That's not how I interpret it. "Kant draws a line in the sand and tells us it's impossible to cross because" it's impossible in principle to see the other side. — Janus

Again, I see this differently. Of course the distinction between phenomenon and noumenon is "inside the box"; along with everything else that is thinkable, and that is Kant's very point. The only difference with Hegel is that he doesn't want anything to be outside the box ( "The Rational is the Real"), and that is why he is referred to as an "Absolute Idealist". — Janus

The human mind in all cultures has grappled with the question of what the ultimate or absolute nature of things is. — Janus

In the East it had been long acknowledged that the absolute cannot be known by means of rational thought. — Janus

OK, but doesn't the same as what you say here apply to speaking of 'things in themselves'? — Janus

the difference between the in-itself and the for-itself is already present in the very fact that consciousness knows an object at all. Something is to it the in-itself, but the knowledge or the being of the object for consciousness is to it still another moment. — Hegel PoS

I can excuse Kant for this because it seems natural to think that anything that appears to us must also exist "in itself" in some unknowable way. — Janus

The understanding accordingly bounds sensibility without thereby expanding its own field, and in warning sensibility not to presume to reach for things in themselves but solely for appearances it thinks of an object in itself, but only as a transcendental object, which is the cause of appearance (thus not itself appearance), and that cannot be thought of either as magnitude or as reality or as substance, etc. (since these concepts always require sensible forms in which they determine an object); it therefore remains completely unknown whether such an object is to be encountered within or without us, whether it would be canceled out along with sensibility or whether it would remain even if we took sensibility away. If we want to call this object a noumenon because the representation of it is nothing sensible, we are free to do so. (A288) — Kant CPR

The non-sensible cause of these representations is entirely unknown to us, and therefore we cannot intuit it as an object; for such an object would have to be represented neither in space nor in time (as mere conditions of our sensible representation), without which conditions we cannot think any intuition.(A494) — Kant CPR

You've glowingly approved theorem's caricature of idealists as self-important, while saying things like 'It's time for a new breed of philosophers to throw off the chains, escape the scourge' etc. — csalisbury

My understanding is that Hegel rejected the ding an sich as an 'mind-independent thing', because he saw it as another idea within consciousness, and nothing beyond that. I am not sure if you mean to claim that Hegel also rejected it on account of an alleged misapplication of the concept of causality. I would need to see textual evidence of that. — Janus

They either have to implausibly deny that they exist, or twist the meaning of what's being said beyond good sense. — S

it also follows naturally from the concept of an appearance in general that something must correspond to it which is not in itself appearance, for appearance can be nothing for itself and outside of our kind of representation; thus, if there is not to be a constant circle, the word "appearance" must already indicate a relation to something the immediate representation of which is, to be sure, sensible, but which in itself, without this constitution of our sensibility (on which the form of our intuition is grounded), must be something, i.e., an object independent of sensibility. Now from this arises the concept of a noumenon, which, however, is not at all positive and does not signify a determinate cognition of something in general, in which I abstract from all form of sensible intuition. (A251–2) — Kant CPR

But the proper use of the gem, imo, is to show us that whatever there is, beyond our thought and experience, it is confused to think of it as something that's basically like how we experience the apple, only unexperienced — csalisbury

Yeah, they are. What they have in common with brain states is that they're identical to them. That seems painfully obvious to me. — Terrapin Station

So just in case someone argues that x is not real, then x needs to be explained? — Terrapin Station

Those are brain states. Brain states are measurable. — Terrapin Station

Why would you think you need to explain change, anyway, by the way? — Terrapin Station

If there were a lack of change, would that need to be explained? — Terrapin Station

How would there be a property that's not empirically measurable (whether it's been measured yet or not)? — Terrapin Station

Theyd have properties, right? — Terrapin Station

What is it with there being so many Aristotelians on this board? Both "prime matter" and "substantial form" are nonsense, as is most Aristotle. — Terrapin Station

If they exist, then empirical evidence would be available for them--even if we haven't discovered it yet. — Terrapin Station

At any rate, what would you take to be an example of this? — Terrapin Station

It's a mistake to expect empirical evidence of existents? — Terrapin Station

I don't think it needs to be explained. — Terrapin Station

At any rate, there's no way I'd get into a "Does this work/count as an explanation" discussion without you first giving your general criteria for explanations. — Terrapin Station

You'd have to make most of those terms not just gobbledygook first. — Terrapin Station

The only reason we need is that there's zero evidence of extramental principles, or extramental abstracts period. That's not a category mistake. If something exists, there's evidence available of it. — Terrapin Station

Things like "principles of pure potentiality" don't exist outside of our thought. — Terrapin Station

Change obtains because things are in motion. — Terrapin Station

Things like "principles of pure potentiality" don't exist outside of our thought. — Terrapin Station

As stated already, what one might think of as the properties of a thing are aspects of the form of the thing. This really should show you that there is no way to ever tell when matter is present and when matter is not present- it just has to be asserted as the case. In truth, it appears that its forms all the way down to the most basic substances that make up reality. — Walter Pound

Aristotle's metaphysics is no help in avoiding absurdity. — Walter Pound

This is a nice sounding story. — Walter Pound

Not controversial? I am willing to bet that the majority of philosophers reject Aristotle's metaphysics and they clearly know that metaphysics can do well if it is empirically informed with science. — Walter Pound

That does not follow at all; please google nominalism if you are confused about other possibilities. — Walter Pound

Modern physics goes on fine without dubious metaphysics. — Walter Pound

Your arguments fail since you conflate the is of identity with the is of prediction. — Walter Pound

Question begging. — Walter Pound

For Aristotle, hydrogen and oxygen are NOT "concrete, material particulars with their own causal powers." — Walter Pound

Aristotle believed that the essence of a thing was its substance and necessarily composed of matter and form; therefore, Aristotle would describe an atom, such as hydrogen and oxygen, as a hylomorphic compound of matter and form. — "Walter

Aristotle famously contends that every physical object is a compound of matter and form. — Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

You want to identify the MATERIAL cause of the water molecule as hydrogen and oxygen atoms, but it is a FORM that makes something hydrogen and oxygen; indeed, it seems that all of what one would ordinarily consider as the properties of things are aspects of the form of the thing. Given this fact, what makes the cause "material?" Furthermore, you mention that atoms are potentially molecules, but surely what a thing is "potentially" depends on what it is ACTUALITY like and depends on the properties (or the aspects of the FORM) of the thing- again, I don't see what role matter plays here... — Walter Pound

Again, you just repeat yourself and you confuse the Aristotlean understanding of matter with a physicalist understanding of matter. No physicalist will agree with you that hydrogen and oxygen are just a piece of something like prime matter; that wouldn't make any sense... — Walter Pound

but what physical reality does is not what physical reality is. — Walter Pound

The debate isn't whether Aristotle's metaphysical framework can be made compatible with modern physics, but whether we have a good reason to even accept it when there are more parsimonious alternatives available. — Walter Pound

Whatever is in actuality has causal power over whatever is in potentiality. Substances that are composed of matter and form have causal power over potentialities. This is not at all like stating that physical reality has causal power since physicalism does not entail hypomorphic composites. — Walter Pound

If you assume that H2O is a hylomorphic compound or that protons and Carbon atoms are hylomorphic compounds, then you would be correct to say that modern physics does not contradict Aristotle; however, this would be begging the question. What reason is there to suppose that a proton is a composite of form and "matter?" — Walter Pound

Assuming that Aristotle is correct, then whatever one imagines matter to be, it cannot be protons, or quarks or electrons or any fundamental particle or fundamental force, since those things are all composites of form and some nebulous thing called "matter." What informatively can be said of Aristotle's matter is that it is a "thing" that is impotent and exists as a potential for which forms actualize and exists in an asymmetric relationship with forms since matter does not act on forms, but forms do act on matter. — Walter Pound

You want to suggest that "arrangement," "regularity" and "structure" are not exhausted by matter and that these things must be evidence for something beyond matter and there is no reason for that conclusion. — Walter Pound

A carbon atom has in itself the kind of charge that attracts the charges of four hydrogen atoms and an oxygen atom has in itself the kind of charge that attracts two hydrogen atoms; however, a Helium atom has no such charge that could attract hydrogen atoms and all this is inherent to matter and no "forms" are necessary to explain the behavioral differences between carbon atoms and oxygen atoms. — Walter Pound

Aristotle describes matter as only possessing potential and it is the forms that actualize those potentials, but modern physics demonstrates that matter is not a hapless impotent part of reality, but an active participant in why matter behaves as it does; matter has causal powers that determines how matter behaves. — Walter Pound

Suppose that you have a scientist insert 4 protons into a carbon atom, the behavior of the new atom (Ne atom) is unreactive and will not form bonds that carbon atoms would have; this new behavior is determined by other parts of matter and not by forms. — Walter Pound

I liken this to "no harm, no foul" reasoning. If no one was ACTUALLY born, no ACTUAL person was deprived of the "goods" of life. — schopenhauer1

It seems to me that death eradicates point and meaning because only the living can have desires. — Andrew4Handel

What justification do you have to claim that the DNA encoding does not refer to anything? — tom