You just posted it. — frank

Do you mean where Socrates said "Homer put it poetically"? (94d) Socrates makes the distinction between poetry and argument several times. Homer does not present and argument. He says:

Odysseus struck his breast and rebuked his heart saying, 'Endure, my heart, you
have endured worse than this.'

Socrates uses this to claim that the soul is not a harmony of the body, but rather the soul rules over the body.

I pointed out that:

But the passage cited (Odyssey XX 17-18) is not a case of the soul ruling the bodily desire, but of the soul controlling its own anger. — Fooloso4

And:

In an earlier post I discussed the problem of soul’s desire. In both cases the divide between body and soul cannot be maintained. — Fooloso4

Who is the opponent he is addressing? We talked about this earlier (in regards to why it comes in handy to call Plato's approach idealistic). What is the existing contrast to his approach? You should know this. — frank

I don't know what you mean. If you explain it I will respond. If you mean the appropriateness of using the term 'idealistic' I have nothing further to say.

This is a middle work. It's Plato we're hearing here, not Socrates. — frank

It is all Plato we are hearing, from the early dialogues to the end, simply from the fact that he wrote the dialogues. We cannot make a clear distinction between where he might be repeating what Socrates said and where he is not. Some scholars have attempted to do this, but others reject this approach. One thing is clear: With the possible exception of what he wrote while awaiting the poison, Socrates did not write anything and Plato never speaks in the dialogues. In this dialogue attention is drawn to the fact that he was not present. Xenophon also wrote Socratic dialogues. His dialogues differ from Plato's, even when they are writing about the same thing. Compare, for example, Plato's Symposium and Xenophon's.

In what sense was Plato conservative?

I don't think he was. You said:

So maybe Plato is showing off the conservatism of the gentry? — frank

And I responded:

As a student of Socrates a case would have to be made that he is conservative. — Fooloso4

Plato was an aristocrat but not a conservative. He was truly a revolutionary. Socrates was not an aristocrat but was a revolutionary.

Holy crap, man. — frank

Is this what stands as an argument for you? You have not told me why it makes a difference to our understanding of the text if Socrates was alone in calling Homer divine. It is right there in the text. No one who heard it disagreed or found it odd for him to have said this.

One of the things one could do is analyze the argument that Homer affirms that the soul can be separated from the body. — frank

Where in the dialogue is it? Stephanus number?

Who is Plato arguing with here? — frank

Where?

Who was the great Athenian law giver? — frank

What is the relevance to the dialogue? Again, a stephanus reference would be helpful.

So maybe Plato is showing off the conservatism of the gentry? — frank

See above. As a student of Socrates a case would have to be made that he is conservative. Socrates certainly was not.

None of these things speak to the specifics of your claim that my conclusions are odd. None of them speak to your point that the Greeks did not deify Homer.

The setting of the work is Socrates last day. If you think that any conclusion I have arrived at is odd then I would welcome a discussion of it. The fact is what he called Homer divine. If I am wrong that others did not regard him this way what difference does that make?

And how does this relate to my analysis of the Phaedo?

From the article cited:

"The Hellenistic portrait belongs to another category. The heavy, archaizing locks framing the face, the fillet containing the hair rolled up in the back—also an archaizing trait—and the full, heavy beard all conjure up the majestic aura of a god."

Mention is also made in the Archelaos Relief , also known as, "Apotheosis of Homer":
http://www.hellenicaworld.com/Greece/Art/Ancient/en/HomerArchelaos.html

The point that should not be lost is that Socrates called him the "divine poet" in the Phaedo and in the Ion calls him the "best and most divine".

This is not the place to get into the concept of apotheosis. Here is a short quote from Wiki before I move on:

Apotheosis is the glorification of a subject to divine level and most commonly, the treatment of a human like a god.

No. That was simply the first thing that came up on search. For a more scholarly source:
https://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft3f59n8b0&chunk.id=d0e3428&toc.depth=1&toc.id=d0e3009&brand=ucpress

https://sententiaeantiquae.com/2018/07/05/homer-divine-not-human/

A comment made by Valentinus about Cebes got me thinking about why Plato chose to use him to play such an important part in Socrates’ last dialogue with his friends.

Early on Socrates makes a comment that will pr

ove to be ironic:

'There goes Cebes, always hunting down arguments, and not at all willing to accept at once
what anyone may say.' (63a)

As we have seen, this is in part true but in part not. There are things he readily accepts but he keeps returning to the same questions. There is a peculiar mixture of remembering and forgetting. It is Cebes who remembers Socrates’ story of recollection, but he loses the scent of the current argument. He is a lover of philosophy, but not a philosopher. He is like the lover of music who is not musical. He admires what the philosophers have to say, but seems incapable of making the “greatest music”. (61a)

The danger of misologic leads to the question of who will keep Socratic philosophy alive? Put differently, philosophy needs genuine philosophers and not just scholars.

Socrates turns from the problem of sound arguments to the soundness of those who make and judge arguments. He now introduces what is an all too common problem:

I run the risk of being in a mood not to love wisdom but to love victory., as do altogether uneducated people … I won’t put my heart into making what I say seem to be true to those present, except as a side effect, but into making it seem to be the case to me myself as much as possible. (91a).

What Socrates is saying here may not be what he seems to be saying. He is not saying that he is not interested in “making the weaker argument stronger” so as to gain victory. He is not going to try to persuade others, but to persuade himself that what he says seems to be true. Now persuading himself that what he says seems to be true is very different from attempting to say what seems to be true. It appears as if he is taking his own advice when he tells Cebes and Simmias that they themselves might be the most capable of singing their own incantations about death.

If this is correct, then what he is recommending is that sound arguments be put aside and in their place songs to make the soul sound. That something like this is what he has in mind is confirmed by what he goes on to say:

For I am calculating - behold how self-servingly!- that if what I’m saying happens to be true, I’m well off believing it; and if there’s nothing at all for one who’s met his end, well then, I’ll make myself so much less unpleasant with lamenting to those who are present during this time, the time before my death. (91b)

Here, for the first time, Socrates suggests that there might be nothing at all for those who die, that they have met their end. The timing is important, coming immediately after the questioning of the ability of arguments to establish the truth.

Socrates returns to the argument but, following Cebes example of the weaver, introduces a new definition of death:

… this very thing is death - perishing of soul (91d)

Socrates once again returns to recollection, and both Cebes and Simmias agrees that:

… our soul is somewhere else earlier, before she is bound within the body (92a)

With this agreement Socrates returns to Simmias’ argument that the soul is a tuning. It is only with this being agreed on that Socrates is able to dispute Simmias’ argument that the soul is an attunement.

But see which of the two arguments you prefer - that learning is recollection or soul a tuning
(92c)

Socrates argues that the soul cannot be an attunement if the tuning existed prior to what is tuned. But
there is an argument that Socrates neglects to pursue. 'Tuned and Untuned'. The tuning of a lyre exists apart from any particular lyre. It is the same relationship between the Equal and things that are equal, and the Beautiful or Just and things that are beautiful or just. In accord with that argument the Tuning of the Lyre still exists, but the tuning of a particular lyre does not endure once that lyre is destroyed. Why does he neglect this? The consequence would be the death of the soul along with the body.

Then is this the same with soul? Is one soul, even in the slightest degree, more fully and more so than another, or less fully and less so this very thing - a soul? (93b)

Simmias denies this, but note the shift from ‘soul’ to ‘one soul’ and 'a soul'. If death is the “perishing of soul” then a soul, the one that perishes, is to the greatest degree "less fully a soul".

'Well, but is one soul said to have intelligence and virtue and to be good, while another is said to have thoughtlessness and wickedness and to be bad? And are we right in saying those things?'

'Quite right.'

'Then what will any of those who maintain that soul is attunement say these things are, existing in our souls- virtue and vice? Are they, in turn, a further attunement and non-attunement? And is one soul, the good one, tuned, and does it have within itself, being an attunement, a further attunement, whereas the untuned one is just itself, and lacking a further attunement within it?' (93c)

The proper analogy to good and bad souls would be good and bad tunings. Good and bad, virtue and vice, are not things in the soul, they are conditions of the soul, just as sharp and flat are conditions of an attunement. A good soul would be a well tuned soul and a bad soul a poorly tuned one.

'And moreover, since this is her condition, one soul couldn’t partake of vice or of virtue any more fully than another, if in fact vice is to be lack of tuning and virtue tuning? (93e)

Socrates has intentionally jumbled terms and Simmias is unable to disentangle them. Attunement itself cannot be non-attunement just as Equal itself cannot be unequal, but just as equal things are more or less equal, attuned things are more or less in tune.

Therefore it follows from this argument of ours that all souls of all living beings will similarly be good if in fact it’s similarly the nature of souls to be this very thing - souls. (94a)

The argument is as follows: soul is an attunement, vice is lack of attunement, and so the soul cannot be bad and still be a soul because it would no longer be an attunement. What is missing from the argument is that being in or out of tune is a matter of degree. Vice is not the absence of tuning but bad tuning.

Socrates closes this discussion by citing the authority of Homer, the “Divine Poet” (95a). Homer for the Greeks has been made divine, a god, apotheosis. Socrates appeals to Homer’s divine authority or less gloriously, to the authority of the poet rather than the strength of argument. He uses Homer’s authority in support of his argument against attunement on the grounds of the separation of body and soul, and the rule of the soul over the body. But the passage cited (Odyssey XX 17-18) is not a case of the soul ruling the bodily desire, but of the soul controlling its own anger. In an earlier post I discussed the problem of soul’s desire. In both cases the divide between body and soul cannot be maintained.

Which raises the question, maybe not relevant to this particular passage, why Socrates was accused of atheism, if he saw himself as a disciple of Apollo. — Wayfarer

A major theme of the dialogue is phronesis. If Socrates was an atheist how prudent would it be for him to admit it? His concern is threefold: what this would mean for him, what it would mean for others, and what it would mean for philosophy if he openly professed atheism. We have seen what it meant for Socrates. What it means for philosophy is a perennial problem. There are always those ready to condemn and censor. What it means for others depends on the person. This is something Socrates will address.

In 85B, Socrates likens himself to the followers of Apollo but speaks for himself at the same time. — Valentinus

In the Apology:

"And now I wish to prophesy to you, O ye who have condemned me; for I am now at the time when men most do prophesy, the time just before death. (39c)

He speaks here in his own name.

I checked a few other translations. I think I misread the one I used:

"I possess prophetic power from my master no less than theirs ..."

This means prophetic powers that are not less than theirs, that is Apollo, not from some other master.

Fooloso4 So - who is the reference to? — Wayfarer

The swans owe their prophetic power to Apollo. Socrates says: "I hold that I myself am a fellow-servant of the swans, consecrated to the same god ..." which would seem to indicate that his master was Apollo. But (and with Plato there is always more to it) he goes on to say: "... that I possess prophetic power from my master no less than theirs" Which indicates that it is not Apollo.

Short answer: I don't know.

Plato's own Greek terms were often varied and indeterminate. Plato deliberately did not employ precise or just consistent meanings throughout his works or even within the same dialogue.

Why? Perhaps his philosophy was a work in progress with many problems and hypothesized solutions still open in his mind. He suggested many alternatives for discussion or debate but certainly not for fixed single-minded interpretation. Although Plato's philosophy can be partially reconstituted for a single dialogue as implied by the setting, events, and characters portrayed. — magritte

I agree. This openness is a reflection of his zetetic skepticism. Knowing that he does not know he inquires. The other half of his openness may at first seem to be its opposite. The dialogues frequently end in aporia.

Plato brings an intimacy that is special to the dialogues. A chance to be there when they were. — Valentinus

Many who are taught to read philosophy are taught to pay attention only to the arguments. With Plato the setting, characters, and action are all essential elements.

I possess prophetic power from my master.

His 'daemon'? — Wayfarer

In the works of Plato Socrates daemon only warned him away when from doing things. One argument he made is that if death were bad he would have been warned.

In the first section of my reading I discussed Plato's absence. I will have a bit more to say toward the end.

We might still know of Socrates through Xenophon and Aristophanes, but although Xenophon had his admirers, including Machiavelli, he is not held in the same high esteem or enjoy the same popularity as Plato. From Xenophon we know of Socrates as a comic figure hanging from a basket in the Clouds.

Socrates is well aware of the weakness of his arguments:

Certainly, in many ways it’s still open to suspicions and counterattacks - if, that is, somebody’s going to go through it sufficiently. (84c)

This kind of hint should not be overlooked. Plato is well aware that the arguments will not persuade somebody who is going to go through it sufficiently. We see here that he is writing to two different audiences: those who in one way or another will benefit from hearing his “songs” and those who will not be charmed. Socrates will himself make this distinction.

Instead of another argument Socrates says:

… you must, it seems, think I have a poorer power of prophecy than the swans, who when they realize they must die, then sing more fully and sweetly than they've ever sung before, for joy that they are departing into the presence of the god whose servants they are. (84e-85a)

This is Socrates’ swan song. Interlaced with all his arguments are his songs, his music.

I believe, because, belonging as they do to Apollo, they are prophetic birds with foreknowledge of the blessings of Hades, and therefore sing and rejoice more greatly on that day than ever before. Now I hold that I myself am a fellow-servant of the swans, consecrated to the same god, that I possess prophetic power from my master no less than theirs, and that I'm departing this life with as good a cheer as they do. No; so far as that goes, you should say and ask whatever you wish, for as long as eleven Athenian gentlemen allow.' (85b)

There is something comical about Socrates’ likening himself to the swans. He is, by all descriptions, not at all like a swan in appearance.

It seems to me, Socrates, as perhaps you do too, that in these matters certain knowledge is either impossible or very hard to come by in this life; but that even so, not to test what is said about them in every possible way, without leaving off till one has examined them exhaustively from every aspect, shows a very feeble spirit; on these questions one must achieve one of two things: either learn or find out how things are; or, if that's impossible, he must sail through life in the midst of danger, seizing on the best and the least refutable of human accounts, at any rate, and letting himself be carried upon it as on a raft - unless, that is, he could journey more safely and less dangerously on a more stable carrier, some divine account. (85c-d)

Later Socrates will talk about his “second sailing”. For the moment I will note only a few things. There is pilot in control of the raft. It goes wherever it is takes. Short of knowledge, what is sought is the best and least refutable “human accounts”. He is fully aware that these accounts may not bring them safely to where they want to go. As an alternative he proposes “some divine account”. This safe account is one that is accepted, but does not stand up to exhaustive examination. They are stories that calm men’s fears and give them courage. Like Socrates’ prophetic swan song.

Simmas:

...'one could surely use the same argument about the attunement of a lyre and its strings, and say that the attunement is something unseen and incorporeal and very lovely and divine in the tuned lyre, while the lyre itself and its strings are corporeal bodies and composite and earthy and akin to the mortal. Now, if someone smashed the lyre, or severed and snapped its strings, suppose it were maintained, by the same argument as yours, that the attunement must still exist and not have perished-because it would be inconceivable that when the strings had been snapped, the lyre and the strings themselves, which are of mortal nature, should still exist, and yet that the attunement, which has affinity and kinship to the divine and the immortal, should have perished … (86a-b)

This is an argument that deserves closer attention, but rather than respond immediately Socrates gives Cebes a chance to voice his objection to Socrates’ argument. Cebes says that he too, like Simmias, must make use of “some sort of likeness” (87b) The making of a likeness or image, the use of the imagination, eikasia, plays an important but often overlooked role in the dialogues. The reoccurring play of images operates throughout the dialogues on many levels.

Cebes draws the likeness: the soul is to the body as a weaver is to his cloak.

'The relation of soul to body would, I think, admit of the same comparison: anyone making the same points about them, that the soul is long-lived, while the body is weaker and shorter-lived, would in my view argue reasonably; true indeed, he might say, every soul wears out many bodies, especially in a life of many years-because, though the body may decay and perish while the man is still alive, still the soul will always weave afresh what's being worn out; nevertheless, when the soul does perish, it will have to be wearing its last garment, and must perish before that one alone; and when the soul has perished, then at last the body will reveal its natural weakness,moulder away quickly, and be gone. (88d-e)

Simmias’ and Cebes’ arguments have shaken the confidence of the others.

Phaedo:

Who knows, we might be worthless judges, or these matters themselves might even be beyond trust. (88c)

Echecrates:

'What argument shall we ever trust now? (88d)

Simmias’ likeness of a raft in dangerous waters was prophetic. Can Socrates restore their trust in arguments? This is an issue of grave concern. Socrates suggests they should be in mourning if the argument cannot be brought back to life. (89b) Socrates makes the problem explicit:

“So that we don’t become haters of argument (misologic), as some become haters of human beings (misanthropic); for it is not possible for anyone to experience a greater evil than hating arguments. Hatred of arguments and hatred of human beings comes about in the same way, For hatred of human beings arises from artlessly trusting somebody to excess, and believing that human being to be in every way true and sound and trustworthy, and then a little later discovering that this person is wicked and untrustworthy - and then having this experience again with another. And whenever someone experiences this many times, and especially in the hands of just those he might regard as his most intimate friends and comrades, he then ends up taking offense all the time and hates all human beings and believes there’s nothing at all sound in anybody. (89d)

… when someone trusts some argument to be true without the art of arguments, and then a little later the argument seems to him to be false, as it sometimes is and sometimes isn’t, and this happens again and again with one argument after another. And, as you know, those especially who’ve spent their days in debate-arguments end up thinking the’ve become the wisest of men and that they alone have detected that there’s nothing sound or stable - not in the realm of either practical matter or arguments - but all the things that are simply toss to and fro, as happens in the Euripus, and don’t stay put anywhere for any length of time. (90b-c)

I think that this is a remarkable demonstration of the power of Plato’s insight into human psychology.

The danger here is that they may come to believe that philosophy has failed them. Socrates is about to die because he practiced philosophy and nothing he has said has convinced them that he will be better off for having practiced it. It is because of Socrates that they came to love philosophy, but it may be that philosophy cannot do what they expect of it. They are in danger of misologic, hating what they once loved.

Furthermore, there's a counter-argument that the living are simply the natural descendants of other living creatures — Wayfarer

Right. I pointed this out. The opposite of soul is body, which would mean that the soul comes from body.

This got me thinking about why Plato chose Cebes to be a major participant in this dialogue. I will be trying to tie some things together in an upcoming post.

'You're right, Simmias,' said Cebes. 'It seems that half, as it were, of what is needed has been shown-that our soul existed before we were born; it must also be shown that it will exist after we've died, no less than before we were born, if the demonstration is going to be complete. (77b)

Cebes does not remember what went before, the cyclical claim about life and death he had agreed to. Socrates reminds them that it has been demonstrated, but is willing to go through it again. Their fears, he says, are childish. (77e) We might then wonder whether Socrates will attempt to persuade them the way one might persuade a child. And sure enough, that is exactly what Cebes asks him to do:

'Try to reassure us, Socrates, as if we were afraid; or rather, not as if we were afraid ourselves-but maybe there's a child inside us, who has fears of that sort. Try to
persuade him, then, to stop being afraid of death, as if it were a bogey-man.' (77e)

Cebes is too manly to admit that he is afraid of death.

What you should do,’ said Socrates, ‘is to sing him incantations each day until you sing away his fears.’
Then where, Socrates,’ he said, ‘are we to get hold of a good singer of such incantations, since you,’ he said, ‘are abandoning us?’ (77e-78a)

There are a few things here to note. First, Socrates tells him to sing his own incantations to sing away his fears. Second, Cebes sounds like a child when he accuses Socrates of abandoning them. Third, it appears that he really does not want proofs and demonstrations but incantations to charm away his fears. I think this is why they are so ready to accept what really are weak arguments. It may be why some readers are so ready to accept them as well.

'Greece is a large country, Cebes, which has good men in it, I suppose; and there are many foreign races too. You must ransack all of them in search of such a singer, sparing neither money nor toil, because there isn’t anything more necessary on which to spend your money. And you yourselves must search too, along with one another; you may not easily find anyone more capable of doing this than yourselves.' (78a)

Socrates says they could search both Greece and foreign cultures to find a singer of incantations to spend their money on. In the earlier passage on purification he also abruptly talks in terms of monetary exchange, but suggests that thoughtfulness is the genuine coin for which and with which all things must be bought and sold. The incantational songs are the Greek and foreign mysteries and mythologies.

But Socrates says that they are not needed, that there is no one and no song more capable of preparing them for death than themselves by their own thoughtfulness, courage, moderation, justice, and true virtue.

At Cebes urging they return to the point they left off. Socrates uses an argument that Descartes will borrow:

'Then is it true that what has been put together and is naturally composite is liable to undergo this, to break up at the point at which it was put together; whereas if there be anything incomposite, it alone is liable, if anything is, to escape this?' (78c)

Cebes agrees.

Then aren’t those very things that are always self-same and keep to the same condition most likely to be non-composites; and aren’t those that vary from one moment to another and are never in the self-same condition likely to be composites? (78c)

Cebes forgets about “the child inside us”. Their fear of death and turmoil at Socrates’ impending death are at odds with something that is always self-same and keeps to the same condition.

Socrates now returns to the discussion of Being, the Equal itself, the Beautiful itself, what is invariant and constant, and contrasts them with the many beautiful things and equal objects, that is, things that change. (78d-e)

'Now these things you could actually touch and see and sense with the other senses, couldn't you, whereas those that are constant you could lay hold of only by reasoning of the intellect; aren't such things, rather, invisible and not seen?'
'What you say is perfectly true.'
'Then would you like us to posit two forms of things that are - the Visible and the Unseen?'
'Let's posit them.'
'And the unseen is always constant, whereas the seen is never constant?' (79a)

Cebes agrees, no doubt he has heard Socrates talk about the Forms. But the distinction between the visible and intelligible realm in the Republic is not the same as the distinction between the visible and unseen. Obviously, not everything that is unseen is unchangeable.

In accord with this distinction Socrates divides body and soul, here and There, the senses and thoughtfulness, master and slave, divine and mortal.

'Whereas whenever it studies alone by itself, the soul departs yonder towards that which is pure and always existent and immortal and unvarying, and in virtue of its kinship with it, enters always into its company, whenever it has come to be alone by itself, and whenever it may do so; then it has ceased from its wandering and, when it is about those objects, it is always constant and unvarying, because of its contact with things of a similar kind; and this condition of it is called "phronesis", is it not?' (79d)

I left the Greek term phronesis untranslated here. The online translation uses ‘wisdom’, Brann uses ‘thoughtfulness’. It is commonly translated as ‘practical wisdom’ or ‘prudence’. Brann’s choice is intended to distinguish phronesis from sophia, that is, wisdom and to emphasize thatphronesis, “ … in spite of its strong connotation with the heights of intellectual vision in this dialogue, refer in its most basic meaning to a thoroughly healthy state of mind - to good sense and sound judgment”.


What Socrates here calls ‘ phronesis’ is instead the state of the soul separated from the body. The condition Socrates elsewhere calls death. The attempted division does not hold. Practical wisdom is about living, the union of body and soul. The soul alone has no use for phronesis or thoughtfulness. We should recall that Socrates previously said that knowledge of things themselves, the Forms, is only possible, if possible at all, in death. Despite the high flown language, Socrates’ feet remain firmly on the ground, tethered byphronesis.

Don't you think the divine is naturally adapted for ruling and domination, whereas the mortal is adapted for being ruled and for service?'
'I do.'(80a)

It is instructive to compare this with the divisions of the soul in the Republic. A tripartite soul undermines the argument for a unitary soul. The problem of self-rule in the Republic is not a matter of competition between the body and soul, but takes place within the soul itself and introduces an element that is absent here: thumos or spiritedness, the love of honor and recognition, loyalty, anger, defensiveness, and so on. With the split between body and soul desire, eros, is atopos, without a place. Socrates has tied it to the body, but philosophy, the love of wisdom is described in the Symposium as eros and is not a bodily desire. Is eros then an in between, between body and soul?


The assertion of separation and the unchangeable nature of soul now becomes more doubtful:

'Whereas, I imagine, if it is separated from the body when it has been polluted and made impure, because it has always been with the body, has served and loved it, and been so bewitched by it, by its passions and pleasures, that it thinks nothing else real save what is corporeal-what can be touched and seen, drunk and eaten, or used for sexual enjoyment-yet it has been accustomed to hate and shun and tremble before what is obscure to the eyes and invisible, but
intelligible and grasped by philosophy; do you think a soul in that condition will be released herself all by herself and unadulterated ?' (81b)

Cebes agrees. Previously he agreed that the soul is unchangeable but he has changed his unseen mind.

What happens next seems to undo what has been done. The immutable human soul can become the soul of donkeys and other animals of this sort, or wolves and falcons and hawks, or bees or wasps or ants. (82a -b)

The problem is obvious. What happens to the human soul? The soul of these animals is not a human soul. Such transformation is contrary to the claim of an immutable human soul. But Socrates does not stop there. The soul of the philosopher may enter the class of the gods (82c)

I will leave him to address your concerns - yet again — Amity

I won't. When he deliberately alters what I have said, as he has done and elsewhere, I no longer respond. Disagreement is one thing, dishonesty another. Disagreement I address, dishonesty I call out and the conversation ends.

Plato's views are called idealism by professionals. — frank

There are different schools of thought. There are also many scholars who avoid the use of anachronistic terminology. The idea is, to the extent it is possible, to understand an author on his own terms using his own terminology.

I'm trying to understand why that's significant to you. — frank

As a general interpretive principle I think it best to minimize the use of anachronistic terminology.

So, what do you mean when you say Socrates 'demystifies' these virtues etc? — Wayfarer

... moderation and justice and courage and thoughtfulness itself are nothing but a kind of purifier.

It is this kind of purification that is needed for those who arrive in Hades.

I think it’s better described as objective idealism. That is, Ideas or Forms are real, in that they’re not dependent on your or my mind, but they’re only graspable by a rational intelligence. — Wayfarer

Why call it idealism at all? Is everything that is grasped by a rational intelligence a form of idealism? Is mathematics a form of idealism?

In the Idealism article. — frank

The article continues:

"Although we have just referred to Plato, the term “idealism” became the name for a whole family of positions in philosophy only in the course of the eighteenth century."

Yes, it's ontological idealism. — frank

Neither term existed then.

I don't agree that his intent is to demystify. — Wayfarer

Here are the quoted terms from 69c-d in context and bolded, starting with what I quoted above with a break in the paragraph. It is one paragraph though without a break.

… maybe this alone is the right coin for virtue, the coin for which all things must be exchanged - thoughtfulness. Maybe this is the genuine coin for which and with which all things must be bought and sold; and maybe courage and moderation and justice and true virtue as a whole are only when accompanied by thoughtfulness, regardless of whether pleasures and terrors and all other such things are added or subtracted … and maybe moderation and justice and courage and thoughtfulness itself are nothing but a kind of purifier.

And it looks as if these people who initiated our mythic rites weren't a bunch of bunglers but spoke with a genuine hidden meaning when they said long ago that whoever arrives in Hades ignorant of the mysteries and uninitiated will lie in Muck, but he who arrives there purified and initiated will dwell with gods.

The purification is as he identifies it, moderation and justice and courage and thoughtfulness.

78c-79a, 80b)

In due time.

Demystify that! — Wayfarer

Socrates has done it for me, but I do not want to get ahead of myself.

Plato was neither a realist nor idealist. The terms were not used and do not fit. What we take to be the real world was said to be an image of the Forms. The Forms are independent of the human mind.

Idealism vs realism, yes. — frank

I think this is anachronistic.

In fact, I think there's a kind of 'anti-Christian' bias that is often at play - the wish to deny the religious or metaphysical dimension in the dialogues so as to project the kind of Plato that is more harmonious with this secular age. — Wayfarer

The following from my last posted reading:

… maybe this alone is the right coin for virtue, the coin for which all things must be exchanged - thoughtfulness. Maybe this is the genuine coin for which and with which all things must be bought and sold; and maybe courage and moderation and justice and true virtue as a whole are only when accompanied by thoughtfulness, regardless of whether pleasures and terrors and all other such things are added or subtracted … and maybe moderation and justice and courage and thoughtfulness itself are nothing but a kind of purifier. (69 b-c)

Socrates demystifies “mystic rites”, “genuine hidden meaning”, “mysteries”, and “purification”. (69c-d) The practice of dying and being dead turns out to be the practice of a life of moderation and justice and courage. — Fooloso4

For Plato, and others, there is a something more... a reification fo the use of "equal" — Banno

In my opinion, which is certainly not original, the Forms are themselves images rather than, as he says, what things are images of. But that is a discussion for another time.

I find it odd that Cebes seems convinced by the argument at (72 b-d). — Banno

I will be addressing his eagerness to agree in my next section. As I see it, it has little or nothing to do with the strength of the argument.

Gotta love a cliffhanger... — Banno

I would throw in some sex but Socrates already said the philosopher has not interest. Although, as I mentioned, at seventy years old he had a young son.

Wayfarer already answered that. It isn't my fault that you don't read other people's posts. — Apollodorus

Actually I read it. And I responded. It is your fault for not reading other people's posts.

The Republic 509D-513E — Apollodorus

This does not support your claim of a Cosmic Mind

I am not surprised to see this in Apollodorus, having observed a habit of first forming a conclusion and then looking for the arguments that might support it. — Banno

The same occurred to me but decided not to give him something else to turn into an extended rant about Marxism and liberals.

I think part of the attraction to Plato is the lack of interpretative consensus. Each year, after all this time, hundreds of books and articles are published on Plato. One would think that if a consensus existed none of that would be necessary.

Thank you.

Many Platonists today look to Plato for religious and quasi-religious answers,often of the Christian variety.

Plato naturally preferred to convey his teachings orally — Apollodorus

We know nothing of his oral teachings. I asked you to provide authentication of any oral teaching. You could not.

You seem to deny both the scholarly consensus and the Platonic tradition itself. — Apollodorus

I deny that there is a scholarly consensus. The fact that you think there is shows that you really do not know what is going on today.

There has been an important reappraisal in the way the dialogues are read. Influential figures are Jacob Klein and Leo Strauss, and his students including Alan Bloom, Stanley Rosen, Thomas Pangle, and Seth Benardete, and their students, including Charles Griswold, Rhonna Burger, David Roochnik, Laurence Lampert , and many others.

then you can read into the dialogues anything you like and you don't need a discussion. — Apollodorus

It is evident that you have not been reading what I have written and have not checked it against the text. You have not made even one specific textual comment on anything I have said. Show me where what I have said cannot be confirmed by the text. I asked you to provide textual evidence for your claim but you have not been able to. Instead of point to Plato's texts you cast about elsewhere.

Socrates wraps up his defense by saying:

… maybe this alone is the right coin for virtue, the coin for which all things must be exchanged - thoughtfulness. Maybe this is the genuine coin for which and with which all things must be bought and sold; and maybe courage and moderation and justice and true virtue as a whole are only when accompanied by thoughtfulness, regardless of whether pleasures and terrors and all other such things are added or subtracted … and maybe moderation and justice and courage and thoughtfulness itself are nothing but a kind of purifier. (69 b-c)

Socrates demystifies “mystic rites”, “genuine hidden meaning”, “mysteries”, and “purification”. (69c-d) The practice of dying and being dead turns out to be the practice of a life of moderation and justice and courage.

Cebes breaks in:

Socrates, the rest seems to me to be beautifully put, but what you say about the soul induces a lot of distrust in human beings. They fear that the soul, once she is free of the body, is no longer anywhere, and is destroyed and perishes on that very day when a human being dies; and that as soon as she’s free of the body and departs, then, scattered like breath or smoke, she goes fluttering off and is no longer anywhere. Of course, if she could be somewhere, herself by herself, collected together and freed from those evils you went through just now, there'd be a great hope - a beautiful hope - that what you say, Socrates, is true. But this point that the soil is when the human being dies and holds onto both some power and thoughtfulness - probably stands in need of more than a little persuasive talk and assurance.(70a)

Cebes hopefulness amounts to saying that if what Socrates says, that the soul is somewhere herself by herself, is true then is true. Cebes states it in such a way that the latter follows as a conclusion from the former, but both state the same thing.

Socrates responds:

What you say is true, Cebes, but now what should we do? Or do you want us to tell a more thorough story about these things to see whether what we’re saying is likely or not?” (70a-b)

Socrates proposes telling a more thorough story in order to see if the stories he has told are likely or not. He shifts from Cebes ‘true’ to ‘likely’. He proposes to “investigate it in some such was as this”. (70c)

… do the souls of men exist in Hades when they have died, or do they not? Now there's an
ancient doctrine, which we've recalled, that they do exist in that world, entering it from this one, and that they re-enter this world and are born again from the dead; yet if this is so, if living people are born again from those who have died, surely our souls would have to exist in that world? Because they could hardly be born again, if they didn't exist; so it would be sufficient evidence for the truth of these claims, if it really became plain that living people are born from the dead and from nowhere else; but if that isn't so, some other argument would be needed.' (70c-d)

But, of course, some other argument is needed. The living come from the living. The argument that life comes from death requires a soul that does not come to be or die. Now perhaps a soul separate from the senses, a priori, might think that the living come from the dead, but our experience informs us that we are born of living parents.

Socrates now shifts from living things to beauty and ugly, just and unjust, larger and smaller. It should be noted that he mentions justice and beauty but not the good. According to the argument, doing good would result in doing bad. (70e)

In the Republic Socrates says that the Good: "provides the truth to the things known and gives the power to the one who knows". It is "the cause of the knowledge and truth". Further, "existence and being" are the result of the Good. (508e - 509b)

The argument from opposites concludes with the claim that this movement must be circular:

And similarly, my dear Cebes, if all things that partake in life were to die, but when they'd died, the dead remained in that form, and didn't come back to life, wouldn't it be quite inevitable that everything would ultimately be dead, and nothing would live? Because if the living things came to be from the other things, but the living things were to die, what could possibly prevent everything from being completely spent in being dead?' (72 b-d)

Perhaps Cebes is persuaded by this, but it assumes what is still to be proven, the continuation of the soul in death, and ignores the obvious fact of generation of life from the living.

'Yes, and besides, Socrates,' Cebes replied, 'there's also that argument you're always putting forward, that our learning is actually nothing but recollection; according to that too, if it's true, what we are now reminded of we must have learned at some former time. But that would be impossible, unless our souls existed somewhere before being born in this human form; so in this way too, it appears that the soul is something deathless.' (72e-73a)

Two points to be noted here. Socrates just went through this long argument from opposites, how life comes from death, but if the soul is deathless then it could not come to be or become again from its opposite.

Second, note the qualification: “if it is true”. Simmias does not share Cebes enthusiasm. He does not place his hope in the possibility that it might be true. He wants to be reminded of the demonstrations that it is true. There is a play here between recollection and remembering.

'One beautiful argument,' said Cebes, 'is that when people are questioned, and if the questions are well put, they state the truth about everything for themselves-and yet unless knowledge and a correct account were present within them, they'd be unable to do this; thus, if one takes them to diagrams or anything else of that sort, one has there the plainest evidence that this is so.' (73b)

He is referring to the demonstration in the Meno where a slave without any education is able to solve a complex geometric problem. Cebes mentions but seems to fail to recognize the importance of Socrates’ “well put” questions. Without them the slave would have never “recollected” the solution. The irony here should not go unnoticed. An overarching question of the dialogue is about teaching and learning. Socrates teaches him how to solve the problem and yet claims it was recollection. This is not the place to get into it, but the difference between Meno’s problem, teaching virtue to someone like Meno who is lacking in virtue and teaching someone geometry is very different. There is a sense in which virtue must already be in the soul if one is ever to be virtuous, but it is not evident that the same holds for mathematical knowledge.

Socrates breaks in:

'But if that doesn't convince you, Simmias, then see whether maybe you agree if you look at it this way. Apparently you doubt whether what is called "learning" is recollection?'

'I don't doubt it,' said Simmias; 'but I do need to undergo just what the argument is about, to be "reminded". Actually, from the way Cebes set about stating it, I do almost recall it and am nearly
convinced; but I'd like, none the less, to hear now how you set about stating it yourself.'

'I'll put it this way. We agree, I take it, that if anyone is to be reminded of a thing, he must have known that thing at some time previously.'

'Certainly.'

'Then do we also agree on this point: that whenever knowledge comes to be present in this sort of way, it is recollection?

He goes on to give an example of recollection:

'Well now, you know what happens to lovers, whenever they see a lyre or cloak or anything else their loves are accustomed to use: they recognize the lyre, and they get in their mind, don't they, the form of the boy whose lyre it is? And that is recollection. Likewise, someone seeing Simmias is often reminded of Cebes, and there'd surely be countless other such cases.'(73b-d)

There seems to be no distinction here between recollection and being reminded of something. In the example given recollection is independent of stories of death. Socrates now shifts from things perceived to “the equal itself”. (74a).

'But still, it is from those equals, different as they are from that equal, that you have thought of and got the knowledge of it?' (74c)

It is through the combination of sense and thought that we perceive that things are equal. That this is either based on or leads to recollection of “the equal itself” is questionable.

'Then we must previously have known the equal, before that time when we first, on seeing the equals, thought that all of them were striving to be like the equal but fell short of it. (75a)

All that is necessary to see how implausible this is is to consider how we learned what it means for things to be equal. But Socrates’ concern is not simply with the equal:

Because our present argument concerns the beautiful itself, and the good itself, and just and holy, no less than the equal; in fact, as I say, it concerns everything on which we set this seal, "what it is", in the questions we ask and in the answers we give. (75d)

Can the earlier argument for opposites be reconciled with “the beautiful itself”, “the good itself”, and “the just itself”? What each is itself does not allow for its opposite.

As Socrates wraps up this argument we should not overlook a difficulty that is introduced but only developed later:

Just as sure as these beings are, so also our soul is (76e)

The problem is that “the beautiful itself”, “the good itself”, and “the just itself” are each one and distinct from things we call beautiful, good, and just. If the soul is in the same way they are then “the soul itself” exists, and my soul and your soul are like the things that are beautiful, good, and just, things that admit of their opposite. Things that come to be and pass away.