all these signs of Socrates’ piety — Leghorn

But we have no signs of Socrates' piety. We have the stories of Plato and Xenophon who wrote in light of the trial and prosecution of Socrates. There was good reason to portray Socrates as pious in both the conventional and an unconventional way.

It is not without significance that Plato brings Anaxagoras into the trial. It is not just Socrates but philosophy that is on trial. It should be noted that Socrates neither affirms nor denies that the sun is a rock and not a god.

All too often it is unreflectively assumed that talk of god or gods is about the same thing. Although Plato wrote a dialogue that asked what piety is, there is no dialogue that asks what a god or a deity or a divinity or daimonion or the divine is.

When the question of whether or not Socrates was an atheist is raised we need to ask just what specifically it is that one thinks is being denied or affirmed. Did he believe in the gods of the city? Did he believe in one or more of the gods recognized as gods today?

What is the relationship between gods and Forms? What is the relationship between theology and religion? Between gods and religion?

The problem was raised regarding how Socrates is seen in light of current views. We must also consider how he was and is seen under the influence of Platonism and Christian Platonism where it is unquestionably assumed that he did believe in gods as they did. But we must also look back prior to Platonism. The pre-Socratic philosophers, sophists, and those educated by them were not bound by such assumptions. In other words, appeal to the views of modern, educated liberal students on the one hand, and Platonists on the other solves nothing. They are not the only options.

What both might overlook but we should not is that questions about gods could not be raised without regard for politics and public opinion without great risk.

[Accidently posted before complete.

When reading Plato the problem of concealment stands together with the problem of interpretation. Someone lacking the ability to interpret is not even aware that there is anything concealed. They are content with what the see and may even vehemently deny that there is another other than plainly stated claims that they accept as true.

The problem is not that anyone can read what is written, but the author is not there to respond to misunderstandings and misrepresentations. In the Seventh Letter Plato says:

Therefore every man of worth, when dealing with matters of worth, will be far from exposing them to ill feeling and misunderstanding among men by committing them to writing.

It is not that there is some secret teaching hidden in the dialogues meant only for initiates into the mysteries. It is, rather, that there are matters that those too attached to their beliefs would be hostile to, things that are not understand by men who are not of worth and cannot deal with matters of worth.

But Plato did write, and it would be wrong to assume he did not say anything of worth in his writings. He devised ways of keeping things from readers who are not suited to read them while making them available to those capable of interpretation and following the arguments wherever they lead. So we find statements and claims that give the impression that he or Socrates thinks or believes one thing or another only to find that he says something else elsewhere in the same or another dialogue. Even the impression that is Plato or Socrates and the problem of whether it is one or the other or both is the result of an act of concealment.

I do think Socrates works laterally in many exchanges to question a convention rather than declare something wrong outright. — Valentinus

Although the images are vertical - ascent, higher, the importance of lateral exchange should not be ignored. It is often a matter of a shift in focus or attention.

I am not sure of how cleanly the boundary between the realm of the city from the pursuit of philosophy is drawn. — Valentinus

This raises all sorts of questions. A distinction must be made between the philosopher in the Republic and actual philosophers. But this raises the question of who the philosopher is in distinction from those who call themselves or are called by others philosophers. Both actual philosophers and actual cities exist in the realm of opinion. The city regards itself as wise, but does not make the distinction between knowledge and opinion. The philosopher's knowledge of ignorance is not simply a matter of knowing he is ignorant but knowledge of what it means to think, choose, and acting in the face of his ignorance.

If the city is the cave and responsible for our opinions, is the city responsible for the philosopher? Or is philosophy something that arises contrary to the city? Is the education of the philosopher dependent on or independent of the city?

... must be dragged back into the darkness of the cave to rule a merely temporal entity. Does that sound to you like a true philosopher’s business? — Leghorn

They still spend most of their time in philosophy and return to the cave out of necessity. (540b)

The city is hostile to the philosopher precisely because the philosopher is hostile to the city—not in the way of ordinary lawbreakers, but implicitly, by calling the city’s dearest beliefs into question. — Leghorn

If the philosopher does this for the benefit of the city is this still a hostile act or a benevolent one? But here Plato puts his thumb on the scale. In the Republic the philosopher is not one who inquires but one who knows what is best for the city. The philosopher in the Republic has knowledge of the good. But, of course, this is not a true image of the philosopher. Plato makes the philosopher appear to be more beneficial to the city than he might be. Were Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle hostile to the city? Did their activities cause more harm than good? Those who wished to conserve the old ways might think they did, but if the old is not the good then it is not so clear that what they did was not for the good of the city.

Socrates knows full well that the laws don’t speak the truth! — Leghorn

As I noted earlier, both Plato's Laws and Cicero's Laws, as opposed to their Republic which takes place in the light of the sun, take place in the shade. As Strauss says succinctly:

... We seek light, we seek knowledge; shade, we seek obscurity.

Why is obscurity necessary for the Laws and not for the Republic? The answer has something to do with the fact that the Republic is a city in speech, it is theoretical, but the Laws has to do with the founding of an actual city. This is related to the theologico-political problem. On the one hand, political action requires concealment. On the other, what might be called "legal theology" or theology enacted in the laws requires that it be shaded from the light of truth. Men are lawmakers but they make it appear as though the authority for what they do lies with the gods. Nomos in the sense of custom must be honored, but as law it attempts to stand above what is customary.

Euthyphro is a distorted image of the lawmaker. Piety is for him the measure of the law. Socrates, in praying to the gods, does what is customary. But Socrates' actions are guided by his views of the just, noble, and good not by piety.

I think the over-arching point is that it would have been inconceivable for classical culture to entertain the idea that the Universe is the product of chance — Wayfarer

That assumes that they could not free themselves from the idea that the cosmos is a product. Aristotle argued that the cosmos is eternal, that it did not come into existence. The pre-Socrates explained things in terms of one or more elements. Anaximander's arche, (beginning, principle, cause) was the apeiron:

The apeiron is central to the cosmological theory created by Anaximander, a 6th-century BC pre-Socratic Greek philosopher whose work is mostly lost. From the few existing fragments, we learn that he believed the beginning or ultimate reality (arche) is eternal and infinite, or boundless (apeiron), subject to neither old age nor decay, which perpetually yields fresh materials from which everything we can perceive is derived.[4] Apeiron generated the opposites (hot–cold, wet–dry, etc.) which acted on the creation of the world (cf. Heraclitus). Everything is generated from apeiron and then it is destroyed by going back to apeiron, according to necessity.[5] He believed that infinite worlds are generated from apeiron and then they are destroyed there again.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apeiron

What counts as a causal explanation? Those who desire a reason why, a teleology, or some kind of intentional act or actor will find physical explanations inadequate.

That there is something is beyond dispute, even if there are some somethings here or out there so inclined to disagree. Why there is something cannot be answered by appeal to something, but cannot be asked if there was not something. The ability to ask a question, however, does mean that there must be a suitable answer to the question. And yet, some think that the question leads to a necessary answer. Some non-contingent being or ground of being. But of course such is not necessary. It is an expression of personal preference or a desire that there be meaning in existence. To the assumption that such meaning can be found rather than made, here too we can ask why.

He wants that his hearers believe he believes as they do ... — Leghorn

I agree. Socrates has respect for the conventional. His civic piety requires a demonstration of piety toward the gods.

... while subtly expressing doubt through his questioning, to elicit those of his audience who might rise above the conventional opinion of the citizenry. — Leghorn

This is the other side of it. When one follows the arguments, his theology, what he said about gods, leads to questioning the gods. He does this, in part, by seeming to defend the gods. If the gods are good then they cannot do what the poets say they do. Talk of the gods is displaced by talk of the just, noble, and good.

Socrates' examination of the just, noble, and good exposes a tension between convention and philosophy. The assumption of the city is that the conventional is the good. The city is hostile to philosophy because it regards it as a threat to its conventions.

In the Republic and elsewhere Socrates argues that philosophy is not a threat but the greatest good for the city. On the one hand, with justice understood as minding your own business, the just city protects the self-interests of the philosopher. On the other, although the city may be hostile to philosophy, the philosopher is not hostile to the city. She recognizes the need to protect philosophy from the city, but also recognizes an obligation to it.

For their part, I'm not sure. It could be many things -- envy, feeling threatened, bewilderment. It's something I've been keenly trying to figure out. — baker

It is a matter of his rude disregard and intolerance for views on Plato that differ from his own. The moderators have seen fit to delete many of his posts. He insists not only that his beliefs about Plato and Platonism are true and others thereby false, but that he must have the last word. He deliberately misrepresents the views of those who see things differently, and disparages influential scholars he had not read because of such things as when they were born and because they had academic associations with "socialists", not knowing they are critical of socialism.

I do not envy or feel threatened or bewildered by his derivative interpretation. If is run of the mill. The kind of thing you find in any introductory text. There are, however, scholars doing what is in my opinion much more interesting, imaginative, and insightful work. They are able to make sense of each part of the dialogue as part of the whole. They are able to show both where the dialogues connect to each other and where they differ. In my opinion one must understand both the whole and the parts and not just take parts out of context.

When I was first introduced to Plato I was very much attracted to the idea of mystical, transcendent truth, and paid little attention to Socrates' claim of ignorance. In time it began to occur to me that I knew nothing of such transcendent truths. Following the work of highly regarded scholars I came to see Plato in a very different light. Rather than imagining I was in the process of escaping the cave, I came to realize I was seeing the images that Plato was casting on the cave wall, and like the other prisoners, mistaking images for the truth.

Your petty small mindedness is something that neither Plato or anyone else can fix for you, so live in the bliss of your ignorance of your ignorance. Perhaps one day you will come to know yourself well enough to recognize how impoverished both your understanding and attitude are. If it is ever to happen the former will follow from the latter.

I want to see your Heidegger dance first, just to test your interpretive powers... — Tom Storm

Appropriately enough, in this case the dance is as inelegant as his writing. It's got a good beat though, if you like ponderous marches.

Not under the Socratic method.

Inherent in the Socratic method is the inequality of the teacher and the student, and the student's submission to the teacher. — baker

Although dialectic is depicted in the Republic as a way out of hypothesis of the Forms to knowledge of the Forms, Socrates famously says that he knows that he does not know. He did not gain knowledge of the Forms through dialectic.

↪Fooloso4 Thanks, that's an elegant summary. — Tom Storm

If you think that was elegant you should see me do interpretative dance. I do all the major philosophers.

@Tom Storm

Unfortunately, Socratic skepticism has been misrepresented in this discussion. If it is to be understood, it must be distinguished from other forms of skepticism. Two points:

Socratic skeptics make no claim about what can be known, it is rather, an awareness of what is not known.

Second, it is not a claim that extends to any and all kinds of knowledge. It does not lead to a paralysis of action or an inability to make decisions. We act and make choices, but when it comes to such things as what is good or just or noble, we do so on the basis of opinion not knowledge. The Socratic skeptic, however, does not simply settle for whatever opinion she happens to hold or has been told to hold. If there is transcendent knowledge, she is aware that she in not privy to it.

She knows she knows nothing of the soul separate from the body, but she does not simply leave it there. She questions what happens to our understanding of a human being when we divide him in two and regard only part of him, the soul, as who or what he is. She questions whether it makes sense to think that knowledge can only come from the soul apart from the body, apart from the ability to see and hear and feel. Apart from desire, for desire for Plato includes the desire to know. The location of desire, in the soul or in the body, differs in different dialogues, as, for example, the Republic, Phaedo, and Phaedrus. In some of the dialogues the soul is said to be immortal, but in the Timaeus, the soul of human beings is mortal. In addition, although in the Phaedo the soul is said to be immortal, the question of what happens to Socrates when he dies is not raised. If the soul becomes that of an ass or an ant then it is no longer Socrates' soul. Socrates, it would seem, is dead. Plato leaves it up to us to sort all this out as best we can. It is a serious mistake to take what is said in one place or another as the truth when what is said is contrary to what is said elsewhere.

As part of the examined life, she examines her opinions and the opinions of others. But such examination can only be done on the basis of opinion. The Socratic skeptic remains open to revising her opinions when it seems best to do so in light of reason and what seems to be good and true.

If anyone is reading this and is interested, I will tie some things together in order to make sense of all this.

Strauss introduces Cicero in order to make sense of the the theme of the difference between contemplation in the summer and winter. It is a theme in Cicero's own works entitled after Plato's own, Republic and Laws as well as those of Plato.

In his lectures on Cicero Strauss quotes him:

“Socrates was the first who called philosophy down from heaven, and placed it in cities, and even introduced it into the houses, and compelled it to investigate, regarding life, manners and good and bad things. Socrates’ manifold way of disputing, and the variety of subject matters, and the magnitude of mind consecrated this way of disputing to writings and thus produced a variety of dissenting philosophical schools. Out of those schools (the relevant philosophical schools), we, Cicero, have followed that school particularly, or that manner particularly, which we believe Socrates had used (namely, the dialogical) in order to conceal our opinion, in order to liberate others from error, and in order to seek in every disputation what is most similar to the truth (alt, translation: what is most probable).” Tuscan Disputations V. 6.10-11

Socrates concern was not with heavenly things, not the sun or gods or whether the sun is a god, but with the human things, both public and private, which includes what is said about the gods.

"To conceal our opinion" is what is at issue here. Socrates opinion about the gods is concealed because of his concern for the city and philosophy. This is the theme Strauss is pointing to regarding summer and winter. As with Socrates' contemplation during a military campaign, Cicero relates a story of a military campaign in the winter where a few soldiers gather in a meadow for a discussion:

A sunny place, surely. In summer they would seek the shade. Now this is the symbolism which Plato has used in the Laws. In the Laws the discussion is taking place on the hottest day of the year, the longest day of the year, a very hot day, and they seek the shade. Here they seek the sun. Now what is the meaning of that symbolism, the seeking of the shade and the seeking of the sun? It is not difficult to guess—because Cicero’s Laws, which we shall read afterwards, are a summer discussion. This is a winter discussion.

... We seek light, we seek knowledge; shade, we seek obscurity.

In Cicero's Laws:

Atticus suggests that they go to an island in the river there, and they sit down there. It is a hot day, the longest day in the year; they seek the shade and they find that shade on an island. And you understood this [is an] island of contemplation.

Plato's Laws too takes place on an island.

There is a connection made in both Plato's and Cicero's Laws between law (nomos, authoritative custom) and obscurity. As Strauss points out, the first word of Plato's Laws is "God". The laws that found a city must deal with the gods, but the gods of the city are not the cosmic gods. What Socrates says about the gods, that is, his theology, is determined by what he thinks is best for the city. But the participants in Plato's Laws are from different cities, and so, the problem of which gods is of central importance. A cosmic god who is impartial is the answer.

A few other points:

The theme of the active versus the contemplative life. In both Alcibiades story and Cicero's there is a contemplative pause within a setting of military action. Socrates prayer to the sun is not theological , not a matter of what is said, but of something done with the Ionians but not the Athenians watching.

Strauss points out that the Symposium is the only Platonic dialogue explicitly devoted to a god. It is, he adds, "of course", a Socratic dialogue. Eros was generally regarded as a god, but Socrates denies that Eros is a god. The reason has to do with eros' connection to the human.

What is going on here is not evidence that Socrates or Plato believed in a cosmic god. What is at issue is, as Cicero correctly points out, philosophy brought down from the heavens to the city, a concern with human rather than heavenly things, or, rather, a concern for heavenly things in so far as they were related to human things, for example, justice rather than piety.

Is English your first language? Not believing you does not make me a liar.

From Dictionary.com:

Discuss:
to consider or examine by argument, comment, etc.

Strauss comments in order that those who know Cicero's dialogues will consider what the story Alcibiades means. He does not spell it out, but he says enough that those who know will make the connection.

Socrates could not have acted according to what Cicero says — Apollodorus

First, what is at issue here is not a matter of how Cicero said Socrates acted. Second, it is not Alcibiades who says who how Socrates acted. Strauss points out that what is told is not even by someone who was there to hear what Alcibiades said. The dialogue is a work of fiction. But neither works of history or of fiction are bound by an author being alive at the time he writes about. Third, Cicero often discusses Socrates, referring to the works of Plato and Xenophon. The fact that he was not alive is no more relevant than the fact that we were not alive to discuss Socrates.

There are now several issues that you have ignored in your attempt to discredit me and Strauss. If you would address them you might begin to see that there is so much more here than you are aware of, beginning with what theology is for Plato and how it cannot be understood apart from political considerations.

Strauss does not discuss Cicero. — Apollodorus

Once again, he says:

That theme is known to those of you who have read Cicero's Republic and Laws. Cicero's Republic is a dialogue in winter where they seek the sun, and the Laws a dialogue in summer where they seek the shade.

Strangely, you go on to quote this but still this he is not discussing Cicero.

If his point was simply that people normally seek the shade is summer he would not have brought up Cicero.

He brings him up in response to his question:

What could that [contemplation is summer as distinguished from winter] possibly mean?

Can you answer that question?

Strauss' lecture were very popular. They were attended by professors and grad students from various departments including classics, and including those who had read Cicero's Republic and Laws. He is saying something to them that others might not understand. Do not fault him for your lack of understanding.

I have Strauss' book right in front of me. Name any page and I can quote from it any time. — Apollodorus

Good to hear that you have finally gotten around to at least obtaining one of his books, but perhaps you can get your money back. Since you do not understand him, it is of no value to you.

Prove that he doesn't say that if you can .... — Apollodorus

Prove it to you? I brought it to your attention! https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/581017

He says:

That theme [contemplation in summer as distinguished from winter] is known to those who read Cicero's Republic and Laws. — Fooloso4

This discussion started with your claim that:

Strauss admit that the Sun is a God and that Plato has a theology involving cosmic Gods like the Sun: — Apollodorus

I assume you mean that Strauss admits that the sun is a god and not that Strauss admits that the sun is a god. In either case you have misunderstood him.

He says:

Plato substitutes a natural theology for a civil theology (38)

Compare this to the charges brought against Socrates regarding the gods of the city.

If the sun is a god then it is a god without intellect.

Taking things out of content and not thinking things through leads to serious misunderstanding.

Cicero does not discuss Socrates’ praying to the Sun. — Apollodorus

And you avoid discussing what Cicero does discuss and how it relates to Strauss' discussion. But of course you cannot discuss it because you know nothing about it.

In the whole 294-page book, Strauss mentions Cicero only once, when he addresses Socrates' endurance to the heat of summer. — Apollodorus

Once again:

He says:

That theme [contemplation in summer as distinguished from winter] is known to those who read Cicero's Republic and Laws. — Fooloso4

What is the theme of contemplation in summer as distinguished from winter? What is the connection he is making between Alcibiades story and Cicero?

Strauss also says that "Plato substitutes a natural theology for a civil theology". — Apollodorus

Right, but you fail to understand the significance of this. You do not know what he means when he says that:

In the tenth book of the Laws Plato presents what one might call his theology and also his political doctrine regarding gods. It consists in a substitution of the gods of the cosmos.

He is not saying that Plato believed the sun is a god. The theology of the Laws is not separate his political doctrine in the Laws. Theology was not a matter of personal belief. For the Greeks, and for Strauss as well, the problem of the gods and the problem of the city were part of the same. But the sun is not a god of the city.

In the Apology when Meletus accuses him of declaring the sun a stone (26d) Socrates does not deny it. He points out that Anaxagoras said that, but does not say whether he agreed with him or not. Nowhere does he criticize this. In fact, his criticism of Anaxagoras was not that he did not elevate natural things like the sun to divine status but that natural things cannot be the kind of cause that Socrates sought.

Of course I have read Strauss since I am quoting from his book On Plato's Symposium. — Apollodorus

Bullshit! You searched for statements by and about Strauss so that you could argue against them, found excerpts online, and quote them out of context.

... symptoms of psychological deficiency and unscholarly methodology. — Apollodorus

You are projecting again. Your inability to directly respond to questions I raised shows you have not understood him. The only deficiencies here are your own. Your ignorance of your ignorance is a serious stumbling block.

I'll take this as an admittance that you cannot answer the questions raised and don't understand what Strauss is saying, which is not surprising since you have not actually read him.

You do not understand him and yet you think he demonstrates that he is as unimaginative and clueless. This is an example of why knowledge of your ignorance is so important. Shifting blame from where it belongs to someone else.

Yes, but a lack of imagination is not a lack of being.

Why would he mention Cicero if only to say what everyone knows and does in summer and winter?

He says:

That theme [contemplation in summer as distinguished from winter] is known to those who read Cicero's Republic and Laws.

Have you read them? Do you know the meaning of that theme is in them?

Strauss is pointing to Alcibiades' disregard for Socrates' justice and in its place his admiration of his endurance. (274)

He says:

In accordance with that [seeking the sun in summer] he prays to the sun at the end.

Do you know what this means? How is seeking the sun in summer in accordance with his prayer to the sun? Do you understand the connection between custom/law (nomos) and prayer? What do you know about the topic of prayer in the dialogues.

There is a great deal more going on in Strauss's lectures on the Symposium then one can know from taking a couple of statements out of context.

Edit: With regard to the cosmic gods versus the gods of the city look at the charges brought against Socrates.

The only ignoramus here is you! What seems to you to be a contradiction is not.

Strauss is talking about Socrates. — Apollodorus

He is talking about Socrates as depicted by Cicero. It is right there in the text if only you would look!

From what I see, some claim that Socrates could never have contemplated metaphysical realities (1) because he had a young son and (2) because the realities he was talking about don't exist .... — Apollodorus

It is never clear whether you are incapable of understanding what is said, or if you just imagine that your argument will appear to be persuasive if you deliberately misrepresent what is said.

The point about his son has nothing to do with "metaphysical realities", it has to do with how we are to evaluate what he says about pleasure and the body and the extent to which they interfere with philosophy.

Contemplation of "metaphysical realities" is not contingent on the existence of such. To contemplate does not mean that one sees the Forms or whatever your imagined "metaphysical realities" are. It is a movement toward rather than from what is hoped to be seen.

You make several good points. Recognition of our ignorance is the essential condition for philosophy. Following Thrasymachus, Gorgias, and other sophists, there are two frequent but diametrically opposed mistakes that are made. The first is that we cannot overcome our ignorance and so rhetoric and other more forceful means of persuasion are taken to be ends in themselves. The second is that our ignorance is overcome by what we are told, that knowledge can be put in the soul.

It is ironic that some claim to take what is said in the dialogue at face value and yet ignore Socrates' profession of ignorance. The reason, I think, is clear. If Socrates is ignorant regarding the things above and the things below, namely, Forms and Hades, then nothing he says about such things can be taken at face value; and so, the illusion that one has become knowledgeable based on what the dialogues say about such things cannot be maintained.

Because, if Socrates is only pretending to be ignorant, the entire process of the Dialogues is a sham. — Valentinus

Exactly, and this is why some will never even begin to understand Socratic philosophy.

Let us not forget that the sun is a cosmic god ... In the tenth book of the Laws Plato presents what one might call his theology and also his political doctrine regarding gods. It consists in a substitution of the gods of the cosmos [e.g. the Sun] for the gods of the city

- L Strauss, On Plato's Symposium, pp. 38, 277 — Apollodorus

In the first part he is not talking about Plato, he is discussing Cicero's Republic and Laws, as can be seen by looking a few lines before what you quote.

As to the second part, having never read Strauss you are bound to misunderstand what he is saying when you take things out of context. It is only when you read the tenth book of the Laws and follow the argument that you may begin to get a better idea of what his theology and political doctrine regarding the gods might be. Hint: it is a political doctrine regarding the gods being discussed in the context of establishing the laws of the city. In other words a theology (speech about the gods) suited to the city.

It's true there's no certainty on the level of discursive reasoning. — Wayfarer

And that is exactly what is required to distinguish knowledge from fanciful speculation. But, as was seen in the Phaedo, argument ends in aporia. So without the experience of being dead we have no knowledge of such things.

I think, possibly, the Platonic forms or ideas are not so remote or mysterious as many are making them out to be. — Wayfarer

Many would include Plato himself.

One clue for me is platonism in mathematics. — Wayfarer

The mathematician does not know the mathematical Forms. They are treated as hypothesis.

imagining real abstracts — Wayfarer

You make my point. Unless we know the original we do not know whether the image is really like what it is an image of.

But the counter to that is that they are the same for all who think - they're independent of any particular mind, but can only be seen by the rational faculty. — Wayfarer

We learn about triangles through images. We learn about number by counting.

But in addition to that imaginative realm there is also in Buddhism a precise definition of degrees and kinds of knowledge — Wayfarer

Again, you make my point. These are not things you know, they are things you are told about.

Imagination opens into other domains of being — Wayfarer

There is a difference between the power of imagination and imagining that what is imagained is a "domain of being".

What can replace god? Silence. — Banno

There are always those who want to eff the ineffable. They don't know what the eff they are talking about.

a thorough-going secular philosophy has no imaginative domain which corresponds with 'the mystical'. — Wayfarer

As I see it, the problem is when what is imagined is taken for what is. Plato distinguishes between truth and imagination, dreams and reality. What do you know of an imaginative domain other than what you imagine it might be?

Don't you think it's also revealing that you wish to dissociate Plato from anything religious whatever? — Wayfarer

I am speaking specifically about such things as the experience of being dead and the transcendent experience of seeing the unchanging Forms.

In contrast, the assumption that Plato spent all his life writing books, and even founded a school, for no other purpose than to preach ignorance and "aporia", seems rather unfounded and far-fetched to me. — Apollodorus

It is quite revealing that you think what Plato is doing is preaching anything at all.

It is not a matter of something preventing it, it is simply that you and I and others here have not had an experience of being dead.

One thing that puzzles me about this last statement is that it doesn't square with your efforts in other places to see Plato presenting a unified theory of the soul. — Valentinus

It also does not square with the dialogues. The dialogues do not clarify themselves in conversation.

The leap from language and discursive thought to direct experience is the very thing that is ignored. Although such an experience can be imagined, we should not make the mistake of imagining that it is our own experience.

Calling things you know nothing about "metaphysical realities" illustrates the problem. We know nothing of life before or after death. We know nothing of the separation of body and soul. The examined life requires at least enough honesty and self-awareness to admit this.

Plato did not "teach" ignorance and aporia. These are things that one must come to know on their own. The problem is, as Simmias says in the Phaedo:

“It seems to me, Socrates, as perhaps you do too, that in these matters certain knowledge is either impossible or very hard to come by in this life; but that even so, not to test what is said about them in every possible way, without leaving off till one has examined them exhaustively from every aspect, shows a very feeble spirit; on these questions one must achieve one of two things: either learn or find out how things are; or, if that's impossible, he must sail through life in the midst of danger, seizing on the best and the least refutable of human accounts, at any rate, and letting himself be carried upon it as on a raft - unless, that is, he could journey more safely and less dangerously on a more stable carrier, some divine account.” (85c-d)

Not knowing is not the goal, it is the condition within which one begins to philosophize. What is sought is the best and least refutable “human accounts”. But it is a way that is fraught with danger. And so, Socrates tells stories in the guise of "some divine account" for those who are unable to navigate the dangerous waters. Stories that will guide them in their ignorance of their ignorance. Stories that are grabbed hold of like a life saving raft, as if they have become privy to "metaphysical realities".

Since the topic of this thread is the examined life, it is appropriate once again, to examine what it is that you know in distinction from what it is you believe and why it is you believe it. One might believe that Plato's poetry is revelation, but he himself tells us otherwise. We know nothing of life before or after death or of the soul apart from the body in life. Socrates repeatedly qualifies such stories by saying things like "if these things are true" (67b). It turns out that the purification he talks about in mystical turns is nothing other than phronesis:

… and maybe moderation and justice and courage and phronesis itself are nothing but a kind of purifier. (69c)

As always, Plato returns us from the flights of imagination to our life here and now.

The problem is:

… if we can know nothing purely in the body's company, then one of two things must be true: either knowledge is nowhere to be gained, or else it is for the dead. (66e)

We are "in the body's company". Accordingly, as long as we are human beings, knowledge is nowhere to be gained. Separation from the body, to the extent it is possible while alive, is taken by some to mean asceticism. But Socrates in not an ascetic. Eros, as can be seen for example in the Symposium, is of fundamental importance to him. Rather than asceticism he advocates phonesis as the way of minimizing the distractions from philosophy. We should not overlook the fact, as we are told (60a), that Socrates, a seventy year old man, has a young son.

The examined life is not about stories of death and transcendent realities, it is a matter of self-knowledge, which means knowing that we do not know anything about such things. And so, we do not know if these are "likely stories" or "if they happen to be true". They are images on the cave wall, and when mistaken for truth bind us more securely to the cave wall.

Such people should keep away from philosophy, because studying that would only lead them to question everything, that is would only lead them to think for themselves — Janus

There is a split that goes back at least as far as Plato. On the one hand, Socrates' human wisdom is his knowledge of his ignorance, and, on the other, the philosopher-king who possesses divine wisdom.

Those who read philosophy typically stand on one or the other side of this divine - those for whom philosophy is a matter of inquiry and those for whom philosophy provides answers; those who think for themselves and those who are told what to think and believe.

In a world ruled by opinion, the task of the philosopher is twofold. On the one hand to provide necessary, useful, and salutary opinions, and, on the other, to lead those who are not satisfied with opinion to think for themselves. The road to the latter, however, is by way of the former. All along the way one must ask if this or that is something one knows and how it is that they know it.

It doesn't sound like we will be getting tans outside the cave any time soon. — Valentinus

It is very often the case that readers mistake the images Plato creates on the cave wall for their escape from the cave.

Returning to a conversation that has undergone the rigors of the dialectic in order to form better opinions can be a starting place for a new conversation. — Valentinus

Good point. Dialectic is mutually beneficial. Sooner or later, however, we have to address the claim that we can use hypothesis to free ourselves from hypothesis.

So much so that I am uncertain about what counts as divine or not within it. Thus my previous concerns about comparing different models. — Valentinus

In the Phaedo Socrates calls Homer divine. In the Iliad Homer call salt divine (9.214)

In addition to the question of what counts as divine with it there is the question of whether there is anything divine outside of the whole. Or if the whole is itself divine.

People who know, do not need the Dialectic. — Valentinus

Some think that dialectic is a method that leads to knowledge of the Forms. But how can someone know this unless they have completed the journey? That it does is something we are told not something we have experienced. It is a matter of opinion. Dialectic leads to knowledge of our ignorance. It leads us to see that philosophical inquiry leads to aporia.

There is a tension in Plato where he both points beyond us and points in the opposite direction to us, to self-knowledge as fundamental. The risk of the former is the neglect of the latter. The former is an activity of the imagination, the latter of truth about oneself. The flights of the former do not encounter resistance, the work of the latter must overcome self-resistance.

I think of the different readings of Plato in a smaller circle of comparison. Either the various and quite different approaches seen in the Dialogues were necessary in view of what Plato was attempting or they were episodes of pretense. If he could have written it all down like a system in the fashion of Proclus, the whole process of the Dialogues is a sham. — Valentinus

This raises several issues. If the whole is singular it seems reasonable to think there should be a single logos. But we do find these different approaches in the dialogues that address different aspects of the whole. Each, by bringing something to light occludes issues that come to light in another. None, however, either separately or all together, are comprehensive. Any speech of the whole must include us, the speaker. Our inability, the inability of the part, to give a comprehensive account of the whole says something not only about us but about the whole of which we are a part.

To be clear, if 'safe' is a property of the vaccine, not our knowledge of it, then the FDA are lying. — Isaac

To be clear, you are making things less clear. We cannot evaluate the safety of a vaccine without some knowledge of it. When it is said to be safe this means to the best of our knowledge. If it turns out to be less safe than the evaluation concluded that does not mean that they are lying, but that they were mistaken.

...otherwise everything can be declared 'might not be safe'. I really don't think that will help. — Isaac

Does that mean that when you say:

Nothing is without risk. — Isaac

that is not helpful?

We're talking about what level of risk people ought to accept. — Isaac

It is not so simple. When discussing communicable disease we have to consider what level of risk the community ought to accept. More and more in both the private and public sector the answer is that the risk of the vaccine is lower than the risk of an unvaccinated community.

Your use of the fact that the vaccine had been declared 'safe and effective' to argue that it ought to be taken was nonsensical because the person concerned had already said that they'd prefer to wait until it was proven more safe, a greater degree of certainty about the dangers. — Isaac

Once again you misrepresent what I said. I did not say it ought to be taken. I said I was surprised to here he was waiting. It is his choice to wait and I did not challenge that. For some perverse reason you keep returning to this. It gets us nowhere.

Because efficacy is not binomial either. — Isaac

It seems as though you do not actually know what this means. The fact that something can be more or less effective does not mean it is not effective. When the vaccine is said to be effective that does not mean that it does not significantly increase chances of a good outcome. If it did not significantly increase chances of a good outcome it would not be regarded as effective. I think you know this, but just can't help arguing.

... it is not a good risk/benefit balance for younger adults and children where they have no pre-existing vulnerability. — Isaac

At first it was thought that there was not much risk for younger people but that is no longer the true. In any case, as with any vaccine that is considered safe that does not mean that it would be helpful for everyone.

Someone was told that they ought to take the vaccine because it had passed a certain threshold of safety and efficacy. — Isaac

I suppose one advantage of being you is that you will never be lonely. You always have the voices in your head to argue with.