The problem with using the word "belief" is it implies the bedrock hinge statements are epistemic. It's a matter of being a part of a form of life. People don't doubt hinge propositions, they avoid playing the game by not being a part of a community.

But how does belief fit in a language game, l still need to figure this out ? — Eskander

I would disagree that beliefs imply that "hinge-propositions" are epistemic. A belief must have two other components in order for it to be epistemological, viz., justification and truth. A simple claim, or a mere belief, is just that, a claim, it maybe true, or it maybe false. Hinge-propositions, which many interpret to not be propositions at all (and I agree), are a special kind of belief, with a special status, i.e., they stand outside of epistemological language. These beliefs form the backdrop that allow the language-games of knowing and doubting to take root. They function very similar to the rules of chess, the pieces, and the board, which need no justification, i.e., they form the backdrop which allows the game of chess to be played. And, it's that playing of the game that is a form of life.

People do doubt Moorean propositions (hinge-propositions), which is why Moore wrote his papers in the first place. Although, in practical terms, we don't (generally) doubt them in our everyday speech acts.

Beliefs can be expressed in words. What is expressed in certain acts goes beyond words, and hence beyond belief, into a form of life. — Banno

Forms of life are just acts, shown in what we do. Wittgenstein is focused on those forms of life that are connected with language use, and by extension, those acts done by a society or culture. I don't know what acts would go beyond words, maybe certain mental phenomena, but I'm not sure. Wittgenstein was wrestling with this very thing at the end of his life, not only in OC, but in other writings during this period.

That's what was wrong with Moore's "Here is a hand" - it expressed a mere belief, a mere propositional attitude, that could indeed be subject to discussion, when what was needed was the form of life that shows us as embedded in the world. "Here is a hand" takes place in that form of life, as do all discussions. — Banno

I'm not sure what you mean by a "mere belief," but if you mean one of W's hinge's or bedrock beliefs, I agree. Ya, his claim amounted to more of a conviction of a belief, an attitude is probably correct too, expressed in tone of voice or a gesticulation (OC 42 seems to suggest this).

A form of life is not a mere set of beliefs. — Banno

I would also agree with this. There are other things going on in a form of life besides belief expressions. A form of life expresses feelings, attitudes, etc, although these things can be phrased as beliefs. For example, "He has a bad attitude."

So, some of this, or most of this I agree with, depending on what you mean by "mere beliefs." I tend to use the phrase "mere beliefs" to refer to opinions, but I suppose you could also use it to refer to basic beliefs, like Moorean beliefs, e.g., "Here is a hand."

Well, time for bed, thanks for the discussion.

And what are examples of these beliefs? How can you have a belief, or claim to have one without language? — Cobra

Just think about your own life. Your beliefs and the beliefs of others are expressed in non-verbal actions all the time, not just expressed in linguistic terms. The very act of turning the key to start you car shows a myriad of beliefs, those beliefs, can be expressed in language, but they're also expressed in your actions apart from statements. You can't have a claim without language, but you can have beliefs without language.

I would say that there are pre-linguistic facts or beliefs that give rise to language.
— Sam26

What do you mean by this? — Cobra

What I mean, and you have read other posts in here to follow my point, is that there were and are beliefs associated with pre-linguistic man that gave rise to language. Beliefs are not restricted to language. But to have a language, necessarily involves pre-linguistic beliefs, they're foundational to language. It's like the beliefs animals have, only animals weren't able to take it to the next level, language.

Any fact can be stated. That's what a fact is, and that's what is said in Tractates 1 & 2, and I think these among the views that carried forward into his later work. — Banno

Facts are states-of-affairs quite apart from language. We use language to refer to facts, which is what the Tractatus is about, but the world of facts is separate from the world of propositions, which are just claims, that either match with the facts in the world or not. He did carry some of this through to his later work, no doubt.

If to believe is to hold that some state of affairs is the case, then beliefs range over propositions. — Banno

Yes, but that is what I'm disagreeing with, a belief is not just about propositions, but, it can be said that all beliefs have something to do with states-of-affairs (facts). All acts come into contact with states-of-affairs.

I'll add that statements such as "I believe in freedom" or "I believe in Sam26" use a different sense of belief. — Banno

They are still about states-of-affairs.

That seems to me the best grammar for beliefs. Their structure is a relation between someone and a proposition such that they hold the proposition to be true. — Banno

There is no doubt that the grammar of a proposition is the best way for expressing one's belief in statement form. However, that is not the question, the question is, are beliefs only expressed in language (statements/propositions)? My contention is that beliefs can be expressed in two ways, acts that are not linguistic, and acts that are linguistic. This gets to Wittgenstein's idea of showing, viz., the showing of beliefs that are not propositional. For example, a religious person showing their religious belief through prayer, meditation, etc., the very act, shows the belief, apart from any statement or proposition. In fact, the very act of opening a door shows various beliefs about your surroundings. Language expression simply adds to the beliefs that are already there. That one can state the belief after the fact, is no argument against the view that the ontology of a belief, is not restricted to language use.

Hence any belief can be put into propositional form. Further if it cannot be put into that form it is not a belief as such, but perhaps an intuition, gut feeling, vague notion or some such. — Banno

It doesn't follow that because any belief can be put into proposition form, that all beliefs are of this form.

What's interesting is that Wittgenstein believed that some beliefs (religious beliefs, moral beliefs, etc.) could not be expressed as facts in the world. This, it seems, is why Wittgenstein was against arguments about the existence of God, there are no facts of metaphysics ("the world is all that is the case"), no facts that correspond to metaphysical propositions. I believe he was wrong about this.

Where did I say anything about pre-linguistic propositions, that wouldn't make sense. Propositions are by definition linguistic. I was talking about pre-linguistic beliefs. You seem to think all beliefs are propositional, I don't.

So you must have some way to square this with "The world is all that is the case".

How? — Banno

Well, something that I haven't talk much about, is my disagreement with Wittgenstein about what can be talked about in terms of metaphysics.

You need to be more specific, in what way do my statements, conflict with his statement?

Wouldn't a language with no factual basis that is nonsensical just be a private language? It seems so.

I guess it's just what we mean by nonsense. — Cobra

Is the game of chess based on facts, other than the rules of the game? So, language-games are based on, for the most part, the rules of grammar, and the way we use concepts within certain contexts etc. We use language to refer to facts in the world. You could say there are facts of language, some of those facts arise out of the meanings of our words. It's a fact that bachelors are unmarried, but I suppose you are referring to facts outside of language. I would say that there are pre-linguistic facts or beliefs that give rise to language.

There are circumstances; phantom limbs, numbness or paralysis, alien limb syndrome, perhaps some virtual reality aps, where the possession of a hand becomes a real question. But these situations where the question becomes real and meaningful, are outside the realm in which one discusses philosophy — unenlightened

Of course, and Wittgenstein gives examples which are exceptions to Moore's propositions, viz., that there are instances where a doubt can occur, but they are not the norm. When I talk of doubting, I'm referring to Moore's specific use of, "I know this is a hand," given in front of an audience where a doubt is meaningless.

What does "unknown" mean in this use? Other than we don't know if the statement is true or false. What third option is there? There are unknown truth values, but that again, just means that the proposition/statement can be true or false.
— Banno

But that is not the same as there being propositions which do not have a truth value. — Banno

Banno, these people are going in circles. Again, what does having a truth value amount to, other than being true or false? There just is no such thing as a proposition that is true, and not known to be true. What are they saying is true? That's my question, it amounts to nothing.

But as a final comment, if a hinge proposition is not true, then we could not make any deductions from them - hence rendering them pointless. — Banno

This is where I go beyond Wittgenstein, although Wittgenstein alludes to it, that these so-called hinge-propositions are just very basic beliefs, shown in our actions. With these come language itself, and then the whole of epistemology. So, they stand apart, as the background, so to speak, that gives us everything needed for our language-games. They are simply acts of a different kind than propositions, they are pre-linguistic. So, they are not pointless. In fact, they are extremely important.

An anti-realist may say that the statement "There is water at Mercury's poles" is neither true nor not true, until the observation is made. — Banno

The anti-realist is confused. If I make a claim, that there is water on Mercury's pole, that by definition is a proposition, and propositions can be true or false, just as any claim that's not known. If I verify that there is water on Mercury's pole, now it becomes knowledge. The use of words by the anti-realist, is, for the most part, senseless.

By the way you didn't give me an example of something that is true, but not known to be true.

Give me an example of something that is true, but not known to be true? It would have to be some proposition, right?

While there are issues with unjustified knowledge I don't see an issue with unjustified truth. The alternative would presumably be some sort of antirealism. — Banno

Ya, I think we have a difference in the way we look at truth. If some proposition is true, then how would you know it's true without a justification? A simple claim that something is a truth, doesn't mean that it's true. I can't make any sense out of an unjustified truth, if you're saying that X is true without a justification, then the claim that it's true is more akin to an opinion. If it's an opinion, then it could just as easily be false. However, the way you're using it, is like saying, "I know it's true." A kind of knowing without justification, which seems contradictory.

I don't think of hinge-propositions as propositions in the normal sense of the word, which is why they're called hinges, basic. or bedrock propositions. They don't fall into the epistemological language we use, at least in terms of JTB. They're not truths, they don't need some kind of justification, at least in the way Moore was referring to them. They're more akin to the rules of chess, as has already been mentioned. Although, it seems, we can make more sense of the question, "Do bishops move diagonally?" - than we can of the question, "Do I have hands?" I don't think Wittgenstein worked this out, "having hands" seems more fundamental, more foundational, if you will, than the rules of chess (not foundational, though, as it's typically used in epistemology). Wittgenstein seems to think of them as a contingent function of the world in which we live, the backdrop of all acting, verbal and non-verbal. And, one of the things that sets them apart. as @Banno mentioned, is that doubting them, at least generally, is senseless.

It seems that just as chess needs the rules, the board, and the pieces, in order for there to be a game of chess, so too, do we need these hinge, bedrock, or foundational beliefs (I think of them as special beliefs, not as propositions) in order to have a language, especially the language of epistemology. This includes the language of doubting. They have a special place between the mind, the world, and our language, and that place is related to our actions in the world.

I answered this question already, when I replied to Tom.

I think maybe I'll keep the book in the first person. I was just looking over a book my philosophy professor wrote many years ago, which is similar to what I'm doing, and it was in the first person.

I'm mainly writing the book as something to accomplish before I pass away. I don't envision selling it or anything like that, it's just something I want to accomplish. It may only be read by a few friends and family members, so I don't think of it much beyond that.

I'm heading in the direction that my thread on "Does Consciousness Survive the Death of the Body" was headed, only I want to show the whole process leading up to the inductive argument.

No, I don't have a chapter breakdown, but I have a pretty clear idea of how I'm going to proceed. I agree that I should have an outline, so before going further I'll do that. I have about 40 pages written so far, which includes much of what will be in the linguistic analysis section; and I also have much of what will be in the epistemology section. I don't want anything long, so I'm going to keep the book length at about 100-120 pages. I figure it will take me about a year to complete the book. Your right about the editing, it's a real pain. Just changing everything written so far will take weeks.

Sorry, but I think some of the comments are still applicable. I'm still trying to decide about first person vs third person. First person is more intimate, but third person is more objective, and maybe more suited for this writing. I would like to be both.

I really appreciate the time spent looking over this material. It gives me some idea of what needs to be worked on, or at least improved upon. I'm hoping to get others to chime in, so I can get more feedback.

What I'm trying to do is show the process that leads up to my final argument, because I'm going to claim to know the conclusion follows; and that others can know too. This starts with understanding some of Wittgenstein's thinking about the meaning of our concepts, and some of the misunderstandings involved in our thinking about how we acquire knowledge. However, I need to be able to explain Wittgenstein so that people can understand it (this is the challenge). Maybe I'm biting off more than I can chew, but I think it can be done. It will just take a lot of work.

My intention is to start with the argument, which is what people are interested in, then if they want more they can go deeper into the book. Next would be epistemology, and finally, linguistic analysis, which is the most difficult part. So, the book will be in reverse order, because if I start with linguistic analysis, they may read a page or two, then give up. I have the outline in my head, i.e., I know how I want to proceed. I should write it down though.

Thanks again.

I understand, no worries. I had to repost the last post because I'm having a hard time with the cutting and pasting, it's leaving names of books out for some reason. Maybe that had something to do with using a unicode text converter.

So, basically, what you're saying is that the writing is mediocre, and it's about as clear as mud. You may be right, and it's especially true if I'm trying to explain this material to people with no background in this area of philosophy. I don't mind the honesty. Let me give the next few paragraphs to see if it helps, with the caveat that none of this is written in stone, obviously.
________________________________

Before we get to the subject of epistemology, we will need some background on how meaning has been traditionally thought of in philosophy. Traditionally, the meaning of a word was thought to be connected with the object it refers to, that is, its referent, or the object it denotes (the object the word points to). The idea that meaning is directly connected to things or objects in reality can be traced back to Augustine (354 A.D. – 430 A.D.). Thinking of meaning in this context culminates in the twentieth century with Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus-Logico Philosophicus (originally published in German, in 1921, then translated and published into English, in 1922).

Again, just as our treatment of epistemology is just meant to be an overview, so is our look at Wittgenstein’s ideas only meant to be a glimpse at some of his ideas. This glimpse is mainly focused on his ideas about meaning; and to briefly contrast his ideas of meaning in terms of his early and later philosophy.

Wittgenstein (1889-1951) was born in Vienna, Austria, and he was the youngest of eight children. He came from a very cultured and very rich industrialist family, where the arts, especially music, played a central role. In fact, Johannes Brahms, who was considered a close friend, would come to the Wittgenstein home and play his music; and Brahms was also known to have given some family members piano lessons.

Ludwig was educated at home until the age of 14, when his parents decided to send the young Wittgenstein to Linz to prepare him in mathematics and the physical sciences. It seems that the young Wittgenstein wanted to study with the physicist Boltzmann, however Boltzmann died in 1906. After being educated in Linz for three years, he then went to Berlin to study mechanical engineering at the Technische Hochscule at Charlottenburg. After two years in Berlin, he went to England where he became a research student of engineering at the University of Manchester. During this time, he engaged in aeronautical research, and went from experimenting with kites, to the construction of a jet reaction propeller for aircraft. The design of the propeller was a mathematical endeavor, which eventually led the young Wittgenstein into pure mathematics, and then, to the foundation of mathematics.

Apparently, his interest in the foundation of mathematics led him to Russell and Whitehead's work, called, The Principles of Mathematics. The Principles of Mathematics greatly affected the young Wittgenstein, and this interest led him to the works of Frege, who was the founder of modern mathematical logic. So, it was through Russell, Whitehead, and Frege's works that Wittgenstein entered into the study of philosophy.

Wittgenstein’s early work, the Tractatus, is a more traditional philosophical work. It is traditional in the sense of the kind of analysis he is doing. He digs into a proposition as if to find some essence that will logically connect it to the world. It is an a priori analysis of the proposition that shows how propositions picture (or mirror) the world of facts through a one-to-one correspondence between the proposition, and the fact it pictures (it is a picture theory of language). It is through this investigation that Wittgenstein hopes to find an exactness of meaning, or an exactness of expression. He accomplishes this by breaking down the proposition into what he believes are its essential parts, namely, elementary propositions, and even smaller parts, called names. So, according to Wittgenstein, “…propositions must bring us to elementary propositions, which consist of names in immediate combination (T. 4.221).” Names, again, being the smallest constituent part of the proposition. And, since Wittgenstein held to the traditional view of language, namely, that the meaning of a word is the object it refers to, or the object it denotes (T. 3.203). He then links the proposition, via a name, with an object, the smallest constituent part of a fact. Facts being broken down into atomic facts, then into objects. There is a direct connection from the name (the smallest component of the proposition) to the object it represents (the smallest component of the fact). In this way we have a direct link between the proposition and the world of facts. This brings us back to the traditional view of meaning, that the meaning of a word is its referent.

Wittgenstein’s analysis is much more complicated than what is presented here. My only point is to show how meaning was thought of in the traditional sense, and how Wittgenstein’s Tractatus continued this historical line of thinking in a much more exacting way. This is probably why Russell mistakenly thought Wittgenstein was trying to construct an ideal language. Because if Wittgenstein was correct in the way he thought of propositions, then you would have more precision based on the nature of the proposition, and how it pictured the world of facts.

Wittgenstein’s later work, in some ways, is continuous, namely, he continues to think of many of the problems of philosophy as misunderstandings of the logic of our language. It would be a mistake to think that his later philosophy completely repudiates his early philosophy. He mainly repudiates his method of analysis. This contrast of methods into the nature of the proposition, is what separates his early philosophy from his later philosophy. If there is a gap between the two periods of his thinking, it is a gap of method. One could say that the difference between these two investigations, is like comparing the a priori (independent of experience) with the a posteriori (dependent on experience).

Wittgenstein’s early philosophy starts when he meets both Bertrand Russell (1911), and Gottlob Frege (1912); and his later philosophy starts roughly around 1929. His later philosophy is most famously expounded in the Philosophical Investigations; and culminates in his final notes on the subject of what it means to know, called On Certainty. His final entry occurs two days before his death in April 1951.

It is important to understand the background of Wittgenstein's works in order to better understand his thinking. I am not going to be able to give those of you who are interested a complete background of what was going on in philosophy at the time, vis-a-vis Bertrand Russell, A. N. Whitehead, and Gottlob Frege. I will only give you bits and pieces in order to show the connection with Wittgenstein’s analysis of what it means to know, and the view of epistemology as presented in these musings.

Does anyone else have an opinion on writing this in the first person? This is meant to be read by the public, so I don't know if that makes a difference. I've read different opinions about first person writing.

Thanks Tom.

That's exactly what I'm looking for. Thanks. I was wondering about the first person part, and I've also been trying to clean up some of the wordiness. There is going to be a complete section on what knowledge is, this part is specifically about linguistic analysis, but your point is well taken.

Thanks for the input. It's appreciated.

Weird, when I pasted this in here, things were left out, so I had to make corrections.

Same slip again. What is true is independent of what is believed. One can assert the truth of a statement that is true. It doesn't matter if that person knows it is true. The way that we (the outside evaluators) know that it is true is based upon our own justifications, not the person that merely believes something is true by luck (or other insufficient warrant). We know it is true, they don't know it, we both assert that it is true. Why is that a problem? — Ennui Elucidator

You seem to be confusing certain concepts. A truth is simply what is asserted, what is independent is the fact that the truth claim is about. If I say, "The Earth has one moon," it's true, why? Because it tells us something that mirrors or reflects reality, generally speaking. Truths are just claims that are expressed as propositions, they don't exist somewhere in the ether. The only things that have this ontology, that you seem to be referring to, are the facts, the states-of-affairs in reality.

That's it for me, I'm in the middle of writing a book. Good Luck.

Or on the triune analysis of JTB, can't you have TB without the J such that you can say, "X is true and I believe X is true, but I lack justification such that I don't know X is true?" Consider the old "Child believes his father has his wallet because he gave it to him moments before, but as it turns out, the Child is wrong about who his father is because he was kidnapped at birth by FakeFather, FakeFather doesn't have his wallet because someone just pickpocketed him, and the pickpocket is Realfather!" — Ennui Elucidator

I thought my explanation was very clear, but apparently not. I'll just respond to this. Can you have a true belief, without the justification? Obviously you can, in at least three ways. First, I can have a belief that's true, i.e., I don't know it's true, I just believe it's true without the justification. In this case, it's akin to a lucky guess, since there is no justification. Second, I can hold to a belief that's based on some or little evidence, but it's not enough to, again, justify believing it's true. You still don't know if it's true. So, still, in these two cases, you can't make a definitive claim that it's true. A claim to truth doesn't equate to truth. Third, and finally, you can have a truth claim that's justified, you have good reasons or good evidence to back up the claim, if this is the case, then you not only have a truth claim, but a truth claim that's amounts to knowledge.

In your example, which seems to allude to the Gettier examples, is that the child believes something that's not true, so what's the point? Presumable the point is that the child thinks their justified, when their not, so their belief is false. Again, the difference between believing a claim is true, and it actually being true. These are totally different things. All of the Gettier examples fall short of actually being justified, or actually being true, as opposed to thinking or believing one is justified. The same with your example.

But do we ever say, "I don't know that it's true (i.e., I'm affirming the truth, not doubting the truth), that Paris is the capital of France." So, it's true, but I don't know it. What!?
— Sam26

Do you mind elaborating a bit on this?

A: Has sufficient epistemic warrant to know X.

B: Was told by A that X is true, but lacks sufficient epistemic warrant to know X because "B said so" is inadequate. Has never had cause to doubt A's claims of truth and believes that if A says it is true, it is true. If "X" was "It is true that this bridge is safe for you to walk across" and B said it to A, B would unhaltingly walk across the bridge.

B says, "I don't know that X is true." — Ennui Elucidator

This gets back to the statement, "X is an unknown truth." First, I hold to the view that generally speaking, the definition of knowledge is justified true belief, i.e., for many of our uses of the concept know, this definition works perfectly well.

Second, if someone makes a claim that X is true, it's just a claim, not known to be true. For a claim to be true, it needs a justification, otherwise it's just a claim and nothing more. What's being stated here, is that we have a truth, categorically, not a claim that maybe true, but a truth. But, how can we make such a claim, unless that truth is known to be true, and if it's known, then it's by definition, knowledge. It follows necessarily then, that the statement, "X is an unknown truth," is contradictory. There are unknown claims (beliefs or opinions), that is, we don't know if their true or false. There are unknown facts, yet to be discovered, but there is no such thing as an unknown truth. It's like saying there are unknown knowns. Keep in mind, again, to say that something is definitively true, then supposedly you have good reasons or good evidence to support the truth of the claim. Otherwise, again, to repeat myself for clarity, you don't have a truth, you have a proposition that maybe true, or maybe false.

Your example seems to make a similar mistake. Let's say, for example, "Joe tells me that the bridge is safe to cross," and let's suppose that I know Joe, and have interacted with Joe on innumerable occasions, and moreover, I know Joe is honest and levelheaded. Would I have sufficient warrant to believe Joe? Yes. We justify many of our beliefs in this way. In fact, most of our beliefs are justified based on the testimony of others, unless there are mitigating circumstances that give us reason to suppose otherwise. So, you do have sufficient warrant to believe Joe. And, if you don't believe what Joe said is true, then supposedly you have reason to doubt what Joe said. In this case you don't have a justification for the truth of what Joe said, so it's not a truth, it's simply a claim, a simple proposition.

Yes, you want to read his original works, but read this first it will give you a lot of background information, then read his works.

One of the best books to read starting out is, Wittgenstein's Conception of Philosophy, by K. T. Fann. You can get it used for just a few dollars.

That's understandable, you're not alone. It's difficult material. I still find large parts difficult to follow, and I started reading his notes in 1979. Good hunting Agent Smith.

Yes, we feel at home in the bottle.

There is just so much of this in philosophy, and in our general thinking, it's difficult to unravel it all. And, even those of us, including myself, who think we understand Wittgenstein, makes these same errors, over and over again.

Omniscience is a logical impossibility if interaction is involved, for interacting with that what the knowledge is about will destroy the knowledge you had before interacting. Hoisting the interaction aboard of the knowledge already there doesn't change the outcome. If the process of knowing becomes part of the process the knowing is about then the knowing itself becomes a hindrance to knowledge of it all.

Only the evolution of neatly isolated material arrangements, given well defined initial conditions, can be related to omniscience. The science being about the material insofar it satisfies the criterion of being valid knowledge. If the arrangement is started and we let it evolve freely, without us intervening, the evolution can be known completely. The moment we intervene, the knowledge is frustrated. If the molded matter behaves not as expected the knowledge has to be adjusted. Which potentially involves changing the theory, or changing the mold and conditions. — Raymond

This is just too convoluted Raymond.

Why shouldn't there be referents for these? Time refers to a clock, free will refers to the will, the refers to nouns, etc refers to a not mentioned part. Only nothing refers to nothing. All words have referents or meaning. Unless you use the words like words only, like can be done in poetry. — Raymond

There are plenty of threads in this forum that discuss this, so I'm not going to explain it again. I find it funny that you think 'time' refers to a clock. So, if we didn't have clocks there would be no time? What if there was nothing used to measure time, would there be no time, and what would be its referent then?

1. Can have meaning in the usual sense (as referents). Which meanings of this strain makes omniscience coherent? — Agent Smith

The idea that meaning is generally derived from referents has been debunked. There are exceptions, but meaning should be seen, primarily, as a function of use. There are no referents for words like, time, nothing, the, free will, etc. Freeing yourself from this idea is very helpful in philosophy.

I gave you an example of a coherent use of omniscience. Read my other post to you above. Remember you can always create examples where a particular concept doesn't make sense, or is incoherent. The problem is that people want to give some precise definition to the word, and there may not be one. I like the general definition of omniscience as, knowing all that's possible to be known. There maybe things that are impossible to know, for anyone, including a god. And, because people don't like the concept, because it has religious overtones, they go a bit overboard in their analysis.

But can we buy the proposition that there are true propositions that cannot be known? And can we know that proposition to be true? — Cuthbert

My view, is that it's largely a misunderstanding of the concepts involved. You also see this in the Gettier problem. But to answer your question, and I think you're leaning this way too, is that there is a serious problem with the phrase, "unknown truths." One can say "unknown facts," facts being states of affairs, but "unknown truths" is a misunderstanding. Again, it seems this phrase, as has been pointed out, is saying "unknown knowns." If we have an X that is true, then how can we say it's true, if it's not known to be true? Otherwise you just have a proposition that's either true or false, a claim that's not known to be true, an opinion.

As to your second question, what proposition? There is no proposition that corresponds to this supposed "true proposition." It's an illusion. Language again confounds us. Can we call an imaginary claim true or false?

Someone give me an unknown truth! Saying we don't know X, Y, or Z, is one thing, it makes sense. And, saying there are unknowns, makes sense, but the rest of this is senseless to me. There are states of affairs that are unknown, viz., facts that we haven't discovered. There are claims that are potential truths, but they are potentially false too. A claim is about propositions, and the only way to know if a proposition is true, is if we can justify it in some way. However, if we justify it, it then becomes knowledge. This, I believe is just a confused way of talking. Where am I going wrong?

Also, we apply the word truth to actual claims, not some invisible claim existing in the ether.

We can say "I don't know algebra," or "I don't know if I remembered his name correctly." But do we ever say, "I don't know that it's true (i.e., I'm affirming the truth, not doubting the truth), that Paris is the capital of France." So, it's true, but I don't know it. What!?This is essentially what you're doing by affirming an unknown truth. I can say, "I don't know if Paris is the capital of France," which expresses a doubt about one's knowledge.

Again, linguistic knots.

Notice that "p is an unknown truth" uses a proper name - p - for the unknown truth. It is quite different to the everyday "there are things we do not know". — Banno

I find the phrase "unknown truth" to be problematic, to say the least. If X is known to be true, which is what this statement seems to imply, then how can it be unknown? It's like saying, "I both know, and don't know, that X is true, which is contradictory. If truth in this statement is just a claim without justification, then you can't say it's true, you can believe it's true, but that's not the same as being true. Claims don't equate to truth, so I'm not sure the statement "P is an unknown truth" even makes sense. This reminds me of the Gettier problems, they say things that seem to make sense, but in reality don't make sense. People tie themselves up in linguistic nonsense.

Well, it seems to me that if I make the claim that I'm omniscient, most people would say the claim is false. However, how could you say it's false if it was incoherent? How are you able to have this discussion if the word was incoherent? Are you saying that the concept omniscience is the same as "xfisdia?" And, what are you saying when you say it's incoherent?

If I say that I know everything, i.e., there are no facts hidden from me, is this incoherent? I don't see how it's incoherent. So, it depends on how you are using the concept. You might argue that no one has access to all the facts. Okay, if no one has access to all the facts, then no one is omniscient, which would make my claim to be omniscient, false. But, again, I don't see where the conversation about omniscience is incoherent.