Yes, I agree. There are both implicit rules and explicit rules, as in comparing some children's games where the rules are not spelled out, and some board games where the rules are spelled out. Both kinds of rules can change over time, and both are developed over time.

The central idea throughout the PI is the idea of the language-game, and under this rubric is the idea of rules of use (or logic of use), and also Wittgenstein's idea of grammar which falls under the role of the rules. Although the role of rules is probably more expansive than just the rules of grammar.

Whether we are referring to Wittgenstein's grammatical rules (which are important), or the more general idea of rule-following, as seen in the application of rules across a wider swath of language usage, rule-following is central.

Grammar is what makes the moves in language possible, just like the rules of chess make the game of chess possible. And just as the rules of chess permit some moves and disallow others, so also does grammar permit and disallow certain linguistic moves. This should be seen under the logic of use, but again keep in mind that the logic of use is broader than just grammar. It includes the various acts that occur in a language-game. For instance, the act of bringing the slab in Wittgenstein's primitive language-game, is also seen as part of the logic of use. Just as the rules of chess bring about the various moves in chess as part of the logic within the game.

It's also part of the nature of the rules of grammar to adjudicate certain moves as correct or incorrect. Again the parallel with chess rules. One can think of the rules of grammar and the rules of chess as more akin to commands to follow in order to play the game correctly. The rules are conventions, but they necessitate certain moves, i.e., if you want to play the game correctly within the social structure.

I will just make general remarks here and there.

Hopefully I didn't distract your thread too much. I'll stop by from time-to-time to make a comment or two. Good luck with your discussion.

:ok:

Another key element to the continuity of his early philosophy and his later philosophy is how we come to mean something by our words. What constitutes meaning? In the T. he does it through the picture theory of meaning. In the PI meaning is seen through the eyes of the language-game and use, i.e., meaning happens in linguistic rule-governed social settings. Your private experiences have nothing to do with meaning.

Looking at the Routledge edition there is nothing much there that does more than the text itself. It is NOT a complex text at the start. Anything I have said is to reference the text and expand a little on what W says. For example I like the term “ostensive” as something to apply to non-verbal thought (I haven’t said this because it is irrelevant. — I like sushi

I'm not familiar with the Routledge edition.

Actually, the way Wittgenstein is using "ostensive," as in "ostensive teaching of words (PI 6)," is not in connection with non-verbal thought, but in connection with how words are taught, and he thinks this view is very primitive, viz., it doesn't account for how we learn many words. For example, I may point to a cup while saying the word cup as I teach a child how to use the word. However, there is nothing to point to when using the words nothing or the, we learn how to use these words in other ways.

Think of the "ostensive teaching of words" in reference to the primitive language-game at the beginning of the PI.

In the Tractatus Wittgenstein believes that the structure of language is revealed by logic, and that the main function of language is to describe the world. The three main issues of the T. are - logic, language, and the world. His investigation in the T. is purely a priori.

In the PI he still believes that the logic of language is important, but the investigation of that logic is different, it's more of an a posteriori investigation. The logic in the PI is seen in the language-game, and the grammar and rules that make up the language-game. It's also seen in how we use words in social contexts. These social contexts (language-games) reveal the logic behind the use of the words or propositions. Our actions as seen in a form of life also reveal the logic within the language-game.

There is definitely a continuous narrative between the two works. He didn't completely disavow everything in the Tractatus. One of the continuities, is that there is a logic behind the use of words. Although the way he applies that logic is different.

The professor I studied under studied under Cora Diamond who is one of the proponents of the resolute reading. I'm definitely not a fan of the resolute reading, and that article explains part of the reason.

http://wab.uib.no/agora/tools/alws/collection-7-issue-1-article-21.annotate

The best book I've read that sums up Wittgenstein is K. T. Fann's, Wittgenstein's Conception of Philosophy. You can get it used for just a few dollars. It's sums up his philosophy from the Tractatus to the PI.

The best book on Wittgenstein's life is Monk's Ludwig Wittgenstein.

https://www.amazon.com/dp/B07922L4HW?tag=opr-mkt-opr-us-20&ascsubtag=1ba00-01000-ubp00-win10-other-nomod-us000-pcomp-feature-scomp-wm-5&ref=aa_scomp#customerReviews

Believe me Wallows, I would loathe leading this thread. One of the reasons is that like other forums, people think their opinions have the same force, without studying, as those who have studied the material. Studying it doesn't make you right, but it sure gives you a leg up on those who haven't studied the material. Besides I'm working on my book, along with a theory of epistemology related to OC.

This thread is like the blind leading the blind. There are so many misunderstandings going on that it pains me to read this. If you listen to MU you'll all be screwed in the head. He doesn't have a clue. He sounds like he knows what he's talking about to someone who doesn't know the material, but he is lost in a fog.

First, I think you people are going to fast. Some of this material takes a lot of thought, and if you don't think it takes a lot of thought, then you definitely don't understand it. You really need someone who knows the material well to guide you through it. Otherwise, you'll end up with a bunch of cliches that will distort Wittgenstein's thinking. I've spent years studying the 90 pages of OC, and only then can I say I have a decent understanding of Wittgenstein's thinking in terms of knowing. I only say this because I've compared my thoughts to what other philosophers have written on the subject, and it lines up well.

If you don't have a philosophical background, and you start with Wittgenstein, that's like trying to learn calculus without learning the math leading up to the study of calculus. Wittgenstein's works are some of the most difficult to understand in all of philosophy. Even people who have a good background in philosophy get confused about his ideas. In fact, many of them are confused.

My summary of the PI in my thread on Wittgenstein is very simplistic. It doesn't come close to doing justice to his writings in the PI. My comments on OC are much better, but still need work.

Anyway, those are my thoughts for what they're worth.

I don't disagree with that Terrapin.

Some, sure. But it makes little sense to say philosophy belongs, or ought to belong to that subclass. The rules of chess are more or less utterly contingent and utterly arbitrary after all (constrained only by the - already contingent - choice of an 8x8 grid, our physionomy, and our intelligence and history). Insofar as philosophy asks after how things in reality hang together in the broad sense, the constraints which govern its discourse ought to be far more significant that than those which govern a frivolity like chess. — StreetlightX

Of course the discourse of philosophy has broader ramifications than a chess game, but the analogy, as far as it goes, still holds. How we talk about facts, truth, real, exist, etc, is not only contingent on how the world is, but the concepts of language hang together based on how we use the concepts to describe the world.

It's true that there is a kind of arbitrariness to our concepts, but that arbitrariness is only in the choice of the letters and words used (among other things) within language. We could choose what we want to mean by the words car or book, just as we could choose whatever rule we want when setting up the game of chess, or a game of baseball. However, once the rules are set, then we follow them to play the game, or to talk about philosophy. This is what Wittgenstein meant by the logic of use, at least partially. We can see the logic behind the use of words by observing how we use the words in social settings. For example, did the person properly respond to the word slab as given in Wittgenstein's language-game.

Once the rules, say, of syntax are arbitrarily decided, then whether we use such rules correctly or not can be seen objectively. You either followed the rules or not. In baseball, the rules are arbitrary, but whether you follow the rules correctly is not arbitrary. We can observe whether the hit was a home run or not, it's objective. It's not always clear whether someone correctly followed a rule, but generally we know. This is true of our concepts, if it wasn't we wouldn't be able to communicate, which is somewhat what happened at the beginning of this thread.

No, you have just made an invalid inference. You claim that if the child has learned how to use the word "cup", this implies that the child has learned how to follow rules. That is begging the question. It's only true if using language requires following rules. But that's what you need to prove, not assume. You will never prove it though, because the converse is obviously what is true. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, I have not made an invalid inference. Your understanding of this point is just confused. When you learn to use a word, then you have also learned how to follow a rule. There is an implicit rule involved in using the word correctly, it goes hand-in-hand with language. So, to learn to use a word, as in my e.g., is to learn a rule about how to use the word. One knows that the child has learned to follow a rule by observing how they use the word. Just as we know that someone knows the rules of chess by observing their moves. This is not rocket science.

To say that you need to prove that using language requires following rules, is akin to saying that you need to prove that chess moves involves following rules. By definition a language involves rule-following, its an essential property of language, just as the rules of chess are essential to the game of chess.

I could give the following proof, which is not begging-the-question. This is also a valid inference.

Premise (1): If all languages are rule-governed, then necessarily, learning to use a word is a rule-governed activity.
Premise (2): All languages are rule governed.
Conclusion: Therefore, necessarily, learning to use a word is a rule-governed activity.

Consider what Wittgenstein demonstrates at the beginning of The Philosophical Investigations. If learning a language consisted of learning rules, then one would already have to know a language in order to learn a language, because the rules would have to be communicated to that person, via language. This is what drove him to inquire into private rules, and private language, to account for the capacity to understand rules, if learning rules is necessarily prior to using language. But that whole line of investigation breaks down into nonsense. So we ought to conclude that learning language does not consist of learning rules at all. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is just not true. Think of how a child learns to use the word cup. The child has no idea what a rule is, but by learning to use the word in social settings they implicitly learn to follow rules. The two go hand-in-hand.

I found this post on Quora written by Jun-Ichi Yano to be a good guide to objective and subjective. The following is taken word for word from his post at - https://www.quora.com/Whats-the-difference-between-the-concepts-subjective-and-objective

For understanding basic meaning of words (or concepts), it is often wise to take an etymological approach: we just trace the basic meaning of words by examining the form of words (and in some cases, tracing their historical roots, though this is not important in case here).

The basic meanings of “subjective” and “objective” are something to do with “subjects” and “objects”, respectively. Then, what are the “subjects” and “objects”? In a way, this is a grammatical concept: for example, if you say, “I have an apple”, “I” is a subject that takes an action (“to have” here), and “an apple” is an object that is affected by an action.

By following these basic meanings, it immediately follows that when we use these terms in philosophy, “subjective” and “objective”, respectively, mean “from a point of view of the subject” and “from a point of view of the object”.

You can talk about an apple subjectively, that is from a point of view of the subject, that is yourself: it is about how you see it, how you feel about it. More specifically, it looks delicious, you may find it beautiful, etc. All the statements are subjective, that is only from your own point of view. Some other people may not think this apple is delicious, but your judgment that the apple is delicious is not disputed by someone else’s opinion, because it is your subjective manner.

At the same time, you can talk about an apple objectively, that is from a point of view of the object, that is apple: you examine an apple just as it is, forgetting about yourself, but talk about the apple only as if you are actually not there. A given apple may be red, if may be round, or not quite round, etc. All these statements are objective, because you can discuss about it with the other people: you may not be looking at the color of the apple carefully enough. It may be actually more like pink, rather than red, etc. You can discuss about this matter with the others, because it is an objective matter.

These are basic meanings of these two concepts.

However, in actual application of these concepts, the things are pretty much immediately getting complicated, because you cannot talk about anything objectively without yourself, that is the subject: if you are not there, of course, you cannot see the apple, henceforth, you cannot talk about this apple. We can develop a long argument about subjectivity and objectivity, and in short, we must realize that we can talk about subjectivity and objectivity only in a dynamical manner, under interactions between a subject and an object. From this dynamical perspective, subjectivity and objectivity rather mean which has a stronger role between subject and object: there is no pure subjectivity without object, nor pure objectivity without subject.

However, apart from this complication, as I said in the first part, the basic meaning of subjective and objective is very simple, and if you stay with this basic meaning, you will not be confused with many confused arguments about subjectivity and objectivity, as some of the answers try to point out.

This is all well and good, but rules are immanent to use, and it's not a case of 'group consensus' which determimes them, as if from above and without. — StreetlightX

All facts whether subjective or objective operate within some system of use. And it is the case that some rules are determined by group consensus. The rules of chess for example, or the rules of baseball. Even reality itself, i.e., what's veridical is decided pretty much by what the group calls reality, or what the group calls a hallucination. It doesn't necessarily have to be from above and without, although that can work too.

Arbitrariness by consensus is still arbitrariness. — StreetlightX

All languages are based on rules of use, so in that sense one doesn't just get to arbitrarily choose one's own meaning, no more that you would choose to move a piece in chess one way when the rules dictate another. The rules when set up may be arbitrary, but once set, like the rules of chess, you don't get to arbitrarily suspend the rules to suit your own particular view of the game. If you did you wouldn't be playing chess.

The same is true of language, if you just arbitrarily decided to use your own definition, you would not be playing the language-game by the rules. There are rules of use, i.e., the logic behind the uses of concepts. By the way, the following of those rules is what's objective about language. I can observe your actions to know if you're following the rules of the game. When I say "Slab," did you in fact bring the slab, objective observation.

I didn't say they were. I said attempts to give them substance in the absence of any conceptual motivation would make them so. The OP is one such attempt. It is preferable that people disagree on the use of terms when motivated by different problematics, than trivially agree on such uses without being productively constrained by a need to address a well-founded set of issues. — StreetlightX

But it's not conceptual motivation that gives these concepts substance or meaning, and I would say that conceptual motivation plays little to no part in the meanings of these words. If the primary factor is conceptual motivation, then it is purely subjective and arbitrary. Unless your saying that part of the way one expresses certain meanings or concepts within a particular argument, is that we choose particular uses of those concepts. However, you seem to imply that conceptual motivation gives them substance.

Another way to interpret what you said is that unless we are talking about a certain context of use, which would involve the use of particular concepts in certain ways based on goals, then we are just fishing for a definition which may or may not work in the context of the problem at hand.

However, my problem is that we shouldn't just arbitrarily pick meanings out of thin air, that there is a general consensus of correct use among concepts. I shouldn't just pick my own meaning based on some conceptual motivation, that's part of the confusion of doing philosophy.

Finally, even outside of a particular theoretical problems words generally have meanings, or at least guides that suggest possible uses. So we might list a variety of definitions of the word game for example, and those definitions have uses that fit within certain language-games. My goal was to come up with certain generalized definitions that would be starting points for pointing out the objective nature of language.

Sam’s problematic revolves around objective validation of something which can only ever be known first-person — Wayfarer

This is a misinterpretation, first, in my argument, if you would have read it carefully, you would see that there is much more to the testimony on NDEs than subjective experiences. They are experiences that can be corroborated by the objective observations of those who were there, but I don't want to start that argument in here.

Why? Without some conceptual motivation to which the distinction responds to, it's just an arbitrary excercise. Kant, Scotus, and Poinsot all had a set of conceptual motivations which made their employment of the terms non-arbitrary. In the absence of this, its just a trivial bit of language wringing. Linguistic engines on idle. — StreetlightX

This is just so much nonsense. It's an arbitrary exercise, it's arbitrary because you think it's arbitrary. Concepts like subjective and objective aren't arbitrary concepts. And your last sentence, which refers to something Wittgenstein would say, kills me, because your about as far from understanding Wittgenstein as you can get. Stupid philosophy has turned concepts like these into arbitrary notions.

The fact that people are having such a difficult time understanding what should be fairly simple concepts to understand generally, tells me just how philosophically confused people are.

One of the reasons I wanted to stick to coming up with a working definition for these words, is that I knew people couldn't even agree on this. If there is any "language wringing" it's in these kinds of statements.

But are you looking for some everyday meaning - when everyday meanings are never sharply demarcated anyway? Or are you seeking a well-founded philosophical distinction? In which case clearly it is the metaphysical-strength claims the words might invoke that are in contention. You can't avoid that by some kind of ordinary speech manoeuvre. — apokrisis

You haven't read what I said closely enough. How many times does the mantra have to be repeated, that there are no clearly defined overarching meanings to these words. There is a built in vagueness to these concepts, and Banno also pointed out this fact. However, by the same token it doesn't mean that we can't use the words in contexts where we're being precise. This is true of the word game, there is no clear definition that will subsume every use of the word under one definition. However, if I say, "Baseball is a game," am I being imprecise? No. So context sometimes will drive the precision, based on that one contextual use, but the trick is in realizing that that one use is not indicative of one overarching definition that fits all uses. All games are not baseball games.

You keep making the same error, that I'm talking about ordinary speech in the sense that the meanings are based on what someone might say on the street. I've tried explaining this earlier, at least partially, but your brain seems locked into position.

Fred believes that common salt is composed of chlorine and sodium.
again, making propositional attitudes central. — Banno

I don't see how the proposition you've used here is an example of a subjective statement. Just because one utters a false statement, that in itself doesn't mean it's subjective. Fred may think he has uttered an objective statement, but has just got the objective facts incorrect. It's not like, using your words, the archetype subjective statement, "I like oranges," or even, "Sam likes oranges."

This is an error on my part, the statement isn't false. Duh. Thanks Banno for pointing that out.

I will never not take joy in pointing out that 'objective' used to mean exactly the opposite, and that for the Scholastics, that which was objective was that which existed for - and only for - a mind: — StreetlightX

Of course, the meanings of words often change over time, but how does this hurt the goal of this thread, at least the beginning goal, that we should at least be able to agree upon a working definition of what the concepts subjective and objective means. I can always say that at some time in the past such-and-such a word meant this. I don't see how this helps the discussion right now, except to point out that meanings change over time. It surely doesn't mean that the concepts are useless, we use them every day.

So a pair of technical terms are developed within metaphysical discourse. And instead of applying dichotomous rigour to clarify the intelligible basis of those terms, we should ... go listen to ordinary folk to see how they bumble about with them? — apokrisis

Did you even read this part, or do you see what you want?

And everyday use doesn't mean that we take what the man on the street says. It means that words develop in everyday uses, and those uses can tell us much about what words/concepts mean. It's the very logic in back of the development of words and language.

Contrast "I live on the planet Earth" and "Sam lives on planet Earth". The former is tied to a speaker by its grammatical structure; the latter is not. — Banno

I see both of these as objective facts, and both can be tied to speakers, but in different ways.

Another approach worth considering is that first person statements are subjective, while statements in the third person are objective. — Banno

So, "I live on the planet Earth," is subjective? Say what?

I can't tell if you're agreeing or disagreeing. Read the second sentence of my original post.

Exactly, that's what I've been saying.

But are you looking for some everyday meaning - when everyday meanings are never sharply demarcated anyway? Or are you seeking a well-founded philosophical distinction? In which case clearly it is the metaphysical-strength claims the words might invoke that are in contention. You can't avoid that by some kind of ordinary speech manoeuvre. — apokrisis

There is no definition that will cover every correct use of many of our words, so I think the pursuit of exactness, in many ways, is an illusion. Especially when discussing subjectivity and objectivity. That's why I usually say that it's generally the case that... I take a Wittgensteinian approach to the study of these subjects, especially as it relates to epistemology. And everyday use doesn't mean that we take what the man on the street says. It means that words develop in everyday uses, and those uses can tell us much about what words/concepts mean. It's the very logic in back of the development of words and language.

there are underlying issues, which give rise to these deep questions of epistemology and metaphysics. — Wayfarer

I agree Wayfarer, but I was trying to find a baseline in which to proceed. My metaphysics when pushed, is that at the bottom of reality is consciousness. I believe it to be the unifying principle of reality in all its forms. So I agree with Max Planck.

I guess another way to talk about objective facts for instance, is to say they are independent of my thoughts, feelings, perceptions, intuitions, etc. Can we agree on this definition?

If we can't generally agree on a basic definition there is no way to continue the discussion, is there?

But the question is, what role does 'the observer' play? — Wayfarer

Actually my question has to do with the concepts of objective and subjective. What do these concepts mean. Already people are going way beyond the opening statement, which is understandable, but I'm trying to reach a consensus on the use of these words.

I see a conflict if you want to both use dualistic terminology and yet claim that you might as well just be talking physicalism. This is what leads to all the problems with theories of truth. — apokrisis

It's not necessarily dualistic. In fact, many non-dualists will use this kind of terminology. For the purpose of our discussion I have no problem with the term viewpoint. I don't think you can escape the metaphysical by choosing those words though.

A triadic modelling relations approach - semiotics - is the consistent way to make sense of what is going on. Rather than the mind receiving the truths of the outer world into its inner world minding is about forming embodied and adaptive points of view. Mindfulness is the larger thing of that relation in action. — apokrisis

Are you saying that I'm saying, by using the word mind in reference to my particular epistemological view, that it receives truths from the metaphysical? I don't understand your point.

One context where making the distinction happens is between events that are disclosed to all who are close enough to perceive it and events that can be hidden from others because it happens to a particular individual. Of course, when I put it that way, all events are equally real in so far as they are experienced. — Valentinus

The problem I have with the first part of this statement, is that proximity may have nothing to do with whether something is objective or subjective. For example, one could make the argument that there are objective facts that have nothing to do with my proximity to them, or nothing to do with the fact that they may be hidden.

I do agree that all experiences are real. So even if your experience is a hallucination it still is a real experience, maybe not objectively real, but real nonetheless, at least subjectively real.

So the argument against private language in Wittgenstein, for instance, is not a denial of the reality of private experiences. It just puts talking about them in a particular light. Also, many of our language games play on the theme that what seems private may be easily perceptible by others. Many choose silence as the way to be alone. — Valentinus

I agree with this, but what was the point of it as it relates to my opening remarks? Was you referring to my other thread where I referenced Wittgenstein?

So, and you would be right, especially as it concerns my views, mind invokes a particular philosophical dualistic idea, although not necessarily, but certainly it has a tendency to point to something in back of the brain, something metaphysical. So your way of separating this is what leads to your choice of words?

While it's true that I'm a dualist it doesn't really effect what I'm saying, mind could simply be a reference to the brain, and in fact it's often used as a synonym for brain activities. I'm not trying to evoke anything metaphysical here. In fact, my argument can easily stay within the realm of the physical universe. At least at this point in the discussion.

My general definition of “subjective” would be claims that are viewpoint dependent, and “objective” would be claims that are viewpoint independent. — apokrisis

I'm interested in your choice of wording. I say mind-independent or mind-dependent. Are you saying there is a significant or even a difference between my wording and your wording, that is, your choice of viewpoint dependent or viewpoint independent?

Maybe I'll start a thread on the subject of language, and the objectivity of language-games.