We are only familiar with [...] — Devans99

Instead of such creative special pleading, shouldn't you try something a bit more defensible?

You can't have something timeless going about doing stuff. It's nonsense. Start over.

Isn't this more or less a repeat of earlier posts of yours, ? :)

There's no logical or conceptual problem with infinite sets, like, say, $\mathbb{N}_+ = \{1, 2, 3, \ldots\}$.
Would be kind of tedious for physicists and cosmologists to have to check whether their results had exceeded "the largest number". :D
Just have to remember that ∞ isn't a real number, can't be shuffled into arithmetic calculations (+-×/) just like that.

And there are any number of ways to write 1.
0.5 + 0.5 = 2 - 1 = 1 × 1 × 1 = $\frac{\sqrt{2}}{\sqrt{2}}$ = $1^5$ = $1 + \sum_{n \in \mathbb{N}_+} (1 - 1)^n$ = ...
No numerical difference.

And we can reason about $\sum_{n \in \mathbb{N}_+} 9(\frac{1}{10})^n$ and such if we're careful. (y)

Why would any of this be a problem anyways...?
(I didn't see the formalities implying a contradiction here in the thread.)

, indeed, calling infinitesimals

Ghosts of departed Quantities — Berkeley

goes along with (contemporary) calculus. They do occasionally come up as matters of convenience or tradition (e.g. in notation), but not of necessity.

Another possible source of confusion could be the Archimedean properties^[23][24][25]: neither ∞ nor infinitesimals^[26] are real numbers^[27][28].

Ghosts couldn't comprise a "boundary" between 0.999... and 1.


_{23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28}

But you can't have 'an infinity of' 9s because infinity is not a number. So no, .999... is not 1. It only converges to 1. — EnPassant

Looks like the confuzzlement mentioned earlier.
There are infinitudes of numbers. Therefore there aren't numbers? Hmm...

Census doesn't have much to do with it, .

A NASA engineer may invoke a handful of mathematical theorems and formulae out of physics, involving π, differentiation and integration (which are calculus related to limits), only to find that x + 7m was what they were looking for. For example, there are all kinds of rules of differentiation, many of which are, or can be, proven by limits. Also, no manner of discussion and voting can somehow make √2 mysteriously become 1.414.

Years ago I vaguely recall having done error analysis in physics experiments. Tedious. Maybe that's more along the lines of what you're thinking of?

What's this ancient (science/mathematics) book you're referring to anyways?

for some systems 0.111 would be close enough and for NASA (they have less room for error), 0.1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111 might be required — christian2017

A sensible person would just use 1/9. Loss-less. Unless or until they needed to write it out differently anyway.

, I'd say the best way to improve via critique is by already knowing what we criticize.
Common educational systems can be improved for sure, but we have to know them to launch critique.
Like, uhm, say, Einstein had intimate knowledge of Newtonian mechanics/gravitation before improving upon it with relativity.
Anyway, just my two ¢s on this fine day. Carry on.

since there is no natural number between 9 and 10 to be found, that means that 9=10 — Tomseltje

The naturals aren't densely ordered like the rationals and the reals. ;)

, yeah, reading through the note takes familiarity with the mathematics and notation.
And it's a fairly large area; might scare some away.

the very last number before 1 — Pfhorrest

Both the rationals and the reals are densely ordered.
For any two different numbers, there's a third between them.

I suppose they might say that 0.999... isn't a number.

, typically when "0.999... = 1" is brought up, you'll find a flurry of objections, you just watch. :)

Either way, I think the attached proof is valid, but others are invited to point out errors.

Another argument, more or less following similar thinking, is whether a number could be found between 0.999... and 1.000... (like the mean).
If no such number can be found, then we might reasonably say they're one and the same.

Still doesn't address the comments, . :confused:

Your definition is what sets out whether calculation-verification-falsification can be done from they get-go.

agency [...] that existed BEFORE this thing we humans call the universe — Frank Apisa

If "the universe" includes time, then "agency" isn't a mind.

On the other hand, atemporal mind ("outside it all") is incoherent nonsense, so that's one out anyway. — jorndoe

Besides, "before time" is incoherent.

Okay — Frank Apisa

You didn't really address anything (just took a guess at what's in my head instead).

These supposed beings aren't shown and don't show, so we'd then need a sufficient characterization of what they're supposed to be instead, something that makes a difference — jorndoe

... say, a definition.

Thus, your definition is exactly what any calculation (and much else) depends on, it's all we have to go on in the first place.

Define so that no calculation is feasible, then so be it. Define so that a calculation is feasible, then calculation it is. Define so that this-and-that, then deal with the implications thereof.

Beings (or a being) that exist...whether we humans can perceive of that existence or not. An entity of agency…something that existed BEFORE this thing we humans call the universe came into being…and which caused or helped to cause it to “come into being.” — Frank Apisa

Vagueness aside, can you include something that admits calculation?
Better still, some implications that we can go out and check tomorrow (verifications-falsifications)?
Otherwise you've just set things up so that calculation-verification-falsification can't be done in the first place.

Not much to go on .
Maybe somewhat antropocentric/morphic, conducive to people imagining whatever, ...
On par with The Matrix, Bostrom's hypothesis, "real dreamworlds", nondescript (panen)deism, what-have-you, ...
On the other hand, atemporal mind ("outside it all") is incoherent nonsense, so that's one out anyway.
What does it take to be labeled a god/God anyway?
If both what is said, and the negation, are consistent with attainable evidence, then further knowledge thereof is unattainable, and, so, yeah, calculations are another timewaster.
Differentiation makes a difference.

, why would that be smuggling in religion?

The most common use of the term "God" (by far) is in reference to whatever religious scriptures.
Not sure how to calculate the probability of those old, sumptuous stories being literal history, but I'd say rather unlikely.
As (mere) characters in stories, a whole lot of fantastic, fictional beings exist, that come to life in the heads of people.

Diametrically opposite, if you will, surely there's plenty unknown to us, so that, in itself, is about certain.
Whatever that may be, perhaps it could include superbeings of sorts, which would then be a "who the heck knows"?

Since this is a philosophy forum, there are other special uses of the term "god" (or in plural), though they'd have to be related to the most common use in some way or other, yes?
These supposed beings aren't shown and don't show, so we'd then need a sufficient characterization of what they're supposed to be instead, something that makes a difference; otherwise we're asked to calculate the plausibility of the independent existence of whatever vague, nebulous entities that come to mind when invoking the words.
Or, are we just talking (ontologized) abstract objects (Platonia style)?

Ignosticism (Wikipedia)
Theological noncognitivism (Wikipedia)
Abstract Objects (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Hmm ... what is motion but a spatial path in spacetime anyway?
It's just that no particular time is considered (a special privileged indexical) now, hence the block-verse model is incomplete.
But wasn't that the idea in the first place, that a t parameter can represent any now, any time, on equal footing? That any direction only is implicit in the ordering and nothing else?
It's not that block-verse does not model motion as such (mentioned path with all of time internal to the model), it just sacrifices the special for general (non-indexical) descriptive prowess.

(An odd but seldom noticed consequence of McTaggart's characterization of the A series and the B series is that, on that characterization, the A series is identical to the B series. For the items that make up the B series (namely, moments of time) are the same items that make up the A series, and the order of the items in the B series is the same as the order of the items in the A series; but there is nothing more to a series than some specific items in a particular order.) — Time (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

What might a complete model look like anyway?
I'm thinking that both duration and simultaneity would be part thereof, which seems to suggest dimensionality of some sort.
By the way, language, English at least, is heavily tensed, which can lead to some confuzzlement.

In case you haven't yet noticed, religion offers the most intelligent understanding of time. — Metaphysician Undercover

You dismiss eternalism because it requires religion to make sense of time passage. That says a lot about you. — Metaphysician Undercover

How odd. What does that have to do with anything...? :brow: (Requires, even?)

@StreetlightX, you wouldn't think this is 2020.

WTF? Is this confirmed?

That's fuckisgusting if true, pardon my French.


EDIT: Hadn't read this yet:

Philly mayor, police commissioner condemn armed vigilante group in Fishtown (Michael Tanenbaum; PhillyVoice; Jun 02, 2020)

The mayor seems to be catching on?

@MonisticIdealist, so you're more or less going by the tenets of Levine's explanatory gap / Chalmers' mind conundrum, and that I can't deny the mere existence of my experiences, I can't coherently deny mere self-existence.

Actually, I'd question more or less the entire opening post.

In an ontological sense, you'll have it that the Moon is not actually the Moon, but rather is Moon-experiences, a bit like a dream that exists only due to the dreamer.
All I can ever know is the experience, and so that's where the road ends, more or less literally.
The Moon = those Moon-experiences.
Solipsism. :confused: But OK, maybe that's the stance here.

So, idealism (mental monism) starts with conflating epistemics and ontology by universalizing self-dependence. (n)

Some points I've picked up from others:

• Novelty: We sometimes discover new things; things previously unknown, unthought, unexperienced, uninvented. I'm not omniscient, since otherwise I'd know that I were. Sometimes we hear new ideas from others.
• Error: We're sometimes wrong about things. What, then, made us wrong, but whatever is indeed the case?
• Agreement: We agree on numerous things; when to be at work in the morning; where the local grocery store is; how a pawn moves in chess; this is English; ... The fly and the chameleon are in agreement about the colors of the environment when the chameleon sneaks up on the fly and catches it. And, as a spectator, I can understand this little drama; I also agree with the fly and the chameleon about the colors.
• Constraints: We can't do just anything, whether trying to "will" it so or not, and "willing" alone is inadequate. Imposed extra-self limitations.

The simplest coherent explanation is some sort of non-idealism (or realism). (y)

They're incompatible. — Marchesk

I wouldn't say incompatible, at least not in the sense of contradictory.
It's just that neither seems to derive the other, hence why Levine called the conundrum an explanatory gap.

Seeing an object is not an object, rather it's an occurrence.
That's one possible category mistake.

I'm thinking the naïve direct indirect thing can be misleading.

Suppose we categorize perception like this ...

the experience ≠ the experienced (non-identity, self versus other)
the experience = the experienced (self-identity, dreams, hallucinations, etc)

So, we perceive whatever else by interaction, not by becoming the perceived, whereas dreams, hallucinations, etc, are parts of us when occurring.
When we experience, say, love, it's not an experience of something extra-self, whereas (non-imaginary) loved ones are, and can be interactees.
If I chat with my neighbor, then I'm not chatting with my experiences, rather I'm interacting with my neighbor, and my experiences are my end of it, are contingent thereupon.

Then, by this sort of thing ...

hallucination is mistaking ≠ for =
subjective idealism (solipsism) is mistaking = for ≠

_{Also ... Phantom pain, Synesthesia, Sleep paralysis, Introspection illusion, Refraction}

Whereas this article, strictly speaking, commits mind-reading (and ad hominem), it seems fairly obvious that Trump is an opportunist and a bullshitter.
On the other hand, the article does expose some of Trump's voter base — people that he has successfully conn...err spoken to and secured.

I Questioned the Sincerity of Donald Trump's Pro-Life Stance. The Response From My Fellow Evangelicals Was Troubling
Robb Ryerse
TIME
Feb 2020

Here's a story by Jeannine Nicole (3873 words):

I am a Covid ICU nurse in New York City, and yesterday, like many other days lately, I couldn’t fix my patient. [...] He was only 23 years old.

Work on the frontline is rough. :(

Please don't strut about risking spreading covid-19 further.

Alarming video shows how quickly coronavirus can spread at a restaurant (Yaron Steinbuch, New York Post, May 2020)

I'm not sure why I am bert1 rather than someone else — bert1

Others are already them, in fact, everyone are themselves, it's quite common. :)
Say, you can't experience someone else's self-awareness, since then you'd be them instead.

A separate example of this sort of thinking:
Some are suffering and poor (e.g. tragic stories of African orphans), some are more fortunate and have spare resources to post stuff like this on Internet forums.
But why do I happen to be one of the latter, luckier ones...? :chin:
I'm guessing that's (also) what @bizso09's opening post is about, but please correct me otherwise.

Anyway, there's a theorem of sorts stating that indexical information can't be derived from non-indexical information.
Suppose we have two similar, nondescript rooms, and a pair of twin robots, one in each room (alternatively, you and your identical twin).
One room is δ, the other λ, and they're marked as such over in a dark corner.
To the rest of the world, it doesn't make much difference which robot is in which room, describing the world (non-indexically) doesn't really differentiate, including to the robots if they had access to such a description.
(For the sake of argument, since it's a thought experiment, we'll just ignore the no-cloning theorem and such.)
But, once this robot checks the dark corner, it has acquired a (new) piece of information that makes a difference (to this robot), "I'm in room δ", and it can then go on about its business.
Maybe not the best example; some writings feature the amnesiac Rudolf Lingens to illustrate the theorem.
I don't think it's specifically about mind or physicalism or whatever as such, rather the other way around, self-awareness is essentially indexical.

Seen on the news yesterday ...





What to do when you can't differentiate adults from juveniles?
Might be time to address that swamp.

_{16 Not The Brightest People Who Are Against The Quarantine Holding Some ‘Interesting’ Signs (Rokas Laurinavičius, Ilona Baliūnaitė)}

Sometimes indeterminate forms come up, like 0 / 0.
In arithmetics, it doesn't really mean much.
In some cases, in calculus, it can.
Best not conflate, the angle matters, context matters.

If we only want to speak of intervals, non-zero durations, then what about the starts and ends thereof?
Are we going to toss it all out...? :o

Anyway, successful tested-and-tried application speaks for itself.

Time t has no context — Metaphysician Undercover

Sure it does, especially how we're talking about it here, other times, events, occurrences, you name it.
Actually, I'm not sure it's coherent to go all out context-free here.

The problem is that "time t" is not real — Metaphysician Undercover

Excellent.
I'm going to quote you on that next time I'm late for a meeting with my boss.

It's the 0.9999... = 1 denialists, hard at work again. — Banno

Now you've jinxed it. :D

, speaking of things at time t does not mean removal of context.
Velocity or momentum or some such vectors (at t) depend thereupon.
It's not like we have something appearing and vanishing at t, whether talking averages or differential calculus.
How/can you differentiate things at t in the two mentioned scenarios...?

Wait, I not well veresed with potential and actual in infinity, is pi a potential or actual infinity. — BB100

Why does dividing things by three, into thirds, create an "infinite" number of threes after the decimal point, as if we can never get to an actual third of something? — Harry Hindu

Well, no.
π = 3.14159...
1/3 = 0.333...
Sure, the righthand side has unending digits, but don't confuse the representation and the number.

When you glance at your speedometer and it reads 60 mph, indeed that is based on an approximation made over a small interval of time. So you do have a point, although a rather insignificant one. — jgill

(y)
It's all contextual.
Similarly with differential calculus; if the plot has a sharp turn or just one point (which would have no context), then it's not differentiable, which would represent something we don't really see much in the world.

(y)

Take two hypothetical scenarios for something, in one it's still, in another it's moving.
Physics can differentiate the two at time t by different motion vectors, speed and direction; by momentum too for that matter.
If you can't, then you're missing something.
Simple school physics could plot out the different speeds at different times throughout the scenarios, and see acceleration/deceleration (change in speed) over time; the former scenario would be a bit boring.
If you can't, then you're still missing something.
Gravity expressed as acceleration (the equivalence principle): at time t, Earth gravity is a downward acceleration that we're subject to.
Without differential (and integral) calculus, physics would be impoverished, it's proven in action, so our philosophical musings best account for this, or we'd be missing something.

So the universe is not quite as you thought it was. You'd better rearrange your beliefs, then. Because you certainly can't rearrange the universe. — Asimov (1941, 1990)

Therefore there exists some event in the past that is an infinite number of events from the present — BB100

If you're going by the integers or some such, then no.
They're closed under subtraction (and addition).
Adding and subtracting any two integers gives an integer.
And ∞ ∉ N, by the way (Archimedean property).

The idea of time, I believe, presupposes a starting point from which to measure its passing — Sir2u

That's pretty much what we already do, yes?
Except, we place whatever markers we want, year 0 by the common Western calendar is a good couple 1000 years ago, epoch 0 commonly used in computing is 1970-01-01 00:00:00 GMT, we use 1 year day second as whatever, and go by that.
We only need indexicals, contextuals from which to proceed, and with those conventional markers we can (and do) go back and forward as we see fit, without being bound to any one particular marker or unit.
So, in that sense at least, we need not assume a definite earliest time altogether, if that's what you meant.

Does that specific entity have an internal state or How do I know other people have internal states? — schopenhauer1

I guess solipsism and the gap are related, proving one impacts the other. I wonder if, say, Searle's "Chinese room" and Jackson's "Mary's room" are impacted as well.

The hard problem of consciousness is the bedrock for all arguments for dualism for it addresses the issue of qualia directly, without resorting to imagined scenarios. Refute it and you undermine the significance of qualia and do that and all qualia-based arguments fall. — TheMadFool

Substance dualism simply declares "mind stuff" (irreducibly) fundamental or without any explanation in other terms, even in principle. An easy answer.

• say, some sort of physicalism (or maybe speculative realism) and qualia do not contradict, rather neither entails the other, hence the gap
• placing qualia (or whatever aspects of mind) as basic/fundamental/irreducible does not explain mind, but rather avoids explanation by said placement, thereby disregarding some things we already do know about mind

Maybe we can at least account for the gap rather than bridge it.


Plenty evidence pointing in one direction ...

• Brain makes decisions before you even know it (Kerri Smith; Nature; Apr 2008)
• Brain Scanners Can See Your Decisions Before You Make Them (Brandon Keim; WIRED; Apr 2008)
• Mind-reading program translates brain activity into words (Ian Sample; The Guardian; Jan 2012)
• Scientists Use Brain Waves To Eavesdrop On What We Hear (Peter Murray; Singularity Hub; from the Public Library of Science (PLoS) Biology; Feb 2012)
• Neural Decoding of Visual Imagery During Sleep (Horikawa, Tamaki, Miyawaki, Kamitani; Science AAAS; Apr 2013)
• Researcher controls colleague’s motions in 1st human brain-to-brain interface (Rajesh Rao, Andrea Stocco; University of Washington; Aug 2013)
• Brain decoding: Reading minds (Kerri Smith; Nature; Oct 2013)
• Mind-Reading Computer Instantly Decodes People’s Thoughts (Tia Ghose; LiveScience; Jan 2016)
• Device that can literally read your mind invented by scientists (Ian Johnston; The Independent; Apr 2017)
• After 15 years in a vegetative state, nerve stimulation restores consciousness (Cell Press via AAAS; Sep 2017)
• Computer system transcribes words users “speak silently” (Larry Hardesty; MIT News Office; Apr 2018)
• Amazing New Brain Map of Every Synapse Points to the Roots of Thinking (Shelly Fan; Neuron via Singularity Hub; Aug 2018)
• Our brains reveal our choices before we're even aware of them, study finds (Lachlan Gilbert; University of New South Wales; Mar 2019)

A different way to illustrate the problem (the explanatory gap / mind conundrum) could be to ask:
Can you derive what a bat's echolocation is like by examining the bat?
Can you derive those special formats of experience (qualia) from looking at an (alleged) experiencer?
We can guess and correlate of course; is that the extent of it?
Either way, I cannot experience your self-awareness, since then I'd be you instead.

So, by the above, sufficient reason derives an infinite past.
Let's try a third application of the principle, an anecdote attributed to Wittgenstein ^{† ‡} :

Wittgenstein overhears someone saying "5, 1, 4, 1, 3. Done."
He asks what that was about, and they respond that they just finished reciting π backward.
"But, how old are you?"
"Infinitely old. I never started, but have been at it forever and finally finished."

The moment they were done reciting seems random, no sufficient reason their recitation was done at one time and not another, any other.
And likewise for any of the other digits.
So, with our expectation violated, we tend to reject the thought experiment, and out goes an infinite past.
Now what?


^† James Harrington
^‡ Craig Skinner

Side note on ∞:

There's an anecdote attributed to Wittgenstein showing how an infinite past seems uniquely counterintuitive.

Wittgenstein overhears someone saying "5, 1, 4, 1, 3. Done."
He asks what that was about, and they respond that they just finished reciting π backward.
"But, how old are you?"
"Infinitely old. I never started, but have been at it forever and finally finished."

Not logically impossible or inconsistent, notes both James Harrington and Craig Skinner, but a strong intuitive argument nonetheless.
The moment they were done reciting seems random, there seem to be no sufficient reason their recitation was done at one time and not another, any other. And likewise for any of the other digits.
So, with our expectation violated, we tend to reject the thought experiment, and out goes an infinite past.

Anyway, looks like Wittgenstein doesn't accept ∞ as such.

Not sure I buy the rationale here, but intuitionist physics is a worthwhile pursuit I think:

Does Time Really Flow? New Clues Come From a Century-Old Approach to Math.
Natalie Wolchover
Quanta Magazine
Apr 2020

As to "1", I suppose we may proceed from self-identity?
Wherever we deem some such, like we talk about and point at things every day, we say there's (a quantity) of 1 of that, regardless of whatever exactly it may be.
Could include hypotheticals and whatnot, too.
It'll take some conceptualization to get 2 (of those), but we may instead have 1 of this and 1 of that, thus having 2 of this or that together.
So, in the abstract, 1 (just 1) would denote 1 of anything, without referring to anything in particular, but still exemplifiable.
Seems to be how we typically use 1 anyway, no?