How does a neural net function? Should it be modeled as a computational system, a distributed parallel, dynamic, a connectionist architecture, or via a non-representational enactivist description? The differences in these approaches are key to assumptions concerning what consciousness might be. — Joshs
These questions are not relevant to the NEC theory. That is, it does not matter how the neural net functions to form the final conscious moment, how this network should be modeled, or what consciousness as represented by this moment might be.
I've read Robert Lanza's books on Biocentrism and my thinking much aligns with his on the critical role of consciousness in understanding the nature of our universe, but I thought his discussions of death in these books were ambiguous and inadequate and wrote him concerning this. He asks the question "But does this energy transcend from one world to the other?," but he never answers it or explains the how. Perhaps when oxygen and nutrition are no longer consumed and blood flow ceases to supply energy to the brain, the "‘Who am I?’ ... 20-watt fountain of energy operating in the brain" may just dissipate as leftover heat into the environment as the body turns cold. So is there really any energy left? I believe the NEC theory is more explainable than is his and actually more consistent with Biocentrism with its emphasis on perception, i.e., that our universe is that which we perceive. Besides, the NEC requires no energy at death or beyond for sustainability!
Also, unlike the theories of Hameroff and Roger Penrose, the NEC theory is compatible with "the current models in physics." It requires no "new physics." Moreover, while I draw upon modeling techniques used in computer science to model states of mind, events, and moments in order to explain the theory, I do not believe I assume "older information processing models of consciousness" or use "the computer as a metaphor for how thought functions." The theory's basis is the concept of discrete conscious moments, one present moment at a time. The underlying type of processing required to produce these moments is not material to the theory.
I reference works of Bruce Greyson, Emily Williams Kelly, and Edward F. Kelly to support some of my characterizations of NDEs..
Just because one references another article to support a statement does not mean they subscribe to all of the claims or positions taken by that article or those of its authors.
You are right in that my theory is novel. Indeed, it does not conform to the positions of Hameroff, Penrose, Lanza, and I imagine most philosophers. Nor need it conform. In terms of subjectivity, a final conscious moment, and so an NEC, can range from dull to extremely intense and from an all encompassing thought of dying at any moment to a sensually gratifying and pleasurable "awareness" of spending an eternity in heaven. The precise "nature of subjective experience" is not specified by the theory and thus need not be determined via any empirical testing designed to test the theory. The "idea of a subjective state as potentially freezable, out of time and absent of material conditions" is not so radical. It simply boils down to never being aware that your final conscious moment was indeed final. I'm very tempted here to state "Duh!"
:-)
You state "But I would be willing to lay down big money that if you submitted your article to Hameroff, Penrose or Lanza, they would likely make the same argument as I would." First, what is your specific argument when stripped of much that I've pointed out is irrelevant to the NEC theory? Second, so what? The three you mentioned have their own theories about an afterlife that I too could argue against. And besides, unlike theirs, my theory makes no claims about anything materially surviving after death, i.e., energy, and thus is compatible with current models of physics.
Finally, I believe my article has already "fleshed out the philosophical presuppositions grounding it." The following presuppositions are much discussed.
- the perception of time as relative to an ordered sequence of events
- a consciousness that occurs only in discrete conscious moments, one present moment at a time
- the inability to perceive the transition from a time-perceiving state into a timeless state.