• the Moon
• perception of the Moon
• linguistic practices of Moon discussion
They're not the same, so shouldn't we keep them as such? — jorndoe
It's impossible to discuss the moon without discussing both our perception and the linguistic dynamics of our perceptions and representation of the moon. There may be an object preceding those things, but it's impossible for us to access that except through our perception and language, which are greatly linked. — Thanatos Sand
It's impossible to discuss jorndoe without discussing both Thanatos Sand's perception and the linguistic dynamics of Thanatos Sand's perceptions and representation of jorndoe. There may be a jorndoe preceding those things, but it's impossible for Thanatos Sand to access that except through Thanatos Sand's perception and language, which are greatly linked.
It's impossible to discuss the moon without discussing both our perception and the linguistic dynamics of our perceptions and representation of the moon. There may be an object preceding those things, but it's impossible for us to access that except through our perception and language, which are greatly linked.
— Thanatos Sand
Let me try to misquote you for the occasion:
It's impossible to discuss jorndoe without discussing both Thanatos Sand's perception and the linguistic dynamics of Thanatos Sand's perceptions and representation of jorndoe. There may be a jorndoe preceding those things, but it's impossible for Thanatos Sand to access that except through Thanatos Sand's perception and language, which are greatly linked.
If anything significant differentiates fictions/fantasies/hallucinations/dreams (which do exist) and perception, then it must be the perceived (the Moon, jorndoe).
Hopefully you wouldn't (rudely) suggest that I'm not self-aware because you cannot experience my self-awareness? :)
Can you explain what it is you think Wittgenstein thinks is only names? — Banno
Although, I have read some more about the mystic Wittgenstein. He seemed to assume that there are facts and things that have a property of abstractness that cannot be found in the world. Namely, ethics, aesthetics, and the similar; but, this seems to talk about epiphenomena and not phenomena per se. — Question
Seems like we could discuss ...
• the Moon
• perception of the Moon
• linguistic practices of Moon discussion
They're not the same, so shouldn't we keep them as such? — jorndoe
Realism, by its very account, can't argue itself to be the case simply by pushing semantics. — Michael
If you do not understand that "the cat is on the mat" is about the relation between the cat and the mat, you haven't understood quite a bit. In restricting themselves only to "cat" and "mat" the antirealist is in danger of missing the rather vital bit; it's about cats and mats. — Banno
Is the angel in the painting more than just a mixture of paint? Is the wizard in the story more than just a fictional character? Is the cat that I see more than just a collection of sense-data? Is the Standard Model more than just an instrumental tool? — Michael
Then explain why there is the metaphysically-primary, fundamentally existent material reality that you (or at least some people) believe in. — Michael Ossipoff
What would an explanation look like in this case? More words.
I could throw spit balls at you until you agree that there are indeed spitballs.
Would that help?
"Thanatos" 's wasn't discussing philosophy. His conduct in this instance is just that of the ordinary usual internet-abuser and flamewarrior, sadly ubiquitous on the Internet.
Michael Ossipoff
Nothing you say in your "counter" to my quote above it counters or even effectively addresses what I said at all. I never made a physicalist belief; I just correctly said our facts are our reflections of the material reality of the universe; I never said they weren't part of our reality as well.
And the only big, blatant brute-fact is your statement calling my statement one, as my statements can and have been explained, and you don't explain or support yours at all. And your referring to your outside in-supported topic with the interesting name does not suffice or stand as explanation or support.
A primary, fundamentally-existent material reality is a brute-fact. Physicalism and "Naturalism" need to posit that brute-fact. That's what makes it unparsimonious...not the fact that someone assumes that Physicalism is correct.
A primary, fundamentally existent material reality Is not a "brute-fact," as a brute-fact is something that cannot be explained and a primary, fundamentally existent material reality can be explained. Michael doesnt' know what "brute-fact" means.
.I didn't name-call. I said you posted blather, which isn't calling you a name.
.And you are the one who wasn't specific at all.
.So, you're just being hypocritical. And you're particularly hypocritical here where you become the only one name-calling here, calling me two names.:
"Thanatos" 's wasn't discussing philosophy. His conduct in this instance is just that of the ordinary usual internet-abuser and flamewarrior, sadly ubiquitous on the Internet.”—Michael Ossipoff
.And you're the one who was unable to name where I made mis-statements and errors and then show how.
I said that Physicalism has a brute-fact. You said you didn’t think so, and I pointed out that the independently-existent, objective, fundamentally-existent, metaphysically-primary physical world that you (or at least someone) believe in is a brute-fact, unless you can explain it or quote from someone who has.You accused me of having made a "brute-fact,"
.and I asked you to show how and you continually failed to do so.
.I never made a physicalist belief
.; I just correctly said our facts are our reflections of the material reality of the universe; I never said they weren't part of our reality as well.
.And the only big, blatant brute-fact is your statement calling my statement one
., as my statements can and have been explained, and you don't explain or support yours at all.
.And then you again failed to support your claim, as I requested, that my statement was a "brute-fact," instead providing a tautology not backing your claim at all.
.A primary, fundamentally-existent material reality is a brute-fact.
.Physicalism and "Naturalism" need to posit that brute-fact. That's what makes it unparsimonious...not the fact that someone assumes that Physicalism is correct.
.And I made specifically clear, as you wrongly claimed I didn't, how that was wrong:
A primary, fundamentally existent material reality is not a "brute-fact," as a brute-fact is something that cannot be explained, and a primary, fundamentally existent material reality can be explained.
Ok, but you could say a thin man not being in a doorway has nothing to do with a fat man not being there. Or, if they do have something to do with each other, then I guess we can drag in other locations, characters and even Julius Caesar. I'm talking about the problem of identity-criteria for facts. — Cuthbert
What is the ontology of 'facts'.
The early Wittgenstein postulated that the world is the totality of facts, not things. — Posty McPostface
What does he mean by asserting the existence of facts in logical space? Does he mean to say that the world is everything that is the case, which means that the world is what configuration objects have in the world between one another?
I have a hard time seeing these facts about the world as observer-independent
When we assume that facts exist, we are implicitly committing ourselves to a form of nominalism as opposed to viewing things as mutually dependent and holistic.
as opposed to viewing things as mutually dependent and holistic.
When we assert the ontology of the universe as facts and not things, we seem to be saying that objects are nominalist, but, as opposed to what?
Are all of these facts observer dependent?
Because otherwise, everything would consist of thing's and not facts if it weren't.
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