There is so much to reply to, I don't know if I can get to all of it.
It all comes down to "why do anything?". Once you go through the dialectic, it leads to questioning procreation and survival. And rightfully, it questions modern secular philosophies like hedonism, "economics as religion", and existentialism. This doesn't mean to then turn to the warm embrace of religion. That is a falsehood as well.
However, the universality of some religious ideas (the One, Nirvana, etc.) can counteract the absurdity of minutia-mongering. If you JUST figured out how that transmission works, you would be a better person, more useful. If you JUST figured out how to start an innovative X, more useful. If you JUST figured out how to solve the meaning and essence of words (philosophy of language debates), or the best physics model (theoretical physics debates), or know the intricate details of any subject, you will be edified with your knowledge. You will be BETTER, you will be USEFUL. QUESTION ALL OF THIS THINKING, whether you think minutia-mongering is more USEFUL, makes you BETTER, or you think MEANING comes from delving deeper into the minutia of a topic at hand you think is important.
As for the "religious experience", people generally seem to mean "flow states" or "meditative psychological states". These are ways to preoccupy the chatter of the restless mind. — schopenhauer1
As for the first paragraph, it seems to me that all values are arbitrarily asserted. So you have to arbitrarily decide whether life is worth living, and then go from there. I have decided that it is worth living.
It seems like the second paragraph is how we often get stuck looking for the "next thing".
I'm aware that religious experience often is associated with alternative states of mind, which I think are still important. I am more concerned with changing the general/usual state of mind.
Sounds like a fairly conservative take on good. I am uncertain what 'good' means and how it can be identified. The only thing I can say is that to cause suffering deliberately would appear to be bad. Does it follow that to prevent suffering is good?
Aren't all human choices motivated by wanting to feel satisfied in some way, regardless of whether it involves pleasure or pain? Isn't that why we have the idea of psychological egoism? Even when people act in ways that appear to be self-sacrificing or aimed at benefiting others, they are actually motivated by the pursuit of personal satisfaction, whether it be through direct pleasure, the avoidance of guilt, or the fulfilment of a sense of duty.
Doing good to satisfy a philosophy or please a god would ultimately seem to be a pursuit of personal pleasure. Do you think one can transcend self-interest? — Tom Storm
First paragraph. I think values are arbitrarily asserted. Although in a state of nature, before a person has developed much, it seems like good is associated with pleasure and bad is associated with pain. However, humans can learn to associate good and bad with almost anything as adults. Consciously thinking about what things we ought to consider good and bad is the point of this discussion. Because of the arbitrariness of value-assertion, using an external guide as a rule (such as a religious tradition) can be very helpful.
Second paragraph: I know subjectively speaking, I might think to myself, "I'd rather be playing video games, but it would be better for me to do the dishes," and then I will do the dishes. So my subjective experience is that I don't always do what I want. I suppose it could be argued that I get some satisfaction from doing the right thing, or that I really just don't want to feel guilty, or that I don't want to have to eat off a dirty plate later. Or maybe I choose to do the dishes because I know that otherwise my wife would do them, and I want to make things easier on her. It seems to me that if it is possible to think that I am good and therefore I do good things for myself, then it ought to be possible to think that another person is good for their own sake, and to want to do good things for that person (although this kind of thought probably requires some degree of training). It might be possible that if I didn't get some kind of personal satisfaction somewhere deep inside from helping another person, that I wouldn't do it. But my subjective experience is that I can value another person for his/her own sake.
Perhaps this is a problem with considering a monastic life to be conducive to developing psychological insight? Considered from a neuroscientific perspective, a monastic life could be considered to be starving one's brain of the input that comes with interacting with diverse people in diverse situations. It doesn't seem to me like a monastic life would be very conducive to developing robust intuitons regarding human psychology.
To take it back to Christianity, do you think the diversity of people who Jesus is purported to have associated with might have been relevant to Jesus being particularly psychologically insightful? — wonderer1
I actually lived at a monastery once, and it was very useful for learning about myself. I would not have gotten the psychological insight that I have without having been at the monastery. I suppose if I lived my whole life at the monastery, however, without having had experience of the broader world, then I probably would not be as psychologically developed.
If I understand the story of Jesus correctly, he was basically a mature person and ready to do his mission by the time he was 30. Maybe he developed more after that, but it seems like he was mostly already who he was by the time he started ministering.
Well, obviously all of our instincts, desires, and emotions are wired to keep us alive. But it seems to me that the way emotions do that is that they make us try to make ourselves happy. It seems like a common-sense thing that we prefer to be happy rather than sad.
— Brendan Golledge
You make two unrelated statements. First you say the way emotions help keep us alive is to try to make ourselves happy. This is mostly wrong. Then you say that we prefer to be happy than sad, which is generally true, but irrelevant. — T Clark
I don't understand what the problem is. I would assume that most of the stuff that makes us happy would have been useful for our ancestors for staying alive, and that therefore aiming towards happiness is generally useful for our survival. This seems to me to be the same as that we prefer to be happy than sad. Where is the confusion?
Next you argue about instincts/desires/emotions. It seems to me that you are arguing about the definition of words. I realize that if you're talking about how those words are commonly used, then what I said was not right. But when I was talking about instincts/desires/emotions, I was giving definitions that I find useful for the purpose of discussion. They seem to me to be a complete description of the sensations that we feel that encourage us to do one thing or another.
This seems like a very simplistic analysis. More than that - it's presumptuous unless you are a student of religion, which you indicate you are not. — T Clark
I have not studied every single religion in the world in-depth (although I do have a cursory knowledge of Taoism, which you mentioned before). I have studied Christianity a great deal. I even lived at a monastery for a few months.
I disagree with just about everything in this paragraph. — T Clark
Lots of people have told me things like, "What you said is contradictory", or "I disagree", but if they don't provide an argument, then I have no reason to change my mind.
Re Kafka - I suspect that if you don't discover him in your 20's, he may be less affecting. I like The Metamorphosis and The Trial best. — Tom Storm
I think I was made to read, "The Metamorphosis" in high school. I only understood it at the surface level that some dude turned into a bug, and that it was meant to be a horror story. If there was some kind of psychological lesson to be learned from the story, then I missed it.
Considering that psychology is a science
— wonderer1
Hardly. Surely not in the sense he is meaning there: giving explanation to natural events (Zeus and lightning). — Lionino
I don't think there is much knowledge of physical sciences in religion. But I do think that religion is how people understood their psychology. The morals of the people were embedded in their religious stories.
Even though I don't believe in the literal truth of these stories, I am still inspired by them sometimes. The first example that comes to mind is that in Norse mythology, all the gods know ahead of time who they are going to fight in ragnarok, and that they will all die. But they all choose to go fight anyway. This seems inspiring to me. It seems to me to be a good thing that even if things are bad and you know you can't win, it is good to fight anyway. But in real life, we don't have prophecy, so we never really know with certainty that something is hopeless, like the Norse god do.
People are born without instruction manuals. The only instruction manuals are written by other players. So, I think it's no wonder that people got everything mixed up. Ancient people likely didn't have the concepts of "objective" (existing independently of the self) and "subjective" (occurring from within the self), or the idea of the unconscious, so it's no wonder that they got everything all mixed up. Google says that the first occurrence of the word unconscious was only a few hundred years ago. It seems to me that if people didn't even have a word for a thing, then they likely didn't have the concept either. But we have the experience that thoughts and feelings come to us from we know not where. So where did people think that they came from? They thought their spontaneous inner experiences came from gods (like Aphrodite = lust and Ares = anger), or from angels and demons. So, in a certain sense, people really did experience their gods. Modern people just don't believe in their interpretations of their experiences. So, although most religious people don't know this, their religious beliefs are actually how they model their psychology.
The paragraph does seem to be consonant with recent thinking on the relation between affectivity, cognition and values. For instance, enactivist approaches to cognitive psychology insist that cognitive and affective processes are closely interdependent, with affect, emotion and sensation functioning in multiple ways and at multiple levels to situate or attune the context of our conceptual dealings with the world , and that affective tonality is never absent from cognition. As Matthew Ratcliffe puts it, — Joshs
I don't really disagree with anything you said there. What I said was a simplification. I realize that emotions don't occur without a thinking process, or without knowledge of events. I also think that we wouldn't think much without emotions. Without some kind of stimulant like an emotion, our brains would probably just sit there doing nothing like a computer that is not receiving instruction. So in a very simplified sense, our values determine our emotional responses, our emotions determine what we think about, and we select our behavior from our thoughts.
Positivist approaches in psychology were based on the same assumptions concerning human behavior, which is why they excluded ‘unobservable and untestable’ concepts like emotion and cognition from their models. Fortunately, things have changed significantly with respect to what is considered empirically testable for both humans and other animals. — Joshs
Part of the point of my original post was that psychology cannot be studied like a hard science because it is difficult/impossible to observe inner psychological states. I was arguing that people ought to be interested in their own psychology as a real subject of study, even if they have to go it alone. And people like myself who make general claims about psychology have a hard time because we can't easily demonstrate that things are the way we say they are.