies.

I suspect Socrates and Plato wanted it to be that way: ambiguous and open to interpretation. — Leghorn

I think both would agree that whatever Socrates might have believed about the gods is secondary to the truth about the gods. To even raise the question is an impiety. To who or what do we turn to learn the truth about the gods? Do we believe the poets and their stories of the gods acting unjustly? Do we turn to reasoned argument? In that case the authority of reason stands above the gods, for it is reason that determines their truth.

There is, however, no such dialogue.

The sophists were a diverse group.

Three dialogues often referred to as the trilogy, Sophist, Statesman, and Theaetetus (the subject is knowledge) address the differences between the sophist and statesman. It should be noted that the third in the trilogy is not named Philosopher, but all three deal with the question of who the philosopher is and how he differs from the sophist and statesman. As is typical the dialogues end in aporia.

Sophists were known for teaching how to make the weaker argument stronger. The sophist's concern is with persuasion without regard for the truth. Socrates not charging money speaks to the issue of benefit. He did not teach in order to benefit himself, and did not refuse to teach those who could not pay.

What signs of Socrates’ piety would you accept as proof then of his belief or disbelief in god? — Leghorn

Both Plato and Xenophon defend Socrates in a way that he does not defend himself in their accounts of the trial. What we read of his piety should be seen in light of their rhetoric. In the Euthyphro Socrates places the just above piety to the gods. In Plato's Apology he demonstrates his obedience to the god by doubting what the oracle said and trying to show it was wrong. His daimonion is problematic because it is a personal deity, which is quite different from the gods of the city as well as gods of the cosmos.

Socrates in that passage attempts to distance himself from that natural philosopher — Leghorn

He correctly points to Anaxagoras as the source of that claim, but he does not distance himself from it. He neither confirms nor denies.

But this passage is fraught with irony. — Leghorn

As are many others as well. The whole question of the gods is fraught with irony.