In that regard, he is too inclusive and sees everything through the goggles of Plotinus. — Paine

It is no surprise that when seen through the interpretive lens of the Platonist Plotinus Plato and Aristotle are regarded by Gerson as Platonists. Central to Gerson's Platonism is the intelligible world. Perhaps the world is intelligible, but that does not mean it is intelligible to us. Gerson acknowledges this distinction. For example, in a

review of a book on Plato's Timaeus he says, with regard to Timaeus' likely stories:

Likelihood is in principle the best we can aim for in dealing with a likeness, though, if we had direct knowledge of the eternal model, we could no doubt give a better account. As it is, the best we can aim for is “conviction” ( pistis) not “truth” ( aletheia) ...

This likely account is, therefore, a muthos as well as a logos, a muthos for humans. From the divine perspective, however, there would undoubtedly be a genuine logos of creation, because from that perspective the purposes of creation would be transparent.

The philosopher, like the poets and theologians, deals in likely stories. They too are myth makers. They do not bring truth and light to the cave, They too are puppet-makers, makers of images that by the light of the cave cast shadows on its walls.

I will leave it to others who are more familiar with Plotinus and other Platonists to say how closely the philosopher as myth-maker aligns with their teachings.

They have not forgotten. They are convinced that kissing the ring or ass is necessary if the are to be reelected. Those who refuse have decided not to run again.

Has anyone else noticed that now that all the sycophants are now wearing red ties Trump is now wearing other colored ties?

Others might agree that there is more to silence than mere inactivity. — Banno

Of course there is more:

There must indeed be some kind of ethical reward and ethical punishment, but they must reside in the action itself.

(6.422)

Hopefully in silence, baby sucks its fist, unawares of being a baby , or having a fist . That this is a fist arises as the baby takes its place in its family, in its linguistic community. — Banno

In the builder's language there is no word for 'hand' but surely they are aware they have hands. They use them skillfully. The baby becomes aware that it has hands as it learns to use them, not as it takes its place in a linguistic community. It learns to use them skillfully. To touch things, to feel things, to hold things. That they are called hands comes later.

We need to go the step further and see why that silence needed to be broken by the Investigations. — Banno

He came to see that the way he thought about language is not the way it works. Language is a social practice. It is not determined by an a priori transcendental logic. Is there anything he says in the Investigations that refutes the insight in the Tractatus that ethics and aesthetics are not matters to be resolved by linguistic analysis?

The distinction is between the public teaching and matters which are not made public. In the OP a theory of Forms is regarded as a "core doctrine" that represents Plato's own view. There is, however, a great deal in the dialogues that call the Forms into question. The idea found in the Republic of eternal, fixed, transcendent truths known only to the philosophers is a useful political fiction. This "core doctrine" is a myth, a noble lie.

Are you claiming that Plato did not intend to make anything whatsoever public? — Leontiskos

No. Both Plato and Aristotle write in ways intended to mitigate the problem of writing. Both have a salutary public teaching.

The letter does not say that Plato holds no positions, or that none of his positions are inferable from his texts, or that none of his positions are inferable from Aristotle's texts. — Leontiskos

Nor did I say that. Once again:

In other words, according to Plato in the Seventh Letter there are no core doctrines or any doctrines at all in his writings that can rightly be attributed to him. — Fooloso4

If you are arguing that his core doctrines are unwritten that is a whole other discussion. Griffin's review of Gerson, however, addresses such things as the unmoved mover and the "theory of Forms", that is, what is written.

I already addressed this in the parenthetical remark at the end of that paragraph. — Leontiskos

Here is what you said:

Therefore Plato held knowable positions (insofar as we accept Aristotle's depiction of Plato's thought) — Leontiskos

Are you claiming that Aristotle made public what Plato intended to keep private? Wouldn't that be a breach of trust? Do you think he rejects what Socrates says about the problem of writing in the Phaedrus:

[E]very [written] speech rolls around everywhere, both among those who understand and among those for whom it is not fitting, and it does not know to whom it ought to speak and to whom not.

(275d-e)

Aristotle too was aware that what is appropriate to say or not to say must take into consideration who one is speaking to. He had no control over who was reading his work or listening to his lectures. And so, like Plato, only made public what he thinks will benefit the reader or listener while not disclosing what only a few might be able to understand.

One thing that is verifiable is that Gerson's criticism of Aristotle is a repetition of Plotinus — Paine

In following Plotinus I think Gerson misrepresents both Plato and Aristotle. Plotinus' first principle, the arche of the Whole, is the Good or One. He tries to resolve the problem of the One and the Many in this principled way, but neither Plato or Aristotle do this. For them the problem stands as a limit of human understanding.

Socrates is heard joining the criticism of Heraclitus but does not explain why he won't criticize Parmenides except to say he was wise. — Paine

An interesting observation. Plato's Timaeus begins with a devastating criticism of the Republic. It is radically incomplete. It is a city created by intellect without necessity, that is, a city without chance and contingency. A city that could never be. The fixed intelligible world is unintelligible. Heraclitus rather than Parmenides seems to have the last word.

Ok, fair enough, but with the assurance that you will know? — ENOAH

No assurance is given. In the Republic Socrates tells stories about transcendent knowledge but given his profession of ignorance these stories should not be mistaken for knowledge.

Gerson's central focus, as a scholar, has been upon Plotinus and his contemporaries (broadly speaking). — Paine

Are you saying that Gerson's interpretation of Plato is through his reading of Plotinus? That seems right to me.

Beyond the role of the mid-wife taking precedence over that of recollection, Socrates is heard defending Parmenides who also criticizes the Forms (in that named Platonic dialogue). — Paine

If we look at the dramatic chronology of the dialogues Plato places Parmenides criticism of the Forms at an early stage of Socrates own philosophical education. This raises doubts as to whether Socrates own criticism of Forms should be explained away as the result of Plato having changed his mind in a later stage of his development.

In his role as mid-wife he says he is able to help others bring their ideas to birth but is himself barren and without wisdom.

Is there such clear evidence of this lingering-skepticism ... — ENOAH

It should be understood that Socratic skepticism differs from other types of skepticism. It is the desire to know based on the knowledge of our ignorance. It is, as the root of the word indicates, the practice of doubt and inquiry.

With regard to evidence, we must follow the argument and action of the dialogues in Plato that lead to aporia and the dialectic of Aristotle. In both cases there is not a move from opinion to unqualified knowledge. I have discussed some of this in various threads that look closely at their writings.

My point is that it does not entail what you say it does. — Leontiskos

What does:

There is no treatise (suggramma) by me on these subjects, nor will there ever be. — Fooloso4

mean if not that Plato did not give us written doctrines?

It seems you missed the point of my post. — Leontiskos

Your post began by saying that the quote from the Seventh Letter was:

... a 21st century thesis in the sense that Plato and Aristotle died 2500 years ago ... — Leontiskos

How do you understand this if it does not mean what he said in the letter?

If Plato held no knowable positions, then Aristotle could not have argued with Plato. — Leontiskos

Of course he could. He was responding to what was said in the dialogues. Surely he was aware of how what is in the dialogues differed from Plato's own positions as they known by and discussed with those whom he trusted and not by and with others. He was also aware of how Plato was being interpreted. As you go on to say:

Aristotle had access to Plato's person, not just his texts. — Leontiskos

This does not mean that Aristotle disclosed what Plato kept from those he regarded as unsuited to hear them. If Plato did not make them public then it is almost certain that Aristotle would not disclose them.

Gerson accepts Plato's theory of Forms and argues against a break between Plato and Aristotle regarding Forms. But Plato himself gives us reason to doubt that he seriously held a theory of Forms. He did, however, apparently think it better that those not well suited to the truth believe in Forms rather than what the poets, sophists and theologians taught.

That's a 21st century thesis in the sense that Plato and Aristotle died 2500 years ago and we can argue about their texts ad infinitum. — Leontiskos

Some argue that the Seventh Letter was not written by Plato. As far as I know Gerson accepts its legitimacy. In the letter Plato says, as quoted:

"There is no treatise (suggramma) by me on these subjects, nor will there ever be." (341c) — Fooloso4

That is not a "21st century thesis", it is, if genuine, what he wrote. Even if you think it is a forgery it is not a 21st century forgery.

The problem is that Aristotle was Plato's literal student. Aristotle knew Plato, Aristotle was taught by Plato, Aristotle and Plato inevitably argued with one another about things, and Aristotle continued to argue with Plato in his own writings. — Leontiskos

This is only a problem if you claim that Aristotle rejected Plato. I don't think he did.

The claim that Plato held no doctrines or positions is almost certainly false — Leontiskos

The claim is that there is no written doctrines by Plato. No doubt he has his opinions on such matters, but Plato never spoke in his own name in the dialogues. Make of this what you will. If you want to discover Plato's doctrines in what one or more of his characters say in the dialogues then such claims must be weighed against what is said and by whom in other places both within that dialogue and in other dialogues.

But crucially false is the claim that we cannot discern doctrinal differences between Plato and Aristotle from their writings, and especially from Aristotle's writings. — Leontiskos

Not only can differences be found between Plato and Aristotle, differences can be found within the dialogues themselves and in the works of Aristotle themselves. Explanations abound as to why. Whether these differences are doctrinal is not the same thing.

One of the key strengths of Gerson’s work is his detailed comparative analysis of the core doctrines of Plato and Aristotle. — Dermot Griffin

I think that this is the key weaknesses of his work. In Plato's Seventh Letter he says:

"There is no treatise (suggramma) by me on these subjects, nor will there ever be." (341c)

In other words, according to Plato in the Seventh Letter there are no core doctrines or any doctrines at all in his writings that can rightly be attributed to him. I have included more from the letter below.

According to the Phaedo, if there is a "theory of forms" it is, as part of Socrates' second sailing, a hypothesis. (Phaedo 96a-100a) It is a turn away from the attempt to see the things themselves as they are themselves, which like looking directly at the sun can cause blindness, to take refuge in speech. The hypothesis of Forms is called "safe and ignorant" (Phaedo 105c) The inadequacy of Forms is the starting point of the Timaeus.

With regard to Plato and Aristotle their shared common ground is that they are both Socratic skeptics, inquirers who know that they do not know. Their writings are dialectical or dialogical. The dialogue between Plato and Aristotle is part of their practice of thinking and writing as both internal and external dialogue. It models the reader's or listener's active role as skeptical inquirers.

More from the Seventh Letter:

If it seemed to me that these [philosophical] matters could adequately be put down in writing for the many or be said, what could be nobler for us to have done in our lifetime than this, to write what is a great benefit for human beings and to lead nature forth into the light for all? But I do not think such an undertaking concerning these matters would be a good for human beings, unless for some few, those who are themselves able to discover them through a small indication; of the rest, it would unsuitably fill some of them with a mistaken contempt, and others with lofty and empty hope as if they had learned awesome matters.

(341d-e)

For this reason every man who is serious about things that are truly serious avoids writing so that he may not expose them to the envy and perplexity of men. Therefore, in one word, one must recognize that whenever a man sees the written compositions of someone, whether in the laws of the legislator or in whatever other writings, [he can know] that these were not the most serious matters for him; if indeed he himself is a serious man.

(344c)

Any man, whether greater or lesser who has written about the highest and first principles concerning nature, according to my argument, he has neither heard nor learned anything sound about the things he has written. For otherwise he would have shown reverence for them as I do, and he would not have dared to expose them to harsh and unsuitable treatment.

(344d-e)

What is it according to the Tractatus that we must remain silent about? The answer is, the sense (Sinn) of the world, as opposed to the sense of things in the world (6.41). Matters of value, of ethics and aesthetics as opposed to the accidental facts of what happens in the world. Things in the world, both as they are in themselves and as they are for us phenomenally, are not things about which one must remain silent.

I won't get into the odd notion of one's own hand as an external thing in itself. In any case, I don't think it has anything to do with the problems of On Certainty.

We evict questions of meaning, looking instead to questions of use, and so trade silence for action. — Banno

Wittgenstein does not evict questions of meaning. 'Meaning' has different senses that in German can correspond to Sinn and Bedeutung. The meaning of a word, how it is used, is not the same as a word being meaningful or having significance or importance. What is meaningful, matters of value, of ethics and aesthetics, are not matters of the use of terms. We might see from someone's actions that something has meaning for them, but the action does not explain the meaning of the action.

... the confidence that this is a hand comes from communal agreement, not from the perception of a homunculus or solipsistic conviction. It is inherently a public activity. — Banno

A baby grasps things. It uses its hands to put things in its mouth, including its hands. It does not become confident that its hand is a hand. It becomes confident in the use of its hands. That this is a hand arises when it learns the name of things.

But On Certainty does not present us with a "Third Wittgenstein". — Banno

I agree, although for reasons that perhaps differ from your own. I see it as a development of such things as the notion of a form of life, as part of the shift away from propositions as foundational.

From OC:

In the beginning was the deed.

(OC 402)

But that means I want to conceive it as something that lies beyond being justified or
unjustified; as it were, as something animal.

(OC 359)

I want to regard man here as an animal; as a primitive being to which one grants instinct but
not ratiocination. As a creature in a primitive state. Any logic good enough for a primitive means of
communication needs no apology from us. Language did not emerge from some kind of
ratiocination.

(OC 475)

Following or going against a rule allows us to implement practices, ways of doing things, that have a social role despite in a sense not having an empirical grounding. — Banno

The rule is determined by the practice rather than the practice being determined by the rule.

See:

26. But can it be seen from a rule what circumstances logically exclude a mistake in the
employment of rules of calculation?
What use is a rule to us here? Mightn't we (in turn) go wrong in applying it?

And:

OC 139. Not only rules, but also examples are needed for establishing a practice. Our rules leave loopholes open, and the practice has to speak for itself.

OC 140. We do not learn the practice of making empirical judgments by learning rules: we are taught judgments and their connexion with other judgments. A totality of judgments is made plausible to us.

The remedy for this misunderstanding of On Certainty lie in Philosophical Investigations. — Banno

And what is the remedy for misunderstanding Philosophical Investigations? Certainly not a rule!

Crime data in the US has been manipulated for years for political gain. — BitconnectCarlos

To the extent this might be true it is not something that one party does and the other eschews. In the case of Trump data does not matter.

Well said!

But don't fall for the 'equivalence' fallacy. — Wayfarer

Right! It is a rhetorical tactic. There is no equivalence, but when the danger of Trump and the red tie sycophants is pointed out their propaganda machine accuses Biden and everyone else who tries to hold Trump to account of the very things that Trump is guilty of.

The erosion of trust is likely to continue no matter who is elected. 'Us vs Them' leaves no common ground. Perhaps the disarray of coalitions falling apart will lead us to something better. Perhaps not.

a ‘mirror universe’, a world of ‘alternative facts’, — Wayfarer

An apt description. Each side suspecting the other of the same things. One result of this rhetorical
tactic is that reasoned argument is defeated.

I'm quite concerned that President Biden is now attempting to imprison his main political rival ... — BitconnectCarlos

Trump has effectively turned civil and criminal matters into political matters and is accusing Biden of doing exactly what Trump himself is doing. When Trump declared his run for President so early the astute observation was that he did so in order to avoid prosecution.

There is no evidence that Biden is attempting to imprison Trump. The judge, not Biden, determines sentencing.

How could we have, and why would we need, proof against radical skepticism, if it incoherent? — Janus

Moore thought it necessary, which is the reason he claimed to know he had hands.

I think the counterpoint would be something like 'What could it possibly mean for it to be false?'. — Janus

Yes. That is what Wittgenstein does.

Let me know when they start razing blocks and destroying stores. — BitconnectCarlos

If such things concern you then pay attention to what happens, and not only to what has not happened. You do not need me to let you know.

You seem to be pushing Witt into a more relativistic position — Sam26

A relativistic position might be one of many different positions called relativistic.

305. Here once more there is needed a step like the one taken in relativity theory.

I take this to be related to the following:

152. I do not explicitly learn the propositions that stand fast for me. I can discover them
subsequently like the axis around which a body rotates. This axis is not fixed in the sense that
anything holds it fast, but the movement around it determines its immobility.

There is no fixed point that serves as the basis for beliefs and judgments. The system of judgments varies from time to time and place to place and to some extend from person to person. Some might think this is a situation that must be resolved, but I do not think that Wittgenstein intends to offer any kind of solution.

There is a relativistic point to all this of course, but there is also an objective component, which is more important. — Sam26

But you make a distinction between hinges that are proper and those that are not. You include belief in God with those that are not. For those who believe God may be what is most important and against which all other things are measured. For the same reason one who does not believe might also think it important. Wittgenstein seems to be content to let such differences stand.

Anyone notice the lack of rioting and looting after the Trump verdict? — BitconnectCarlos

There have been threats of violence by Trump supporters. We do not know the extent to which they will follow through or when such actions might occur. The January 6th insurrection attempt did not occur until two months after the election.

The question becomes, are there good reasons to reject or doubt what they consider a hinge belief? — Sam26

What may count as good reasons for you may not be what others regard as good reasons. Once again:

336. But what men consider reasonable or unreasonable alters. At certain periods men find
reasonable what at other periods they found unreasonable. And vice-versa.
But is there no objective character here?
Very intelligent and well-educated people believe in the story of creation in the Bible, while others
hold it as proven false, and the grounds of the latter are well known to the former.

And one that has been quoted many times including by you:

166. The difficulty is to realize the groundlessness of our believing.

Also:

612. I said I would 'combat' the other man, - but wouldn't I give him reasons? Certainly; but how far do they go? At the end of reasons comes persuasion. (Think what happens when missionaries
convert natives.)

Does the missionary convert the natives by providing good reasons? Are there good reasons to convert them? Are there good reasons to reject the missionary's Christian beliefs?

Doubting that there is a God makes perfect sense. — Sam26

Not to those who are convinced otherwise. To doubt it would put everything, their whole system of beliefs, into doubt.

Is there any support in Wittgenstein for the notion of a "proper hinge"?

My view is that belief in God is not a hinge belief. — Sam26

In an earlier post you said:

For many religions, belief in God is a hinge. — Sam26

107. Isn't this altogether like the way one can instruct a child to believe in a God, or that none
exists, and it will accordingly be able to produce apparently telling grounds for the one or the other?

That belief is part of their inherited background of our world picture. That there is or is not a God is for them bedrock, foundational.

Do you agree that the philosopher must uphold, almost, a fiduciary duty towards the public, in terms of living a certain life? — Shawn

Well, the public sentenced Socrates to death for living a certain life that they thought threatened their way of life.

Historically, the practice of philosophy moved from the personal to the impersonal, under the assumption that the truth is independent of the thinker. For Heidegger thought itself, as what is to be thought, is independent of man in so far as what is to be thought withdraws from man. Accordingly, man's responsibility is toward thinking itself.

But there are many beliefs the truth of which is not determinable. — Janus

I think this not knowing is part of Socrates "human wisdom".

I don't see the problem with saying that you know you have hands, or that you know any of the things that can be directly seen to be the case. — Janus

I don't think Wittgenstein does either, when said in appropriate circumstances. Proof against radical skepticism is not such a circumstance.

OC 1. If you do know that here is one hand, we'll grant you all the rest.

It is not that Wittgenstein thinks that Moore does not know it is a hand, it is that he misuses the word, as if it corresponds to a mental state that guarantees that what he knows must be true because he knows it. It is this that is not granted.

I know that, what's your point? — Sam26

He does not agree with your claim that hinges are not epistemological because:

An epistemological use of these words includes the proper justification and their truth. — Sam26

But since you said you were moving on I left it there.

I read Pritchard's paper on Hinge Epistemology. The first thing to be noted, as can be seen in the title, is that he regards hinges as epistemological.

And, if for example, belief in God is a hinge, then there is no need to justify the belief as true or false, since they're arational beliefs. — Sam26

That depends on what is being claimed. If someone were to say that they believe in God, I cannot prove them wrong. If, however, they claim that like Abraham God commands him to sacrifice his son then their belief in God and what God commands would need justification.

239. I believe that every human being has two human parents; but Catholics believe that Jesus only had a human mother. And other people might believe that there are human beings with no parents, and give no credence to all the contrary evidence. Catholics believe as well that in certain
circumstances a wafer completely changes its nature, and at the same time that all evidence proves
the contrary. And so if Moore said "I know that this is wine and not blood", Catholics would
contradict him.

If a priest takes transubstantiated wine and attempts to donate it to a blood bank, whether his belief is true or false is in question.

243. One says "I know" when one is ready to give compelling grounds. "I know" relates to a
possibility of demonstrating the truth. Whether someone knows something can come to light,
assuming that he is convinced of it.
But if what he believes is of such a kind that the grounds that he can give are no surer than his
assertion, then he cannot say that he knows what he believes.

The believer will insist that the wine has truly become blood. When chemical analysis confirms that it is wine the believer will reject the science. This is something he will say he knows. Something beyond scientific understanding. What we might regard as compelling ground may be something he thinks needs to be corrected by the word of God. There are deeper truths, he might say, that science is blind to.

336. But what men consider reasonable or unreasonable alters. At certain periods men find
reasonable what at other periods they found unreasonable. And vice-versa.
But is there no objective character here?
Very intelligent and well-educated people believe in the story of creation in the Bible, while others
hold it as proven false, and the grounds of the latter are well known to the former.

So, where does this leave us? As far as I can tell, at an impasse. Such beliefs are not simple arational they are irrational.

This is not about pondering the use of the word "God", but pondering life itself. — Richard B

In his Notebooks 1914-1916 he says:

The meaning of life, i.e. the meaning of the world, we can call God.

To believe in a God means to understand the question about the meaning of life.

To believe in a God means to see that the facts of the world are not the end of the matter.

To believe in God means to see that life has a meaning.

However this may be, at any rate we are in a certain sense dependent,
and what we are dependent on we can call God.

In this sense God would simply be fate, or, what is the same thing: The world-which is independent of our will.

I can make myself independent of fate.

There are two godheads: the world and my independent I.

I agree with the significance of Part ll and that Wittgenstein goes far beyond the analyzing the use of words. What I am wondering about is the idea of taking philosophy in new and interesting directions. There are scattered comments about him seeing his work as preparatory for what others will do.

I believe that my originality (if that is the right word) is an originality belonging to the soil rather than to the seed. … Sow a seed in my soil and it will grow differently than it would in any other soil. (CV, 36)

Plato opposes 'might makes right' with 'the stronger argument'. I think he was well aware of the ways in which power in one form or another dominates. The power is in Plato's hands. Thrasymachus says whatever Plato wants him to say. He is in this respect powerless and silenced.

The Republic opens with an exchange that points to the question of persuasion. Socrates is prevented from leaving the Peiraeus by Polemarchus:

“Well,” said he, “do you see how many of us there are?”

“Of course I do.”

“Then,” said he, “you should either grow stronger than all of these men, or stay here.”

“Is there not another option?” said I. “Could we not persuade you that you should let us leave?”

“And would you be able to persuade us,” said he, “if we were not listening to you?”

“Not at all,” replied Glaucon.

Force and argument are very different means of persuasion. The former leaves little or no room for deliberation and reasoned argument. With regard to the politics of the soul Polemarchus' elderly father
Cephalus illustrates the problem. As a young man he was ruled by pleasure:

It is like escaping from a raving and savage slave master.’

(329c)

He is concerned with what will happen to him when he dies. He worries about the injustice he has done. His concern with justice is entirely selfish. Cephalus relies on another means of persuasion, the power of money.

The discussion will center on how justice benefits oneself. This condition is accepted from the beginning, before Thrasymachus says a word. Socrates task will be to persuade those who will listen that justice benefits the one who is just. This is also what Thrasymachus claims.

Thrasymachus trades on persuasion as power. His power is a pale imitation of the power of the man of action he hopes to persuade to listen to him and from whom he will be paid. The man of action, however, often has a low opinion of talk. Thrasymachus accuses Socrates of conducting the argument unfairly. (340d) If might makes right then what does being unfair have to do with it? For all his talk of power he is weak and dependent on others to buy what he is selling.

In the background of the discussion of friends and enemies is the fact that Thrasymachus regards Socrates as his enemy. Socrates does for free what Thrasymachus charges money for. By the end of the discussion Socrates has disarmed Thrasymachus and made him gentle. (354a) He has gotten him to agree:

"In that case, will a soul ever carry out its own functions well, Thrasymachus, when deprived of its own particular excellence, or is that impossible?”

“It is impossible.”

“So, of necessity a bad soul exercises rule and care badly, and a good soul does all this well.”

“Of necessity.”

“Did we not agree that excellence of soul is justice, and badness is injustice?”

“Yes, we agreed.”

“Then the just soul, and the just man, will live well, while the unjust man will live badly.”

“So it appears,” said he, “according to your argument.”

“But someone who lives well is blessed and happy, while someone who does not is the opposite.”

“Of course.”

“In that case, the just person is happy, while the unjust is wretched.”

“Let it be so,” said he.

“But there is no profit in being wretched, but in being happy there is.”

“Of course.”

“Then, blessed Thrasymachus, injustice is never more profitable than justice.”

“Well, Socrates, let this be your feast for the festival of Bendis.”

(354a)

It is good to hear you say that. Thanks!

On Certainty and for that matter PI is an un finished work. — Richard B

Wittgenstein did not write books. He writes aphoristically. I think a good many of them are finished.

a continuation of what he had started. — Richard B

What do you think that is?

This is more exciting because it could take philosophy is new and interesting directions. — Richard B

Do you have examples or do you have in mind what statements such as the following:

… our investigation is directed not towards phenomena, but rather, as one might say, towards the ‘possibilities’ of phenomena.

(PI 90)

I find that interesting and have quoted it many times, but I have no sense of what those possibilities are.

Do you think he put as much effort in his words as you are in interpreting them? — schopenhauer1

Absolutely! He was a very careful and thoughtful writer.

Is it even in some way "right" to over-interpret any one human's words to this extent? — schopenhauer1

How does someone know when something is "over-interpreted"?

I think there are interpretations that are wrong, but sometimes they might lead to interesting discussions.

Do you think the onus of understanding is on the author or the reader? — schopenhauer1

There are some weak authors and some weak readers. Sometimes weak readers blame the author for what they cannot do.

If not the author, then can I write a post, and make you figure it out if you don't understand it? — schopenhauer1

Many years ago, when in school, I would offer get comments that my writing was "cryptic". I did not take this as a negative since many of the authors I liked were cryptic. I eventually came to see things differently. What occurred to me was that one needs to earn the right to have others figure out what you are saying. I have not earned that right. I now try to say things clearly.

With regard to your many questions, what I said above serves well for my response:

To this end what I regard as most important is not simply getting Wittgenstein right but the attempt to get him right, even if we decide he gets it wrong. If is an exercise in thinking and seeing. — Fooloso4

The same can be said with regard to some other others as well.

there is one philosopher that stumped even Plato — Shawn

That is a surprising comment! I think Socrates handled him quite well.

Regardless, do you believe that Thrasymachus has not been held in esteem by philosophers? — Shawn

These is for some an admiration, but I don't think that he has generally regarded as a philosopher.

Yes, we do disagree. I don't think we are likely to change our opinions now, but we have both over time changed our understanding to some degree. So, I do think there is value in discussing and defending our take on things. In defending our views we go back to the text and sometimes we find something new.

I would also like to point out that what is at issue extends beyond us. There are others reading, thinking, and in some cases commenting. I invite them to not move on just yet if they, like me, continue to be puzzled, and continue to find new things each time we read the text and what others say. To this end what I regard as most important is not simply getting Wittgenstein right but the attempt to get him right, even if we decide he gets it wrong. If is an exercise in thinking and seeing.

The mental state Wittgenstein seems to be referring to is the mental state of conviction. — Sam26

It is as stated in 12: that "I know" seems to describe a state of affairs which guarantees what is known, guarantees it as a fact. Stated impersonally, if someone knows something then it is true.

In OC 7 Witt points out that our lives show (by our actions) these kinds of hinge beliefs, for example, by getting the chair or shutting the door. — Sam26

What he says is that "life shows that I know or am certain". At 8 he states that:

8. The difference between the concept of 'knowing' and the concept of 'being certain' isn't of any great importance at all, except where "I know" is meant to mean: I can't be wrong.

Just to reiterate, there's a difference between one's inner subjective certainty (or using know as an expression of a conviction) and the epistemological use of "I know..." as an expression of objective certainty (knowledge). Witt uses know and certain in both ways, and it's important to distinguish between the two. — Sam26

If I sit in the chair it is objectively certain that there is a chair. My sitting in it is all the justification that is required. But the requirement for justification is out of place. This does not mean that it is not an epistemological use of 'know'. It means that you are imposing the very requirements on the term 'know' that Wittgenstein is arguing against. If there are two different ways in which the term is used, it is the difference between the way it is ordinarily used and the mistaken sense in which it is used to mean that one who knows can't be wrong. There is no mental state of knowing that guarantees its correctness.

We have to remember that Wittgenstein never finished this work (OC), so it hasn't been edited. We don't know what passages would have been left in, and which passages would have been removed. — Sam26

The same is the case with all his writings except the Tractatus.

I don't know Quine so can't comment on the comparison.



613 is interesting. First, he says he is justified in knowing that the water will boil. If it doesn't he assumes there will be an explanation, some factor he is unaware of. It does not threaten his picture of the world. The whole of physics has not come into question. But if this is not N.N. then everything is plunged into chaos. If this is not his old friend then everything he knows becomes uncertain.

447 seems to challenge 651 regarding the relative uncertainty of empirical propositions. But is my certainty that this is a hand the result of empirical observation?

125. If a blind man were to ask me "Have you got two hands?" I should not make sure by looking.
If I were to have any doubt of it, then I don't know why I should trust my eyes. For why shouldn't I
test my eyes by looking to find out whether I see my two hands? What is to be tested by what?
(Who decides what stands fast?)