If your concern is that we, as a community, have no way of determining that “the thing we are referring to is the same thing”, then it sounds a lot like it is just a lack of referent. You appear to be saying that a lack of referent is the reason for why we can’t be sure, or can’t find a way to agree, that we are referring to the same thing. But I thought we had already agreed that sense does not require a referent? — Luke

It depends I guess on what you mean by referent. So I can point to a specific referent when referring to the Earth, or I can talk about many referents when speaking about cars, cups, or trees, depending on context. These things of course have nothing to do with my internal private experiences, at least in the sense that we are talking about. When we observe how these words are used we can clearly see, in most cases, if you're using the word correctly. If you point to a car, and say tree, we would naturally think something was amiss, and rightly so. We learn these kinds of words through ostensive definition.

Similarly when referring to pains, although, I'm not sure if one wants to call a particular pain a referent, but there is something (call it a referent if you prefer) associated with the pain that let's language and the public connect up with the inner experience. The way we learn to use the word pain, is not by pointing to some unknown inner experience, but by observing the public thing that becomes manifest. So the inner experience must have a public side to it in order for us to agree in terms of meaning. We say this because if the inner experience has nothing that can manifest itself publicly, then how are we able to make sense of the thing. That public thing, by the way, must be more than simply writing down what we think is the meaning of the word.

Definitions are more like guides, they're not what give words meaning, use (although this isn't absolute) has more to do with meaning than anything else. They sure didn't have dictionaries thousands of years ago, but they could observe how someone was using a word within the public domain of rule-following.

Now it doesn't follow from this that we can't talk about our inner experiences unless their is a publicly driven something that's available for us to observe. This may sound contradictory when comparing it to what I just said above. However, we must take into account that once we learn a language within a social setting, then it can be reasonably assumed that you know what you're talking about when you refer to an inner experience. The point being that if you have already demonstrated that you know how to use the word pain, anxiety, happy, etc, correctly, then generally you don't need a public referent to express the inner experience. However, learning what the inner experience is, must take place publicly, and within a linguistic environment. So the inner experience is linked to certain behavior expressions.

As you pointed out there are no behaviors or objects associated with other kinds of words, i.e., no referents if you prefer. It therefore follows from this that not all words need a referent, and this is true, so I follow your point. So how do we learn words without referents? There are arbitrary rules of use associated with the marks or writings we do on paper, or when we type, and the rules associated with these various markings can be checked for proper use. We do this with mathematics too. Note that even though these kinds of words need no referent as you say, they still need some way of checking them publicly, and this is important. It's important because any word that has a meaning, must be checked in a way that makes sense of rule-following, which is why a private language is impossible. Rules and rule-following is not a private thing. However, don't confuse this with not being able to use what we've learned privately. Thus, it doesn't follow from what I just said, that I can't do mathematics privately, or that I can't refer to some inner experience privately. It only means that meaning, viz., making sense, first has to be established openly or publicly, before I can do the private thing.

If all of this is true, then it follows that Wittgenstein's beetle example demonstrates that if we talk about something that is totally private, i.e., it not only has no referent, but there is no way for us to establish a rule of use that can be publicly said to be correct or incorrect. This is why it doesn't make sense for me to make a knowledge claim without some way of verifying that one does indeed have knowledge. It would be weird if your high school teacher asked you if you know algebra, and you replied, "Yes," and that was all there was to it. No, we want to observe that you indeed do know algebra, do some algebra problems (publicly).

Now let's move on to the word soul, and here I'm referring to that thing that is said to be in us that lives on after we die. This is the use I'm referring too, not the use that refers to the behavior acts of a body, viz., he has soul, or your expressions are soulful. These two uses have a public domain, and more importantly they have clear cut (in most cases) uses that can be seen publicly to be correct or incorrect.

The use of the word soul that I'm critiquing, is the use that has no outward behavior act associated with it, i.e., it's referring to the thing in the box, the thing we call beetle (the soul). You can't see it, smell it, and there is no outward expression of it, like there is with the learning of the word pain. But you say it's like learning the use of the word the, of, or about, we learn them by applying these words correctly in certain contexts. However, we learn these words in a much different way, and in completely different contexts; learning them requires learning grammatical rules, like learning mathematics has to do with learning particular rules associated with the marks we make on paper. There are clear guidelines to follow, where errors can be ascertained publicly.

I say the word soul as used by many religious people, has no clear cut meaning that can be said to be correct or incorrect. Moreover, they're saying that there is a something attached to the meaning of the word, viz., the thing that lives on after the body dies, so they're saying it has a referent. Furthermore, they're claiming that that is what gives it meaning or sense (even though it doesn't matter if you associate a referent to it or not, the word is still senseless). Isn't this exactly what people are doing when they refer to the beetle in the box, it's the thing in their box that gives meaning (they think) to the word. How do we know what that thing is? Note that even if I apply the same meaning to the beetle in the box (it's the thing that lives on after we die) that they do when referring to soul, this still does nothing to give the word sense, the problem still persists. Let's suppose that people claim to have religious experiences around their beetle, does that give it sense? Even if they create language-games around the beetle, does that give it sense? How do we know that the thing associated with the word, is a thing at all? That would be like me saying I have a pain, and it causes certain feeling inside of me, but if there were not outward observational things for the word to latch onto, how is saying I'm in pain have any sense.

How is the word soul the same as other inner things that have outward expressions? There are no outward expressions of this thing. All there is, is a definition, but that's not enough to give it sense. No more than giving a definition to the beetle would give it sense.

By the way, meaning isn't always use, that's not what Wittgenstein proposed, there is much more to it than that. If that was the case, then any group could arbitrarily change all meaning simply by using a word how they wish. How we use a word is very important, and use tells us much about meaning, but use is not an absolute method of determining meaning, no more than context is. If I use the word car to describe a headache in a particular context, will that drive the meaning of the word car?

Sorry, but I couldn't get to everything you wrote. I was trying to clear up any misunderstandings. I'm not sure this will even do it, probably not. :razz:

Right, so you do agree that 'soul' has sense, but not that 'immortal soul' does. But again, I must disagree with you, because we understand the sense of 'immortal' by its negation of the sense of 'mortal', and to make sense of 'immortal soul' is just to apply that notion of living forever or never dying to what we already understand to be the living soul. Of course, in accordance with my answer to Srap, I acknowledge that we cannot fully understand the sense of 'immortal soul', in its specific application as 'life after death', unless we have experienced it. — Janus

There is no relationship between the use of the word soul as it has been historically used apart from religion, at least some religions, and how Christians use the word soul, they mean two different things. To say that we have a soul that is recognized as bodily movement among other things, doesn't mean that there is an invisible thing that lives forever. There's nothing invisible about the correct use of the word, it's completely visible, and makes sense because it's visible. But this other idea of soul is devoid of sense. As I said before it's like Witt's beetle example.

The last part of your paragraph I dealt with above.

But still you could not fully understand what 'murderous intent' means unless you had experienced it yourself. — Janus

I just don't see this as being true. Do I have to have the exact experience as you in order to understand certain kinds of pain? I've never had my arm hacked off, so does that mean I don't understand something about the meaning of pain? You might respond, yes, unless you've had that experience you really don't understand that kind of pain. But you might say this about any experience, i.e., how would anyone one know what any pain feels like, because none of us have access to another's inner experiences? How could you possibly know what someone else experiences when they get a dental needle in their front gum, even if you have had the experience? This again links meaning or understanding back to the inner experience, which, I believe is incorrect.

There are public expressions of ecstasy or beatitude, which can be associated with the word 'soul' just as public expressions of suffering due to disease, injury or emotional trauma can be associated with the word 'pain'. Of course an individual will not understand the sense of the words unless they have had private experiences of ecstasy or suffering that they can associate with the public expressions of these private states. In other words the lack of sense of 'soul' is merely a lack of sense for you, and you are unjustifiably attributing this lack of sense to others. — Janus

Any bodily expression is an expression of the soul, which really is related to what we've meant by soul historically. If you really want to know the meaning of soul, watch a living body, it's the very expression of a soul. Note though, that this is the same as how we arrive at the meaning of pain, expressions of pain are the thing that demonstrate the inner experience, the same is true of soul, at it's root meaning.

However, what is the expression of soul, or the meaning of soul as Christians use it? I'm not saying that all Christians are always using the word soul in a senseless way, but much of the time they do, especially when referring to some inner thing that has no outward expression. It's that thing that lives on after we die, well, what are the manifestations of this thing? I can tell you what the manifestations of pain are, or I can tell you what the traditional manifestations of soul are? But what in the world are Christians talking about? Saying it's that thing that lives on is senseless, and it's not just senseless to me, it is senseless, unless you can tell me how it's not. I'm listening, or reading.

No. I thought I already explained what makes the use of the word soul different.

Why would you think I'm taking it personally? I just don't see what you're saying as connecting up with much of what was said.

Anti-foundationalism, where do you see that? I'm sorry, but what you saying seems a bit bizarre. Especially since I've constructed a kind of foundationalist view from much of my understanding of Wittgenstein's later philosophy. If anything we might have some agreement here, maybe.

So the goal of communication is to limit misunderstandings by constructing a shared mental frame of constraints. — apokrisis

First, no one said that the goal of communication is to limit misunderstandings, at least I didn't. Much of what you're saying is a complete misunderstanding of what's being said.

no state of understanding ever bottoms out in concrete atomistic definiteness. — apokrisis

Where does anyone even hint at this? Maybe if we were discussing Wittgenstein's Tractatus you could make such a criticism, but no one is suggesting that, especially me.

I'm glad we agree that sense does not require a referent. However, it seems to be the lack of a referent which leads you to assert that the Christian use of the word 'soul' is incorrect. Given a community who share a use of this word in similar ways (you even offered a definition of the word on the previous page yourself), I don't see how it's at all like W's beetle.

I think there's a definite distinction between saying one person is using a word incorrectly and saying an entire community is using a word incorrectly. It seems inappropriate to label the usage 'incorrect' in the latter case. — Luke

Well maybe I wasn't clear in that post. It's not just a lack of a referent, it's lack of any way to be subject to a rule that gives meaning to the word, or any way that we could possibly agree, or not agree, that the thing we are referring to is the same thing. Christians do offer a definition of the thing they are referring too, are you suggesting that because there is a definition that that in itself is enough to give meaning to the word? I don't think so. Suppose the soul was the thing in the box, would saying it was the soul give it sense? We could even imagine saying the beetle is that thing that goes on after I die, the essence of who I am.

We could easily extend Wittgenstein's beetle example into a language-game similar to how Christians use the term soul. We could develop language-games around the use of the word beetle, would that give it sense? We could imagine pulling out our boxes whenever we refer to the word beetle. I think it's exactly like Witt's beetle example. How is it not? I'm open to being wrong, but at the moment I don't see it.

Finally, why would you say that it's inappropriate to say that an entire community is using a word incorrectly? Communities of philosophers and theologians do it all the time. Wittgenstein railed against philosophers for doing this.

Many words have no referent (e.g. 'the', 'of', 'if', 'then' or names of fictional entities) but this doesn't make the use of these terms incorrect. — Luke

Hi Luke, I haven't talked to you in a while.

Those of you who have followed my posts over the years, or have followed my recent posts, I hope know and understand that I agree with Luke's point. However, if we're talking about the beetle analogy for e.g., there is no agreement, not only in terms of having a referent, but there is no way to know what rule to follow in terms of correct usage. So while it's true that many words have no referent, there are objective ways to know how to use words like 'the,' 'of,' 'is,' etc, there are rules of grammar for us to examine, or some other objective feature for us to examine, as in the case of pain. So sense isn't necessarily dependent on a referent.

I'm always willing to listen to good arguments, and new ways of looking at things.

You make it sound like someone is force feeding you, viz., that an argument against your belief is being shoved down your throat. I'm right you're wrong kind of battle, as though it has nothing to do with discovery, but a kind of ego battle.

I like it, sounds good to me.

Give me my argument, that way I can see your interpretation of what I'm saying. Don't just quote me, but spell it out.

What I think Wittgenstein is interested in blocking, as a sort of catastrophic misunderstanding, is taking a word as it used in one language-game, and bringing it into a another language-game where it is expected to play that same role, to have the same usage. — Srap Tasmaner

It's not just catastrophic misunderstandings, but also subtle misunderstandings, so subtle that much of the time they're missed.

Again, I agree.

The part where you're relaying a completely private experience, i.e., your experience is private. Of course if you're doing more than just saying your in pain, for e.g., screaming in pain, then it's completely appropriate.

Every time you post something, I don't see where we disagree. I'm just guessing as to where that disagreement is. I see where there is possible disagreement, but that's about it.

No, the referent in my private use is not what establishes meaning. I thought I made this clear.

it's actually very clear when I refer to 'my feelings' outside of Wittgensteinian ordinary language analysis, you mean how you feel about things. Or, with a philosophical veneer, you mean something which you take as equivalent to your feelings (not identical). So when I say my piles are a 'sharp, throbbing' pain, you have a very good idea of how I feel if you have the prerequisite experiences and are familiar with the words. 'sharp, throbbing' is my formative transposition of the feeling into language, just like these posts are a formative transposition of how I see us philosophically at odds. — fdrake

I don't see how what I've said differs from this quote. Of course you mean how you feel about things. I'm not saying it's senseless to refer to inner experiences. I think you're misinterpreting my analysis. I'm saying it's senseless if there is no social way of latching on to your inner experiences. I thought we were in agreement on this issue.

Maybe this is where the disagreement arises. We both seem to agree that language is social and that meaning is established socially. So let's suppose that after learning what it means to have a pain, i.e., I've learned how to correctly use the word pain in a variety of contexts, I then go on to tell you that I have a pain in my foot; and as I tell you this, I show no outward signs of pain. So your talking about pain in a very subjective way, i.e., I'm relying on what you mean by pain as you express some inner experience. There is nothing in what I'm saying that poses a problem here.

So according to your interpretation of what I claiming, it wouldn't make sense, or have a sense/meaning to make such a statement. However, this is not what I'm claiming. My claim is that we learn the correct use of the word pain socially as we understand the objective physical cries, moans, complaints, etc. All of us learn the use of the word in this way. After we learn the correct use of the word we can reliably associate it with our inner experiences, and since this is true, generally it's also true that when we talk about inner experiences, even though there is no outward signs, I can be reasonably sure that you're using the word correctly. However, the sense of the word is learned by the outward signs.

I tried pointing this out when I talked about having a private language, and doing mathematics privately. It's very similar, i.e., it's true that having a private language is not linguistically possible. However, this doesn't mean that I can't do mathematics privately, once I've learned mathematics. The same is true of words having a sense when talking about private experiences. Once I've learned how to use the words correctly, I can refer to my private experiences even though you may not see any outward signs of my inner goings on.

Note two things about this: First, you've already learned the correct use of the word within a social context; and second, correction is done in a social context. So if you were referring to the pain in your foot, but later I find out that you weren't using the word to refer to pain, but to a feeling of joy, then of course there was no sense to what you were saying. But generally people use such words correctly to refer to their inner experiences, but only after learning how to do it in the social context.

True, but not all uses of words that you think make sense, do make sense.

You may decide that the soul is not immortal. If Plato, for instance, asserts that it is immortal, his usage of the word is correct though you think his assertion is not. — frank

My point is whether the use of the word soul has sense, not whether there is something immortal that goes on after death. Besides even Plato can be wrong, and has been wrong about some ideas, even though I believe he is right up there with the greatest of philosophers.

Ah, I understand 'use' differently from you I think; all the cases of 'pain' I briefly profiled count as 'uses', and none of them are either 'correct' or 'incorrect': they are simply uses simpliciter. One can speak of the 'correct use' of a word of course, but this is not how I understand Wittgenstein's own deployment of the term (in the context of 'meaning is use in a langauge-game'). The contrast-space of 'use' here would simply be 'not a use in a langauge-game, rather than 'incorrect use'. — StreetlightX

One of the purposes of Wittgenstein's language-games is to show how it is that we mean something by our words, and how this comes about, this has been true since the Tractatus. This is important as we traverse this topic.

In his notes on On Certainty Wittgenstein is pointing out, as I understand it, that Moore's use of the word know is senseless, and it follows from this, I believe, that it's incorrect. Now I'm not saying that all senseless uses of words are incorrect, or that all language-games involving senseless words are incorrect uses, but that one of the features of incorrect usage is that the word is senseless. There are certain language-games where it makes perfect sense to talk in a senseless way, maybe to emphasize the senseless nature of a word, or to be funny. However, in some language-games using senseless words simply misleads us, especially in philosophical language-games. It's important to make a distinction between what's nonsensical and what's senseless. Without getting into a discussion of the differences between these words, suffice it to say that nonsensical tends to be a more radical misuse of a word than something senseless. A piece of nonsense tends to be completely devoid of meaning, whereas something senseless can appear to have sense, like the beetle example. The differences between these two words can be a bit vague, but I think you get my drift.

One more thing about correct and incorrect usage, since language is by it's very nature rule-based, it would seem to follow necessarily that one can speak of correct and incorrect uses of words; and of course in terms of Wittgenstein we see this especially true, I believe, in On Certainty. That said, not all language-games lend themselves to this view.

If someone was to compare the language-games of a primitive culture, where their knowledge was based on the movement of the stars, would it be correct to say that their use of the word know was incorrect? Note that in this example, the whole language is based around this notion, so it's not as though we could compare the use of the word know against other language-games within that language. All of the uses of know is this primitive language-game would revolve around understanding the stars and their movements.

Finally, there's more to Wittgenstein's language-games than meaning is just "not a use in a language-game," because the notion of meaning, which is at the core of Wittgenstein's philosophy, has to do with words having a sense. This gets back to my talk above about the word soul having no sense in much of the discourse of Christians. A language-game in itself may or may not have a sense, and that's one of the reasons I make the claim that one is being incorrect in terms of the use of a word or words.

It might be incumbent on you to demonstrate this. But seriously, how do Christians use this word incorrectly, or how is it like Wittgenstein's beetle? It has an established usage among Christians, AFAIK. — Luke

Yes, it's an established use among Christians, but just because something is part of a language-game, that doesn't mean it's correct usage, or more importantly that it has sense. My contention is that it has no sense, however, I'm open to another way of looking at it.

My point is that the way Christians use the word is exactly like the beetle analogy. They refer to this thing that's a soul, but what is it that they're referring too? Let's assume the beetle analogy for a minute. I can say many things about it in the abstraction, it's that part of me that continues after my death, or that it's this or that, but there's no way to confirm it. When I use the word pain there are outward signs that confirm that inner experience or thing, but there is nothing that can be associated with the word soul as used by Christians. Meaning is established as a rule-based agreement amongst people, and along with that, is the idea of being correct or incorrect. How do we know if we're even referring to the same thing?

If you trace the use of the word soul, and the way it's been used historically (outside of religion), it refers to the animation of the living body; and the animation of a body doesn't necessarily mean that there's something that survives the death of the body.

Am I saying there is nothing that survives death, no, I'm just saying that the use of the word soul in the Christian context has no sense.

I think that's a fair appraisal of it. What do you think the differences in our viewpoints are? — fdrake

I'm going to turn the question around, since it's you who had the bone to pick. :razz:

I agree with this absolutely. One of the motivations I had with picking a bone with Sam26 was to draw attention to the undercurrents of language. There's a lot of expressive, delicious and vital parts of language use that are pulled along by them. — fdrake

I actually agree with much of what you're saying. However, maybe what you're observing about my concentration on particular Wittgensteinian ideas, is not that I, or anyone else, is neglecting other important aspects of language, but that this emphasis is important to our understanding of philosophy. There are always other things that can be pointed out as important, and one should point them out.

I'm sure if we continue, we will find areas of disagreement as you probably have already. That's what makes the sharing of these ideas fun, and sometimes ego crushing. I know it pushes me up against the limits of what I think I know.

I'm not sure what 'correctly' means in this context. All the uses of 'pain' I sketched could be said to be 'correct' if generalizable ('publicizable'). — StreetlightX

I'm not necessarily criticizing your post, but only pointing out that use is not always a good indicator of the correct use of a word. Some people who read Wittgenstein necessarily equate meaning with use when it's not always the case. This same problem arises when we say that meaning has to be seen in context; and while it's true that both of these play an important role, we don't want to be absolutist about it.

The word correct has it's own problems, but generally we know if someone is using the word pain correctly or incorrectly. If for e.g., I'm learning English words and I confuse the use of the word pain with being happy, then it's clearly incorrect. This of course doesn't always mean that it's clear that a word is used correctly, sometimes people are just confused about the use of a word. Moreover, if I make a claim that a word is not used correctly, it's incumbent on me to demonstrate how it's incorrect. I've been making the claim that Christians generally use the word soul incorrectly, because much of the time it's exactly like Wittgenstein's beetle-in-the-box.

That's why how one uses a word doesn't always mean that one is using it correctly. It's also true of groups of people, for e.g., if certain religious groups use a word in a particular way, that doesn't mean they're using it correctly. People forget that although language-games tell us a lot about correct usage, they're are not necessarily good indicators.

What I'm trying to say is that if I express a feeling and its concomitant behavioral tendencies, that expression can be taken as the expressed feeling with no additional linguistic constraints. You either can or cannot see the aspects put forth in linguistic acts. — fdrake

If you express a feeling and its accompanying behavioral acts, then it is necessarily rule-governed, so it may or may not need other linguistic modifiers in order for meaning to be conveyed. Whether I "...can see or cannot see the aspects put forth [as] linguistic acts," is dependent on many things.

The privacy of feelings; that all feelings which are felt in my lifeworld are mine; can make it difficult to express the private thing, to guide the possible interpretations with the right words so that the other can cotton on to how that feeling is for me. The same goes for ideas that we have or opinions that we hold; it is always difficult to take the amorphous and half-formed and codify it into our shared canon of experience and language use. — fdrake

I agree, although I wonder about the use of mine, i.e., these feelings I have are mine. I think this may generate confusion, viz., the tendency to associate meaning with my feeling, as opposed to the shared social construct of language. There is a tension here that seems to force us to acknowledge that there is a private world, but this private world doesn't give meaning to our linguistic expressions, but it's necessary. We also don't want to restrict language to the point that we don't allow for novel thinking and expression. So sense is not a fixed or contrived border, but moves and expands, but ever so slowly around the fixed point (fixed point may not be the best choice of words) of what we already know or believe.

There is a struggle against the trappings of what is shared to express what is novel and singular; what is not already a habit or established permutation of language use. The private/public distinction paints the borders of sense as something demarcated beforehand; as a necessary condition for language use the beetle is not allowed out of the box. — fdrake

Yes, as I mentioned above, we have to be careful that we don't let the border between sense and nonsense become so fixed that we stifle creativity. Sometimes the beetle gets out of the box, as our expressions become clearer and more precise, and other times our words remain senseless because there is no sense to be had. However, it may be necessary for this to take place in order for language to grow and expand. It's like being in a maze, some paths lead to nowhere, other paths take us to new places, expanding our knowledge. Wittgenstein did this with his idea of language-games, and his method of inquiry.

Really, all I have is a suspicion that as uses of language are dynamic, languages evolve, uses are introduced for novel phenomena, and the box the beetle is in shrinks. Just as much as use is a contingent and yet constitutive activity of language, just as much as language is enmeshed in cultural norms, use frames language as the collection of the codified already sensible. Forgetting that use is as much the codification of the new as the reference of the established. — fdrake

I agree, but I'm not sure the box shrinks, the beetle sometimes escapes though, into the world of sense.

That's not an example. So Bob couldn't look at a person who is screaming and correctly use the word pain, viz., he couldn't tell someone else that Sue is in pain based on observation? That would be strange.

What use of the word pain would be beyond Bob's grasp?

To see if we're disagreeing or not, do you think that the public criterion is a necessary feature of language use? If it is necessary, why is it a necessity? — fdrake

I do believe that public criterion is a necessary feature of language use, so I don't think it's possible to have a private language. However, this is different from having a language and putting it to private use.

It's necessary because of the nature of language and following rules, i.e., since language necessitates rule-following, and rule-following is not a private endeavor, then it follows that having a language is not private but public. Sounds a bit circular, so let me give a deductive argument.

(1) If it's not possible to follow a rule privately, then a private language is not possible.
(2) It's not possible to follow a rule privately.
(3) Therefore, it's not possible to have a private language.

Of course then the challenge is show that premise 1 is true. What does it mean to follow a rule privately in this context. This doesn't mean that I can't do mathematics in a private setting, but to know that I've done it correctly needs to be shown objectively, i.e., publicly. In this case many mathematicians have their work checked by other mathematicians to validate correct use of the rules.

If it was completely private, then whatever I think is correct, is correct. Following a rule is by its very nature is public, and not private. Much more can obviously be said.

True, but the sense of the word isn't dependent on your private experience anyway.

Mary, prior to leaving Mary's Room, has never had the experience of seeing red.

Where John is talking about that experience, Mary does not understand.

Whether or not Mary can satisfy anyone with her usage of "red" is irrelevant. — frank

It's true in this example that Mary doesn't understand the sense of the word, there is nothing public here, so Mary has no sense of the word. I don't see in this example how Mary would be able to use the word. However, in my example of the use of the word pain, it's quite different. Bob doesn't feel pain, but he is able to observe along with everyone else the outward signs of pain, for e.g., moaning, crying, pleading, etc., so Bob is able to see how the word is used, and apply it correctly. Mary is not able to partake of anything public.

If someone has never experienced childbirth does that mean they can't use the word correctly? We don't always have to experience the same thing others do in order to understand the correct use of a word or concept.

I see. An expression of pain will be understandable to everyone except that rare person who has never felt pain, even if that person is a neurologist. — frank

I don't think you need to feel pain in order to understand the sense of the word. Surely I could understand the sense by observation, and thereby use the word correctly, giving it sense.

I don't follow. "Soul" under the langauge game model would be sensical. It would mean that non-existent entity to which Christians believe a person's essence resides. That their internal thought varies from their public use (I.e. they believe it existent) would mean that meaning really isn't use only if you're willing to delve into the phenomenal state of Christians, something I thought you wouldn't do. — Hanover

What I would say here is that just because we use a word in a language-game, as in the Christian use of the word soul, that that in itself doesn't mean it has sense. Consider Wittgenstein's beetle-in-the-box example, let's suppose that we develop language-games to refer to what's in each of our boxes - does it follow that the word beetle has a sense? No. The tendency is for people to take Wittgenstein's example of language-games and use, to be, the be all and end all of meaning, but it's not, and Wittgenstein never meant it to be.

The problem with saying that the soul is where the person's essence resides is that there is nothing public about such a thing. I could say for example, that what's in my box (beetle thing again) is where the soul resides, but it would be senseless because there is nothing public here. The same is true of Christians who point to the inner thing in reference to soul. There isn't anything public - as Wittgenstein points out - what we think we are referring to may be something quite different, it may be nothing, or it may be something changing all the time. The sense of the word soul has nothing to latch onto, which is the same with the beetle example.

Meaning isn't always use, we often use words incorrectly. Meaning isn't always driven by context either, and meaning isn't always driven by a language-game. Use has to be looked at in a much broader sense, and that takes place in everyday language. By everyday I don't mean that the man on the street is the one who decides meaning, but that meaning is derived across a wide linguistic swath. One also has to look at the original home of words in conjunction with language-games. It's not an easy thing to do.

Finally, it's not a matter of looking into the phenomenal states of Christians, quite the opposite.

By epistemic access I imagine a relation between a person and thing such that the person can come to know the nature of the thing. Which is a bit of a fuzzy idea. What I'm trying to say with reference to epistemic access is that what is 'private' is beyond our reach - epistemically inaccessible - and what is public is not. — fdrake

When it comes to what we know there are a variety of language-games in which we can make claims to knowledge. So in science we would appeal to inductive and deductive arguments (mostly inductive), but there are other ways of knowing such as: Linguistic training, I know that that is a cup, because that is what we mean by cup in English; knowledge through sensory experience, I know the orange juice is sweet because I tasted it; testimonial knowledge, I believe that X is true, because the testimony is reliable (most of our knowledge comes in this way); and pure reason or pure logic (tautologies). So there are a variety of language-games that use the word knowledge, and each of these is a correct use of the word, and each use is public. I say all this just to give some background of where I'm coming from.

Since each of these uses of the word know is public, i.e., that's where knowledge gets its sense, it's senseless to make a claim to knowledge outside this public use. So it's not, to my understanding, that knowledge of the private is inaccessible, it's that knowing makes no sense in this arena. Maybe that's what you're saying, I guess I didn't like the word inaccessible, but maybe it works.

Also I view these first-person events, like, "I am in pain," "I feel..." as very basic kinds of beliefs, or bedrock beliefs quite apart from epistemic considerations.

I would also say that what is private is accessible, but only in a public way (a slight variation on what you're saying), viz., what's going on privately has meaning as it's exposed publicly through our use of language.

Then I'm trying to say that this is a bit weird, as that each sensation, disposition or emotion can be made equivalent to a series of expressive linguistic acts. The privation associated with any sensation is only the privation of the event of feeling only ever happening to one person, but absolutely nothing to do with the sense of speech acts about it. This works in the real use of language as if the privation can be circumvented by the use of language (which pace the Wittgensteinian background we're working in is language simpliciter) to treat my pain event as equivalent in another's pain event within a language game. — fdrake

I'm not sure you can say, "...that each sensation, disposition or emotion can be made equivalent to a series of expressive linguistic acts." My understanding is that our pain is not equivalent to the speech act, but gets its meaning through the outward public expression. What you're saying reminds me of the idea that the word's meaning is associated with the thing, but it depends on what you mean by equivalent.

I agree that the private event, say, of pain, is only happening to one person, but I'm not sure I agree that it has nothing to do with the sense of the word pain. It has everything to do with the sense of the word, but only as it can be made public. So I can't point to my private sensation and think it will acquire sense without the public expression of the pain (beetle-in-the-box PI 293). The private experience isn't circumvented, it's only that meaning of the private sensation must be shown in the public arena of language use.

You seem to be using equivalent in a strange way, i.e., you say, "...to treat my pain event as equivalent to someone else's pain event within a language-game," but is this what we mean when we compare pains? If I say, "I have the same pain," do we mean that it's equivalent to a similar pain event that I might have, or is it akin, for e.g., to saying, "Stand here," where we don't need to have an exact point in mind, but rather a rough idea.

Which is fine, mostly. We don't feel particular dispositions, emotions or sensations from others, even if two people, A and B, are subjected to the same pin prick, A does not feel the pain that B feels and vice versa. But why should this entail that A's pain and B's pain cannot be part of the language game? Contrast this to A's pain event and B's pain event, which will never be the sense of the words about them. My point is that A's pain event and B's pain event can still be part of a language game, because a comparisons can be made. — fdrake

If someone says, "I've experienced the same pain," referring to a lumbar puncture, we understand what they mean, it's not as though we think that our pain experiences are different; so we can say it, and A's pain and B's pain is part of the same language-game. And what is A's pain event, and B's pain event, other than A and B's pain? It's true that the private experience itself doesn't give sense to the word, but that doesn't mean we can't speak about private sensations. The only point I would want to make is that the only way we can speak about these private sensations, is that we have something that's not private. Once we have the sense, then it follows that the language-games about private experiences do make sense. I'm not sure we are disagreeing.

So, what problem do I have with epistemic access being used as a criterion to demarcate that which may be a sense of a word (its use) and that which may not be the sense of a word (the invisible or maybe impossible referent of pain)? Just that epistemic access itself is part of a language game of knowing, philosophically transposed into the realm of language use simpliciter. — fdrake

I think I answered this already.

If we pay attention to the words people use when describing private sensations, emotions, states of mind, we can establish a kind of equivalence between them. Like two alcoholics on TV describing addiction unfelt by the audience. Establishing equivalence between things is something we do with words. — fdrake

No, argument here.

During the language game of pain comparison, people can offer a lot of adjectives to describe qualities of the pain. Some common ones are; sharp, stabbing, throbbing, blinding, maddening, dull, intense. There are words which connote different intensities of the sensation; like agony and discomfort. Those intensities can clearly be part of the language game, so why not something which is equivalent to the pains themselves within the language game? — fdrake

I think I've answered what you getting at above, but maybe not.

Long story short: epistemic access and establishing equivalence are both part of word use, rather than a transcendental precondition of them. — fdrake

Is this what you think I'm saying, i.e., that there is some transcendental precondition to word use? Because I definitely don't believe this.

Well, I tried to answer, and/or add to what you were saying.

Well, you have to look at the argument, which I give on the first page of this thread about half way down. What you're doing is giving an opinion, which is fine as far as it goes, but it doesn't address the argument. Read the posts between me and Fdrake.

Another important point to make is that just because people are using a word or words in a particular language-game, that doesn't mean that those words have sense. This is also true of context. There are language-games that are used in philosophy and theology that are senseless. For example, the use of the word soul by Christians. The way they use the word in their language-games, the word's meaning would be completely derived by the inner thing, something that's equivalent to the beetle-in-the-box. Note though that they're using the word/s in a particular context, and within their particular language-game, and yet they are using in incorrectly, i.e., it has no sense. This is not how the word soul is used outside their context or language-game; so language-games and context are definitely not absolute. It's much more nuanced than this. One has to look at the birth of the word among other things.

Another way to think of some of this is the following: First the public (in terms of language and meaning), then the private. We can use words to refer to the private, but only if they have a public use, and that we understand that public use/meaning. The problem is that we want to reverse the process, and we do it without realizing we're doing it. We may even acknowledge the public meaning of words, but we end up falling back into ascribing a private meaning without realizing it.

For example, I might say that I understand what thoughts are based on our shared meaning of the word, i.e., the language-games that give meaning to the word. However, I might then think that because I understand this - that I can go on to say that I understand thinking or thoughts by thinking about my own thought, i.e., by introspection. It's here that we can easily go astray.

Your welcome.

But I don't think this goes far enough. The inner/outer or public/private schema is driven, or perhaps haunted, by a personal criterion of epistemic access. What I mean here is that because it isn't possible to feel another's pain, the language cannot be about, or be have the meaning of, particular instances of pain, only pain insofar as it plays a part in language games. — fdrake

I'm not sure of your point here. Are you saying that we have knowledge of private experiences, i.e., "I know I'm in pain?" Let's clear this up first. Much of what your saying I agree with, but this isn't clear to me. I'm specifically referring to your use of the phrase "epistemic access."