But causing it in the first place is fine? Why? And why is it fine sometimes and not fine in others? — khaled

That seems to be a weird question, honestly. I don't think you want to discuss individual scenarios and decide whether this or that is moral or immoral. But apart from that I can't think of a meaningful answer to your question other than "because my moral philosophy says some things are fine and others are not".

If causing suffering were somehow absolutely permitted, noone could function. We'd all have to lock ourselves into rooms for fear of stepping on someone's toes. Perhaps you mean some specific, qualified kind of suffering?

I don’t see this as very weird though. That we find different risks morally acceptable is normal. We make laws out of the ones we agree on. — khaled

I just think it's important to be aware that this is not a mathematical operation. There is no quantifiable amuont of risk that is automatically unacceptable.

Generally speaking though, if X * Y is greater than the suffering alleviated from the person committing the act then the act is wrong. We can debate how big X and Y are in each case, but more often than not it’s clear which is greater (X*Y or the suffering alleviated from the actor) — khaled

I don't think this works. Not least because I see no way to quantify suffering unless you have already decided - based on some other system - what importance to attach to different kinds of suffering. We don't consider heartbreak the same as we consider physical pain, and this isn't based on the actual consequences or the experienced severity of either kind of suffering.

This approach seems to elevate suffering to the ultimate moral arbiter - life is about inflicting as little suffering as possible while experiencing as little as possible yourself. I don't find that a very convincing view, because it makes one the slave of circumstances. Everything turns into an optimization problem, leaving no room for the self.

Exactly. And the reasons aren’t good enough for me. If you discard “the benefit of mankind” I don’t see how you can possibly argue that they are. — khaled

This seems slightly contradictory to me though. If you don't accept "mankind" in some form as having moral weight, why care at all about the suffering we cause for others, especially those that otherwise would not even exist?

Sure. I would say dependents are special. Because it is the job of the parent to make sure they suffer as little as possible, since they’re the ones the brought them here. And so they’re allowed to force them to do things for their benefit. — khaled

I don't really follow the logic here. Why would dependents have some special moral status where you are allowed to do thing to them in the interest of reducing overall suffering, but you cannot do the same thing for non-dependent people?

But what I was getting at was forcing people to do things that YOU like, without knowing whether or not they will. In the example I assume the person tied up is not your dependent and you do not know if they’ll like the game or not. Sure, they may end up enjoying it, but we don’t just take that risk with people who are not our dependents. Ever. And even with dependents we are very careful. — khaled

That's assuming a very specific motivation for having kids though, which strikes me as constructed. I am not saying having children for any arbitrary reason is fine. And as with all examples of this kind, it runs into the problem that it's not the parent taking away the choice to either experience something or not. The experience is necessary and unavoidable.

And you cannot argue in the case of having children that existing is good for the non-existent potential child (because they don’t exist!). So you are taking a gamble, like with the tying up example. Sure the game is pretty good and has few complaints, but is that a good enough reason to force people to play it? Not unless you want to bring in the survival of mankind as a good in itself I don’t think you can argue it is. — khaled

If you want to argue that creating people is "forcing" them to exist, you have to treat non-existant potential children as if they exist. This is a "have your cake and eat it" scenario.

And what would those be? The duties. — khaled

For example to provide your children with the emotional support they need to fully develop their own self, and to provide the necessary material support that your children will not be so preoccupied with survival that they cannot develop their own interests.

And I never get why people are always willing to claim that having children is wrong sometimes but never actually go into detail on when. It happens every time around here. — khaled

I kinda consider it a trap question. There is no way to answer it in a way that cannot be then criticised on the details, and that would lead to discussion of some specific scenario in place of the general question. It's also going to be impossible to give a list of scenarios that is in any way exhaustive, so I prefer to stick to general and vague principles when the discussion is about antinatalism as a general stance - i.e. having children is always bad, regardless of the circumstances.

The idea that "mankind" and other such concepts should be favored over a single human's actual concrete suffering. Things like "For the country" "For mankind", etc always rubbed me the wrong way. If you can't point me to a person getting harmed, then I couldn't care less about "the country being harmed" or "going against mankind's interests". — khaled

Yeah, that makes sense. I think I fall more on the community side of things myself. I think that explains some of the difference in outlook on an emotional level.

It does. I should go into more detail. The test is more like "Had X not been around would Y have still suffered and if not could X have predicted this?". If the answer is yes then it's not X's responsibility to help. If the answer is no-no then again, not X's responsibility. You have to judge people actions based on the info they had at the time. There are other rules but I don't want to overcomplicate things for now. — khaled

That works. I don't agree with making the core of your test a negative rule, but apart from that I don't have any fundamental disagreement.

Had the driver known that he was going to run over a kid by speeding out of town, then he is responsible. However, he did not know that. Furthermore, it is just as likely that that child would have ran behind the parked car 10 minutes later, meaning if the driver did NOT speed up out of town he would have ran him over.

In other words: At no point did the driver commit an act he could reasonably predict would harm someone, as speeding out of town and NOT speeding out of town have a basically equal chance of causing an accident as far as the driver can predict. — khaled

I think the "lesson" here is that we always accept certain risks when we act, and thus those general risks don't come with moral responsibility attached.

Using predictability seems problematic, because I don't see a clear way to draw the line between "reasonable" and "unreasonable" predictions. Freak accidents are predictable. That's why we can create thought experiments like this in the first place. It's not that the driver lacks the information to predict that the accident is possible. Rather, the risk is accepted as a necessary part of vehicular traffic. There is a normative element in what risks we think should be avoided.

And this means that a moral approach that focuses on avoiding the risk of harm must always deal with this normative element somehow. An argument that goes "behaviour X risks suffering of Y magnitude and should therefore be avoided" is incomplete.

Agreed. But from where comes the justification to create happiness at the risk of suffering for others? — khaled

Your moral philosophy will either consider it moral to have children or it won't. We can of course debate the merits of different moral philosophies, but this isn't a special case where we do things we never do otherwise. Lots of actions have a risk of suffering attached. What matters is how good your reasons are.

No matter how much I like a videogame for example, I can't go around taping people to chairs and forcing them to play it. And I definitely can't justify it by giving all these people a button they can press to instantly kill themselves then saying "I'm not even forcing them to do anything, if they don't like it they can just kill themselves. The pleasure and suffering are two sides of the same coin". I find it apphaling how often I hear that as a legitimate argument by otherwise rational people. Heck with life, you don't even get the "quit button" and have to make your own. — khaled

But we have things like mandatory school attendance, so forcing people to do something for their own benefit isn't exactly unheard of. One can debate under what circumstances, if any, this is ok, but it's not prima facie absurd.

You still haven't answered my question though. — khaled

I am not sure I can make a good moral argument on when it is wrong not to have children. My approach though would be to look at the duties the parents accept if they wish to have children and then see if the likely circumstances are conductive of those duties.

I don't know who parents think is responsible for suffering. — Andrew4Handel

Anyone who has a duty to alleviate that suffering.

Sure. I don't think so though. And I find that justification disgusting. — khaled

I think that disgust has a lot to do with the disagreement we have. Can you elaborate on what you find disgusting?

Not in total, sure. If a kid runs into a wall like an idiot despite their parents warning them that running around like that will hurt, that's partly on the kid. However I think that parents are partially responsible for all their child's suffering.

My "test" for responsibility is: "Had X not been around would Y have still suffered". If yes then it's not X's responsibility to help Y. However in the case of children (being Y) the answer is always no (X being the parent), for every instance of suffering. That I find problematic. — khaled

Your test also fails the car example though, doesn't it? Had the car not been around, there would not have been an accident.

You can argue that having children is different, that the dangers are more predictable, more imminent etc. I think ultimately we won't get past the different "risk assessments" for lack of a better word. You place a lot of emphasis on the suffering, and not a lot of emphasis on the value that human life has. I see it differently. I think it's mostly down to my perspective on suffering, which I consider simply the necessary flipside of happyness. One never exists without the other, and there is nothing inherently wrong with that.

Agreed. And we can get into the nitty gritty. But I doubt whatever configuration you choose will end up having the statement "You are responsible for your child's suffering and pleasure" be false. Or are you going to argue that parents are not responsible for their children? — khaled

I think the statement is clearly false. Parents are responsible for the upbringing of their children. Noone is responsible for someone else's suffering and pleasure in toto. Such a responsibility would have to come with absolute authority over the other person, which should never be the case.

If we can agree that they are, and we can also agree that there is a risk the child suffers disproportionately in their life despite the parent's best effort, what justifies that the parent taking the risk? We can agree that usually we would need some sort of justification when doing something that can risk harming others no? — khaled

Everything we do risks harming others. So there are plenty of justifications available. For example, one might argue providing the future with capable humans justified the associated risks.

See! This is where Kant is sneaky. I'm not an expert, but I bet if I say that duties arising through the Categorical Imperative are outside influences, we would find that Kant insists this is all a principle of our reasoning and so is an inner influence of some type and not impinging on our freedom. — Garth

Yeah, you may be onto something here. One of the common criticisms of Kant is that he dismisses emotions pretty much out of hand. It was just obvious to Kant that reasoning was a) sufficiently different from emotions to be it's own category and b) should trump pure emotion as a motivation.

On the other hand, it's pretty obvious that some internal motivations must be privileged over others. Otherwise, we'd come to the absurd conclusion that since every influence does at some point turn into an internal motivation, even outside force would be considered "free".

And if we're going to privilege some internal motivations over others, reasoning seems a good candidate to choose.

But actually maybe Kant's idea here is correct, or almost correct. Because I don't think any emotion can be understood without considering what consciousness thinks is good. In fact, our empathy for others doesn't depend very much on reading facial expressions but on predicting the motivations and intentions of others. Maybe if we don't do what is best we won't be free because we'll feel doubt, guilt, remorse, paranoia, etc. — Garth

I always found Kant's idea that freedom is doing what you think is right convincing. What higher expression of your self could there be?

Preventing suffering takes precedence over the creation of pleasure, especially when not creating 'good lives' does not harm the unborn — Inyenzi

Why though?

Antinatalists seek to prevent all human suffering — Inyenzi

This seems to be an absurd goal. What's the point of preventing suffering by preventing existence? Suffering isn't objective metaphysical evil.

But I'm sure we can agree there is a difference caused between the pain that you experience when you stub your toe and when I punch you in the face. The difference being that I am directly reponsible for one. The goal of antinatalism is to cause as little of the latter as possible while ensuring you yourself survive. With having kids you are responsible for every pain and pleasure they go through. Because none of it would have happened without you. And you didn't need it to survive. — khaled

Sure there is a difference. But there is also a difference between causing something in the sense of the sine-qua-non ("it wouldn't have happened without you") and responsibility. Causality is far, far wider than responsibility.

There is a common example to illustrate this taught in law school: A car drives by a school, within the speed limit, as a child runs into the street from behind a parked car. The car hits the child. Later investigation reveals that the driver could not have avoided the accident and did not make any mistakes in the situation. However, it is also revealed that just outside the town, the driver was speeding. Had the driver driven more slowly before, he would not have reached the site of the school at the critical moment and the accident would have been avoided.

The drivers behaviour (speeding outside of town) was clearly causal for the child's injuries. The child would not have been injured otherwise. At the same time, it seems obvious that speeding beforehand does not make the driver responsible for the accident.

I think it is that you guys think we consider "not having children" as a good act. It isn't. Having children is a bad act. That doesn't make the opposite good. The opposite (not having children) is not good or bad, because it doesn't harm or benefit anyone.

Put simply, the goal of antinatalism was never the elimination of pain, as that would require the existence of someone whose pain you're eliminating. The goal was not to cause pain. So the fact that the elimination of pain is not the same as absence of being is irrelevant. — khaled

The problem is I don't see how "do not cause pain" can possibly be a reasonable goal in isolation. In the abstract, pain is just a fact of the universe. It's a bit like making a rule not to strengthen magnetic fields.

The entire reason we care about pain is because we care about people. If your solution to pain is to prevent people from existing in the first place, you're totally missing the point.

The key point is that anti-natalism confuses elimination of pain with absence of being. — Joshs

This seems a very obvious point, but it's not one that the anti-natalists here accept, so there must be some fundamental disagreement about the basics of the argument involved. Unfortunately, I have been so far unable to figure out just how exactly this fundamental disagreement comes about.

I mean, intuitively, there are few things more oppressive for our emotions and our feeling of being free than having some duty imposed on us, especially a duty which we do not also desire to do. — Garth

But isn't it also intuitively true that freedom involves the freedom from outside influences? From hunger, outside pressure, social norms? And can we not then go further and conclude that freedom also implies absence of motivations like fear or anger or any equally influential emotions? From there, it's only a small hop over to desires.

Lock's version fo freedom - liberty, a much better term - is the capacity do act if one so wills, or to not act if one does not will. — Banno

But this definition of liberty seems fairly useless in practice, because everyone either has this capacity at all times - even at gunpoint - or they never have it. It's only real relevance would be to pathologic changes of the ability to form a will at all.

This leaves out all the practically important questions.

Because people didn't object to this man's rage and hatred in this particular instance. In fact, they offered him support. Yes, I admit that considering the counterfactual in which he wasn't then approached by the girl requires a bit of imagination, so it doesn't qualify as more than speculation. I don't claim to make an empirical claim since I'm not an empiricist nor a scientist. But I am fairly sure that if he had simply voiced complaints at a girl he likes sleeping around nobody would have said anything nice to him. — Garth

So, for one your last sentence is clearly an empirical claim. But apart from that, I don't see why we need to ignore the differences between the two situation. Complaining that a person you like doesn't return your affections is one thing. Complaining that it took someone a year to figure out they like you is another.

I don't think I agree with being angry in either case, but one is certainly much more relatable than the other.

The point of my essay is this: The substantive question about incels is what phenomena in our culture produces them. — Garth

Quite. It just seems to me that your approach is a very narrow and idiosyncratic one. You are apparently very concerned with the plight of young men and the damage caused by "liberal elites". I think your conclusion is meant to fit in your pre-existing worldview.

So I see no reason to even bother reading incel ideology. We should decide what the incel is. — Garth

There is a difference between not taking people at their word and not looking at what they actually believe. If we want to find out what causes fascism, we need to look at what self-described fascists actually believe. If we're only interested in why some people call others fascist, then of course the social significance of the appellation matters.

What you seem to be interested in is not what causes incels to arrive at their own views, but rather to criticize society at large, for which calling someone an "incel" is merely a convenient example.

So what is the use of 'freedom in it's first instance that you're trying to define by it's second use? — Isaac

You're right, this isn't very clearly written. I'd say there are at least three different definitions for freedom: the theoretical freedom of will, acting in accordance with the principles of freedom and freedom as a result of a certain social organisation.

The latter is the most difficult to pin down, I would roughly describe it as a society that enables it's members to self-actualise to the largest extent possible.

According to whom? You? I don't particularly care about your opinion. So I don't see why I should provide evidence for my claims to you. — Garth

Then what are you doing here? It's a forum. If you cannot deal with criticism, perhaps avoid inviting any.

If you can't identify any problems with my explanation other than calling it "questionable" — Garth

We might start with this paragraph:

But the problem with this narrative is that if she had not asked him out and if he was simply
sharing his rage and hatred for her at being rejected, there is no way he would garner the same
sympathy. He would be branded an incel -- that is to say an irrational hater of women. This
would suggest that the defining difference between a person expressing his pain at being hurt
by women and a person being an incel is the mere event of being unwanted by women.

For one, why would someone normally express "rage and hatred" for being rejected? That'd already be a sign of an unhealthy approach. For another, why would we then conclude the only possible reason people object to such an expression is because the person is "unwanted by women"?

What about all the other possible reasons? The unflattering portrayal of the behaviour of the woman in question? More general negative views on female promiscuity? The feeling of pity for a person that witnesses someone they love be with somebody else?

If one cannot, then he or she is to that extent not free. — tim wood

I am not sure Kant would say that there even are situations where you cannot do your duty. If you cannot do something, it cannot really be considered your duty. What makes your actions free is then choosing your duty.

But the purpose here is to draw attention to people who claim as a matter of right under freedom to do what they want; and to the harm they do, potentially to be sure, but too often as a matter of fact. — tim wood

This is a result of the negative conception of freedom as the freedom to be left alone which has come to dominate in Europe and the US. Here freedom is the freedom from all obligations and duties, mostly imagined as being imposed by the state or, more broadly, society.

I think it's important to consider how both conceptions came to be. Kant starts his from the bottom up. From the theoretical possibility of the freedom of will to it's practical application to the social conditions that create the "state of freedom".

Meanwhile, the "common sense" notion of freedom as freedom from interference is the result of social movements that were concerned with specific instances of interference and violence, from which they generalised.

As a result, the idea of personal freedom is mostly derived from legal concepts, such as the concept that all legal restriction require specific justification, which was then applied more generally to signify freedom.

I think a good way to start to point out why this is problematic is to start with situations that are commonly considered extremely unfree. Chattel slavery is an obvious one. At first glance, one might argue that chattel slavery represents the ultimate imposition of obligations and duties on the slave. But I think it's actually the opposite. Someone who is considered no different from a horse or cow cannot have duties or obligations. Their relationship to others, specifucally the "master", is purely one of naked ability - in this case ability to use force. I think this points towards the conclusion that freedom is not at all freedom from duty.

1. If I justify my view, I simply offer another set of premises which are equally unjustified. You may refer to Aristotle's Prior Analytics for a discussion of the possibilities involved. — Garth

You're making an empirical claim. About how people use a term, what they associate with it and what their motivations are.

2. If you ask me to justify a definition, what form would the argument take such that the definition itself is justified? — Garth

But it's not a definition. You're not saying "I define incel as a looser". You're describing how other people supposedly see the issue and what causes these views. Those are claims for which you can - and should - supply evidence.

Furthermore I wrote an entire essay on the subject, which you are ignoring the existence of — Garth

I have looked through your essay. It doesn't discuss the actual usage of the word beyond a single example. And even in that single example your explanation of what's going on is highly questionable.

It's really quite clear that your essay takes the worldview often expressed by incels as it's starting point, and really seems intended for their consumption.

You know, it's ironic you ask me for reasoning when you didn't bother to look at my essay. — Garth

You could point out to me where you justify your view. To me it seems like a naked claim, a premise that is taken as granted from the start.

How we describe the incel is one thing and how the incel describes himself is another thing. I don't think that my essay really requires me to address the details of the way incels describe themselves since it is really about how we describe incels. — Garth

How are you going to talk about incels, or talk about talking about incels, without first establishing who you consider an incel and why?

Are you talking about the people labeled "incel" by others? Then your essay seems to lack any actual examination of just who is called an incel. You pretty quickly claim that when we say "incel" we really mean "looser", but how do you arrive at that conclusion?

I've written an essay last year about whether we honestly judge others as incels or whether we actually apply a different set of criteria to them — Garth

You seem to be missing the fact that "incel" isn't predominantly a slur we use for others. People self-described as "incels" first. In a convoluted way, to the incels, being as they are is a badge of honor.

So the central premise of the essay seems misguided, and it's definition of what an "incel" is seems to bear little resemblance to how members of incel communities describe themselves and their views.

Can you explain to me the concept of strict proportionality? Does it mean that you cannot harm someone in self-defense more than he will likely harm you if you didn’t take the self-defense measure? — TheHedoMinimalist

It means the mode of defense must be appropriate to the threat, so you're not allowed to simply use the safest option for you, but have to consider less dangerous alternatives. The measures used will usually also have to be in the same ballpark as the threat, so no responding to theft with deadly force.

No, it's not. A person, male or female, who is not under the influence of debilitating substances, who is not physically forced or coerced, and is aware of the fact that sexual relations produces kids, is literally what defines a legal adult, de facto of course. — Outlander

Awareness isn't usually considered the same as intent though. So while pregnancy is an entirely predictable consequence of sex, it's not thereby an intentional one.

This doesn’t entail that everyone should always be responsible for killing someone while driving their car so why should someone always be held responsible for a pregnancy simply because they chose to have sex? — TheHedoMinimalist

Responsibility is kind of an odd concept to use here, I think, because responsibility is usually to someone. Responsibilities occur in relations, they define obligations and duties (or the lack thereof, as with the common use of "responsible adult") between people. But what would responsibility for pregnancy entail?

It'd be an interesting case of provoked defense, which itself is handled differently in different jurisdictions.

In the roman legal tradition, self-defense is usually a "strong" right, which is to say strict proportionality doesn't apply. You can defend yourself effectively, even if there were other, less damaging but more risky options. This is usually considered to be the result of self-defense being both protection of the self and protection of law, since the attacker is considered in breach of the law.

Obviously abortion is not also protecting the law, which is why it's usually not classed as self-defense. Being pregnant is not an attack by the fetus.

Defense against children, mentally ill or otherwise disabled persons can be classed under self-defense, but the rules that apply are usually different. Strict proportionality will apply, with perhaps duties to avoid conflict as far as possible. None of that seems to be of much help to shed light on the abortion discussion though.

I tend to class abortion as one of those kinds of personal decisions where one might be able to make a moral argument in a specific case, but there is very little point in trying to make exact legal rules, since those will very rarely be needed and if they are, they are unlikely to work exactly right.

Would a rule selected in accordance with arbitrary parameters from a set of predetermined rules be dependent upon those arbitrary parameters in its application after being selected? — ToothyMaw

That'd depend on your meta-rule which governs selecting the rule. If your meta-rule says to change rules according to circumstance, then the current rule depends on circumstance.

The rule chosen will always be based on the arbitrary parameters insofar as the parameter caused the rule to be selected.

Further: is the rule itself arbitrary after being selected? — ToothyMaw

The behaviour based on the rule would be arbitrary. The parameters don't technically change the rule (unless they're also a variable within the rule).

I'm inclined to think not since it was part of a set of predetermined rules. — ToothyMaw

I think this only seems plausible if you imagine having a small number of rules. But if you had 5.000 different rules, and selected one, it'd be hard to argue the result isn't arbitrary.

Or is it mind-independent and free of subjectivity because it has a purpose that appears to be mind-independent and free of subjectivity? — ToothyMaw

I am not sure how a rule could possibly mind-indendent. Rules are a mental phenomenon.

I don't see what is wrong with seeing things from their perspective. If they consider themselves as victims, then we should try to see whether it is true or not. — Wittgenstein

No doubt many of them are victims of some kind or another. The problem is that they've turned themselves into professional victims. Inceldom is all about victimhood. Which is why you'll find almost exclusively negative posts in any of their communities, reaffirming to each other how hopeless their lot is.

Perhaps one could properly call this mindset religious. The combination of victimhood, rejection of mainstream society, traditional notions of masculinity certainly seems reminiscent of religious movements, not least political Islam.

Maslow's hierarchy of needs would make it difficult for incels to reach selfhood after skipping the essential physiological needs and in general ,love/belonging needs at the lower order of pyramid. — Wittgenstein

Maslow's hierarchy of needs is not, however, the definitive theory of human psychology.

By the way, I think the most interesting topic with ties to philosophy and incels is probably how online dating, or perhaps more accurately dating between people who are always online, is changing the way relationships form, develop and end.

It's after all not impossible that dating is really changing in a way that makes it increasingly hard for a group of people - perhaps mostly men - to find something like romance.

While growing up, they were told about life getting better as you grow up or how consuming " this and this " will fill the hole in your heart, your craving for living a meaningful life. They think it's all a scam. — Wittgenstein

I am not sure about this connection. This message isn't new, and hypercapitalism has been around a while, and doesn't seem to have given rise to anything like "incel culture" until the first online generation. I think this particular movement has more to do with the internet as a "support group gone wrong" then with capitalism or any specific hedonistic philosophy.

I'd even argue that the Incel's view on life isn't actually as hedonistic as you make it sound. Because from talking to self-professed incels on the internet, I got the feeling that their problem was less that they craved something above all else. It was more that they had elevated their suffering to a defining element of their character, which then required them to find ever more reasons to suffer.

Here's what you do, you ask them this simple question: — BitconnectCarlos

You're not going to get to any entrenched incels with reason. They're not actually all that much interested in having love and sex anyways. What they're actually interested in is being part of a community, where being like they are is suddenly an asset - because the worse you have it, the higher your status.

The supposed arguments given for why this or that character trait makes it impossible to be "truely desired" is just so much window dressing. What it's actually about is the emotional need for belonging, which they fill by being part of a tight-knit and community. They're kinda like monks, angry frustrated teenage monks.

If they answer "yes" to the fate question you've got to wonder why fate has conspired to punish them in particular and what the story behind that is. — BitconnectCarlos

I think I actually know this story. Fate here is genetics, and genetics has randomly given them the "never get loved" ticket in the genetic lottery. There was nothing they could have done (isn't that nice?) and there is no way out.

That they are Intelligible and sufficiently representative of humanity; the axioms need to be coherent with respect to human nature for any reasoning done with them to produce behaviors rational for humans. — ToothyMaw

Ok, that seems like a good start.

I see no issue with what is sufficient for being human being arbitrary; human nature can still be objective. Furthermore, I think some aspects of human nature are observable. For instance: humans value the lives of loved ones over those of strangers much of the time. There are exceptions, but not many. It actually seems to me the nomological account is superior in this respect; evolutionary biology can provide some truths about what humans tend to be. Neuroscience too. — ToothyMaw

But one could then argue that other species save loved ones too, and indeed what is peculiar to human nature is that we also help strangers, and even when the help is not reciprocal.

The practical question here is what kind of argument might be used to convince others that your take on human nature is the "objective" one.

I'm saying that since the behaviors are reached via reasoning they are rational - if they are anchored to human nature. According to another metric they might not be rational. — ToothyMaw

That seems like a low bar to cross though. Humans can reason themselves into all kinds of things, including behaviours usually considered extremely immoral. In fact, it's kind of a feature of the most egregious human conduct that it's the product of reasoning of some kind. Purely emotional reactions can be very violent, but are also usually limited.

Can axioms that can be reasoned with be extracted from an evolutionary view of human nature? — ToothyMaw

What does "can be reasoned with" mean here? That they're intelligible, free of contradictions, or some other quality?

If humans are, for instance, compassionate towards those less fortunate than themselves in a way distinct from other animals, and sufficiently for being human, does that mean that this trait can be synthesized and used to develop behaviors for specific situations that are rational, with respect to human nature, for humanity? — ToothyMaw

Whether or not human compassion is "sufficiently distinct" to be a genuinely "human" trait seems to rest on a number of value judgements. We'd first need to show that these can be made in some non-arbitrary way.

Could these loose concepts be extracted and reasoned with to create rational behaviors, with respect to human nature, for specific situations for humanity? — ToothyMaw

How would you go from a behaviour to a rational behaviour? Where does rationality enter the picture?

The only objective with floating these kind of absurd ideas was to get Donald Trump's attention, — ssu

And possibly to get Trump's base acclimated to these kinds of ideas, so that the next time an election doesn't go the right way, they might just seem a bit more reasonable.

I conclude that nobody can see the world as it is. — Daemon

That's not the interesting question though. The interesting question is, if no-one can see it, is there a world as it is?

Well there is no alternative for us. We exist. However, as long as a capacity exists where someone in the future can be prevented from challenges, then it is incumbent not to start X[1,2,3] challenges for that person (that is to say all harms/challenges that come from existing in the first place, which is caused by procreation of that person). — schopenhauer1

Why though? I can see the argument being made for particular sets of challenges, but what right does the "future person" have to not have challenges "imposed" at all? What rule, based on what philosophy, would be broken?

I do think that antinatalism has implications for how to act as a community. If you want to discuss that, let me know. — schopenhauer1

What I'd be interested in is how you view the relationship between the individual and the community. Does the community only exist to facilitate the purposes of it's individuals or is community a more fundamental element of humanity?

Knowing this, I see it as paternalistic to think that another person should be born, because I deem life's negativity/challenges sufficient to bear the burden of. — schopenhauer1

Well, in a sense it is almost the definition of paternalism. Of course if you're a parent, you're going to be involved in paternalism, it's right there in the word. But of course parental guidance isn't usually seen as a negative, whereas paternalism usually is. Adults are supposed to make their own decisions.

But given the scenario we are dealing with, it's not obvious why paternalism should have a negative connotation. We can imagine a fantasy scenario where we time-travel to ask all out future children on their opinion about being born. But then the question is, what more right does any one version of me have to decide on all of my existence with all its consequences? Is some moment of me empowered to make the decision for all moments? And what about the consequences for everyone I have and will meet?

This sounds like a scenario where I'd welcome some paternalism.

Antintatlists will either take the metaphysical stance that it is a "good state of affairs" (a sort of absolute axiom) that all cases of harm were prevented in one inaction OR, simply that AT LEAST the bad situations of affairs of all/any harm befalling a future person was prevented. — schopenhauer1

But where do you even get the moral weight of harm from? That's a problem for all utilitarian ethics, but it's especially problematic here, because you square absence of harm with absence of existence. But aren't harm and it's absence judgements by existing minds? How then could there be an absence of harm without minds?

Similarly, antinatalists often view impositions on other people as wrong. Starting someone else's life by having them is seen as an imposition. This is where the facts on the ground are seen as different. Natalists don't see starting someone else's life as an imposition. They see individual instances of challenges to be the impositions. Antinatalists don't understand why these individual instances cannot be summed up as a general category of negativity/harm. Thus instead of 1, 2, 3 instances it is X[1,2,3] that is being prevented. — schopenhauer1

My view here is different insofar as I don't even see why impositions are strictly negative in the first place. I am aware the word has negative connotations, but are they warranted in this scenario?

So, if you have time to stop and contemplate, I am asking you to step into my fantasy of many members of the forum, sitting in a room together ? What difference would it make to the agenda and discussions emerging? Would there be many raised voices, with others silent, but listening?Would we come to a better understanding of philosophy, as being discussed on the many threads, which are perhaps like little safe, houses, distanced from the harsh realities of the three dimensional world? — Jack Cummins

I think the tone would certainly overall be more amicable. People tend to get angry much more when interacting with "dead" text, without gestures or facial expressions to establish rapport. In a big setting, we'd probably see relatively few people speaking a lot, and most people mostly listening. If you split up into smaller groups, that's probably less of an issue. That would of course open up the question of group dynamics. Would people split by political affiliations? Would the idealists and the materialists form their little corners?

In terms of content, it'd probably get better for some, but also probably worse for many. Those people with overlapping interests and comparable backgrounds might get into good conversations. But I suppose for a lot of people, the lack of time to compose answers would lead to there being less concete talk, and more general (and possibly more confusing) discussion. There are also probably a lot of people who'd be more likely to avoid to obvious disagreements in a social setting and settle for some middle ground (which would be good for some of the more acrimonious and less productive topics, but might be less interesting overall).

In the case of flat earth, that standard is common sense, trust in our sources, and trusting our eyes. No need to elevate our visual reports or the photos to the status of "undoubtalbe" see? For the purposes of any discussion ever we only deal with agreements. Big T doesn't enter the conversation, so I don't care if it exists or not. — khaled

Well, the question I am asking myself is whether you can have a relative standard that isn't grounded in some absolute. We could say "the earth is round" is relatively more true than "the earth is flat". In fact, saying this seems to make a lot of sense, because even "the earth is round" is obviously ommitting some information, while even "the earth is flat" yields correct enough predictions for a limited number of problems.

But does this notion of more or less true - in this case roughly equating to yielding more or less accurate predictions - work if we don't simultaneously have the idea of the Laplace demon? I.e. have the concept of perfect predictability, and from this we can graduate to imperfect predictabilities.

But then again perhaps this is nonsense, and really the concept of "perfect predictability" is an empty category created from experience of imperfect predictability. In any case, this might all seem outside of the bounds of your topic, since you have specified "practical value", which one might say doesn't include the mere presence of a concept of absolute truth.

No the challenges are a game.. I guess death is a way out of the game. I'm calling it that.. Call it challenges if you want. Discreet things to overcome over a lifetime of surviving, finding comfort, entertainment in a society being exposed/impinged along the way by contingent harms. Stop trying to find "gotchas" and engage and maybe this will go somewhere :roll:. — schopenhauer1

I am trying to engage in a new direction, but it's perhaps not clear that I do. I think there is an alternative perspective that you're not fully considering. That death isn't actually "a way out", but rather just another part of "the game". That there aren't ways out, and that the idea that there should be is really kind of absurd.

I think it's the same kind of problem that happens when people ask "what's the meaning of life?" The question contains a hidden assumption (that someone imbued life with meaning) that people who ask the question don't realize, and hence they don't realize that the question they're asking is nonsense. To ask for the meaning of life is to give someone else the authority to set that meaning.

The problem I see with your approach isn't the same one, but it's similar. You're trying to conceptualize life in a way that's not compatible with a secular, materialistic worldview. There is a hidden assumption here, something along the line that we're souls trapped in bodies that we could conceivably escape.

That's difficult on this forum for whatever reason though.. Mainly due to personalities perhaps. — schopenhauer1

Did you have better luck in other forums? Purely text-based conversation has the tendency to get aggressive, probably because it's much easier to be angry at a red bird than at someone actually in front of you.

No, see I never said that. You can certainly address other problems I just focus on this one. It is the originator of all the other problems, so is one place to start. For people already existing, yep there is a shit of challenges to get your hands dirty if you want. — schopenhauer1

But why is it "get your hands dirty if you want, but do not, under any circumstance, have children?

What does seem like moral superiority to me is chastising those who do not want others to live out the challenges but rather default assuming that the challenges are the be all and end all.. But that's just it.. Of course it is, because what else is there if we don't kill ourselves right away or die of starvation? Yep, of course we are going to buy into the challenges thing.. It's a must. Do or die.. I get it. — schopenhauer1

But, aren't the challenges the be all and end all? This kinda refers back to my remark about "the meaning of life". If there is no outside, metaphysical reason for any of this - and I assume you'd say there isn't - then why complain about the nature of life itself? There isn't any point of comparison, outside the utopias we can dream up. And dreaming them up of course requires that we exist first.

What do you think about the line of reasoning that life is the universe experiencing itself? Useless drivel or important insight?

I'm more interested in why someone would want (need?) A to be True in the first place. We can all agree that 2=2 and that this site is mostly in English, what further need is there for us to elevate these statements to "undoubtalbe" status? Is it for peace of mind? Is it a reflex to not have to deal with unreasonable people suggesting that 1=2? What is it? — khaled

While actually getting to the capital-T Truth is probably impossible for most cases, don't we need it as a concept so that we have an idea of what "false" is? If we want to say that the statement "the earth is flat" is false, we'd need to be able to point to some authority that determines falsehood. In practice, this authority will always be something temporal. A mental conviction that we're correct for a bunch of reasons. But it seems we need some absolute standard so that we can conclude that the (small t) true statement is at least closer to it as the false one.

Yes, die slowly (by playing the game in various ways.. some leading to faster death than others) or kill yourself. Kind of strengthens the argument actually. — schopenhauer1

Still wrong though. There is no "or" here.

Sounds like a game.. challenges to overcome.. figuring out the key to overcoming the challenges. That's what I mean by you reiterating the game analogy. — schopenhauer1

So challenges are a game, and death is a game, and I suppose making an argument is also a game, since it's also challenging. Everything is games!

What I wanted to point out that for someone who can't abide smugness, your own position sure is awfully convenient. You get to feel morally superior to everyone else without actually having to address a single real problem. Because you're doing the much more important work of fighting the devil himself

Why do people have to be put in a circumstance where they have to figure out a solution for anything in particular? — schopenhauer1

If you believed in God, I'd say ask them. In the absence of that, not sure why you're asking.

For someone who poo poos my analogy about a game, you are sure reiterating it. — schopenhauer1

Uh, I am?

You can reinforce it with more smug responses and I'll entertain it. Keep your greatest hits coming. — schopenhauer1

You sound a bit like a teenager, complaining that they have to prepare the dinner before eating it. So smug to point out facts!

But, someone is being started in life.. and the analogy is that the "game" is one of life or death. You either live the structural and contingent conditions or you die. — schopenhauer1

But that's wrong. Because it assumes that when you start the game, you already have something to loose. Hence the "or die" part has significance. This isn't the case though. The supposed "game" is literally all there is. It isn't a game where you either play or die. It's a game where you play, dying is part of playing.

It's smug to assume people should play the game.. that is to say start the game for other people to play. — schopenhauer1

What's smug about that?

Irritatingly pleased with oneself, offensively self-complacent, self-satisfied.

?

I have compared this to a Stockholm syndrome scenario. The child becomes grateful to the parent without realising the nature of the relationship and the imposition. — Andrew4Handel

What you seem to be saying here that the parent-child relationship is somehow bad. That it should not be so. But what's the basis for that?

Those are the de facto conditions. That is the game. I don't like to start games for other people. — schopenhauer1

The whole game thing is an analogy though. Life isn't a game, because games are a part of life. Life just is, no-one decided that this is how human life feels to us.

Smug assumptions and conclusions to do on behalf of other people if you ask me. — schopenhauer1

I don't know what's smug about it. No-one here is claiming that everyone should be happy about their particular lot. But perhaps it seems smug because it throws a wrench into the fantasy of the "perfect" life.

IT doesn't matter if the world that is better doesn't actually exist, it's just not this world. — schopenhauer1

I just have this theory that anti-natalism is a secularised version of heaven. You see all the pain and suffering in the world and look for a metaphysical way out. Some way to fight all the evils at once, without actually having to figure out a solution for anything in particular.

And if yes, is there any other way of saying this, other than "I have to trust past experience because past experience tells me that"? — znajd

You can also logically arrive at the conclusion that trusting past experience is reasonable. Since all information about the objective world is given either a priori, or a posteriori through the senses, the senses are your only source of new information. Since you only have access to experiences you made in the past, this makes them your only source of information which you might need to integrate. No other information can be gained. And since judgements made with little information are still better than judgements made with no information, it makes sense to use the information you have to make your judgements, which means using past experience.

But I don't necessarily have to subscribe to that kind of metaphysics to get the point. Being alive entails essentially being de facto forced into deprivations of the survival, comfort, entertainment varieties. — schopenhauer1

You do have to subscribe to ascribe to a particular metaphysics to arrive at the conclusion that there is someone to blame for this in it's entirety. The alternative view is that rather than having one big dragon to fight, we instead all have to make the right decisions everyday, with everything.

I just don't get the idea that we want to make other people deal with any kind of thing. The natalists response is to, again, "deal with it" or "go kill yourself". I just don't find that acceptable. — schopenhauer1

Because you want an option where you exist, but don't have to deal with it? Isn't that what heaven is?