Comments

  • Are 'facts' observer-dependent?
    I cannot discuss you without utilizing my perceptions of you.Rich

    Right. What other than perception would you suggest?
  • Are 'facts' observer-dependent?
    It's impossible to discuss the moon without discussing both our perception and the linguistic dynamics of our perceptions and representation of the moon. There may be an object preceding those things, but it's impossible for us to access that except through our perception and language, which are greatly linked.Thanatos Sand

    Let me try to misquote you for the occasion:

    It's impossible to discuss jorndoe without discussing both Thanatos Sand's perception and the linguistic dynamics of Thanatos Sand's perceptions and representation of jorndoe. There may be a jorndoe preceding those things, but it's impossible for Thanatos Sand to access that except through Thanatos Sand's perception and language, which are greatly linked.

    If anything significant differentiates fictions/fantasies/hallucinations/dreams (which do exist) and perception, then it must be the perceived (the Moon, jorndoe).
    Hopefully you wouldn't (rudely) suggest that I'm not self-aware because you cannot experience my self-awareness? :)
  • Are 'facts' observer-dependent?
    Seems like we could discuss ...

    • the Moon
    • perception of the Moon
    • linguistic practices of Moon discussion

    They're not the same, so shouldn't we keep them as such?
  • Are 'facts' observer-dependent?
    Thanks for further showing that "round" is just a linguistic concept dependent on other equally non-materially based linguistic concepts as itself. So, use whatever words you want when you chat about the moon. All you'll be doing is using words, not accurately describing the moon itself.Thanatos Sand

    Are you claiming that language is only ever about language? Or about concepts? :o
    That doesn't seem right.
  • Are 'facts' observer-dependent?
    All you have done is describe the moon after observation.

    Now, describe it before observation.
    Rich

    Huh?
    Maybe I should ask you to describe my colleague.
    If you're conflating ontology and epistemology, then you'll conclude there's no such colleague.
    And maybe there isn't for all you know.
  • Are 'facts' observer-dependent?
    Thanks for further showing that "round" is just a linguistic concept dependent on other equally non-materially based linguistic concepts as itself. So, use whatever words you want when you chat about the moon. All you'll be doing is using words, not accurately describing the moon itself.Thanatos Sand

    Well I'm not trying to be exhaustively accurate with error-free certainty, just chatting about the Moon.
    If you'd written "the Moon is a regular tetrahedron", then you might need new glasses or a new encyclopedia or something. :)
    As mentioned, I'm not chatting about English, but about the Moon.
    Not about the word "Moon" either, but about the Moon.

    As an aside, I just noticed the Wikipedia page has a list of characteristics, mean/equatorial/polar radius, flattening, circumference, surface area, volume, ...
    I guess you could register and fix the page?
  • Are 'facts' observer-dependent?
    All we know is that the moon is quanta which is essentially nothing. Anything you observe in your life is necessarily the result of the interaction between you, the observer, and the observed quanta. This is absolutely fundamental without any wiggle room.Rich

    Allow me to misquote you:

    All jorndoe knows is that Rich is quanta which is essentially nothing. Anything jorndoe observes in jorndoe's life is necessarily the result of the interaction between jorndoe, and the observed quanta. This is absolutely fundamental without any wiggle room.

    Solipsism.

    "There is no Moon"? :)
  • Are 'facts' observer-dependent?
    , you introduced "smooth-edged orb"; "a spheroid within some margin of variation" is a bit better.
    Not that it matters much, though.
    Would you prefer using other words when we chat about the Moon?
  • Are 'facts' observer-dependent?
    And since the moon isn't a smooth-edged orb, it's not actually "round."Thanatos Sand

    The shape of the Moon is largely a result of gravity and composition and whatever, a spheroid within some margin of variation, round.jorndoe

    Emphasis added.
    In this context, the term round is how we already characterize the Moon, along with whatever other things.
    It's not a definition of the Moon's shape (we don't define things into existence), it's observation.
    In case I'd written "the Earth is flat", I'd be wrong. Not so with "the Moon is round".
  • Are 'facts' observer-dependent?
    I'm not referring to our concepts or words, but the shape of the Moon.
    Feel free to chat about the former; meanwhile I'll chat about the Moon. :)
  • Are 'facts' observer-dependent?
    Here "round" doesn't mean



    The shape of the Moon is largely a result of gravity and composition and whatever, a spheroid within some margin of variation, round.
    It had that shape long before homo sapiens walked the Earth.
  • Are 'facts' observer-dependent?
    Depends?

    If I observe "I'm in a great mood", then that fact is observer-dependent.
    If I observe "The Moon is round", then that fact is independent of me observing it.

    An observation may be observer-dependent, the observed may not be.
  • Drowning Humanity
    ?Thorongil

    Just uhh surprised I guess. Don't throw yourself off a tall building ya' hear.
  • Illogical Logic
    Doesn't logic tend to start with self-identity (the 1st law)?

    Something like ...
    x = x (ontological, anything that exists is itself and nothing else)
    pp (propositional, statements (not baby-talk) are themselves)

    Anyway, attempting to abandon identity (and individuation for that matter) seems to void all our talk, thinking, making sense of things, etc, sort of like a kind of intellectual mental suicide (figuratively).
    Maybe identity is auto-presupposed.
  • Drowning Humanity
    Without the hope of salvation, which religion provides, life is demonstrably not worth living. Your typical atheist, like Dawkins, seems to realize this on some level, but the fact is clearly too much for him to bear, as shown above.Thorongil

    ... strikes me as a textbook example of wishful thinking, appeal to consequence.
    Do you think an emotional existential crisis somehow makes this yearning true...?

    I'm not sure what "religious salvation" is exactly (though "salvation" often is preached by Christians), and how it supposedly satisfies your yearnings, but feel free to explicate.
    Some sort of predetermined purpose (or predestination perhaps) bestowed upon you by something else?

    It seems odd to claim that these atheists you refer to do not enjoy living.
    Feel free to demonstrate that "life is demonstrably not worth living" unless your yearnings are the case.
    Perhaps Dawkins agrees that it'd be nifty to get together with his grand/parents and other loved ones again, in some sort of afterlife, but admits that doesn't make it so?
    (I haven't read much of his stuff, so I don't know.)

    In The Illusion of God's Presence: The Biological Origins of Spiritual Longing (Jan 2016), John C Wathey discusses what he dubs an "innate model of the mother", which seems to shed some light at least on some psychological phenomena related to emotional existential crises.
    Whether there's something to it or not, who knows, but it's not wishful thinking nor appeal to consequence fallacies.
  • A Uniquely Parsimonious and Skeptical Metaphysics
    Existence is all over the place? By what particular definition?Michael Ossipoff

    Not by definition.
    You exist, I exist, my coffee cup exists ☕, heck even my dreams exist, you're walking on it, your walking exists (when occurring), ...
    Darn unavoidable!

    Definitions can be helpful for expressing what we mean when we say something.Michael Ossipoff

    Yes.
  • A Uniquely Parsimonious and Skeptical Metaphysics
    By the way, I’d like to add that, so far as I’m aware of, the words “Real”, and “Exist” aren’t metaphysically-defined. Better to not use them. Of, if I use them, it’s with the understanding that they don’t say anything definite or meaningful. You can define them as you like, and people do.Michael Ossipoff

    If they want to define existence in terms of something else, then that something else cannot exist.
    But it's rather trivial to exemplify, can't miss it, it's all over the place. ;)
    It's one of those things, like truth perhaps, where you strand on rock bottom as it were.
    I've become a bit wary of (always) demanding definitions; doing so may also be susceptible to a regress anyway.
    Conversely, if we were to exemplify something that does not exist, it could only be by non-referring definitions or nonsense, something like that.
    Incidentally, in some older thread, I tried to sort of assert "real on top of existence" as per:
    x is real ⇔ x exists irrespective of anyone's definitions
    Not sure it's any good though (maybe some day).
  • Is it possible to categorically not exist?
    A related inquiry:

    Suppose in a few centuries no living person has ever encountered the Harry Potter stories. It's a thought experiment. All that remains of them is a dusty box with the (by then) old books, hidden away somewhere, all else long since having been recycled.
    Can it then be said that Harry Potter still exists (as a fictional narrative), perhaps as a kind of extended memory found in that dusty box?
    Or, can Harry Potter only "come back to life", as it were, once someone has read the old books?
    Can one speak of any ontological status worth mentioning?

    It is said that Zeno devised 40 thought experiments, paradoxes, though only 9 are known, and only second-hand. We might suppose they could still be uncovered in ancient texts of course, perhaps even Zeno's own words, however unlikely it seems by now.
    What might be the ontological status of these alleged 31 thought experiments supposedly devised by Zeno?
    After all, I just referred to them, hypothetically at least.
  • Is it possible to categorically not exist?
    But fictions, fantasies, hallucinations, dreams and such do exist.

    Yet, if anything significant differentiates fictions/fantasies/hallucinations/dreams and perception, then it must be the perceived.

    We sometimes come up with fictions and share them among us, which language and whatnot are sufficiently flexible to do.

    Such fictions, fantasies, hallucinations and dreams are still confined to us, though, and could perhaps be contrasted with "real" things, depending on how we use the term "real".

    @Wayfarer might have a dream in which he slapped Donald Trump, though (unfortunately perhaps) the real Trump never felt a thing. :)
  • What Philosophical School of Thought do you fall in?
    At the first go I got Epicureanism, and Humanism on the second.
  • Everything and nothing
    Wait, @Bitter Crank, except according to some theologians, their deity can do the impossible, creatio ex nihilo.
    So much for the old metaphysical thesis, nihil fit ex nihilo, I guess.
    It may be sort of wrong anyway, after a fashion, e.g. the zero-energy universe, expansion of the universe.
  • Everything and nothing
    :D

    1. No, "nothing" is the missing complement of everything.
    2. No, of course not.

    if it be nothing, I shall not need spectacles — Gloucester


    Nothing (Wikipedia)
    Nothingness (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
  • Post-intelligent design
    Suppose there is absolutely nothing. How could something come into existence?Metaphysician Undercover

    I guess, in that case there couldn't have been anything preventing it either?
  • Post-intelligent design
    @Wayfarer, anything other than endless 3-dimensional space is difficult to imagine for a universe, isn't it? :) A simpleton universe could just be 'one' "thing" in it's entirety (indivisible, changeless, no green trees however much I like those, etc). As far as consistency goes, that seems fine (to me at least); as far as contemporary physics goes, who knows.

    it is simply an empirical and logical impossibility that there could be a universe comprising a single entityWayfarer

    Logical impossibility isn't implied. Can you derive a contradiction?

    As an aside

    in the absence of observers, our universe is dead — Davies

    Notice that Davies does in fact presuppose (imagine?) an unobserved universe here, namely a "dead" one, by his own words. But Davies is writing about our universe, with us and lovely green trees in it, and a hypothetical "theory of everything" thereof.
  • Bug reports
    Weird. For a bit I've had this showing up when logging in:

    uviztpqzzetd186e.jpg

    But there isn't anything new in the Inbox. What gives?
  • Post-intelligent design
    @Wayfarer, I was thinking in terms of ontological self-identity, consistency.
    Your 'one' doesn't seem contradictory to me, not "impossible to conceive".
    But if you're thinking physics, well, then who knows, things are a lot more complicated, and I'd tend to agree (though something like a photon seems indivisible, in a manner of speaking).
    Was that what you meant by "impossible to conceive"?
  • Post-intelligent design
    I was simply observing that it is impossible to conceive of a universe with just one item. 'One' depends on there being 'more than one'.Wayfarer

    How so?

    In reference to the further comments, of course it's impossible to observe anything if you're absent.
    You mean you can't imagine something you're not observing?
    That seems a bit like incredulity.
  • What will Mueller discover?
    [...] politics. I don't expect them to play fair to begin with.Agustino

    Maybe you should? Just sayin'.
  • In defence of weak naturalism
    I'm a realistHarry Hindu

    I tend towards realism (or anti-idealism) as well; alternatives just don't stack up.
    But of course the conundrums you brought up still apply. Who doesn't like a good mystery? (Y)

    Anyway, my comment was just an attempt to point out a potential problem with some propositions.
    Say, there's not much doubt that the Sun exists, and we may then come up with sufficient definitions thereof (converging on quiddity). Such definitions can be found in dictionaries and whatnot.
    If, on the other hand, we only have definitions to go by, then things become more questionable, which was what I meant by defining quiddity (like flying pink elephants perhaps).
    Come to think on it, Hume may actually have agreed.
    If the potential problem holds up, then it would go towards naturalism of some sort.
  • In defence of weak naturalism
    If something can exist, then it must existSrap Tasmaner

    Seems vaguely like modal realism?

    I wonder if the universe were infinite, then wouldn't what is actually possible have to become actual at some point?Cavacava

    Well, it would have to be infinite in all possible aspects, at least, wouldn't it?
    Even then, I'm not quite convinced; infinitudes aren't that easy to reason about.
  • In defence of weak naturalism
    @Sam26, haven't you ever wondered why these NDE experiences tend to be visual (with the eyes safely situated in the body), and audio (with the eardrums safely back in the body), remembered (with the brain back in the body), etc?
    Some common characteristica are known from other reports, like "sensing a presence", when being subject to generated magnetic fields, fluctuating similarly to brain scans.
    Individual self-comprehension has always been troublesome.
    Jumping to the conclusion that "supernaturalism is much more probabilistic than" something a bit more "down to Earth", as it were, seems a stretch; I'm guessing what we might call the "natural" world is significantly richer than our thinking.
    I suppose several independent, credible, well-justified reports of somehow "seeing" something that the experiencer couldn't possibly otherwise have known (or inferred/guessed), would lend more merit to the hypothesis.
    How about putting together an organization of spies using OOBEs? :D
  • In defence of weak naturalism
    Even if we provisionally accept the PSR, it still doesn't logically follow that a cause must have all the properties of its effects (whatever that might even mean). The most that PSR entails in this case is that there must be a cause for any property, which is a plausible (though not necessary) principle if by that we mean that the property is either entailed or made more probable by a prior state of the world combined with dynamical laws. But conservation of properties does not follow from this.SophistiCat

    Sufficient reason can't apply to existence, the lot, everything, without circularity (e.g. existence is self-explanatory).
    Thus, if you want to apply sufficient reason to the universe, then you'd have to show that the universe isn't everything first (which could make the principle kind of redundant in this respect, who knows).
    At least that's how it seems to me.
    Otherwise you just get the usual structure of "everything and then some".
  • In defence of weak naturalism
    Sure, @Harry Hindu, well, you could just hand me a dictionary/encyclopedia, those have plenty good definitions.
    But, there are no running elephants in dictionaries, for example. You might, however, show evidence of a stampede or whatever, and that's "real" in this sense at least:

    x is real ⇔ x exists irrespective of anyone's definitionsjorndoe
    (may or may not be a worthwhile thesis, don't know)

    On the other hand, dictionaries excel at context-building, e.g. may state where elephants live or something. You won't find flying pink elephants in dictionaries either, by the way, but that didn't stop me from just mentioning them. :)

    Anyway, I've just noticed there are some relations among ...
    Invention   Discovery
    Definition  Evidence
    Quiddity    Existence
    
    ... when it comes to epistemic claims.
    Definitions are fine; my depreciation is just when some such x is defined only (possibly invented).
  • In defence of weak naturalism
    I'm the opposite.Harry Hindu

    Apropos, it seems we spoke past each other. :D (Too few definitions?)

    Here's another expression of my inquiry regarding existential claims:

    Is x something you can show us first (without having to define it), or is x something you have to define for us first (without having shown existence)?

    The former is easily exemplified, e.g. the Sun. The depreciation I expressed was towards the latter.

    Whatever is real, does not require our definitions to exist. Rather the opposite, we try to converge on quiddity of whatever is real by means of discovery, something like that. Oftentimes this involves predication.jorndoe

    Perhaps I can turn it into a thesis:

    x is real ⇔ x exists irrespective of anyone's definitions

    I'm not sure that holds, though.
  • In defence of weak naturalism
    I've come to depreciate definitions over time, in this context, not because they're useless or anything, but because their employment can be misleading.

    Whatever is real, does not require our definitions to exist. Rather the opposite, we try to converge on quiddity of whatever is real by means of discovery, something like that. Oftentimes this involves predication. Merely defining quiddity of reality-constituents seems fraught.

    Of course, in terms of our language, it's always a good idea to express things concisely, which may involve definitions. Going by dictionaries and encyclopedias, definitions are inherently circular, but that can work wonders in context-building.

    For a large class of cases — though not for all — in which we employ the word ‘meaning’, it can be explained thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language. — Wittgenstein

    So, anyway, what are we on about with "natural" and "supernatural" here...?
  • PSA: This site supports MathJax
    MathJax basic tutorial and quick reference (2016)
    LATEX Tutorials A PRIMER (2003)
    Getting Started with LaTeX (1995) » Mathematical Symbols


    Note, the forums do not support MathJax completely; there are some limitations here and there (e.g. multiple lines of LATEX).


    The Basel problem:



    \sum_{n=1}^\infty \frac{1}{n^2} = \frac{\pi^2}{6}
    


    Function continuity:

    is continuous at



    \forall \epsilon \in \mathbb{R}_{+} \Bigl[ \exists \delta \in \mathbb{R}_{+} \bigl[ \left| x - d \right| < \delta \Rightarrow \left| f(x) - f(d) \right| < \epsilon \bigr] \Bigr]
    


    ... and God said ...



    \begin{aligned} \nabla \times \vec{\mathbf{B}} -\, \frac1c\, \frac{\partial\vec{\mathbf{E}}}{\partial t} & = \frac{4\pi}{c}\vec{\mathbf{j}} \\ \nabla \cdot \vec{\mathbf{E}} & = 4 \pi \rho \\ \nabla \times \vec{\mathbf{E}}\, +\, \frac1c\, \frac{\partial\vec{\mathbf{B}}}{\partial t} & = \vec{\mathbf{0}} \\ \nabla \cdot \vec{\mathbf{B}} & = 0 \end{aligned}
    

    ... and there was light.
  • Islam and the Separation of Church and State
    We just watched "The Monster Among Us" (2008) on the Documentary channel.
    Sixty years after the Holocaust, a new brand of anti-Semitism has reared its ugly head again in Europe. It has the same purpose, but a different face.
    It's somewhat related to Islam, in part due to the unfortunate Israeli-Palenstinian situation.
    Here's a short youtube: The Monster Among Us/ Allen Mondell Cynthia Salzman Mondell (4m:38s)
    Yeah, if there are aliens out there, then that's why they're keeping out of sight.
  • Islam and the Separation of Church and State
    Among fundamentalists, extremists and fanatics, it so happens that religious scriptures can be interpreted either way. That's not limited to the Quran. You could similarly interpret the Bible to both be against and to allow slavery. For that matter, anyone could claim that their interpretation is the one correct reading. Such is the nature of scriptures I guess; anyone may employ whichever interpretation when that's convenient.

    I personally know a lovely Muslim couple, currently living in the US (and was a bit worried when Trump got into office, but fortunately they're fine for now). They're just ordinary moderates, not anti-secular, or theocratic or anything. If things in the US takes a turn for the worse, then we'd invite them to stay here until they could get a footing. Off hand, I'm guessing their sentiment is the majority among Muslims, but it's a guess on my part.

    I also know a Muslim that's a bit less moderate. In their own words, Islam is all-encompassing, and addresses every aspect of life. Not sure what their sentiment on secularism is, though I can't really see them wanting to enforce Islam, Sharia Law, or the likes. All I can say, is that they'd most likely be fine if living in a theocratic, Islamic society with heavy enforcement of blasphemy laws.


    At this time in history, it seems that a good lot of violent, extremist religious folks are Muslims. I'm not sure that can be derived from the Quran in particular (in comparison to any other scripture) though. It comes down to what their reading is; you can also find passages that prescribe kindness toward others.

    But, yeah, "Jakarta's Christian governor jailed for blasphemy against Islam" is ridiculous, deplorable, and should be met with critique accordingly.
  • Hypostatization
    Thankye for the comments.

    I wasn't going for Platonism in particular, though Plato is the first articulation of such thinking I know of.
    There are a few angles, like Plato's forms versus instantiations (or ideals versus convergent instantiations), universals versus particulars, abstracts versus concretes, etc.

    (Please don't get hung up on the words.)

    The image wasn't intended to be our abstract cow, more like observing that cows in general doesn't seem to be just those creatures going about their business out on the grassy fields. :)

    But, I'd say there is indeed such as thing as a reification fallacy.
    An "external", wholly independent, abstract cow comes through as an example thereof, sort of.

    How exactly is this abstract cow supposedly related to the cows in the world?
    Why should anyone take this hypothesis serious, and ontologize such an abstract cow, anyway...?
    jorndoe

    Or is it that, what we (or some at least) consider an abstract cow, originates with our rough "maps" (recognition) of worldly "territories" (mentioned creatures), and so has attained a life of it's own...?

    [...] Then there's the issue of how things in the world can change but still instantiate a the transcendental Platonic Form.darthbarracuda

    (Y) Those oddities with Platonism were among the objections that came to mind.

    One of the areas where such thinking seems to resurface regularly is in logic and mathematics.

    Abstract Objects (Gideon Rosen, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)