But Dennett shows no sign of backing down. So, how would you argue with him? — Wayfarer

I wouldn't even consider Dennett a third tier philosopher. He is more of a theorist. And from a philosophical perspective, all you have to do is sit back quietly and watch his theories eat themselves.

[...] bats, birds and humans are subjects of experience ought to be non-controversial.

Whereas, I would argue that no device, no matter how complex or advanced, is a subject of experience, because it doesn't possess any of the attributes of subject-hood. A device can emulate or simulate the activities of living beings, but it's not actually 'a being'; it's a device, or a mass of networked devices. — Wayfarer

I agree. Yet, I anticipate strong objections from the knowing ones.

What would you say subject-hood entails, and what is it dependent on?

Perhaps we should. The tree is a marker, a shade, a topic of conversation, a good example of what it is to be useless.

Say that it is useless, and by that very fact it has a use. — Banno

I think this is the gyst of what he meant.

Perhaps much the same goes for your comments on the subjective. — Banno

I'm pretty sure you mean this as an insult, but I take It as a compliment. So thank you. :victory:

I would say the neurological structures of a bat are immeasurably more complex than any computer's program, and are probably not all that much less complex than the human. — Janus

One of the problems with comparing humans and computers, is that computers don't actually have a neurological structure, that is, if what we are referring to by "neurological" is a product of evolutionary biology.

I don't guano about that! — Janus

:lol:

Guano is a delicacy in certain cultures. :yum:

As I said in the answer above; it seems we have al least some motivation to ask the question of bats, since there is every indication that they are percipient beings, as we find ourselves to be. There is little motivation to ask the question of toasters since we have zero reason to believe they are percipient. Same goes for computers. — Janus

I agree that there is reasonable ground to consider the similarities between the cognition of bat and human. However, when we enter the realm of unfettered speculation, why should we not go further. For example, it could be argued that it is just as reasonable to compare the similarities between human rationality and the logic of computers (as predicate calculus attempts).

My problem is that the human being is impossibly complex, and there is much more happening in being human than in being a bat or computer. Of course this is more speculation.

Probably because we know that bats have brains and central nervous systems which are not too dissimilar to our own; whereas computers have nothing analogous. — Janus

One thing I know for sure, is that bats produce an immense amount of shit, so we should keep that in mind when attempting to enter the mind of the bat. :grin:

Of course the answer is that we don't and cannot know; we can only guess. — Janus

It's the same as asking what it's like to be a toaster.

Quoting unrelated fiction...that's what Banno does when he can't keep up and has nothing relevant to add, which is more often than not.

Talking stick. :blush:

Really? That's all you can come up with? What a plop.

Pretty much the theory critiqued in the first few pages of the Philosophical Investigations. — Banno

I'm still waiting for Banno to tell me which passages he is referring me to in 'Philosophical Investigations'.
— Merkwurdichliebe

All of them. — Banno

Garbage.

@Janus Let him speak for himself. That is what he said — Banno

I'm sorry, did I miss something?

I'm still waiting for Banno to tell me which passages he is referring me to in 'Philosophical Investigations'. Its really a simple request. I don't know why he's having such a hard time with it. I'm beginning to think he has no idea what he is talking about. Or maybe its just a reflection of his hollowness as a philosopher. :grin:

Merkwurdichliebe It needs and deserves more than a quick read.


https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/4520/philosophical-investigations-reading-it-together — Banno

Thanks for the link. But I have the book. Can you tell me which §'s you were referring to?

One simple example I gave earlier was a visual artist thinking in terms of shapes, relationships of shapes, etc. — Terrapin Station

That's a good point. A musician too, thinking in terms of sounds and rhythms.

It needs and deserves more than a quick read. — Banno

I promise to read it closely and carefully, and then reread it even more closely and carefully.

Pretty much the theory critiqued in the first few pages of the Philosophical Investigations.

So, Merk, have you a reply to Wittgenstein's critique? — Banno

Cool. Do you know the specific pages? I want to check it out. Then I will do my best to reply.

Settle it for me.

Thought, speech, and statements...

What counts as each? — creativesoul

I don't intend to settle anything. Rather, allow me to stir things up with some opinions...

Thought is the product of thinking. Thinking can produce either linguistic or nonlinguistic thoughts ( distinctions/correlations).

Speech is the product of speaking or making audible words with one's mouth. It is an audible mode of language that depends on linguistic thought. But it does not directly reflect linguistic thought, rather it mediates it beyond thinking, and into something perceptible that is meant to communicate thought.

Statements are the product of language, or rather, grammar. Anywhere language exists, statements are possible...they can be linguistically thought, spoken, or written.

I'm sure these statements are inadequate, but I wrote them anyway.

It was spot on though, given the context. — creativesoul

I don't know what you were reading, it was a bunch of irrelevant nonsense.

All manner of imagery; that which is to be regarded as pictorial in form, can subsist in thought, in spite of the absence of certain aspects thereof which insofar as each be present, serve to facilitate linguistic expression. — Vessuvius

Thus, we have made discernment whereof imagery, inasmuch as it pertain solely to a particular sight, is an instance of non-linguistic expression, and by virtue of that, the same sentiment holds true as a matter of thought. — Vessuvius

Thanks. That makes sense.

Speech is not thought, it is a medium through which thought can be communicated/expressed.
— Merkwurdichliebe

That's pretty much where you go astray. — Banno

Why, is speech blue and not red? Or, is it that "medium through" does not include "medium". What nonsense criticism are you trying to get away with this time?

I see nothing philosophically interesting there to talk about. Looks like an exercise in arguing semantics. — creativesoul

I don't see much of an argument here. Speech and statements are distinct, just as thought and speech is distinct. So what's the problem?

Statements are statements of thought/belief. — creativesoul

Statements are statements of thought/belief — creativesoul

I said speech is not identical to thought.

Statements are something else. Not all statements are posited in the form of speech, and not all speech counts as a statement. Statements can also be thought or written.

So, it would be more correct to say: statements about thought/belief are statements, regardless if they occur in thought, speech or writing.

So, what counts as not involving language? — creativesoul

Definitely not speech or writing. Hmmmm...I just can't seem to find a good example that illustrates thought that doesn't involve language.

All unspoken ones then? — creativesoul

No. All thoughts are unspoken. Speech is not thought, it is a medium through which thought can be communicated/expressed.

What exactly are you calling "nonlinguistic thought"? — creativesoul

Any thought that doesn't involve language.

Has one clear example of nonlinguistic thought even been posited?

Is it a cowardly retreat to recognize the futility of certain approaches? — g0d

It is a glorious victory to recognize the futility of all approaches, but discuss them nevertheless.
:cheer:

I cannot argue for its non linguistic viability. — fresco

I'm completely ok with dismissing the notion of nonlinguistic thought. The more I consider it, the more it becomes apparent that it is quite redundant and that it unnecessarily complicates matters.

@fresco is correct. As far as it concerns us existence is relative.

Not interested. Are there any other frameworks you'd like to compare/contrast? — creativesoul

Any and all. I'm a philosopher. I have nothing to prove, and nothing else to offer but speaking all my opinions clearly and directly.

If you cannot tell the difference between existence and an existent, then there's not much I can do here. — creativesoul

Just tell us. Not everyone is as clever enough to distinguish them as you.

That, I think, can be maintained by careful ad hoc. — creativesoul

Anything reasonable can be maintained by careful ad Hoc. That is why all knowledge is relative.

Gratuitous assertions are inadequate on my view. — creativesoul

Like:

The existent is not existence. — creativesoul

I agree.

Thinking that something is directly perceptible requires thinking in those terms. Those terms require already having picked something out to think about in terms of whether or not it is directly perceptible. — creativesoul

Not when making nonlinguistic correlations.

predication — creativesoul

Does correlation require predication?

Only directly perceptible things can be the content of non linguistic thought/belief. — creativesoul

And what happens when something that is thought to be directly perceptible is not perceived? Then there is the thought that it does not exist (perceptually). It is easy to see how existence factors into nonlinguistic thought...As I said:

One without language can have existence in mind in any number of ways without ever having used the term "existence" simply by drawing a correlation between the existent and other things that may or may not exist. — Merkwurdichliebe

Wrong question. It's not a matter of why. — creativesoul

Don't make it an ethical contest. :grin:

Existence is attributed to things already named. First and foremost. Existence is thought about by virtue of using descriptive practices. — creativesoul

Existence is attributed to things merely experienced. Making any distinction/correlation , linguistic or nonlinguistic, is predicated on the pressupossition of existence. So it it rather illogical to say that existence does not factor into thought prior to language acquisition.

I hope you can convince me otherwise.

In non philosophical situations, 'existence' is never attributed except in disputes about the utility of a concept which the word 'existence' is invoked instead of 'utility' in order to suggest the authority of 'an absolute'. That is the whole crux of my thesis.. — fresco

Then maybe you can help me to get my point across. Existence is present at all levels of thought, linguistic or nonlinguistic.

The existent is not existence. — creativesoul

Okay Terrapin Station. :cool:

You cannot show me that. Existence is attributed to things already named. First and foremost. Existence is thought about by virtue of using descriptive practices. — creativesoul

Why? Because all thought pressuposes the existence of it's own content regardless of further qualification?

But thought is not existence, and that is why a correlation can be wrong, and that brings up the question of how "thought pressuposes the existence of it's own content regardless of further qualification, yet which some/all of the presupposed content does not correspond to anything concrete or actual?

I think this is a reasonable question.