Whether the concept is coherent depends on how it is used. Just like any concept it can be misused, and as a consequent it can be incoherent.

My turn. Sime, you're wrong about the arrow example." How an arrow is understood is not private; the arrow has a use only because we (not "I") agree as to which end of the arrow is which. The example leads in exactly the other direction to the oen you suppose. — Banno

I agree.

Also, @Sime think of how playing a game of chess would go if the rules for chess were determined privately - no one would understand what in the world you were doing. It wouldn't correspond with the moves the rest of us were making. Of course, it's even worse than this, at least people in the chess example could point out how the correct moves are made; but in your private language, one where there is no interaction with others, it would be even more problematic.

And Sam26 says my interpretations of Wittgenstein are "so far from the norm". What Sam refuses to accept, is that when we are talking "private language", there is not such thing as the norm. How can one even discuss the possibility of private language if one insists that language use must be normative? — Metaphysician Undercover

Geez MU, who in the world ever said there was a norm of use with regard to a private language? Norms of use, as discussed by Wittgenstein, have to do with language-games as part of a social use. It's our social uses of concepts that give us a norm of use. Moreover, there is not one norm of use, but many norms of use, depending on the context, and the language-game associated with that concept and context.

We are only able to talk about the false assumption of having a private language, in light of the social nature of meaning, namely, it's a necessary feature of a concept that its meaning happens socially within forms of life, both linguistically and non-linguistically.

I found an excellent article that is worth reading, by Stefan Majetschak, entitled

"A misleading parallel”: Wittgenstein on Conceptual Confusion in Psychology and the Semantics of Psychological Concepts. It's definitely worth reading.

Just search, "A misleading parallel”: Wittgenstein on Conceptual Confusion in Psychology and the Semantics of Psychological Concepts by Stefan Majetschak, and download pdf.

This article is from the Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy Volume 9, Number 4.

The observation here is quite specific: hell is immoral. The simple answer is that assuming god is good, then there is no hell, and various popular forms of christianity and other religions are simply wrong.
— @Banno

That's like saying that the police and the justice system are immoral, and that if they were good, there would be no arrests, no judicial processes, and no prisons. — baker

Forgive me, but this is just a stupid comparison, and needs to be called out. We are talking about a God, according to some Christians, obviously not all, who sends people to eternal damnation for not believing or accepting certain beliefs. We are also talking about a God, who created humans knowing full well that many would reject these beliefs, given their free will. So, God would have known that creating this or that person, at the very least, would result in, or at least there would be a good chance, that that person would go to hell. If such a God existed, I would do all that I could to oppose that being. Moreover, such a view makes this God responsible for the resulting evils that occur given God's knowledge. It would be like me creating a robot, giving it free will to do whatever, knowing that it's probably going to result in a certain amount of evil, sometimes even great amounts of evil. I would be responsible for the evil that ensued as a result of such a creation, and I should be held responsible for that evil and punished.

Furthermore, eternal punishment or damnation, is excessive by definition, even if you don't think of it as torture. Most people go through their lives without committing the most egregious of sins, yet because their not within the fold of Christian beliefs, they are damned, forever (according to many Christians, Protestant and Catholic). This is not just, and should be rejected as part of any Christian belief, and many Christians do reject it.

Finally, to compare this belief with what we do in our legal system, is just ridiculous, to say the least. Even we recognize that sending someone to prison forever for minor crimes is not just, period. Yet this is what the God, as defined by some Christians, does! We at least try, although not always successful, to be just in our deliberations about punishment. We can recognize, generally, what's just and not just, given the crime. But the concept of God as defined by these particular beliefs (I don't believe such a God exists), is outright immoral. So, on the one hand you have no justice, or very little justice, and on the other hand you have an attempt to be just.

I guess it depends on how far you want to take it. I talk to people about this stuff all the time, but I'm measured, I'm not always measured in this forum, but when talking with friends, etc. I even went to a church and sat in on a class on faith and reason. I was very careful about what I said, and mostly, offered answers only when asked. However, the person leading the class didn't like that I was there, at least that was my impression. I find that some progress can be made, but I had to watch my attitude. And, I had to be careful not to come across as a know it all. I find that many atheists and agnostics have a very condescending way of talking. I include myself in this mix. My metaphysics, although not religious, is a bit spiritual, so I do have some sympathy for those who appeal to something beyond.

Many Christians need to be challenged on some of these beliefs. I remember arguing with one Christian many years ago who believed that if you didn't "accept Christ" as savior, then you're doomed to hell. So, I asked him, "What about babies who die in infancy? They never accept Christ." His response, is that they too go to hell. Now obviously not everyone who calls themselves a Christian would believe such a thing, but there are many who do.

I also find it reprehensible that there are many people who think communism is a good thing. Especially if you consider how many people have been murdered under this ideology in the 20th century, too many to count. People fall victim to all kinds of crazy beliefs. This is why I continuously point out that most beliefs have nothing to do with logical arguments, it's more about how people were raised, what their friends believe, what their family believes, group think, etc., etc.

Ok, but what other uses? That is what I'm asking. Strange that you can't even provide any examples of what it is that you are trying to say. — Harry Hindu

I haven't given any examples because I've assumed that most people know, that any use of a word in a sentence, is an example of how it's used. So, if I'm talking about epistemology for example, and I say, "I know John is guilty of murder," then the sense of the word know, (namely, how it's used in this sentence), is that I'm justified in some appropriate way. Another use or sense of the word know that is common, is to use it as a kind of emphasis. The emphasis on know would reflect a conviction, i.e., how one feels about the belief their expressing. Wittgenstein pointed this out in OC, where he says this kind of use can express itself in tone of voice. These are two specific examples of different uses of the same word. An epistemological use, and a use that expresses my subjective conviction. However, don't confuse a use that expresses the subjective, as a use that gives the word meaning.

So you've never heard of mass delusions, or ideas that propagate within a group that are just wrong - like the Earth being flat? — Harry Hindu

First, I don't think that because people believe in something that's false, that that necessarily means that they are deluded; and I don't believe this is an argument against my point. And, even if you're under the spell of a mass delusion, it doesn't follow that your words have lost their sense. It just means that you're convinced of something that's false, among other things.

The idea that it's you (emphasis on the subjective) that's convinced, gives people the false idea that it's you that gives meaning to the word. Again, the difference between understanding an expression of the subjective, and understanding how meaning comes about within a social context.

If words have meaning apart from the subjective and is necessarily the case, then how did you misconstrue my intent as being funny when that wasn't my intent? — Harry Hindu

I was being facetious Harry.

Used for what? To accomplish what goal? To win the game? Or to communicate? How does one communicate without the understanding of representation -that something (scribbles and sounds) can mean something else (that isn't scribbles and sounds, like apples and trees)? Unless Witt is saying that individuals don't exist, then it would logically follow that individuals will have varying experiences with the rules of any language which will lead to varying degrees of understanding the rules of some language, which is to say that they have a subjective view of any language. — Harry Hindu

Oh, I get it Harry, you're joking, right? You're trying to be funny, because I can't make any sense of this apart from a joke. If I say a word has a use, then I'm saying that it has a use within a particular language-game or a particular social context. There may be many uses of a word, so your question, "Used for what?" isn't taking into account that there may not be any one use, but many uses. And yes, we do use words/concepts, and sentences to communicate. However, the sense of a word is never the result of your subjective view. We can use words to communicate a subjective view, but we learn to use the words, and the meanings of words, in social contexts apart from the subjective. Not only is this the case, but as far as I can tell, it's necessarily the case.

Any interpretation of a social convention is subjective. Wittgenstein was especially clear about this (e.g how can I know the intended direction of an arrow? how I am supposed to interpret a look-up table? ) . So there is no escape from purely private meaning, at least for Wittgenstein, even if such meaning cannot be linguistically translated. — sime

Sime, you're wrong about the arrow example, and about a "look up table." Let's see if I can make this clear. Wittgenstein asks in (PI 454), "How does it come about that this arrow -----------> points?" Any sign, be it a word or an arrow, only has an application, a use, that we together as a people, i.e., in socially given situations, give to it. "This pointing is not a hocus pocus which can be performed only by the soul [the soul, as used here, should be understood as the inner thing, the subjective]. So, it seems to me, and not only me, but many other interpreters, that Wittgenstein is saying the exact opposite of your point. This is clear throughout the PI, starting at the beginning when he talks about language-games.

Moreover, much of the point of the PI is to escape from the idea of a purely private meaning. I don't understand where you're getting this interpretation from, but I'd run from it. It can't be further from the truth. Anyway, that's my take.

Sometimes the obvious does need to be stated, so than you for stating it. — Banno

I have a knack for stating the obvious. :grin: I do it often. It helps keep us grounded.

I just listened to the podcast that you provided about Lewis and his thinking. I think it's reasonable to ask the questions Lewis asked, I've asked these questions myself. However, I think it's more complicated than just seeing God as evil, and then wondering about all the people who worship this God - i.e., what does it say about the character of these people? I've been around Christians from many denominations and their moral characters vary just as widely as do the moral characters of any group. I don't think you can make the generalization that the people who worship the Christian God, for example, have a diminished character. No more than you can generalize about the moral characters of people who believe in communism, or any other ism. Moreover, many of these people have thought through some of these issues, and do provide a rationale of sorts to themselves and others. One rationale, which I do not in any way find convincing, is that what is meant by just or unjust, good and evil, is based on God himself. We don't determine the sense of these words, God does. It's goes to the divine command theory or something close to it. Moreover, you can always escape some of these questions by saying that God has good reasons which are unknown to us, or some interpret the Bible in a way that helps them deal with these questions.

There have been other types of answers that go to God's infinite nature, how are we even capable of judging whether God is just or unjust, etc, given our limited view of the infinite. Other Christians argue that hell is not forever, that it's for a given period of time, and their are levels of punishment that fit the offense, so it's not as straight forward as one might suppose. And, to answer such a questions requires much more of a study of the psychology of belief, the logic used in thinking about such beliefs, and the conceptual framework these people work within. I don't think it's a simple thing to answer, and we have to be careful about making such sweeping generalizations.

Cheers.

In what follows I've tried to condense some of what's been said in this thread and elsewhere.

Wittgenstein has an important point, namely, that the meaning of our words or concepts is primarily a function of a norm of use within a given language-game. These norms are mostly governed by the rules of the language-game (the logic of the language-game), which take place socially as a cultural practice, in what Wittgenstein calls the activity of a “form of life (e.g., PI 23).” And, it is in this social activity (non-linguistic and linguistic activity woven together) that words or concepts get their sense. Just as the pieces in chess get their sense from how they are used in a chess game, which is also a form of life. Outside the social practice of playing a game of chess, the pieces lose their sense. In other words, how would we talk about chess pieces without referencing their place of origin, that place where chess pieces get their life? The same would be true if we wanted to talk of cellular function apart from the language-game of biology. The word cell, as a biological concept, would lose its sense apart from biology. This is why we say words have a home in which they reside, that is, they have a function, and get their life within their respective language-games.

The meaning of our words or concepts is established necessarily within a social construct, and it necessarily follows that meaning is not a function of an individual’s privately derived sense of meaning; assuming that a privately derived sense of meaning is even linguistically possible, as Wittgenstein’s private language comments seem to suggest.

Further, I have invited you to read something with more care and attention that perhaps you're accustomed to and to do even a little on-line looking about a claim you made. And you're not interested. Where I come from, such dismissive non-interest disqualifies you from conversation. Not least because you have fired off all of your ammunition. "It means what I say it means!" And were that the case, what need the rest of us for any other authority, or even opinion. — tim wood

You have no idea as to how much care I put into studying the Bible, or theology for that matter, that's pure speculation! I was interested enough to study the Bible for years, including going to a Bible college and some master level classes, so I think I have a right to be dismissive of some of these ideas. And, I never said anything close to "it means what I say it means." I was giving you the view of many Christians. I've associated with these people for years (mainly Protestants, but also many Catholics).

No doubt about it. The Old Testament supports slavery, genocide and rape and depicts a monstrous and evil creature who insists on being worshipped. This is not a creature that deserves anything but scorn. — Tom Storm

I'm not saying there is no God, I don't know, and neither does anyone else. I don't believe there is such a being as presented in the Bible, or any other religion. Now some people use the concept God in a very general way, that's fine, but to think the Bible is some divinely inspired book just seems a bit out there. People had all kinds of strange beliefs 2000+ years ago.

I'm going back to Wittgenstein. I'm not getting into arguments over this or that translation, or whether the Greek or Hebrew says this or that. What I know for sure, is that regardless of whether this or that person is stupid or ignorant, that's what they believe, and that's the point.

I mean have you read the OT? God commanded the Israelites to go into villages and slay every man, women, child, and animal, what does that say about this concept of God? All it tells me is that the concept is flawed, and the concept probably has no instance in reality. If there is a God, he probably is nothing like any religious idea of God.

The point is that people can easily interpret this or that verse, in this or that way. But there are plenty of verses in the Bible that indicate, at the very least, there is separation from God for the unbeliever. I spent years studying the Bible, and memorizing large portions of the Bible, but I'd be hard put to recall much of it. There are a lot of references to hell in the Bible, and those references go to the unbeliever.

I think we should judge other’s moral character based on the totality of their actions. Beliefs, in and of themselves, do not cause harm. So their beliefs are irrelevant. Even if we take things a step further and say that this belief causes them to ridicule, belittle, etc. atheists, that alone isn’t enough evidence to judge their moral character. Perhaps they also believe in giving to the poor, forgiving others their trespasses, etc. Are we to exclude these other, more noble, moral beliefs when we judge them? — Pinprick

Well, it's debatable whether having a belief can cause harm. Having any belief is assenting to something, so it's a kind of action. It may not be overt, but it requires a willful mental act on one's part. And, if you take things a bit further, as you say, and include ridicule and belittling, that to me does say something about someone's moral character. However, all of us have flawed moral characters, so it goes for all of us. And yes, when judging someone's character, one should look at the totality of their character. We all know people who generally have good characters, but are flawed in this or that way.

I'm not sure Christians say or believe any of this. Cite? (Lots of people who call themselves Christians do say this, but they're not Christians.) — tim wood

Many Christians believe this Tim, and they infer it from verses like 2 Thess. 1: 8,9 "...in flaming fire, inflicting vengeance on those who do not know God and on those who do not obey the gospel of our Lord Jesus.They will suffer the punishment of eternal destruction [my emphasis], away from the presence of the Lord and from the glory of his might"

However you interpret this, it's not a pretty picture. In flaming fire is not something I want to be associated with, figuratively or not.

Cheers.

There are those who disagree with you. — Joshs

Ya, there are always those who disagree, that's part of the philosophical world. But, I don't want to turn this thread into an argument about Wittgenstein and phenomenology. But there is a connection between the PLA and consciousness.

Those who do not believe in god, when they die, will be cast into eternal torment.

This is a punishment out of all proportion with the offence.

Christians hold that the person who inflicts this unjust punishment - God - is worthy of worship.

So what is one to make of the moral character of folk who hold someone who tortures folk unjustly in the highest esteem? — Banno

Ya, I agree with you, this kind of thinking is really weird. I don't know how any person with an ounce of moral aptitude could possibly think that this kind of God could be loving or just. Moreover, how could this God create anyone knowing full well that they would make choices that lead to torture or their destruction?

I'll tell you something else that seems weird to me, and I was talking to a friend about this the other day. Even if you assume there is a God with some of the Christian attributes, omniscience, omnipotence, loving, for e.g., I couldn't imagine a being like this wanting people worshipping him/her, that seems like a human construction. When I think of how people worship God in church, it seems bizarre, raising their hands praising him, etc. What kind of God would want people doing this? The idea seems to come from our understanding of Kings, viz., how a king might want his subjects to respond, but this seems like an ego trip, not worthy of a God.

I spent 35 years of my life thinking like this, and it wasn't until I was willing to examine my beliefs more closely, that I removed myself from this kind of thinking. It's like being in a cult, you don't really see what's happening until you remove yourself from it. However, to be fair, this happens in other kinds of ideologies, including politics. This has driven me to think more carefully about what I believe, but even so, we're all susceptible to varying degree of weird thinking.

Yeah, I think the concept of ‘facts of reality’ is highly problematic for both Wittgenstein and phenomenology. — Joshs

I would not say that Wittgenstein is a phenomenologist or even close to a phenomenologist, and I don't think that "facts of reality" is problematic, nor is it problematic for Wittgenstein.

The incoherence or lack of sense of the uses of certain concepts is one thing, but that's separate from reality itself. For example, I may use a concept correctly within a particular language-game, but that doesn't mean that that meaning actually lines up with the facts of reality. The two are quite often different things. I think sometimes we confuse talk of reality, with reality itself, or the facts of reality. Our talk may line up with the facts, but our talk may not. My point would be that our talk of consciousness is in its infancy, and probably is far from the facts of reality.

How in the world did Wittgenstein do that?

Part of what I see happening with Wittgenstein's ideas of meaning, is that it's used almost as a denial of internal experiences, or if you will, the denial of the self (not everyone, but some). As if you can't talk about your internal experiences without saying something senseless or meaningless. We wouldn't even have language if it wasn't for what's happening internally, i.e., the mind. So, the point here is that you can go to far in either direction. For example, saying things like the self or consciousness is an illusion, or associating what we mean by consciousness as a kind of inward pointing. Like looking inward and thinking, there it is, that's consciousness.

If you want to know what consciousness is from a conceptual view, or how we think about consciousness in our everyday lives, then you have to understand how it is that we acquire, or attach meaning to our words. Moreover, it must be said over and over again, our concepts don't necessarily equate to reality, which also means, that what we mean by this or that, doesn't necessarily equate to reality. This is the difference between language about reality, and reality itself.

Wittgenstein linguistic analysis doesn't answer the "hard problem," it's still there. However, understanding Wittgenstein helps with how we talk about consciousness, which inevitably will influence one's theories of the self, and what can be sensibly said. Part of the problem with understanding consciousness is that we lack the advanced conceptual framework to discuss it (viz., its composition or source). It would be like the ancient Romans trying to understand the physics of today, they lack the concepts, so there's no foundation to work with. I don't think we're even close to understanding what consciousness is. I wonder if we even know how to frame the questions. That's my take.

(I had to re-write this post to clarify what I was thinking.)

Oh, so here we go with the ad hominem fallacy. You thought that I misunderstood something in the past, therefore everything I say ought to be dismissed as misunderstanding. — Metaphysician Undercover

Did I say anything close to, "...therefore everything [you] say ought to be dismissed as a misunderstanding[?]" No! Again, another misinterpretation of what's being said. I'm just going to move on MU. I can't talk philosophy with you, it's pointless.

Notice how you've moved from "object and designation" here, toward "description". These two are fundamentally different types of language use which cannot be conflated without the creation of misunderstanding and confusion. — Metaphysician Undercover

The point here, is that if someone says (not me or W.), that the inner thing is a kind of picture of some thing (which it's not, i.e., it can't be construed in this way), then this use of the word picture is a bit weird in terms of W.'s beetle example. Why? Wittgenstein answers, "If you [who do you think the "If you..." refers to?] admit that you haven’t any notion what kind of thing it might be that he has before him [referring to the beetle] —then what leads you into saying, in spite of that, that he has something before him? Isn’t it as if I were to say of someone: ‘He has something. But I don’t know whether it is money, or debts, or an empty till (PI 294).’”[/quote]

The only misunderstanding, is if someone wants to talk about the thing in the box in this way (again it's not me or W.). It would be the interlocutor responding to Wittgenstein's beetle example, i.e., they would be trying to describe the thing in the box as a kind of picture. So, the only confusion here, is you not understanding the point of W.'s remarks.

I don't know what to tell you MU, you do this all the time, and no matter how many times people try to explain it to you, you seem stuck in a place that no one can free you from. And, this is why I generally don't respond to your posts. @Luke spent a long time with you trying to explain your misunderstandings, but to no avail. All I can tell you is that your interpretations of W. are so far from the norm, that I wonder if we're both speaking English.

Much has been said in these posts about using words to refer to some inner experience; not that we cannot use words in this way, but that when we attach the meaning of a word exclusively to the private experience, to which no one else has access, then the use of the word becomes problematic. It is not an easy error to grasp. In fact, this is difficult to understand, and it is difficult to explain. However, understanding what Wittgenstein is saying does produce some enlightenment.

Another example Wittgenstein used to explain the problematic nature of associating meaning with the private inner thing, is the beetle in the box example (PI 293). It shows how associating meaning with the private inner thing, which is based on a misunderstanding of the “grammar of the expression,” in terms of “object and designation (PI 293)”, cannot gain a foothold.

“Now someone tells me that knows what pain is only from his own case!—Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a ‘beetle’. No one can look into anyone else’s box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at beetle.—Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing.—But suppose the word ‘beetle’ had a use in these people’s language?—If so it would not be used as the name of a thing. The thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all; not even as a : for the box might even be empty.—No, one can ‘divide through’ by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is.

“That is to say: if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of ‘object and designation’ the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant (PI 293).”

Again, keep in mind that the purpose of these paragraphs is to say something about the meaning of a word in relation to the “object and designation” model. And, what stands out about what Wittgenstein is saying, is that the object could literally be anything, any internal thing we could imagine. This thought experiment demonstrates that the language-game used in such a context would not be dependent, especially in terms of meaning, on the thing in the box. Thus, it would be irrelevant, again, irrelevant in terms of the “object and designation” model of meaning.

Let us continue with Wittgenstein’s thinking: “If you say he sees a private picture before him, which he is describing, you have still made an assumption about what he has before him. And that means that you can describe it or do describe it more closely. If you admit that you haven’t any notion what kind of thing it might be that he has before him—then what leads you into saying, in spite of that, that he has something before him? Isn’t it as if I were to say of someone: ‘He something. But I don’t know whether it is money, or debts, or an empty till (PI 294).’”

Even if you say that the inner thing is a kind of picture, you are still making an assumption with no content. There is no way to describe it, you cannot see inside the other person’s box, so it is an empty assumption. And, of course, if you admit, Wittgenstein says, that you have no notion of the thing in the box, then how is it that you want to say there is something there? Maybe you could respond, “Because I have these kinds of inner things.” Yes, there are these internal experiences going on, but none of us can observe these internal happenings, it is like the beetle in the box example. Does it then follow from this that we cannot talk about our internal experiences of pain, hope, joy, sadness, etc? Obviously we can talk about these things, we do it all the time. This then brings us back to the notion of how meaning does get a foothold.

Each of us lives in a world of subjective experience, based on social meanings and logic, and thoughts may come somewhere in between. Plato spoke of the Forms outside of us... — Jack Cummins

I don't quite agree that each of us lives in a world of subjective experience. I think we have both subjective and objective experiences. However, both worlds are real, and both are important to who we are as individuals.

I'm sympathetic to Plato's ideas, because my own take is that the unifying principle of the universe is consciousness itself. My reasons for believing this have to do with my studies of NDEs and DMT, and what people are describing during these experiences. If it's true that consciousness is the unifying principle of the universe (by universe I mean all that exists), then there may be some deeper connection between each of us. Moreover, if there is an intelligence in back of the universe, not some religious God, but something much more profound, then Plato might have a point. However, some of this is speculation, but I think more and more, the scientific community is considering consciousness as a possible candidate for a unifying principle. I strongly lean is this direction. I think the truth lies somewhere between the dogma of religion, and the dogma of the materialist.

It's difficult to say what role the subconscious has on us, no doubt some role.

The idea of thoughts as 'shadows of our feelings' of Nietzsche is interesting here. I also wonder where dreams fit into this because they may be shadows of thoughts and feelings. — Jack Cummins

In one sense we are inclined to say that if I express my thoughts or feelings, then those are my thoughts or feelings. They're not shadows of my thoughts or feelings. We just don't talk like this, at least generally. Imagine someone saying, "Here is a book that expresses my thoughts, but they're not the real thing. They're only shadows of my thoughts or feelings." So, the wording is a bit strange, to say the least.

On the other hand, if I use a concept to refer to objects in space, that concept is not the actual thing, it's simply used to refer to the thing in space, depending on the context. So, we think of the concept as a kind of reflection of the thing. In this sense, one might say that the concept is a kind of shadow of the thing, it's not the real thing. However, if you're not careful in your wording, you're going to run into problems.

Lastly, to refer to dreams as "shadows of thoughts" also seems a bit strange. Last night I experienced shadows of thoughts. What would that even mean? This seems like even more of a confusion. However, I think we can sympathize with the questioning of what dreams are, many of us do have questions. Again, we have to go back to how we use the concept generally.

The way I think about this, is the following: Thoughts, and for that matter consciousness, and here we're talking about the concepts, are reflected in two ways. First, our bodily actions (digging a ditch, or building a home), and second, linguistic actions (talking and writing). So, consciousness as a concept, is reflected in things we can observe. However, this doesn't deny that there are internal reflective experiences, but as soon as we try to make the meaning of the concept the internal thing, then we run into problems. Pointing to the internal is not the same as pointing to a cup (which we all can observe), obviously, but that is what people do. So, they ask, "What are thoughts?" - and they try to focus on some thing (I'm talking generally, not necessarily referring to the OP) that corresponds to the concept thought, and it is here that they go astray. What can help, is to try to focus on that which gives the concept its footing, viz., how we use it with one another. And, what we see are the expressions (both physical and linguistic), that give substance to these concepts, that is, the social setting.

I'm not saying that the internal experiences are not real, or that there is no connection between what's happening in our minds, and the concepts we use. I'm saying that we lack the objective component to be able talk sensibly, in some cases, about consciousness or the self. In other words, we can't get beyond ourselves, we lack the proper view.

I think each side of the argument tends to go to far in one direction or the other, and they stick with their particular conceptual view. The problem is probably linked with linguistic boundaries, i.e., what can be sensible said about the subject without talking nonsense. So, I see the problem, at least much of the problem, as a conceptual one. We have a tendency to limit our conceptual view based on a theory, and if this theory comes up against another theory, with a different conceptual view, then the clash. It's like chess conflicting with checkers. My piece doesn't move like your piece, etc.

Just some thoughts.

I don't see that any progress can be made, so I don't see the point. More importantly, I don't see that your interpretation has any traction.

What kind of bullshit purpose is "congenital" supposed to serve here? Are you racist? — Metaphysician Undercover

How do you go from having a "congenital logical problem," to racism? All he means is you have a persistent or chronic problem. That's kind of a low blow, don't you think? People just love to throw this word around to make people look bad. The only people who look bad are the people using it without a good reason.

:gasp:

What you describe here is a sort of paradox, which might even be called a contradiction. If a word's "home" is its position within a particular language game, but the same word might be used in different games, then it has distinct homes. So we have the problem of the same word having numerous homes. To resolve this problem we ought not think of these numerous and distinct uses, of what appears to be the same word, as actually being instances of "the same word". — Metaphysician Undercover

You should think of a word like a tool, as Wittgenstein said. Each use of a tool can be compared to each use of a word (each use being differentiated by a context or language-game). Now, would you say that because a tool is being used differently in a different context that it's a different tool? Obviously you wouldn't because that would be silly. It's the same tool or word used in a different way, with a different function or sense depending on the language-game. The idea that it's a paradox or possibly a contradiction is just not the case.

I've been writing in other places, including my Facebook page, and I thought that some of what I wrote would be appropriate here.
_____________________
"There are numerous interpretations of precisely what Wittgenstein's Private Language argument is, where it begins and ends in Philosophical Investigations, what its target is, and whether it is successful...so it was nice to discover Stewart Candlish's one sentence summary of it in Edward Craig (ed.) The Shorter Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy:"

' ...a language in principle [is] unintelligible to anyone but its user would necessarily be unintelligible to the user also, because no meanings could be established for its signs'

The above was take from the following link:

https://virtualphilosopher.com/2006/10/the_private_lan.html
_____________________

How does Wittgenstein demonstrate that a private language is unintelligible? In order to be clear about what Wittgenstein is doing, you must be clear about what is meant by a private language. It is a language that is only understood by the person inventing it. This means, obviously, that the meanings of the words or signs are also generated by the person creating the language, and herein lies the rub.

Wittgenstein wants us to imagine, in PI 258, trying to give meaning to a sign “S” (Think of a sign as any written designation used to refer to something, be it a sensation, as in this example, or some other object.) by associating “S” with a private sensation, and this we do by keeping a diary. So, every time I have a sensation, I mark it in my diary. The only kind of definition I can give is a kind of ostensive definition, that is, it is a kind of pointing to the sensation, but “[n]ot in the ordinary sense.” What I am doing is focusing my attention on the sensation, “…and so, as it were, point to it inwardly.” Thus, the meaning is supposedly established by my focus on the sensation, where the “impression” is made between the sign and the object of the sign, namely, the sign’s designation. However, Wittgenstein points out that the impression can only serve as a future reminder, namely, that I have made the correct association between the sign and the object. “But in the present case [forget about remembering in the future] I have no criterion of correctness (PI 258).” Therefore, it is not about our memory, as some might interpret this passage, but about how we could establish any correct use of sign “S.” And, if there is no correct use of the sign, then how could any remembrance of its use have anything to do with future uses in terms of meaning?

Ya, I lost it about 10 pages ago. :grin: