There is practical life (in the sense of earning a living) and then there is contemplation and study and creative pursuits. Not always easy to balance — John

There's deeper problems than just balancing I think. First even the need to balance is anachronistic - work should be a creative and fulfilling activity in and of itself. The fact that it isn't and there needs to be a separate time for creativity means that one is living a divided life, and probably doing both half-heartedly. In addition, if you honestly play the scenario in your mind that you don't have to earn a living anymore, and you can just do whatever you want, you'll see that you'd get amazingly bored, and so you'd still return to some form of work. That's why I eventually want to get involved in politics and my community, because otherwise there's not much that you can do apart from work work work - which, combined with study, is pretty much all I'm doing now...

What are you reading of Hegel? If this interpretation comes from reading the Phenomenology, can you cite some passages in support of it or at least provide some references to page numbers? — John

I have never finished the Phenomenology, most of my knowledge of Hegel comes indirectly from secondary sources. I've read for example Yovel's translation + commentary on Hegel's Preface to Phenomenology, I've read his interpretation of Hegel as a Spinozist (although an improved version of Spinoza) in Spinoza and other Heretics, I've read parts of Frederick Beiser's Hegel, I've read Macherey's comparison/discussion of Hegel and Spinoza (in Hegel ou Spinoza), and I've started to read the Phenomenology beyond the Preface but have never finished it. Oh and I've started to read the book you have suggested after I "stole" it from online O:)

So yeah, those are the references briefly for my positions. There probably are others but they aren't directly about Hegel. As I said, I'm not a Hegel expert like you :P

The insight I am referring to is personal insight of a kind which cannot be inter-subjectively corroborated. It's just like the insight of the artist, musician or poet which can be expressed only evocatively. What the artist, musician, poet or mystic is 'speaking' about, cannot be explained in propositional language..Painting, sculpture, music, poetry and religious and mystical literature are all like this; it moves you or it does not. If you are not moved by the arts or mystical literature then that says more about you than it says about the arts or mystical literature. — John

Okay I'm moved by them - for a few seconds, minutes or hours, and then back to planting potatos in the garden :P The potatoes don't plant themselves you know, and man does not live on spirit alone. It seems that my place is still in the world - planting potatoes - everything else is just an escape from that, is it not?

Do you include philosophical literature under the 'popular culture' heading? — John

Obviously not... >:O Common man, philosophy is frowned upon in popular culture... do you see folks like Miley Cyrus interested in philosophy?! That's popular culture. Popular culture is empty of content anyway - it's a culture used to brainwash idiots to consume more, and give in to their base desires...

Then what do you mean? What is this "insight" that you are talking about, and how does it relate to the rest of the world? Again, we live in this world. That "insight" will not save us from having to go and plant the cabbage to eat it. We'll have that insight and all, and then back to the everyday we go.

There'd be a paucity of philosophical literature; and if you found yourself capable metaphysical speculation you would either have to keep it to yourself or risk censure and perhaps prosecution, incarceration, or even execution, depending on how prohibitive your society was and how severe your heresy was seen to be. — John

That depends. With the advent of technology and modernity there has been a division produced in culture. There is popular culture - the media, TV, Hollywood, etc. and then there is the real culture, which is quite often ignored and forgotten. The kind of politically enforced culture would be the popular one. Whosoever escapes the popular culture can freely dwell in the real culture. It's just popular culture that would be restricted and controlled. That's the kind of politically enforced view that I would accept to live under.

I don't think it's right to say that Hegel "brings down" the distinction between phenomenon and noumenon if by that you mean abolishes it. I think it is right if by "bring down' you mean 'immanentizes'. He wants to show that the in itself is not in itself for itself, but only in itself for us. — John

What I mean by brings down the distinction is this... In my reading:

Hegel maintains the Kantian Subjective Logic whereby the Subject and the Object are mutually constituted through the synthetic unity of apperception (the noumenon), thereby also maintaining the a priority of the noumenon with regards to the phenomenon. However - Hegel does shatter the epistemological distinction between the noumenon and phenomenon - both the noumenon and the phenomenon are known. Reality is not a mystery. My reading probably is quite close to Yovel's reading of Hegel.

How would we recognize it, if rigorous reason can lead to multitudes of metaphysical views, each based on different starting assumptions? — John

I don't think it actually does, as you know. So there is even disagreement about this, because there are others like me as well.

Would not recognition of a "higher philosophy" be itself a 'higher' recognition and thus necessarily be a supra-rational process? Wouldn't it be something like the gnosis of the mystics, or the abhijñā of Buddhism? If such a process is possible and if it yields genuine insight into the nature of reality, then surely it must a 'higher' intuition, perhaps we could say an intellectual intuition, that transcends logic and defies rational explanation. — John

:s You mean naval gazing Sir?

Would you rather live in a world like that, or a world in which a politically enforced predominant view is mandated, and competing views are at the very least frowned upon, and at the extreme enforced? — John

To be honest, I wouldn't actually care much, so long as there was no state police involved, or abuse in the workforce by the bosses towards the workers.

"Substance: A thing whose existence is dependent on no other thing" — Agustino

And Spinoza actually corrected this by not calling Substance a "thing"... ;)

By the way this is a good review of the book:
http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/32325-hegel-or-spinoza-2/

Read it, and then if you're interested, buy the book if you haven't already! :P And don't get too scared by the "materialist" reading of Spinoza lol :P

It's more accurately what we know through — Wayfarer

It's not only what you know through. It's that through which the whole empirical world is constituted (not only your self - in fact your self and the world presuppose one another - that which constitutes them both is the noumenon - the real). Hegel was fundamentally right in identifying the limits of the subject to also be the limits of the world - hence ultimately bringing down the distinction between noumenon and phenomenon, in the sense of rendering us access to both.

What exactly do you think it is in Descartes' own notion of substance that makes his substance dualism inconsistent? — John

"Substance: A thing whose existence is dependent on no other thing"
- This is virtually the same as Spinoza's definition of substance, and therefore entails the same conclusions when worked out. Descartes however (incoherently) postulated Created Substances apart from this one Substance - these were what his dualism consist of in fact. Mental and Physical Substances are created substances, and depend ultimately on the One infinite Substance - God. In fact, Descartes states this clearly:

"Created Substance: A thing whose existence is dependent on nothing other than God"

These are subsumed under Spinoza's modes - as expression of Substance.

Can you site a passage from Spinoza where he states that substance consists in becoming? — John

Again, as this has to do with the system as a whole there is no particular passage which comes to mind. I don't have the Ethics close at hand at the moment, but regardless, the idea is that Substance is generative, and the modes are not. Hence there can be no becoming of modes if there is no Substance. You have to understand how the elements of Spinoza's system define each other, and how they are related together - in other words you must understand Spinozist logic - to draw these conclusions. Without Substance the modes do not occur - they are in fact inconceivable.

In relation to your Hegelian reading of Spinoza, have you read Macherey's Hegel ou Spinoza? (PS: it comes out in favor of Spinoza :P - and I can tell you that it covers EXACTLY this ground that you're asking me to go over in a lot more detail than I can go over here)

then the becoming of substance is not real, and then what are we left with? — John

The becoming of Substance is an activity - in fact, that's all that Substance consists of - it is the Being of Becoming. The modes exist because of Becoming. The modes are things - particular states - they require some underlying activity to make them possible. Think like waves in an ocean... what is the underlying activity that makes waves possible? The current. The waves are nothing but a manifestation of this underlying activity.

You say dreaming is real and yet you say modality is an illusion. Which is it to be, you cannot have it both ways? — John

It is an analogy - drop it once you have climbed up on it. You cannot step on the other side of the river if you don't let go of the raft. Analogies are of course always imperfect. However, it seems to me that you have missed the point of the analogy. The point was to show that things (dreams) are constituted by activities [dreaming] (even at lower levels of explanation), and that modes, being things, are constituted by God - the underlying activity which alone is Real and makes them possible. Now in what does God's Reality consist? In Becoming - in the eternal coming and going of these illusory and transient modes. God depends on the modes but not on any particular mode. Indeed it is incoherent to think God without thinking the modes - Substance cannot be thought without its modes, since Substance is an activity, and there can be no activity without its products. HOWEVER - no particular mode, or set of modes is necessary for God to exist; ie the only necessity is that there is no necessity.

If you go to this site, you'll find something very similar to what apo is always going on about...

http://www.dichotomistic.com/index.html

Not that I agree with this Peircean triadic stuff, but yeah, it's out there. A large part of it feels like a nice story you know, but then I always question myself like "what have I actually learned?" and it's a little bit of a blank. Like yeah, cool story, but so what? There are a few Peircean thinkers in this semiotic vein it seems, but not that many in today's world. It's an interesting way to think about things, but I don't see it being very productive. More of a way to think about what we already know than to discover something new.

How do you know it's historically accurate? — Thorongil

Wayfarer worked at NASA back in the day X-)

This makes no sense and you certainly need to clarify your position vis-a-vis Hobbes. Our state of nature - which according to Hobbes is famously solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short - is neither just nor unjust [13.13], which is why he believes that the passions should be channelled by the fear of an authority that would ultimate control them. If Plato argues decisively against 'this conception of justice' as you have put it, how exactly is that wrong? And why have you brought in the concept of utilitarianism? — TimeLine

Yes the state of nature is brutish bla bla, correct. So people accept the limitation of the law, only because the state of nature is a greater evil - that's social contract. The social contract is essentially utilitarian - it asks what is the best thing for the greatest number of people? It sees the law as ultimately oppressive, but a necessary form of oppression.

Now according to Plato - accepting the law and justice occurs because these are goods in themselves, not as a means of escaping a greater evil - not as a utility, or a limitation undertaken because of fear of a greater evil.

Now seeing social contract in Plato is like seeing communism in Plato - both silly misinterpretations of the Republic happening when we inject our modern way of thinking and seeing into Plato.

I choose to keep company with those fearless enough to genuinely admit to their errors, confident that I am rational enough to respect - and even admire - such an honourable gesture. — TimeLine

Well I would admit my errors if there existed any. There are posts which are erroneous, but I don't consider that one to be one of those posts. If you find one which is erroneous, I will admit to it, as I have admitted many times in the past...

Now don't get me wrong, I would apologise if I thought I made a mistake - it's human to make mistakes and commit errors - but I just took that as a joke, never intended it to be taken as otherwise. I'm sorry to see that you took it in a different way though...

I have encountered some pretty vicious men but never once have I said that 'all men are vicious' not even 'all the men I have met' because I am respectful enough to know the fallacy with such hasty generalisations; but to go as far as mocking their 'almond sized brains' and other clearly sexist remarks? — TimeLine

Why is it a hasty generalization? I never said all women are so. I said "most", based on those I have met. Almond size brain is a joke - clearly. It obviously doesn't refer to the actual size of their brain, but a metaphor for lack of intelligence. The curious thing is why you don't interpret it as a joke. In addition in that comment I said that it isn't lack of intelligence which is most upsetting, but other character traits, which I doubt you'd consider virtuous.

And what's wrong with a hasty generalization in the kind of talk that was going on there? That wasn't serious philosophy, nor was I trying to make a point there... It was just playful conversation, not much thought goes into it precisely because it's not serious. Now if you take the non-serious as serious and therefore draw serious conclusions on it, who is making a mistake? This is exactly one of the problems of this kind of political correctness you advocate. A writer I like, Max Picard, once wrote that Communists aren't even human, despite their professed morality, because they don't even understand a joke - everything is so serious for them.

Are you trying to bring me to the dark side? :-O >:O

"This is an excellent book. It performs a significant service by its uninhibited exposure of Hegel's dark side."―Michael Inwood, Trinity College, Oxford, International Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 42, No. 3, September 2002 — Review of the book you recommended

Sorry, bert1 really threw me off there. — Question

I wonder what made him say that. — Question

@bert1 enjoys running maybe? >:) >:O

You weren't serious about that last post were you? I mean, that's a hideous thing to say to get me riled up over some stupid emotions about a rather old lady with issues with drugs, alcohol, and sex.

Like you're literally telling me to go down to the dirt, wallow in it and then emerge a new man?

What would Marcus Aurelius say? — Question

Have you not read the:

however on a not so serious note — Agustino

Combined with my agreement that:

I don't think this is a good idea for spiritual development and advancement. — Question

I agree — Agustino

? :P

You people.

I am a happy person. At the very most I'd just have a phone conversation with her or send e-mails.

Some of you scare me and wonder what philosophy has taught you. — Question

>:O >:O >:O

I don't think this is a good idea for spiritual development and advancement. — Question

I agree, however on a not so serious note >:) , running a shagathon with her doesn't sound like a bad idea >:O >:O :-O

making Kant more easily comprehensible. — John

It's not just making Kant comprehensible, it's also synthesising Kant with other philosophers.

Hegel's concerns at least (I don't know much about Schelling) were far more comprehensive than Spinoza's as Hegel was attending to the whole dialectical development of speculative reason, and understanding each phase as a piece in the whole puzzle. — John

Yes, but it is a different style of presentation that is at stake. Spinoza gives a completed system, Hegel gives a Phenomenology - the process of completion of the system. Spinoza is more difficult to learn and understand though, since he doesn't show how his system is completed in the first place. Understanding some Hegel (or Schopenhauer), does help in understanding Spinoza though.

Schopenhauer actually criticizes Schelling and Hegel for doing precisely for following Spinoza in his On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason — John

Yes

I have long thought that Schopenhauer himself appropriates Spinoza's notion of conatus and redresses it as Will, but I can't remember encountering any acknowledgment of this from Schopenhauer. — John

Yes I think so, but he also, at least early Schopenhauer, anthropomorphises the thing-in-itself by identifying it completely as the Will. Both Schopenhauer and Hegel are Spinozists though, effectively performing a re-reading of Kant through the lens of Spinoza.

Some of his bitter diatribes against Hegel are quite amusing, and they, along with his repeated references to his "prize-winning essay" and the immense importance of his own work clearly show his monumental ego. — John

>:O >:O >:O Personally I love his insults, but then, like him, I'd also say I have a big ego :P - which explains why I admire people like Schopenhauer.

having me 'prove' — TimeLine

I never asked you to prove anything. I just asked you to show me where Plato approves of social contract theory.

the adequacy of the link — TimeLine

I don't think that link is adequate. I myself have read Plato, and have studied Plato scholarship, including anthropological resources about Ancient Greece (Eric Voegelin's Order and History for example). Now I understand that the Greeks didn't have the conception of individuality that we have today, hence theories which are possible today, would have been unthinkable for them.

In addition to this are opposing views of freedom that nevertheless illustrates a key role in his thoughts on justice such as that of Glaucon and the Ring of Gyges in the Republic. — TimeLine

Glaucon actually advocates a view which is similar but not identical to social contract, namely that people associate under law, and accept the law, because without being bounded by the law (what Hobbes would call the state of nature) is worse than accepting the limitations of the law (the Leviathan state in Hobbes's parlance). Now Plato argues decisively AGAINST this conception of justice. Justice is an end in itself, not chosen based on utilitarian consideration as in social contract theory.

I have no time for childish boys who are so afraid of facing their intellectual and emotional failures by pretending once exposed that 'they were just joking'. You can shove your LOL's where it hurts. — TimeLine

Okay, well obviously you are taking it seriously, and it has caused you upset as otherwise you wouldn't bring an irrelevant comment from a different thread in discussion over here, nor would you throw these invectives my way. Now while I am sorry for upsetting you, I have to ask what exactly has caused you upset?

If you said, for example, "most men are brutish idiots" I wouldn't be upset, because I don't identify as "most men". So why do I get accused of gender bias for making an observation? In fact, if you are rational you'll see that my comments entail no position on women whatsoever. I simply made an observation. This observation could have a thousand and one explanations, including, for example, that most women aren't permitted to develop their intellectual side in society because of oppression... but since you rush through with judgements you will of course miss all those possibilities.

As for me being "exposed" you're talking as if you took out some "secret video" of myself saying something terrible and bringing it out in public - exposing me. But you did no such thing - I freely said what I said in public - there is no "running away" when exposed, because I exposed myself to begin with. There's no being scared of talking about what I said... I'm willing to talk about it if you want. However what you're doing is much alike what some people would do when they hear me talk to a close friend and calling him, for example, "a retarded idiot" - he doesn't mind it, because he knows I don't mean it seriously. It would be preposterous if someone came to me and said "Oh how vulgar you are, how dare you talk to your best friend so and so" bullshit. Then they will take words I have used, and give them a completely different intention than I actually gave them. They'll just be good politicians, but nothing more. Even close people for example - say my girlfriend - called me idiot and stupid frequently - not as insults, but in a joking way, that we both laughed and enjoyed. I don't see what's wrong with this, but if you do, then please enlighten this "childish boy" O:)

You agree with Hegel now, against Schopenhauer? Actually Hegel's philosophy was arguably very influenced by the mystical tradition, so it is by no means as cut and dried as you are painting it. For an interesting discussion see: — John

:s I agree with Hegel's conception of how we access the noumenon, not with some of his other positions. This is in fact no different than the Spinozist conception, but since Spinoza (the improved Hegel :P ) isn't in this discussion, I'm using Hegel as an alternative.

We should maybe discuss this, but I probably wouldn't agree with a mystical interpretation of Hegel. But I do know Hegel was influenced by the mystical tradition, both by Holderin, and by Schelling. The book you linked looks interesting, I will have a look, thanks! :)

Haven't you done just that when the joke has been about something you disapprove of, like abortion? Or, do you no longer have a gripe with the likes of Amy Schumer? — Sapientia

Well there's a few things here. First of all, I'm not a public person - an educator by virtue of the number of people I reach and who imitate me - the way Amy is. Second of all, Amy isn't just joking, she actually does adopt those pro-abortion positions. So the problem is that she's using jokes as a way to educate others to think like her - it's a means of persuasion. That's what I disagree with. Now in my case none of those two conditions apply.

Right, so I agree with that objection to Kant that you have listed, in the way you have phrased it too. Allow me to explain. Kant goes at length in the Critique to establish the Transcendental Logic, and the synthetic unity of apperception, which alone makes the empirical world possible - including the "I think" of representation - possible. Thereby, Kant has identified a process which is noumenal - which is presupposed by representation. Since representation is real, then this process which alone makes it possible must also be real. So this process then is the noumenon - the unexperienced cause of all experience - this is basically what Hegel, Schopenhauer, Schleiermacher, etc. identified as the noumenon. This process constitutes both the self and the world of representation, and we do know it. These thinkers disagreed how we know it though - Schopenhauer and Schleiermacher thought we know it through mystical intuition, while Hegel thought we know it through speculative reason. I agree with Hegel. We know it by virtue of becoming aware how it is that we and our world itself are generated - by speculative reason.

The social contract theory was suggested in the Republic. — TimeLine

Plato had absolutely no notion of social contracts. Furthermore, Greeks didn't have a developed notion of individuality to begin with... These are just being read back into Plato. If you don't believe me, head back to the Republic and show me otherwise. In fact, even Plato's use of the state as an analogy of the soul is in part based on the fact that the Greeks didn't have a developed notion of individuality and hence couldn't understand except by reference to the community.

And at least my modern "import" has a fixed sensibility that proves my dedication to virtue — TimeLine

Maybe but it also demonstrates that you're not being intellectually honest with regards to what other philosophers have actually thought and will manipulate their thoughts to fit your own ends.

Do you want me to get started on the profound inanity, viciousness, and lack of humility in the abovementioned comments that expose your own gender-bias and subjective inadequacies? I hardly think you are in a position to remark about liberty and my use of it. — TimeLine

LOL!! You are free to take my jokey comment seriously if that's what you think is the right thing to do, however it would be somewhat silly to assume that the comments someone makes half-jokingly in a thread that had already been sliding off topic actually means anything with regards to how they are as people. That would be like assuming that I'm an idiot because I posted that Rakesh video to Heister LOL! Everyone has an outer and an inner personality, it's silly to judge someone by what they say when they're just joking or not talking seriously.

Ah, but do we? I am inclined to accept the view that nobody knows what anything really is. — Wayfarer

You and Kant, but Hegel, Schopenhauer, and Spinoza before, all rebelled against this separation of noumenon from phenomenon, and granting access only to the one and not to the other. I don't see how Kant's distinction is valid if we don't have access to the noumenon. If we actually don't, then the Kantian distinction is merely a logical formalism, and nothing else.

The notion of substance, as an absolutely static eternity or eternailty is a purely logical, formal notion; it is essentially exactly the same as the notion of identity which we use to understand ourselves, and others and in fact all things as 'something that persists despite changing through time'. — John

It seems to me this is nothing but the typical Hegelian critique. But this is not the correct notion of Spinozist Substance. Substance is not an absolutely static eternity...

The point is that Spinoza does not provide a convincing argument for why there cannot be multiple substances, but only provides an argument for why there cannot be multiple substnaces as he coneives substnace, which is an entirely circular argument that assumes its own conclusion. — John

Spinoza is operating with the notion of substance that he adopted from the medieval Scholastics and from Descartes. If you look for Descartes' definitions of Substence, you will see that they are very similar to Spinoza's. So I don't think Spinoza pulled the concept of Substance out of his ass :P lol Certainly he did change its use though.

Willow to tell me what kind of existence an utterly changeless eternal substance — John

And you keep fighting against an image of Spinoza - I already told you that the utterly changeless and eternal substance is Becoming itself. Becoming - the act of becoming - is eternal and changeless. There is no static Substance. Now it seems that you want to discuss Hegel's conception of Spinoza's Substance. I'm just informing you that that isn't Spinoza's actual conception.

Here you contradict yourself, because on the one hand you say that waking existence is an illusion, and only substance is real, and on the other you say that it is real: "the dreaming is real" — John

The dreaming isn't the dream. The dreaming is the ACTIVITY which constitutes the dream - which makes the dream possible, in your Kantian/Hegelian parlance. This activity is very real - you are actually dreaming. The dream however is an illusion - it isn't permanent or fundamental, but rather it is constituted by the activity of dreaming (which is what is actually fundamental)

Even in relation to a dream, what does it means to say the dreaming is real? How do you think you could you know that you actually been dreaming? It could only be known if your memory that you had been dreaming was of something real, right? So, when you wake you say the dreams were an illusion in relation to the reality of your waking life. — John

You are mistaking the analogy. I'm not speaking empirically. I'm using an empirical analogy to drive a metaphysical point. The analogy is as follows - dreaming is real (in other words the activity which constitutes the dream - this has nothing to do with whether or not I perceive it as constituting the dream, just as it has nothing to do with whether I perceive Becoming as constituting the illusory world around), but the dream is an illusion. In similar fashion Substance - that activity which constitutes the modes - is real - while the modes are an illusion.

without affecting liberty and social well-being — TimeLine

This is nowhere specified in Plato, this is your own typically modern import.

Plato I believe the individual represents the State — TimeLine

Plato didn't believe the individual represents the state, rather he meant that the divided State is an analogy for man's own divided soul. The three classes from his ideal state are references to three different parts of the soul.

the Form is harmony or at least conducive to — TimeLine

It is interesting that the very presupposition of harmony means its absence. The very division of the State in three classes which live together harmoniously through the principle of specialisation where each one has his specific function underscores the disunity that is found in the soul and is only overcome through the dialectical activity of Reason. In other words, harmony isn't a given, per Plato. This is in opposition to, for example, Daoism, where harmony is a given, and it is disturbance of that given which leads to disharmony.

The whole Republic is not about external politics, but about the inner politics of the soul. That is the whole Platonic secret. When read in this manner, all of Plato's contradictions disappear.

it's not there there simply are 'differences' or 'similarities' out there, 'in themselves'; rather, these notions come into being and are sustained by dynamic processes that underlie them, or bring about their undoing (the flea dies...). — StreetlightX

I agree to this. But difference is inherent in this dynamic process you mention - un-eliminable. Indeed identity develops in this process as the result of the interplay of difference.

No, incommensurable means that there's no standard, or measurement that applies to both things in question. — Wosret

That's logically incoherent though. Fire is always different from banana for example, even though they are incommensurable. To specify what fire is, one must negate everything that it is not.

In other words, to specify ~A you must already specify A. And to specify A you must already specify ~A. This presupposes an underlying difference as foundational to their identity. An identity is constituted through difference.

Then there's infinitely many incommensurable ones — Wosret

That's only if you presuppose the opposite system in which identity is basic. But if difference is basic, and identity is a product of difference, then there is no problem - differences simply cannot be incommensurable, they are always dialectical - one difference presupposes the other, and together they form the fractured, always incomplete whole.

For something to be incommensurable with something else presupposes that they have clear and fixed natures. Something is A and something is ~A. ~A is defined and hence constituted with reference to the identity A = A. But if A and ~A are both equally real (as it would make sense for them to be), then both are constituted by their difference, which makes their identities possible.

What if things have identities which are constituted by differences? :-O

I don't see how this warrants a conclusion that the modifications are "illusions", which is apparently the central claim of acosmism, rather than merely a conclusion that the reality of the modifications is finite as opposed to the infinite reality of the substance. — John

To be finite is to be illusory, as I will explain below.

I asked you earlier to cite a passage from Spinoza where he claims precisely that modes are "illusions".. — John

Modes are illusions simply because they aren't Substance, and only Substance necessarily exists and can only be conceived as existing and not otherwise. Only to Substance does existence belong to as essence. There is no relevant passage to cite because it just has to do with the relationship between modes and substance. If you understand what both are - then you will see that modes are contingent on Substance, and thus ultimately illusory, unreal, if eternal and unconstrained existence belongs only to Substance (which Spinoza claims in the first book).

what you think "illusion" could even mean in this context. — John

Illusion means lacking being. Something that becomes lacks being, it never is, it is always in becoming. That's what philosophers starting with Plato have pretty much meant by the word.

Involved in this issue is also the corollary (as I see it) that if the being of substance is distinct from the being of the modes — John

The modes have no being, that's what I'm trying to tell you. Only Substance has Being.

how could it be thought to not be the case that the being of the substance is transcendent of the modes, just as reality is transcendent of illusion? — John

Except that reality isn't transcendent to illusion, but inherent within it. A dream may be an illusion, but that illusion is constituted by reality - the dreaming is real, even though the dream is illusion.

if the being of substance is distinct from the being of the modes (which it must be if one wants to say that the former is real and the latter an illusion) then how could it be thought to not be the case that the being of the substance is transcendent of the modes, just as reality is transcendent of illusion? — John

The modes have no being, they are the particular/temporary manifestations of Becoming. Where is Being? In Becoming - it is the essence of Becoming (of the process of Becoming to make that clear, not of its temporary and illusory manifestations). Being is thus immanent in Becoming. In addition, particular manifestations (modes) of Becoming never have Being, because they are always ceasing to be and becoming something else, and are thus never what they are - they are non-Being

It seems to me that you have a tendency to evade difficult issues like this by changing the subject or mentioning how many books you have read. — John

Well I certainly didn't mean to evade any issue, I only cited the books in reference to your opinion that there is (significant) disagreement among Spinoza scholars over Spinozism.

I just want to address this one issue to see whether you can give a coherent and consistent account of yourself — John

Ok, well I think I have given a consistent account above (especially the underlined bits). If you find difficulties and inconsistencies in it, please specify them so that I can address them clearly.

At various points in your preceding posts, you refer to 'reality as it is', 'independently of models'. But, that presumes you can know 'reality as it is', when that is precisely what is at issue. — Wayfarer

Just because reality is not immediately and non-inferrentially given doesn't mean we don't know what it is. The Myth of the Given isn't necessarily resolved by postulating an inaccessible noumenon as Kant did. There are even materialists who reject the Myth of the Given and use this as a way to justify that Sellars' Manifest Image (phenomenon) presupposes and is influenced by a Scientific Image (noumenon) to which we have access to.

Maximising the separation is night and day different from breaking the connection. — apokrisis

So the separation isn't maximised by breaking the connection? Is this what your claim consists in?

Okay I don't understand how that is different from the way I've read it. If our desires are aimed towards ignoring the world ("direction of the desires"), and our desire is ultimately aimed at "escaping into a realm of 'fiction' [created by our own mind]", then it seems to me that we would do well to follow this desire to its conclusions as far as we can. And if we do that, then it seems that we'll live entirely within a fantasy, breaking any link with the actual real world, similar to the madman. Where am I going wrong with that?

Get back to me when you want to discuss what I actually said and not what you are pretending I said. — apokrisis

:-} Well what have you actually said? How is what you said different from how I've rephrased it? Instead of being all arrogant and so forth, you could actually correct my (mis)understanding of your position.

I enjoyed spending time with her a whole lot. She used to sleep all day and be up all night, so I usually didn't get to see her until like 11 pm. I'd take her out to one of the few shit restaurants that are open that late, and then go back to her place. I very very much enjoyed her company, more than I have anyone's, probably ever. I definitely enjoy talking to women more than men just in general.

I often went days with literally no sleep at all, and continued a physically demanding job, just so that I could spend time with her. She thought that I always stayed up with her because I always wanted sex, which I definitely wasn't going to turn down, but that isn't why. I enjoyed her company more than anyone's, and enjoyed being seen in public with her a lot too. — Wosret

Sounds like good times :D

She wasn't a bad person, I'm just an emotional slut, and expect people to open their inner most selves to me like right away, and act like they're immoral if they don't. It was only a couple of months in... shouldn't have probably expected so much openness so quickly, and could be been more sublt and patient... — Wosret

I am similar to you in this expectation, although I think it has to be largely with the way I am. I open quite easily to others. Well not immediately, but if I were to start dating a girl, within say 6 months she'd know most intimate details about me, and I wouldn't hide my vulnerabilities, etc. and I would expect her to do the same, although I've learned not to be too concerned about my expectations, because other people are different and sometimes they take much longer to be honest and open.