Asking a good question - or asking a question in a good way...that would seem to be the aim of a quality OP. But sometimes we just got to start with what we've got. A question. And answers can provide a way forward. — Amity

What I was trying to get at is that our answers should not preclude further inquiry.

Why would saying 'I know I don't know' not allow me to do the 'kinds of things that those who do know something can do with their knowledge' ? — Amity

Socrates often uses the example of the craftsmen, because they do know something. The saddle maker knows how to make saddles. Knowing that I do not know how to make saddles does not allow me to make saddles.

About Socrates: what form did his 'daimon' take ? In addition to his reasoning and questioning he also had access to some 'spirit' ? Did his daimon appear out of thin air, or did he summon it ?
Was he 'wise' to listen to it ?
There is no certainty either way, is there ? — Amity

He did not summon his daimon. He was wise to the extent that it is wise to listen to the wise and as a divinity his daimon possessed divine wisdom.

I think it is no longer worth my time and effort trying to help you see more than your myopic vision allows. It is one thing to discuss the texts but quite another when you resort to personal insult.

If certainty is not indubitable, necessary, or infallible, then how is it "certainty"? — Metaphysician Undercover

That is how we use the term. The demand that it must mean more prohibits its use.

If we accept Wittgenstein's ontology of rules ... — Metaphysician Undercover

? The rules of grammar according to W. are arbitrary.

... then we ought to face the consequences, that such an attitude of confidence is unjustified ...This is the point, and why I insist Wittgenstein's epistemology is incoherent. — Metaphysician Undercover

That depends on what you think stands as justification. See the discussions of the river banks of knowledge, hinges, and his call for a step like that of relativity in On Certainty. See also what he says about groundlessness. It is not incoherent it describes what terms such as certainty and knowledge actually mean based on their use. Consider scientific knowledge. It does not establish eternal, unchanging truths. It represents how we understand things at present, and that will change over time.

Why not just say "I am sitting here typing this", and "I have read On Certainty". What does "I am certain" add to these phrases other than an unwarranted air of confidence? — Metaphysician Undercover

What makes you think it is unwarranted? Generally I would not say that I am certain of these things unless some doubt is raised.

Of course it disrupts the certainty with which we act, that's the whole point. — Metaphysician Undercover

Really? If you doubt that you are reading this or that your fingers are moving or that their moving is part of your response to what I have said then why do it? Or that is not the right question because you cannot even be certain that you are doing it.

If you are fully aware that there is a possibility of mistake in your actions, how is it at all logical for you to proceed with certainty? — Metaphysician Undercover

Once again, the ability to doubt is not a reason to doubt.

But as I explained, this does not impede our capacity to act. — Metaphysician Undercover

That is because first you acted long before you were capable of doubting, and second, you do not take seriously the possibility that you might be deceived.

This is not a "sinister mistake", it is the virtue of prudence. — Metaphysician Undercover

Prudence? Why be prudent? You cannot be certain that you should be or even what it means to be prudent.

The ability to doubt is not a reason to doubt. The kind of certainty Wittgenstein appeals to in On Certainty is not indubitable, necessary, or infallible. It is the certainty of our everyday lives. The certainty that I am sitting here typing this. The certainty that I have read On Certainty.

Now one might invent a situation in which it is possible that I am mistaken about these things, but the more serious and sinister mistake is the philosophical mistake that because such a thing is possible that anything that follows from it disrupts the certainty with which we live and act and think and speak. Descartes' Archimedean point of indubitability is a philosophical illusion.

Is that an example of wisdom ? When you have more questions than answers ?When you can say 'I do not know' but still be willing to broaden perspective...and change if necessary. — Amity

The term skeptic comes from the Greek meaning inquiry and doubt. Eventually doubt came to overshadow inquiry, to the extent that it was doubted that inquiry was of much use. But such a conclusion is antithetical to Socratic inquiry. It assumes an answer, leaves off questioning, and instead sets about making arguments to prove the validity of radical doubt.

One problem when answers take precedence over questions is that we do not ask whether the question it answers was a good question.

In the Apology Socrates claims that human wisdom is worthless. One way in which this is true is that knowing you do not know does not allow you to do the kinds of things that those who do know something can do with their knowledge. As with his daimon who warns him what not to do but never advises him as to what he should do, there is no certainty as to what is the best course of action, the best way to live. It is the question of what is best that leads. And in the absence of knowledge of what is best perhaps human wisdom has something to do with knowing how best to proceed knowing that one does not know what is best.

Thanks but I have no need for your ersatz bear shit.

Who are 'the wise' ? — Amity

Good question. Can one who is not wise recognize the wise? Do those who are not wise, out of their ignorance, only imagine what it is to be wise?

If a bear did not shit in the woods... — S

What? You would offer your services?

Physician heal thyself. If this is not tongue in cheek what makes you think that you are qualified to guide others on the right path? Are you sure that you are on the right path? Are you sure there is a right path?

Only the wise can know if there are paths to wisdom. Do we know that they followed a path or walked a path that can be followed?

The act is a fact. Part of the problem is that murder is defined as wrongful killing, but if it were an act that took place in war or in self-defense a factual description of the act would not change. Some might claim that war is immoral so the act of killing would be immoral. Some might even claim that killing in self-defense is immoral. Where in a description of the facts do we find the fact that the act is or is not immoral? If it were a fact shouldn't we be able to agree on that in the same way we agree that one person was hit in the head with a rock by another on a Tuesday afternoon? Propositions with a sense picture or represent what is the case, some state of affairs. Disagreement over the morality of the act is not an agreement or disagreement over the facts but over our assessment of the facts.

What should we make of the parenthetical remark in §84? The general point seems to be that even though it is possible to imagine a doubt whether an abyss did not yawn behind it when we open the door, we do not; but he adds parenthetically:

and he might on some occasion prove to be right.

I think the following from the Tractatus is instructive:

5.135
There is no possible way of making an inference from the existence of one situation to the existence of another, entirely different situation.
5.136
There is no causal nexus to justify such an inference.
5.1361
We cannot infer the events of the future from those of the present.
Belief in the causal nexus is superstition.

In line with Wittgenstein’s mystical bent I suggest that what is at issue is not simply an epistemological problem, that we have no knowledge of causality, but an ontological one. It may be that when I open the door there will be a yawning abyss. That things are as they are does not guarantee that they will continue to be so. This does not mean that we have good reason to doubt that they will be so. It is, rather, a recognition of the radical contingency of existence.

From On Certainty:

505. It is always by favour of Nature that one knows something.


558. We say we know that water boils and does not freeze under such-and-such circumstances. Is it conceivable that we are wrong? Wouldn't a mistake topple all judgment with it? More: what could stand if that were to fall? Might someone discover something that made us say "It was a mistake"?
Whatever may happen in the future, however water may behave in the future, - we know that up to now it has behaved thus in innumerable instances.
This fact is fused into the foundations of our language-game.

The question I have for you is , if Nietzsche's objection to metaphysics is its attachment to Platonism, then which modern philosophical traditions qualify as Platonic? I think you and I can agree that Kantian and Hegelian Idealism fit the bill, as well as Husserl's transcendental ego. But what about Kierkegaard? Gadamerian hermeneutics? Are Marxist and Frankfurt school accounts Platonic(Adorno? Feuerbach,?Habermas?)? — Joshs

I don't know the writings of any of them well enough to say. From what I have read of Kierkegaard I think his faith may be a form of transcendence. Gadamer's fusing of horizons suggests the idea that we are historically situated in terms of our understanding of both ourselves and in our interpretation of the tradition. I have come across the idea the Marx held a messianic view, but I do not recall the details of the argument.

When Shaun Gallagher says :“Radical or deconstructive hermeneutics
[Heidegger, Derrida , Foucault] , following Nietzsche, would argue that the only truth is untruth, that all interpretations are false, that there is no ultimate escape from false consciousness, that the whole metaphysical concept of truth requires deconstruction", is he describing Nietzsche's response to Platonism?. — Joshs

I have not read Shaun Gallagher and without specifics cannot comment on false consciousness or the requirement to deconstruct truth

You say part of science is correspondence to a real world. Isn't the correspondence theory of truth a Platonism, truth as the mirror of nature, according to Rorty? — Joshs

The correspondence between a scientific theory and the reality it is a theory of is not the same thing as a correspondence theory of truth. The problems that arise from a correspondence theory of truth need not arise with a scientific theory of something in the physical world. What is true of the world and a theory of truth a very different things.

Doesnt the practical orient itself in relation to interpretive accounts of meaning? — Joshs

The practical has to do with the day to day activities of what you might find someone in a lab doing. Purifying a compound or testing some set of variables against a control, for example.

Don't most scientists today still operate under Kantiann assumptions concerning the nature of objectivty as subjective constructions attempting to correspond to what is out there? — Joshs

That depends on the science. Most biologists and chemists would have no idea what you are talking about. Their concern is with how organisms function. Even if it were explained to them they would not agree that they are operating under such assumptions. A physicist might know what you mean but they are split with regard to the question of realism.I do not think that the majority think of space and time as a priori representations in the mind.

My key question for you is , do you think Nietzsche was a radical relativist? — Joshs

Does the rejection of fixed eternal truths mean his was a radical relativist? Does the fact that he did not hold all values to be of equal value mean that he was not a radical relativist?

One thing that I find puzzling is that the idea of the eternal return seems to be an eternal truth.

Despite your claims to the contrary, what you say betrays a great deal of emotional attachment - to wealth, to meeting interesting people, to connecting with people, connection to family business.

Since this is a philosophy forum, I will quote one of Socrates' favorite exhortations: know thyself.

I think your friend Jeremy is not too far off, but it is not just a matter of intent but of the question of why you intend something.

As far as connecting with people: ask questions about them and listen. Most people who will you let talk about themselves will end up finding you to be much more interesting.

I'm not talking about what applies to all men — Joshs

But the question has to do with the abyss the tight rope walker must walk over.

Do you see the history of science as developmental trajectory ...the replacement of one paradigm with another ... — Joshs

That is part of science, but I don't think relativity or quantum mechanics is simply the replacement of one paradigm with another. There are some cosmologists who claim that what other cosmologists are doing - string theory, multiverse, is not even science.

Is the aim of science the correspondence of our theoretical representations with a real world? — Joshs

Again, that is a part of it, but much of day to day science is not theoretical but practical.

Is there a dialectical movement to ideas? — Joshs

That depends on what you mean by dialectical, but I suspect that whatever it is you mean the answer will be as above.

Are you making a distinction between the trajectory of the history of science
and Nietzschean metamorphosis of values? — Joshs

Yes. Consideration of values includes the value of science.

is this revaluation a move toward 'better' values in the sense of being more adaptive to an environment? — Joshs

No. It is not a matter of adaptation but of overcoming.

It is also the overcoming of truth as a superior value to falsity — Joshs

That is part of the overcoming of Platonism.

Does Platonism include the Kuhnian philosophy of science that says that science evolves through revolutions, via the overthrow of extant paradigms by new ones? — Joshs

In that Platonism is about a transcendent world the answer is no. It has been a long time since I read Kuhn and cannot say what his views on the progress of science entails.

Nietzsche wrote:"Our faith in science is still based on a metaphysical faith, – even we knowers of today, we godless anti-metaphysicians, still take our fire from the blaze set alight by a faith thousands of years old, that faith of the Christians, which was also Plato’s faith, that God is truth, that truth is divine." — Joshs

This supports what I said about Platonism.

I think it has to do with the Overman's world being that of "mad chaos of confusion and desire". — Joshs

Do you think this is meant to be taken literally? The overman and the overman's world are not the same. Is there not already within us mad chaos of confusion and desire? I find it amusing that as we sit here in our relatively safe and ordered rooms we talking about chaos and confusion as if that is the world the higher man strives for.

Behold, I teach you the overman: he is this lightning, he is this madness! — Joshs

This really does not answer the question, does it? Do you think that when Nietzsche literally went mad he became the overman? Could one who is literally chaos and confusion create works of philosophy? Dionysus, the god who philosophizes, is also the god of the mask. Nietzsche too loves the mask.

Metaphysicians believe "things of the highest value must have another, separate origin of their own, – — Joshs

More Platonism. Here's the problem. You said:

Nihilism for Nietzsche isn't simply the absence of values, it's the concept of valuation itself understood through the metaphysical tradition of the West. — Joshs

It is not the concept of valuation that Nietzsche finds nihilistic but rather what is held to be of value in terms of Platonism, that is, transcendent truths. Why this is a problem becomes clear when you say:

As far as Heidegger's critique of Will to Power, for Heidegger Nietzsche is the last metaphysician because he determines truth in relation to the establishment of value-scheme. — Joshs

Heidegger shifts from Nietzsche's meaning of metaphysics, that is, Platonism, to his own meaning.

Starting from beings as value-structures turns Will to Power itself into a value, the highest value. — Joshs

What is the "concept of valuation itself understood through the metaphysical tradition of the West"? Here we see the ambiguity, the shift from Nietzsche's rejection of metaphysical values in the Platonist sense to Heidegger's identification of Nietzsche with metaphysics because he fails to make the ontological distinction, and thus treating valuation itself as if it were nihilism.

"The greatest danger that always hovered over humanity and still hovers over it is the eruption of madness – which means the eruption of arbitrariness in feeling, seeing, and hearing, the enjoyment of the mind’s lack of discipline, the joy in human unreason ..." — Joshs

But of course Nietzsche was an extremely disciplined person and thinker. We must keep in mind his use of irony and masks. This should not be taken at face value as the whole of the story. After all, there are plenty of people who arbitrary, and lack discipline and reason. They are not Nietzsche's higher man.

The summary of Will to Power and Nihilism that Heidegger wrote, and that I mentioned above, was Heidegger's attempt to understand Nietzsche in his own terms. Only later in the piece does Heidegger then introduce his critique of Nietzsche. — Joshs

In an earlier post you said:

Nihilism for Nietzsche isn't simply the absence of values, it's the concept of valuation itself understood through the metaphysical tradition of the West. — Joshs

This sounds like Heidegger. Where does Nietzsche say this? Although Nietzsche focuses primarily on the Western tradition, self-overcoming is universal and applies to all living things. He calls man the esteemer, not Western man. Both to value and nihilism are universal and apply to all men, not just Western man or the metaphysical tradition. And, of course, there is the question of just what the metaphysical tradition is according to Nietzsche and Heidegger.

Opposing them is a community of Nietzscheans(including kauffman) who see him within an existential orbit. I'm getting the sense you are reading him this way. — Joshs

I have used Kaufmann's translation but have never read any of his commentary. In fact, I spent years reading Nietzsche before I read any secondary literature. Fundamental to my reading of Nietzsche is the recognition of his irony and the importance of the art of writing, which requires an art of reading attuned to that art.

Getting back to your Zarathustra passage, "the man on the tightrope has rejected what was but has not reached the other side", my guess is from your reading, 'the other side', the 'yes' is a new valuation to replace the old discarded one, along a developmental trajectory. — Joshs

I said nothing about a developmental trajectory. The third metamorphosis is the child, a forgetting, a new beginning. That is not a developmental trajectory. What I did say is that it must always be in the service of life, the revaluation of values always takes play within an environment. As I see it, this has nothing to do with the overcoming of metaphysics. The goal, now as forever, is to create values that promote health, strength, and life. To the extent that it could be seen as an overcoming of metaphysics, it is the overcoming of Platonism.

The overman on the far side of the abyss of metaphysical nihilism is salvation as madness. — Joshs

This requires elaboration. What is its etiology? Plato's Socrates calls philosophy divine madness, but such madness is not the same as Nietzsche's madness caused by syphilis or some other medical illness. I suspect this has something to do with Dionysus.

I mean, a normal person I think would have said that the murder was quite unethical and immoral, and denote the murderer as unethical and immoral too. But not Wittgenstein, he only sees facts. — Pussycat

It is not that he cannot see the immorality of the act, it is that the immorality does not reside in the facts themselves.

The man on the tightrope has rejected what was but has not reached the other side. The no to what was without a yes to what he will become creates an abyss. Using the tightrope metaphor, he has not gotten over, he has not overcome himself. Nihilism would be the result of the failure of this getting over.

From the Three Metamorphoses:

Common translation:

But tell me, my brethren, what the child can do, which even the lion could not do? Why hath the preying lion still to become a child?

Innocence is the child, and forgetfulness, a new beginning, a game, a self-rolling wheel, a first movement, a holy Yea.

Aye, for the game of creating, my brethren, there is needed a holy Yea unto life: ITS OWN will, willeth now the spirit; HIS OWN world winneth the world’s outcast.

Kaufmann translation:

But say, my brothers, what can the child do that even the lion could not do? Why must the preying lion still become a child? The child is innocence and forgetting, a new beginning, a game, a self-propelled wheel, a first movement, a sacred "Yes." For the game of creation, my brothers, a sacred "Yes" is needed: the spirit now wills his own will, and he who had been lost to the world now conquers his own world.

I do not want to go too far off topic with a discussion of Heidegger, but his concept of history, especially in his later works, makes man a participant, and in some cases a passive participant, who hearkens to Being in Being's own self concealment and unconcealment. Nihilism for Heidegger is fundamentally the failure to think the meaning of Being itself. He situates Nietzsche within the metaphysical tradition of the West, and thus concludes that Nietzsche has not overcome nihilism.

The question is whether this is a Nietzsche that Nietzsche himself would recognize? I don't think so. As far as I can see for Nietzsche man makes history. Nietzsche rejects particular metaphysical beliefs, but these same beliefs were themselves an overcoming and the source of a new level of man's strength. They have, however, become the source of weakness and thus must now be overcome. It may be that Heidegger thinks that Nietzsche too must be overcome, but in my opinion if we are to understand a philosopher we must do so first and foremost in his own terms and not those of Heidegger or anyone else. It is only from this vantage point that we can evaluate his place within the context of someone else's work.

It is also worth mentioning that Nietzsche was a very careful writer. The notes that were compiled to form The Will to Power were not compiled by Nietzsche. It is not a book written by Nietzsche. If those notes were to be the basis of a book we do not know which ones would have been included or rejected or revised. We do not know what their order would be or what would have qualified what and so can evaluate them in context.

Nihilism for Nietzsche isn't simply the absence of values — Joshs

If by saying it is not simply the absence of values you mean that having any values, whatever they may be, is sufficient to overcome nihilism, then I agree. But if you mean that nihilism is not the absence of value then I do not agree.

I am not sure that introducing Heidegger is helpful. It presents two problems. First it compounds the problem of interpretation because now we must interpret Heidegger in addition to interpreting Nietzsche. Second, Heidegger situates Nietzsche within the history of Being, and in doing so this raises the question of whether his view of history influences his understanding of Nietzsche.

The issue is that these "private" rules aren't private in the sense that Wittgenstein meant by the word. A private language for Wittgenstein is a language that nobody else can understand, whereas anyone can learn what it is the Übermensch values and check for consistency in his behaviour. — Michael

I agree. I said:

— Fooloso4

The problem of a language that is private is that it cannot convey meaning ... Language is a shared, public activity. — Fooloso4

But I was responding to the question in the OP:

So could Nietzsche follow a rule that was understood only by himself? — Banno

Assuming that Nietzsche is following a rule we might not know what that rule is simply by knowing what he values. The fact that no one else can understand it does not prevent him from understanding and following it. I brought up the example of games for this reason. It is a game that no one else can play. Language games, on the other hand, can never be played by private rules, that is, they cannot have a grammar known only to me because no one would not how words were being used and what they meant.

This "transvaluation of values" just doesn't seem to have anything to do with a private language, and so this discussion seems confused from the start. — Michael

Again,I agree. My point about values was:

... the error has already been made if one thinks that for Nietzsche what is at issue is rules of conduct. — Fooloso4

Isn't it more that is can't be useful? — Banno

Isn't the reason it would not be useful because it would not convey meaning?

The problem of a language that is private is that it cannot convey meaning. There must be some logic or grammar for the usage of words. Language is a shared, public activity. It would be as if we were to play a game but only I knew the rules of the game. How could we play? It is possible, however, for me to make up a game that only I play with rules that only I know, but if I wanted anyone else to play then the rules cannot remain private.

It is possible for Nietzsche’s public conduct to be guided by private rules, but I think that the error has already been made if one thinks that for Nietzsche what is at issue is rules of conduct. What we should focus on instead is values, and this in terms of self-overcoming, the will to power, and the creation of creators.

When Zarathustra enters the town he asks :

All beings hitherto have created something beyond themselves: and ye want to be the ebb of that great tide, and would rather go back to the beast than surpass man? (Prologue 3)

When Zarathustra first descends from the mountain he meets a saint who says:

Go not to men, but stay in the forest! Go rather to the animals! Why not be like me—a bear amongst bears, a bird amongst birds?” (Prologue 2)


This is one option. To not cross the rope, to remain a beast. The saint represents the end of the line, what Nietzsche calls the “last man”. The ebb of the great tide of self-overcoming. He lives alone and does not perpetuate the species.

But self-overcoming, creating something beyond themselves is what all beings have hitherto done. To overcome himself man must reject the values of his past. He must undergo a metamorphosis, there must be, what he calls in the three metamorphoses of the spirit a “sacred no”. The problem is, having rejected his past man’s future remains undetermined. The sacred no must be followed by a “sacred yes”. The rejection of the old values must be followed by the creation of new higher values. The abyss is what stands between the old values that have been rejected and the new values that have yet to be created. This is the problem of nihilism - the absence of values.

No, I meant ethics as the transcendental: if it was employed as a means to see the world aright, then what is its use after this? — Pussycat

It is not like sightseeing. It is not a once and done experience.

I think he uses this as a simile like he says so in the lecture: when someone is happy then he says and feels as if he is with God or in heaven, where being with God and heaven mean something pleasant. — Pussycat

It is an attempt to put into words what cannot be put into words. When he says "ultimate value", however, it suggests something much more profound and important than something pleasant. When he says that he is "so to speak" in agreement with the will of God, again I think he means something far more profound and significant than something pleasant. When he says that his conscience is the voice of God, he is not stating a matter of fact. To attempt to ascribe a more specific meaning to it is antithetical to the Tractatus.

But what happens to ethics afterwards? — Pussycat

Do you mean ethics in the sense of rules or standards of proper conduct? If so, Wittgenstein says nothing about this. The closest he gets in the comment in the Notebooks about conscience quoted in an earlier post:

Living in agreement with the world is living in accord with one’s conscience, which is the voice of God.

I am then, so to speak, in agreement with that alien will on which I appear dependent. That is to say: “I am doing the will of God” (NB 8.7.16) — NB

But when he writes that: "he who understands me finally recognizes them as senseless, when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it.) He must surmount these propositions; then he sees the world rightly". This surmount, climb through, on and over these (nonsensical and ethical) propositions, isn't that transcendence? — Pussycat

He has made it clear that ethics is not about propositions and so the transcendence of propositions is not the transcendence of ethics. It is only when such propositions are surmounted that one can see the world aright. It is the ethical that is the transcendental condition that makes this experience possible.

In support of my last post regarding the meaning of transcendental as the condition of possibility, from the Notebooks:

“Ethics does not treat of the world. Ethics must be a condition of the world, like logic.” (NB, 24.7.16)

He gives no meaning to "transcendental", so anyone can explain it how he sees fit. — Pussycat

So in other words you don't know what it means and think you can define it in any way you see fit. Is this an example of your “improvising”? It is nothing more than a dodge, an attempt to sidestep the incompatibility of your interpretation with the text.

The term has a specific meaning and anyone familiar the term does not need to be given a meaning by Wittgenstein. It means the a priori condition of the possibility of experience through representation (See Critique of Pure Reason, "Transcendental Deduction of the Categories"). Disagreement is not about the meaning of the term itself. Thus logic is transcendental because it allows us to picture the world. Ethics is transcendental because it allows us to experience the moral/aesthetic meaning and value of the world, to see it as mystical.

It doesn't mean it exists either. Or that the ethical that has been transcended has anything to do with what is obtained at the end of this transcendence, it might be something completely different. — Pussycat

Wittgenstein does not say and it does not follow from anything he does say that the ethical has been transcended. It is just the opposite, the ethical transcends the facts of the world. (6.41)

So he says that the mystical shows itself, not the ethical. — Pussycat

Wittgenstein connects the mystical and ethical/aesthetic via linked statements about the world, its limits, and what is experienced beyond those limits. The sense of the world and its value is not to be found in the world (6.41) It is because the sense and value of the world cannot be found in the world that there can be no ethical propositions (6.42). The good and bad exercise of the will and the experience of the world as a whole of the happy and unhappy man (6.43) The solution of the riddle of life in space and time lies outside space and time (6.4312). God does not reveal himself in the world (6.432). The facts all contribute only to setting the problem, not to its solution (6.4321) The existence of the world is mystical (6.44). Viewing it sub specie aeterni and feeling it as a limited whole is mystical (6.45)

Ethics still of course exists, in a sense, or rather not in a sense, it actually exists, for those that are still on the bottom of the ladder or climbing it up, but once they reach the top, they see it as something senseless, it just won't make sense to them at all then. — Pussycat

And yet at the penultimate rung of the latter at 6.421 he says that ethics is transcendental. How do you explain this?

What one sees when the world is seen aright is not simply that propositions about what cannot be put into words are senseless but that the world is mystical.

6.522:

There is indeed the inexpressible. This shows itself; it is the mystical.

What is inexpressible would be nonsense if one attempted to express it. This does not mean that the mystical or the ethical does not exist. It does, it shows itself. What is senseless is not the ethical but rather propositions about the ethical.

I mean if one would do some research on the Tractatus, he would find plenty of different views ... — Pussycat

If one would do some research he would find that the same is true with the work of any philosopher. While there may be no final and definitive interpretation there are interpretations that are more plausible than others. The best interpretations make connections between each of the parts and sheds light on the whole.

I do appreciate Fooloso4's interpretation of the unsaid in the Tractatus, which is hard to find in any textbook. — Wallows

I am not surprised that this is hard to find in textbooks, but there are ample secondary sources that support this view. This was not always the case for those who could not see past the influence of Positivism, Russell, and others, but no credible contemporary interpretation can ignore the central importance of the ethical and mystical for the Tractatus.

In case anyone else is confused, perhaps this letter from Wittgenstein to Ludwig von Ficker will help. In it he makes clear not only that he is certain that ethics exists, but that it is of central importance to the Tractatus.

The book’s point is an ethical one. I once meant to include in the preface a sentence which is not in fact there now but which I will write out for you here because it will perhaps be a key to the work for you. What I meant to write, then, was this: My work consists of two parts: the one presented here plus all that I have not written. And it is precisely this second part that is the important one. My book draws limits to the sphere of the ethical from the inside as it were, and I am convinced that this is the ONLY rigorous way of drawing those limits. In short, I believe that where many others today are just gassing, I have managed in my book to put everything firmly into place by being silent about it. And for that reason, unless I am very much mistaken, the book will say a great deal that you yourself want to say. Only perhaps you won’t see that it is said in the book. For now, I would recommend you to read the preface and the conclusion, because they contain the most direct expression of the point of the book. [emphasis added] — Letter to von Ficker

The first thing that should be pointed out is that in the dialogue Euthyphro the question is what is piety (τὸ ὅσιον). The second is that the question is posed with regard to the gods, not a single God. The problem is not only that the gods do not agree but that the often act very badly. Zeus, after all, becomes king of the gods by overthrowing his father Cronus, who had overthrown his father Uranus. In Homer the gods take sides in the human battles.

The move from the gods to a single God eliminates this conflict but does not address the underlying problem, and here it is highly ironic that Craig is the representative who alleges to resolve the Euthyphro dilemma, given how much he is like Euthyphro - a self-professed expert who under critical examination is revealed to know nothing of piety let alone the gods or God. And like Euthyphro he has made a name and money for himself as an expert on such matters.

What has come to be called the Euthyphro dilemma is not same as the problem posed in the dialogue. What I want to draw attention to is the problematic assumption behind the solution to the dilemma that points back to Socrates’ criticism of Euthyphro and all self-professed experts on matters of piety. Socrates’ question is not an abstract theological one, and is not one that can be solved by claiming that God is good. Ultimately, as the setting of the dialogue highlights - Socrates is about to go on trial for impiety - the question is about human conduct.

And here, religious conflict and holy wars mirror the conflict between the gods. It is not sufficient to claim that God wills what is good because God is good for the simple reason that we cannot agree on what it is that God wills. The claim that it is God’s will does not resolve the problem it exacerbates it by imbuing whatever it is that one thinks he is justified in doing with absolute, unquestionable, divine authority.

Socrates eventually shifts the argument from the question of the gods to the question of justice. In one sense this is itself an impious move - from the authority of the gods and with that the authority of those who claim to speak and act with divine authority, to philosophical deliberation. This is exactly what plays out in the Republic with the philosopher-kings and the banishment of the poets (those who provided the myths of the gods). Here there is no talk of God or gods but of the Good. The desire to know and do the Good is, in this sense, a higher form of piety, one that does not rely on what someone claims God or the gods want of us.

But the philosopher-king, one who has knowledge of Good and of the whole, is also a myth, one told by the paradigmatic philosopher Socrates, whose wisdom is knowing that he does not know. Plato replaces one form of poetry with another. His philosophical poesis is grounded in reason and its limits, guided by deliberation about what is best in full awareness of the knowledge that we do not know what is best.

Yup. Your patience must be wearing thin. All this din. — Amity

It has.

The poster Pussycat has repeatedly challenged him. Fair enough. However, each time he provides the answer it is ignored, there is a move to something else. It is not clear whethet his careful responses are getting through or whether there is a better understanding of the text. — Amity

This is the crux of the matter. Thank you.

Fooloso4 in his understanding of Wittgenstein would probably point out that the reason why Wittgenstein said:  "should seem to have" is because that refers to how things are to Wittgenstein.

If Wittgensteun used "has" he would be making a factual claim, and he rejects factual claims about ethics. — Amity

That is correct. This is a basic Tractarian distinction. One that I have repeatedly pointed to only to have it ignored and the same mistake repeated.

I am grateful that at least one person has been following this thread and perhaps gained some insight. If there are others who have questions or comments I would be glad to respond. But as things stand right now it is pointless for me to continue.

I was asking so that I could understand what you mean. But if you think that what I am asking cannot be put into words, but only shown, then I guess that your efforts should have been better focused on the latter, the showing. — Pussycat

Once again you miss the point. I cannot show you what the mystical is, you have to experience it for yourself. This is all part of the distinction between the world and my world, what can be said and what can only be seen or experienced solus ipse.

For example, in one of my previous comments to you, I used the word privilege ironically ... — Pussycat

I have no idea what you are trying to get at. I see no indication that you were using the word ironically. What I saw was you falsely accusing me of getting ahead of myself and improvising, and using that as your defense for ignoring what the text actually says and making unfounded claims. The rest of the paragraph might be your idea of improvising, but it is meaningless. It is like someone who does not understand the music getting up at a jam session and making noise, with no regard to the form or melody of the song.

Yes, it would seem or appear so, but you know what they say, appearances can be deceiving. — Pussycat

This was a direct quote from the lecture. Are you saying that Wittgenstein was deceived in believing that certain experiences have supernatural value? Or are you still accusing me of not understanding him?

What sort of truths then? Truths that cannot be expressed in language? Is this what you say? Personal truths? What exactly? — Pussycat

We have been over this. Experiential. A proposition does not tell me if I am happy or in pain.

Do you think that this experience of value is of the same form of everyday experience? Somewhat related, or entirely different? — Pussycat

It would not be the everyday experience of the unhappy person. For most people I would think it would be a matter of degree. To delight in being alive is something that many of us have experienced at some time. The sense of the word as mystical is less common.

So you are saying that logic plays no role at all in biology or psychology? — Pussycat

I am talking about the etymology and meaning of the terms. The term biology does not mean that logic is mixed with life. The term psychology does not mean that logic is mixed with psyche. More to the point,
Wittgenstein marks the limits of logic and world and the "I" is not within those limits. They are separate and distinct, not mixed.

Again, per my question as to these experiences. — Pussycat

Again, are you asking me to put into words what Wittgenstein says cannot be put into words? The problem can be seen, as I pointed out, with mundane experiences such as the taste of vanilla ice cream. This is an experience that most of us can relate to. In the Investigations he talks a great deal about the experience of pain. When someone says that they are in pain we know what they mean. But the experience of the mystical is not one we can so easily understand since it is not a common experience.

In the Lecture on Ethics he gives examples from his own experience: wonder, feeling absolutely safe, seeing the world as a miracle. He also says:


... It is the paradox that an experience, a fact, should seem to have supernatural value.'


And:

... no description that I can think of would do to describe what I mean by absolute value ...

The experience is a fact, but what it is the experience of, what he calls absolute value, is not itself an experience.

So if ethics has nothing to do with truth-functions, does this mean that no truth comes out of ethics? — Pussycat

No propositional truths.

I didn't say that there was talk of value judgement in the Tractatus, but only an explanation how these are possible. — Pussycat

He provides no such explanation, and if he did wouldn't he have to discuss it, that is, talk about value judgments? You miss the point. It is not about value judgments but the experience of value.

Well yes, he doesn't, but seeing that you get ahead of yourself, I took the liberty to improvise as well, I mean why should there be only you that has that privilege? — Pussycat

First of all, I am not ahead of myself. I have followed the Tractatus. In a few places I cited his other writings. There is nothing else in addition to these points that I have said that cannot be found in the Tractatus. Second, your claim about mixing logic and soul is contrary to the Tractatus. If you like you can assert the "privilege" of saying things that are contrary to the text but you should be aware and make note of the fact that they are.

So psychology is the logos of the psyche, not the logic of the psyche? — Pussycat

'ologies' are the talk about or examination of or study of the subject matter. Biology is not the logic of life, it is the study of life. Psychology is not the logic of the psyche, it is the study of the psyche.

By what you are reasoning here, you say why it is not a continuation of 6.423, but you don't actually say why or how it is a continuation of 6.42, where ethical propositions are discussed. — Pussycat

Actually, I did. 6.42 explains why there can be no propositions of ethics. This is, however, not the last word on ethics. Ethics is about what we do, that is, the exercise of the will and the pursuant rewards and punishments. In other words - not this (6.42) but this (6.43). But this is not the final word either.

Do you think that in 6.44 and 6.45, the subject is still ethics? — Pussycat

Yes.

And if so, how is ethics connected with these propositions? — Pussycat

Ethics and aesthetics are the same (6.421) 6.44 and 6.45 refer to aesthetic experience, meaning and value.

But since there can be no propositions of ethics he is not pointing to ethical facts or what is the case with regard to ethics, but rather to what can be seen from a vantage point that is outside of logic and propositions and facts:

He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world aright. (6.54) — Tractatus

What relation do you think the general form of truth-function has with 6.4? — Pussycat

The answer is:

6.42

So too it is impossible for there to be propositions of ethics.
Propositions can express nothing that is higher. — Tractatus

Ethics has nothing to do with truth-functions, for propositions can express nothing higher.

All this however, is purely psychological, since believing, willing, judging etc something does not necessarily make it so, which is the foundation for all psychology. — Pussycat

Wittgenstein says:

5.641
Thus there really is a sense in which philosophy can talk about the self in a nonpsychological way.
What brings the self into philosophy is the fact that ‘the world is my world’.
The philosophical self is not the human being, not the human body, or the human soul, with which psychology deals, but rather the metaphysical subject, the limit of the world — not a part of it.

And:

6.423
And the will as a phenomenon is of interest only to psychology.

And thus the Tractatus has explained how value judgements are possible. — Pussycat

He has done no such thing. There is no talk of value judgment in the Tractatus. It is a matter of seeing of what makes itself manifest (6.522).

However, because "logic fills the world", it mixes with our soul and psyche somehow — Pussycat

Where does he say that logic mixes with the soul? Once again you have missed an essential element of the Tractatus, the "I" or self or soul is not in the world, it stands outside it.

and it is not a happy coincidence that the word itself "psycho-logical", bears a logical part, — Pussycat

The term psychological does not mean that there is a logical part of the psyche. Logic is derivative of the Greek "logos", which meant originally to gather together, and thus to give an account, to speak or say. Psychology is the logos of the psyche.

And I think that 6.43 was purposely numbered so by Wittgenstein, being in equal section under 6.4 (All propositions are of equal value) and not under 6.42 (as in 6.424 for example) where he discusses ethics, in order to show that what is contained there (the will and feelings of happiness and unhappiness) pertains to psychology, mostly, and not ethics. — Pussycat

The reason it is not "6.424" is because it is not a continuation of 6.423, which says that it is impossible to speak about the will in so far as it is the subject of ethical attributes. The subject is still ethics. Ethics is not about attributes of the will. It is about the exercise of the will. How we choose to act and the rewards or punishment that follow.

Yes ok. So? Why do you see good willing to be a characteristic of the happy man, and bad willing that of an unhappy man? Because they are placed in the same order afterwards? If he wrote:

"The world of the unhappy man is a different one from that of the happy man",

would you have said that the good exercise of the will is that of the unhappy man, and bad willing that of the happy man?

I don't see the connection, in fact, I don't think they are related at all, in that happiness does not have anything to do with the will, as it is stated above, I am saying that the two statements are unconnected. — Pussycat

The numbering system in the Tractatus is not ornamental. The remark about the world of the happy man is not some offhand remark unrelated to the statement in which it occurs. It follows from the prior related statements.

6.41
In the world everything is as it is, and everything happens as it does happen: in it no value exists—and if it did exist, it would have
no value.
What makes it non-accidental cannot lie within the world, since if it did it would itself be accidental.
It must lie outside the world.

6.42

So too it is impossible for there to be propositions of ethics.
Propositions can express nothing that is higher.

6.421
It is clear that ethics cannot be put into words.
Ethics is transcendental.
(Ethics and aesthetics are one and the same.)

6.422

There must indeed be some kind of ethical reward and ethical punishment, but they must reside in the action itself.
(And it is also clear that the reward must be something pleasant and the punishment something unpleasant.)



6.423
It is impossible to speak about the will in so far as it is the subject of ethical attributes.

6.43
If the good or bad exercise of the will does alter the world, it can alter only the limits of the world, not the facts—not what can be expressed by means of language.
In short the effect must be that it becomes an altogether different world. It must, so to speak, wax and wane as a whole.
The world of the happy man is a different one from that of the unhappy man. — Tractatus

According to 6.41 value is not found in the world. This is followed by 6.42 which states that there can be no ethical propositions because propositions cannot express anything higher. Ethics is transcendental (6.421). This is followed by 6.422 which states there must be ethical rewards and punishments, and that they reside in the action itself. 6.423 states that it is impossible to speak about the will in so far as it is the subject of ethical attributes. This is because the will is not a thing in the world. Rather than attributes of the will it is the actions or exercise of the will that is at issue, but it cannot change what happens in the world, it changes the world as a whole (6.43).

This last comment must be understood in light of the claim that the world is my world. It is my world that changes with my actions. But it cannot be anything in my world that changes, and whatever that change is it must be rewarding if I exercise my will in ways that are good and a punishment if I do not. If the reward is of value that value is not something that can be found in the world. My world becomes a different world dependent upon my ethical actions. Happiness is the reward for good actions and unhappiness for bad actions.

The quote is from the Tractatus:

6.43

If the good or bad exercise of the will does alter the world, it can alter only the limits of the world, not the facts—not what can be expressed by means of language.

In short the effect must be that it becomes an altogether different world. It must, so to speak, wax and wane as a whole.

The world of the happy man is a different one from that of the unhappy man. — Tractatus

Yes, which I translated to "is the will fundamental in all ethical theories?". — Pussycat

You translated what into the question of whether the will is fundamental to all ethical theories? It should be clear that Wittgenstein did not have an ethical theory.

Your disagreement is with theory? Or with fundamental? I guess with the first. But I lost you there — Pussycat

You certainly did!

what do you mean by ethics is not a theory of ethics? — Pussycat

A theory is not the thing it is a theory of. A theory of music is not music, it is about music. There can be no theory of ethics for Wittgenstein because ethics is transcendental.

We have something, say X, and to be able to understand it and say a few things about it, we build a theory of X around it. — Pussycat

The X in question is ethics. Ethics is not a state of affairs, that is, a matter of fact. Propositions that have a sense are limited to matters of fact. This is basic to Wittgenstein. An understanding of ethics is experiential.

And when W says something about the musical score in the Tractatus, he does so to link the musical form to the pictorial form, and go from there to the logical form that governs everything in the world. I don't think that this has anything to do with ethics or aesthetics per se. — Pussycat

A theory of music has to do with its form. It is not the form of music that is aesthetic, it is the sound, the experience, how one is moved.

It's whatever one chooses I guess. — Pussycat

Wittgenstein did not "choose" first one and then the other.

I just copied here what W says in the lecture: — Pussycat

Taking something out of context can misrepresent it. Here is how he ends the lecture:

This running against the walls of our cage is perfectly, absolutely hopeless. Ethics so far as it springs from the desire to say something about the ultimate meaning of life, the absolute good, the absolute valuable, can be no science. What it says does not add to our knowledge in any sense. But it is a document of a tendency in the human mind which I personally cannot help respecting deeply and I would not for my life ridicule it. — Lecture on Ethics

The lecture is consonant with the Tractatus. The will is fundamental. An inquiry into what is good or valuable or the meaning of life is not something that yields a propositional answer. That is why he appeals to experience.

And I will make my point still more acute by saying 'It is the paradox that an experience, a fact, should seem to have supernatural value.' — Lecture on Ethics

There it is again this talk of "experience"... — Pussycat

Yes.

I think that the main reason you misunderstand the Tractatus is because you are primarily concerned with ethics. — Pussycat

I assume you cannot see the irony of this! Ethics is of central importance to the Tractatus. That you cannot see this is a serious blind spot.

"Transcendental" is so Kant, isn't it? — Pussycat

It is a term that Kant used, and Wittgenstein follows his use of the term. The key is that they do not identify the same things as transcendental. I discussed this in an earlier post.

This I say is the traditional view of ethics, that reward coincides with something acceptable and happiness, which also coincides with good willing, in contrast to punishment and something unacceptable and bad willing. — Pussycat

He does accept the notion of reward and punishment. Only it is not to be found in anything in the world. As you quoted:

For there must be something right in that formulation of the question. There must be some sort of ethical reward and ethical punishment, but this must lie in the action itself.

On the other hand, if ethics cannot be expressed in language, then we should remain silent about ethical matters. — Pussycat

And this is why he says:

6.54
My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognizes them
as senseless, when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak
throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it.)
He must surmount these propositions; then he sees the world rightly. — Tractatus

Seeing the world rightly, this is not something he was trying to say, it is what he was trying to show.

However I don't see anywhere in the Tractatus him saying that ethics is about "the life of the "happy man"; — Pussycat

You really should check the text before saying such things:

6.43

If the good or bad exercise of the will does alter the world, it can alter only the limits of the world, not the facts—not what can be expressed by means of language.

In short the effect must be that it becomes an altogether different world. It must, so to speak, wax and wane as a whole.

The world of the happy man is a different one from that of the unhappy man. — Tractatus

I quoted this passage and discussed this in an earlier post. In addition, I added statements from the Notebooks.