If experiences are inner, how could thoughts about them not be inner? And do I not experience my thoughts regarding my experiences? Would anyone think it odd to say "I remember I was thinking about my experience. . ."

I am puzzled as to why my experiences would be inner while my thoughts about them would be not. — Arne

That's a fair question, and one that can be confusing. I'm going to be repeating myself for emphasis, and to word it slightly different for clarity (hopefully).

Our inner experiences must be separated from how we talk about inner experiences, viz., what we mean by saying we have thoughts. So what we mean by a thought or thoughts is not connected with my having a thought/s. Again, experiences, or what we mean by experiences, is not dependent (in terms of meaning) on something inner. This is not to say that the inner experience isn't real, but only that what we mean by experience isn't dependent on inner awareness. So both words, and many others, thought and experience get their meaning from what we observe in each other; and these observations occur in the open. It's not like Wittgenstein's beetle-in-the-box where we can't observe what's in the box, i.e., we can see what it is for someone to mean something by their words, because we all can observe the thing in the box.

Your question is: "If experiences are inner, how could thoughts about them not be inner?" Again, good question, but I'm not saying that there isn't something inner happening, or that we're not expressing something inner. And yes, you do experience thoughts about your experiences. Again, what we mean by these words is not dependent on what's inner in terms of meaning, so if what I mean by these words is strictly based on something completely subjective, then the words have no foothold, thus no sense.

It really comes down to how we are using these terms, so if someone thinks that they're going to understand what a thought is, or what an experience is by observing what's inner, then they're confusing how it is that we come to mean something by these words.

Introspection reveals to someone that some of their thoughts can be expressed in words. Not that all such thoughts can be expressed in words. It isn't as if Mr Chomsky can assess all possible thoughts through introspection, even though he is quite smart. — fdrake

I'll just add some things to these comments.

The question, it seems to me, is, what does it mean to have a thought? How do we learn to apply the word thought? This is similar to the thread on beliefs, there are thoughts and beliefs that are expressed in actions, and it's the actions of a person that give rise to what we mean by thought, and what we mean by belief. Just as the word pain gets its meaning from observing the actions (moaning and screams for e.g.), so the inner experience is expressed as we act in the world. These actions then provide the backdrop for language and meaning.

I believe Chomsky goes wrong by thinking that thoughts are these inner private experiences, i.e., that accessing thoughts is a matter of introspection. For a belief, thought, or pain to have meaning there must be the outward manifestation, otherwise we could claim that rocks have thoughts.

What also seems clear is that for my thoughts to mean anything to you, there must be something in common, i.e., there must be something in common with my inner experiences and yours that is expressed in such a way that we all see that common thing. Language then grabs this outward commonality and calls it pain, thought, belief, intent, etc.

It could be that one's body takes up far greater space than the visible one which appears enclosed in the skin. — raza

I'm not sure what it would mean for our bodies to take up a greater space than what's visible. There's no evidence that that's the case. If you're using NDEs as examples I don't see it. One reason is that people are seeing their bodies from a 3rd person perspective - they're looking at their bodies from a place in space quite separate from their bodies. Also, even if the bodies energy extends further out from the body than is commonly thought, how is it that people having an NDE seem to move much much further than what you're speculating about? People have had NDEs where they're looking at Earth from a place in space, your idea wouldn't account for such an experience. For your account to be reasonable we would need some evidence that the body is larger than what we observe, and even if it is, it still wouldn't discredit these experiences.

Based on my studies of NDEs, I would say that the probability that we're living in a kind of simulation is high. My metaphysics include living out lives in many different possible realities, created by a single or multiple minds. I contend that consciousness lies at the bottom of all reality, and anything that exists is a product of consciousness.

You really don't need to study logic to have a good understanding of what the Tractatus is saying.

Since no one is responding to your thread Posty, I'll post a few things. First, one must keep in mind that the analysis in the Tractatus is an apriori analysis, and that logic is very important to this analysis. In the Preface to the Tractatus Wittgentein tells us that the book deals with the problems of philosophy, and if one correctly understood the "logic of our language," then these problems wouldn't be problems at all. "For there seemed to pertain to logic a peculiar depth--a universal significance. Logic lay, it seemed, at the bottom of all sciences.--For logical investigation explores the nature of all things (PI 89)."

So the purpose of the Tractatus is to put an end to philosophizing. How does Wittgenstein expect to achieve this? One must remember that Wittgenstein is still under the influence of the idea that words refer to things, so there is a logical identity between signs (e.g., names, but not names in the sense you might think), and what is signified by the signs (for e.g., objects, but objects aren't what you may suppose). So Wittgenstein wants to achieve clarity, and he sets out to do this first with his picture theory of language.

The point of giving the examples is simply to show that there is an objective component to harm, it's not just relative. In terms of justice one needs to show objectively that the harm done while administering justice is not out of proportion with the immoral act. Besides my only point is to show that all immoral acts involve harm, that's how we know it's immoral. How justice is administered is a matter of law, and that's a separate issue, but not completely separate.

My point above about facing a choice of harms is to show that in certain cases, like the drug case, where we are faced with two harms, we have to choose the lesser of the harms. Do I want to die, or do I want to take the drug with potential side effects. Generally with drugs one decides that the harm done by taking the drug is much less than the harm done by not taking the drug. The principle of harm is that one wants to always choose the lesser harm based on what is known at the time. In limited cases one might die by taking the drug, but the overall good is that the drug causes less harm to society, at least in theory.

Again, it always gets down to the harm done, and it's not always an easy decision, but generally it is.

Maybe in court you may need to quantify the harm to properly meet out justice, but in our everyday lives I don't see the need to measure the harm, whatever that means. In most cases we can see the difference in the amount of harm done, i.e., I can see that cutting someone's arm off without good reason causes more harm than lying to your parents about where you were at 1 am. So generally I don't see the need to measure the harm, unless there is some context where that needs to be done. Moreover, I'm not sure that measure is the right word.

My view of immorality is very straight forward and easy to understand. Everything that is immoral, i.e., all immorality involves harm in some fashion or form. That doesn't mean that it's always easy to see the harm, because some harmful affects can be very subtle, which is why we often disagree about what's immoral. I don't often use the word all when describing referring to things, but in this case I do; and while it's true that all immorality involves harm, not all harm is immoral. In fact, sometimes doing harm is the right thing to do, especially if you're faced with two choices, in which both will cause harm. In such a case, one should choose the action which causes the least amount of harm.

My view also includes the idea that what's immoral is objective, i.e., we simply look to see the harm done. If no harm, then no immorality. Again, though, it can be very difficult in some cases to see the harm, but in most cases it's clear. For example, in most cases of lying we can objectively see that there is harm done to marriages, businesses, friendships, and to our own character.

I can do that, I'll stop in from time-to-time to check on direction.

What do you want me to do exactly? It's going to be difficult to get people interested enough to actually read the Tractatus. Do you want me to keep an eye on the direction?

I have somewhat, though if you can re-point me in the right direction, I would gladly re-read them. — Posty McPostface

It's called a Wittgenstein Commentary, under philosophy of language. I start with the Tractatus.

I understand, it's a very difficult work. Have you read any of my analysis of the Tractatus?

I'm waiting for this analysis, what happened? You need to understand a bit of Frege and Russell, and Wittgenstein's thoughts leading up to the Tractatus, viz., the Notebooks.

I wouldn't use the phrase "without cause," I would say, "without good reason/s." The word 'cause' has to much other baggage. Moreover, the conclusion didn't say it, which is why I added what I did.

In a nutshell -

P1 - People like you and me have a future, it includes many things of value, relationships, experiences, etc
P2 - It is immoral to deny people like us our future of value without cause.
P3 - After the process of conception there exists a unique human organism
P4 - This organism is alive
P5 - This human organism has a future of value - much like ours

Conclusion - If it is immoral to deny a future of value, and after conception there is a human organism with a future of value, it is immoral to deny that organism its future of value. Abortion denies that future of value - abortion is immoral. — Rank Amateur

Hmmm, it's not always immoral to deny that organism its future value. I would stipulate that without good reason it's immoral to deny that organism its future value.

are you familiar with Don Marquis argument on a future of value ? If so what do you think of it.

this part is opinion - not argument - but the concept of person hood has a rich history of being used as a justification for making a sub class of human beings that it is ok to do bad stuff to. — Rank Amateur

When we talk of the zygote or fetus as a potential person we are talking of future value, but we're also talking of present value. No, I haven't read Don Marquis argument.

Yes, if one makes the argument that since the zygote is not a person, that it's just a clump of cells, and as such has no value, then one can justify doing experiments on zygotes, presumably. One might also argue that any subclass of humans is not a person, therefore they have no rights, and people do and have done this. I believe these are just very poor arguments.

A person is a philosophical construct. — Kamikaze Butter

The meaning of the word person is not some philosophical construct, meaning, and I talk about this all the time in my thread on Wittgenstein, is something that takes place in language, and how that word is used. So one can't just make up any definition of the word and think it applies, as some philosophers and theologians do. It's more complicated than that.

Barring severe mutation or inter species breeding, we know the zygote is human life. We talk of “human rights” not “person rights.”

Life obviously is not a human right. — Kamikaze Butter

I'm not saying you can't make an argument that a zygote has rights, especially given that it's a potential person at the very least. Does all human life have rights, does a sperm have rights? It's not as easy as you seem to think it is. By the way, we do talk about persons having rights, but you're also right, we also talk of human rights, but when we talk of human here, I don't think we're talking about the rights of zygotes. Do you think that when the founding fathers were talking of rights, they were including a clump of cells, probably not. Maybe we should expand some rights to potential persons. I don't know.

legal and moral are at best distance cousins — Rank Amateur

You won't get an argument from me on that.

I wouldn't stipulate abortion is murder either. All the other points there are far from settled and there are good arguments for and against - and the best arguments IMO on both sides of the issue have abandoned any tie to person hood at all. — Rank Amateur

Except that one could make an argument that the closer one gets to viability, the closer one gets to having a good argument that it's a person. The problem here of course is that the line gets blurry at points, and thus isn't as clear as we would like. For me it's clear that a zygote isn't a person. Thus, not being a person, it's difficult to see how abortion could be murder, since murder always involves persons.

the fetus has rights, this is a case of competing rights - — Rank Amateur

I agree, cases for and against abortion come down to competing rights, the rights of the mother vs the rights of the fetus. Of course does a zygote have rights? Usually when we talk of rights, we're talking about persons. If we're talking about moral or immoral, then that's a separate question.

I don't see any reason you can't make an argument either for or against abortion as moral or immoral, understanding of course that all such general judgments can be mitigated by particular circumstances. — Rank Amateur

Again, I agree.

The only 100% method of contraception is abstinence. Therefore, any casual sex risks the possibility of unplanned pregnancy. Under current gynocentric laws in America, women have complete authority on what to do with the baby growing inside them. They can even legally kill the baby. Let's assume that abortion is morally equivalent to murder. — Ronin3000

While it's true that any casual sex risks unplanned pregnancy, it doesn't follow that I shouldn't have casual sex because there is a risk involved. There are many things in life that risk life, and we do them on a daily basis. Under certain circumstances you could argue that casual sex is immoral, but not all casual sex is immoral, one would have to show at the very least that there is harm done to the people involved.

It's also not true that women in America have complete authority on what to do with unplanned pregnancy. Have you actually read Roe v Wade? I haven't read it in quite some time, but if I remember correctly, if a women is in her last trimester she has to consult a doctor. There are also other stipulations.

I sure wouldn't stipulate that all abortion is equivalent to murder, that's just not true. I don't believe that a zygote is equivalent to a person, it's just not the same thing. The most you can say is it's a potential person, and as such it has value. If you believe all abortion is murder, then I can see why you would go to great lengths to do all you can to stop it. Consider a case where the mother's life is in danger if she gives birth, how can it be murder to take the life of the fetus to protect her own life? I do believe that you shouldn't abort without good reason, and I do believe that the decision to abort should be done, in many cases with a doctors advice, if possible. You could argue that some, most, or many abortions are immoral, but that has to be decided on a case by case basis. The decision should be between the mother, family, and a doctor, and in some cases the mother can make the decision on her own. However, your argument isn't a good one to say the least.

The attacks should be against the argument not against the person, so those of you attacking the person are in the wrong. All that should matter is the argument, is it a good one or not. I happen to think it stinks.

.

My reservations come from the gap between our perceptions and actual reality, noumena, which means that our common physiological characteristics may result in common end-of-life mental and emotional effects. — Greta

The problem Greta (and thanks for the reply) is that any kind of common perceptual experience can be said to "result in common" life experiences, whether end-of-life or not. I think the way to look at these experiences, especially given there are so many, and given the consistency of the experience, is to look at them as we look at any veridical experience, unless their is wide inconsistency. I say wide inconsistency, because any large group of testimonials about any veridical experience will have some inconsistency, that's the nature of testimonial evidence. Another important point about the testimony is that there must be some objective way of examining the testimonial evidence. The point being that even if you have large numbers of testimonials, if it's completely subjective, then there's going to be a huge problem. In the case of NDEs there is plenty of objective evidence from those who were there and saw what happened, so as to be able to corroborate much of the testimony, or at least some of the testimony. This also includes medical records, as well as doctors, nurses, and family members.

I agree that NDEs are not just hallucinations or dream. In a hallucination or dream, our perceptions are inconsequential to our ensuing physical (if not, mental) reality. In an NDE, when the senses have shut down, the external physical reality is basically over and thus becomes almost completely inconsequential. At that point, subjective reality is everything; there is nothing else, no input, no external future. — Greta

My research indicates that the senses don't shut down. In fact, people report heightened awareness, which is unusual because the brain is in a state of shutting down. This also goes against a criticism of those who think that these experiences are the result of a common brain experience that occurs when dying (as you suggested above). Again though, how is it that if the brain is shutting down people who are blind can see, or people who have been deaf their whole life can hear. These are experiences of those who have been sensory deprived. And those who haven't been sensory deprived report seeing colors that are not part of our normal color spectrum. Also people report have 360 degree vision, and hearing the conversations of those who are miles away from where their having their NDE.

I've already talked above about the subjective critique.

.

Can you give an example of a fact in realty that is not a conceptual fact? — T Clark

For us to talk about the facts (states-of-affairs) we need the concepts, but the existence of facts are not dependent on the concepts, they're only dependent on the concepts if we are to talk about the facts. Any existent thing is separate from the concept used to refer to it, so the fact that the Earth has one moon is separate from anything conceptual. So I think the confusion can be in our talk about facts, verses the thing itself.

Well there is a sense at least in which all truths are dependent on minds, to the extent that truth is a property of propositions, and propositions need proposers. I think you need stronger term than 'dependent on' - would you say that subjective truths are about (states of) mind? But even then, one can establish beyond reasonable doubt mens rea in a court of law. — unenlightened

Talk about truths or facts is dependent on minds, and thus language is also mind dependent. However, the fact in reality is separate from the concept fact, and it's separate from talk about those facts. Thus, objective facts, i.e., the existence of objective facts are not mind dependent in the sense that they can still obtain whether we have the concepts or language to refer to them. So in that sense they are not dependent on minds, they can have their existence quite apart from minds. There is a sense where everything may be dependent on minds or consciousness, but that will take us far afield. This has more to do with my metaphysics.

Subjective truths are about propositions, and how we use them in relation to our mind. I'm not saying that meaning is derived from something in the mind, only that there is a connection, maybe causal, between subjective truths and minds.

I'll go further, if Sam and the rest of us did not exist, earths and moons would also cease to exist. — T Clark

But there is no evidence for this contention Clark. Unless you want to cite quantum mechanical theories, but even there, there is disagreement about what it means to say that something obtains because we're looking at it.

Not true. The term is used in at least two different ways. 1) well supported by unbiased evidence, e.g. the reporter was objective or 2) absolute congruence with reality independent of mind, e.g. the way things would be if no consciousness existed. — T Clark

Both of these definitions support my contention, viz., that there is no need for the word "true" in front of "objectivity." Something is objective if it is either one of those definitions. How does this support your use of "true objectivity?"

Earth has a number of things in orbit around it. We've chosen to call one of them "the moon." We've defined it as one of a kind. Just like Pluto used to be a planet but now it's not. That distinction makes a lot of sense.

We've observed the behavior of matter and energy. Based on those observations, we've concluded that, at the smallest scales, matter is made up of particles which are acted on by specific types of forces. Those distinctions make a lot of sense also, but they don't explain how the world works except in the most simplistic way. That is not predictable from reductionist, so-called objective "facts." — T Clark

How does any of this support the contention that "objective" is synonymous with "omniscience?" I don't see any connection?

My point was that a denial of objective reality is a well-established, well-supported philosophical position. And, no, it's not just a matter of language and words. If you want to say that position is self-evidently insignificant and not worth discussing, that's your choice. — T Clark

We can go back and forth about what's well established, but I don't see any good arguments that there is no objective reality that make sense. Most of these arguments are misunderstandings, and most of them are misunderstandings of the way we derive meaning from words. I'm not saying that it's insignificant, I was simply pointing out that because something is discussed or argued for, that doesn't make it worthwhile, significant, or true. Many things are discussed in these forums and in philosophical circles that bare little resemblance to reality.

If earths and moons ceased to exist, truths about earths and moons would cease to exist. If Sam did not exist, he would not have likes - what's the difference? — unenlightened

Subjective truths are dependent on minds, objective truths are not, so while it's true that if certain objects failed to exist, then truths about those objects would be meaningless. Thus both truths would fail to obtain without the supporting criteria, but that doesn't mean there isn't a difference between the two kinds of truths.

But using the words objective and subjective does not always play out so smoothly, nor is it clear what domain is under consideration even. — Moliere

I agree, but that's true of most subjects, things can and do get muddy. However, generally it seems fairly easy, especially in Tiff's case, to delineate between the subjective and objective.

You deserve a better quote, Sam-I-am; it makes sense to divide knowledge into knowledge of the subject and knowledge of the object, and yet this is not what people have been wanting to refer to. So I will play hard-ball with you for a moment. Whatever is knowledge is true, and therefore objective.I can only know from what you tell me that you like orange juice, but if you are honest, I know the same thing that you know. — unenlightened

If I say, "I like oranges," the truth of the statement is dependent on me, i.e., my likes and dislikes for example, and this is what makes it subjective. It's also a contingent truth besides being a subjective truth. There are subjective contingent truths like the one I cited, and there are objective contingent truths like the Earth has one moon.

Of course if it's knowledge it's true, that's not disputed, but not all knowledge is objective. If you know that Sam likes orange juice, the truth of that statement is dependent on me, not anything other than how I feel or think about oranges. Therefore, it's a piece of subjective knowledge, not objective knowledge. Of course you know the same thing that I know, but the point is that it's dependent on me, that's why it's subjective. Objective knowledge or facts are independent of minds, i.e., we could all cease to exist and the Earth would still have one moon, but if we all ceased to exist all subjective truths would simply be non-existent.

On the other hand, it seems clear to me there is no true objectivity without omniscience. You can add to that the fact that neither exists. The idea that there is no objective reality is not an exotic one. I'm not the first one to think of it. It's been discussed here on the forum a number of times in the year I've been here. I remember discussing it on the old forum too. — T Clark

Why the quantifier true in front of objectivity? Something is either objective or it is not. Why do I need to postulate omniscience in order to say that it's objective that the Earth has one moon? I don't see the connection, nor the need for omniscience. Moreover, many things get discussed in these forums, but that doesn't mean that they have significance, or that they're true, or that the discussion is worthwhile.

Sure many people make the claim that there is no objective reality, but that belies what the words mean and how they're used.

Finally, this was started with the claim that the word objective is somehow synonymous with omniscience. You still have given no evidence that this is the case. The burden of proof is on you, because most people would say what I've said, viz., that they're two different words with different meanings. To be synonymous - you have to have different words with the same meanings, or nearly the same meanings.

Come on Clark, they're two different words with different meanings. I'm loathe to use the term "self-evident," but if there ever was a case that was self-evident, this is one.

Well, to put it another way, the definitions of most non-rigid designators (objective terms) are circular and depends on other words to determine their meaning. So, that can limit the scope of all things that are not ostensibly defined to be categorized into the subjective category, which I suppose many philosophers agree with. But, then if we assume the implications of the private language argument, then doesn't that mean that the feeling of 'pain' and with it the word used is not in some sense also objective? — Posty McPostface

I don't understand the point of bringing up circularity, as if it's a negative. We're not talking about arguments, which is the point of the fallacy of circularity. But maybe you're using circular in another way, I'm not sure.

Yes, the word pain does have an objectivity to it, as I said in the other thread. There is both the subjective experience of pain, but there is also the cries and moans of pain, which it the objective part. I'm not saying that there aren't difficult aspects to the objective/subjective discussion, but that's true of most subjects. If I look at you and you're moaning, it's objective for me that that's happening, but you're expressing a subjective feeling that can be seen by all. So in some cases there is both a subjective component and an objective component.

Which is to say that how other words are used in combination with the word of interest, contextually speaking. — Posty McPostface

To make my point further, if we create a simple language-game with only one word, say, "slab," and we use it to refer to one object, how is it dependent on other words? Sure we use words in conjunction with other words, but that doesn't mean that they get their meaning from those words. If I say, "Go get the chair!" - how is chair dependent, in terms of meaning, on go or get or the? It may be that to form a proper sentence, words are dependent on each other, but that's a far cry from saying words get their meaning from other words.

In the medical field there is a term of SOAP notes on a patient. That acronym delineates the difference between objective and subjective this way. S stands for subjective reporting: that which the patient themselves are reporting. O stands for Objective reporting: that which the Doctor observed of the patient while in their presence. A stands for Assessment: the Doctors diagnosis and P stands for Plan of Action: what treatment is prescribed, for what diagnosis and the anticipated result from the treatment plan. — ArguingWAristotleTiff

I think Tiff gave a good response. I'll add a bit more. As Tiff pointed out, if I give you a report of what happening internally, it's clearly subjective, i.e., it originates with the subject. If I give a piece of knowledge that is dependent on me, then it's also subjective. For example, it's true that I like orange juice, and someone can claim that they know that I like orange juice, but this kind of knowledge is dependent on the subject (me). Objective knowledge is not dependent of the how I feel or think, it's independent of how I feel or think. Thus, the fact that the Earth has one moon is an objective fact, i.e., it's not dependent on how anyone feels or thinks. Objective facts can exist apart from minds, subjective facts cannot. This is not that difficult to comprehend. I love the way people want to throw out words that they find difficult, or that they cannot fit into their world view.

The idea that objective is synonymous with omniscience is just silly.

Also, words don't get their meaning from other words, words primarily get their meaning from how they're used.

It's either private or it isn't, not both, and more importantly where do you draw the line? — Posty McPostface

No, that's not the case. The beetle-in-the-box is totally private, i.e., there is no way for us to know what is going on in any of the boxes. However, if I have a pain, there is not only the inner experience of my pain, but there is the outer demonstration of pain (moaning, crying, etc), which is why the word pain has meaning, and the word beetle does not. The word beetle is senseless in Wittgenstein's example, but pain is not.

Where do you draw the line? Well, if there is nothing that shows itself in terms of the inner thing, then one can't derive meaning. If we say we are thinking, then there are things that show themselves to demonstrate that we think. If someone says the Holy Spirit spoke to them, and there is no outward demonstration of that, then how does one know that it's the Holy Spirit? Just like how does one know it's a beetle, there is no way to know, no correct or incorrect use of the word, it's senseless.

That's the point, you can't refer to private content. It can't be talked about; but, somehow manifests in the way we talk to one another. — Posty McPostface

I didn't say it can't be talked about, some of it can be talked about. It's just that if we do talk about it, it can't be entirely private. For example, I can say that I'm in pain, that is private content, but when it comes to meaning, there must be something that shows itself. Thus to learn how to correctly use the word pain, we have to be able to use the word in the real world. So we observe people crying, moaning, screaming, etc, these are the outward signs of pain, at least generally. This is how we know if a child is using the word correctly. If there were no outward signs of pain, how would we know what we mean by pain? This directly corresponds with the beetle-in-the-box, there is no way for me to know what the word beetle is referring too, no outward thing for the word to latch onto, no way for us to know if you're using the word correctly or not.

Strange, this whole time I was under the impression that Wittgenstein was pointing towards the illogicality of there being a private language. To be honest, your claim can not be in any way or form be verified or falsified, which leads me to believe that it's redundant to talk about private content. — Posty McPostface

Yes, Wittgenstein does show that a private language is not coherent, at least that's seems to be the argument. So I agree with your first sentence, but I'm not sure what you mean by the last sentence. You seem to be suggesting that I'm either contradicting myself, or that my argument is self-sealing. My question is, what can't be verified or falsified? I'm not sure what you're referring too. The point about the beetle-in-the-box is to demonstrate that meaning isn't derived by pointing to something subjective, so your interpretation of what I'm saying doesn't seem to jive with what I'm saying.

For example, knowing is not some subjective experience, i.e., the meaning of "to know" is not something private. — Sam26

I'm not sure about that; but, there's nothing I can say about any alternative to that matter. — Posty McPostface

Sure there is plenty to be said about the the alternative, viz., that to say that one knows X, is more than just referring to some subjectivity of which I alone am privy. To know algebra, for example is more than just saying, "I know algebra." It needs to be demonstrated objectively that you know how to do the problems of algebra, which is why there are standards by which we measure your knowledge.

You may explain something clearly, and sometimes people still don't understand it. In fact, when they don't understand they often complain that it wasn't clear. What's clear isn't always clear.

So, from what I gather, you mean to say that I can have private content; but, speak about everything in a public manner. Was that what Wittgenstein meant to portray with the private language argument? — Posty McPostface

It's more than that, viz., I have private content, but meaning is not derived from my private content. It may be that private content allows for language, but meaning in a given language takes place in the open, not by referring to something private. For example, knowing is not some subjective experience, i.e., the meaning of "to know" is not something private. The problem in much of society today is that we give too much credence to private experiences, as though that's what's important, that's what's primary.