Okay, so how does a property of meaning, truth, depend on who is assessing it? Do you mean to say that truth is assigned to meaning by the person?I wouldn't say "everything," but "all truth." Not everything is truth (judgments). That's just one activity that sentient beings engage in. It's a very small percentage of all phenomena in the world. Also, this part is my idiosyncratic view. On the standard view, just how the property obtains is left unanalyzed. — Terrapin Station
Okay, so according to you, truth is a property of meaning right? Meanings can be true or false?They're not language per se, they're meaning. — Terrapin Station
Can propositions exist outside of language?You understand that propositions are not the actual words used, right? — Terrapin Station
Does my dog understand propositions?How is that not a proposition? — Terrapin Station
Yes by indicating "there it is". But even my dog understands what pointing my finger means - it means "there's the ball" - a fact, not a proposition in this case, because my dog doesn't understand language, and isn't a language using animal.How does it show that? Not by indicating something like "There (is) . . ."? — Terrapin Station
It shows them the state of affairs they're interested to know about.What meaning does it have? — Terrapin Station
It has meaning, but that meaning is not a statement. It's not a proposition.Pointing your finger has no meaning? — Terrapin Station
Okay, say I don't make any statement, and I point my finger to a drawer opposite me. They seem to be satisfied by that, and yet I made no statement. So how for fuck's sake do they want me to make a statement?As I JUST SAID: They want the person to MAKE A STATEMENT — Terrapin Station
No this isn't about their beliefs. This is about how they're using the term. What are they asking you for when they ask for the truth?You're not at all comprehending the idea that philosophical analysis is NOT a reporting of how someone happens to think about a term re their beliefs about what it is. — Terrapin Station
Well but it's not. If someone tells you "tell me the truth" in a specific context, say you lied about where the car keys are, then you're not going to answer with any proposition which has the modality true. They're not asking for a proposition. They're asking for a fact! So in what sense is the philosophical analysis largely an analysis of how the term functions in normal usage? If it was that, then you'd see that part of the meaning of truth includes facts.I would say that philosophical analysis of a term like "truth" is largely an analysis of how the term functions in normal usage, relative to coherence requirements, relative to what actually exists, etc. And that is the context in which truth refers to a property of propositions. — Terrapin Station
And it's neither simply because the way you use the word truth, it doesn't have the same MEANING it has in common language. That's my problem. That's why it's not a category error. If jealousy means pink, then to speak of jealous trainers isn't a category error, because the meaning of the word is different. Why is it so hard to understand this @Terrapin Station?Neither. — Agustino
Neither.Which implies, "Category errors can not occur in normal language usage." Do you really want to claim that? And would you be claiming it as a definition of "category error," or are you just saying that there's some relation between the two that prevents category errors from ever occurring in normal language usage? — Terrapin Station
Sure, but meaning is given to words by the context in which they are used and the manner in which they are used.At any rate, philosophy isn't journalism about how people colloquially think about language re what their beliefs are with respect to the terms they use. It's not simple philology, lexicography or anthropology. — Terrapin Station
That would depend on what laws you're thinking about, but mostly it's not the case. You're under the laws of the country you're activating in. For example, if a Nigerian earns his dough from within the borders of the UK, even if he's selling to Nigeria, he'll pay income tax in the UK. He can't pay in Nigeria, because we have a few international standards to avoid double taxation. And in either case, the Nigerian government wouldn't be able to check him. There may be taxes on exporting to there that he has to pay to the Nigerian government though.and I believe also our home country if living elsewhere — Michael
Ah I see, yes in that kind of deal that's the case. I thought he owns the forum/website "thephilosophyforum" and hosts with them - because that would be different. He would pay for the hosting and other features available to build the forums, but the domain would be his, and so he would be responsible over the content.The website itself is owned by PlushForums. jamalrob just pays to use it. So unless the website itself is running on a Spanish server, I don't think there's anything they can do (aside from blocking it from being viewed in Spain). — Michael
But it's not at all a category error for the very simple reason that it's not the way truth is commonly used in our language. If your philosophy student comes to you and says my dog ate the homework, you're going to say "No, tell me what the truth is!" What the truth is! The truth can't be the modality of a certain proposition, at least not in that context. When you're asking for the truth you're asking for some states of affairs. And truth is simply used in this manner in everyday language. It's part and parcel of what we understand by truth. So fine, you can arbitrarily decide that for philosophical use truth will represent a property of propositions, and fact will represent states of affairs. But if you do that, you merely take the meaning people commonly attribute to the word truth, and split it in two different words. You're still going to have the same issues you had before with truth, only that you'll shift them in two different words. And I think that's problematic precisely because it is mere semantics, it doesn't change the fundamental issues.I think it makes a lot of sense, as I explained in that post. I rather don't think it makes much sense to say that truth and falsehood would be a completely different type of thing, rather than different modalities of the same thing. That would suggest that something is going wrong with one's analysis. It would be like saying that blue is a particular frequency range of electromagnetic radiation, but orange is a type of tennis shoe, or that a major scale (ionian mode) is a particular sequence of whole and half steps, but that a minor scale (aeolian mode) is an emotion. — Terrapin Station
Okay, but shouldn't we dispute the standard view of analytic philosophy then?That's not the case on the standard view re analytic philosophy that I'm referring to and operating in the context of. — Terrapin Station
Why is that?On analysis, folks are uncomfortable with the idea that falsehoods would be a different kind of thing than truths. — Terrapin Station
Again, what's the motivation for saying they should be that?Truths and falsehoods should be two different modalities of the same kind of thing. — Terrapin Station
Yes but why can't there be true or false facts? There can't be false facts, because if something is false, then it can't be factual. And there can't be true facts, because the notion of true is already incorporated within the notion of fact. When you think of a fact, you always think of something that is already true. When I tell you "that's a fact", then I mean that it is the case - ie it is true.So there are no false facts, and there are no true facts. There are simply facts. — Terrapin Station
Yes this is it. This is exactly what you're not understanding. Let me quote Spinoza:I think the question is, what can possibly rationalise or provide the motivation for that? — Wayfarer
I don't see the argument. Where's the argument? All I see is that my questions go unanswered and yet you claim to be right.I'm not biased, I'm presenting a philosophical argument — Wayfarer
Metanoia is an insight, a change of heart, a movement away from the material and towards God, repentance. It's important for Plato because he considers the relationship with the transcendent to be necessary for the well-ordering of the human soul. Does me reciting stuff like a school child change anything?So what is the meaning of 'metanoia', why was that regarded as important in Platonist philosophy? — Wayfarer
If by higher you mean living with love, compassion, courage, loyalty, devotion, and the other virtues and avoiding hatred, improper sexual conduct, etc, then yes there is something higher. But there is nothing higher than that.So - is there a 'higher'? Is the belief that there is 'a higher truth' simply 'a bias'? You tell me. — Wayfarer
Well again - her life wasn't great. Her life was only apparently great to those on the outside. Maybe her husband didn't love her. Maybe she was upset he lost the bid for president. Maybe she had everything but was bored out of her mind, didn't know what to do with her life - as she says, she didn't feel alive. But again - we're not all like that. We're not all in need of a meta-cognitive change. That's why I referred to Spinoza. It's absurd to think that that's the natural disposition of everyone.I don't see the point of the question. The answer would depend on a lot of factors. There are plenty of people who have apparently fantastic lives but are deeply unhappy. I read a newspaper article yesterday about the wife of a US politician who was so misereable she had to get shock therapy and now has become an advocate for Electro-Convulsive Therapy! That's one way to achieve a meta-cognitive change, but I'm sure you agree meditation would be preferable. — Wayfarer
My problem is that it seems to me - I'm not saying it is the case - but it seems to me that you're not willing to rationally analyse the matter from beginning to end - logically. It seems to me that you're biased in other words. That's why it's pushing buttons. It seems to me utterly absurd why someone would think we're all in need of some meta-cognitive change... Or that this could actually be helpful. Because again - it is absurd to me, that someone, in the absence of this meta-cognitive change, would proceed to pour poisons down their throat. I don't know. Is that something you'd do if you didn't have a meta-cognitive change? Because it's not something I would do.So, what's the problem? — Wayfarer
Yeah, of course I agree meditation has benefits. This worldly benefits :P (and I sometimes do practice it)That's one way to achieve a meta-cognitive change, but I'm sure you agree meditation would be preferable. — Wayfarer
Progress doesn't come from competition. Innovation is never the result of competition. Think of your own innovations. It's always finding a niche, doing something differently, being creative, thinking outside the box.Yeah, but without competition, you have no progress. Not everyone can have a product that initially doesn't have any sort of competition. I mean, it's hard to do that nowadays, at all. — Question
No but tell me Wayfarer. What is lacking in the scenario I described above, in the good one? Do those people need a meta-cognitive change? Would they be helped by one in any way? It's an honest question. You seem to be shying away from answers all the time, so of course I have to be straight up and ask you for them.Strangely, I thought we were in a philosophy forum. I don't know where you think you are. — Wayfarer
To be entirely honest, I think Wayfarer is committing a great moral error. Virtue gives your best chance for happiness as Aristotle understood, but it doesn't guarantee it. Wayfarer still talks of ways of being etc. which guarantee happiness, which is just nonsense. There are no guarantees around. The best you can do (virtue) is the best you can do, and if at the end of the day you're still not happy, well you couldn't have done any better!I think he would have dismissed the second part ('nothing good lies outside him'), which sounds worthy of the most devoted pessimists on this forum. But the first part may be interpreted as suggesting that a necessary condition for eudaimonia is to gain better control of one's own mind - one's reaction to events and one's desires - and that seems to me to be quite Epicurean, as well as Stoic and Buddhist. — andrewk
And what does a meta-cognitive change have to do with anything? Really now... I still have to provide for my kids and so forth. What has changed? Have I become better able to provide for them? Has my relationship with my wife improved? Am I more loving, not in an abstract kind of way, but in a practical kind of way?Well, I really have to differ with you on that. It's not a matter of 'having an experience' - I'm referring to the meta-cognitive change that is called 'metanoia' in Platonistic philosophy. I thought, as you had referred from time to time to Orthodox philosophy that you might understand these things, but apparently not, sorry for the bother. — Wayfarer
No that's not at all the case. At least not necessarily so. As game theory illustrates, competition often results in the worst outcome for all parties involved - for example see Prisoner's Dillema. Consider a scenario from the natural world as well - the trees that grow taller steal the light of smaller trees and therefore survive more. Thus they beat out the smaller trees. And yet, they are the least efficient trees, because they have small trunks, and have to carry the water all through their very tall body against gravity. The small bushes are more efficient at doing the job, and yet they get wiped out! Instead it's the tallest, and objectively weakest trees that will win the race.Efficiency. Ie. a process that can be made more efficient (via technology). Then, via competition the technology gets implemented in day to day living, thus leading to greater productivity. — Question
But thinking that some "beatific vision" is what will change your life, or how you will find meaning in life is nothing short of deluded. No experience, no matter how great, can provide a meaning to life in this world that has nothing to do with this world. Think about it - when you experience a great piece of music, or when in love you stare in your beloved's eyes and the whole world stands still - the experience ends. Human beings are fallen to the point there is no escaping this world. We can get glimpses - beatific visions - of another state, but they all end, and then we're thrown back into this world. We are creatures of the earth, born to live and die as creatures of the earth.Which is why I employed the analogy of 'breaking out of the game'. The 'beatific vision', which you referred to, is not 'a temporary state', but a transition to an entirely new way of being - 'new heaven, new earth', as it is said somewhere. So Plotinus was one of the well-springs of that kind of visionary state. — Wayfarer
No I don't think they dismiss them, only that they realise the limited significance such events have to living.In relation to Epicurus, and other materialists, they also, obviously, dismiss such ideas, but the question I have is, have they even begun to understand them? — Wayfarer
But whatever good Plotinus found is especially subject to decay. Are you enlightened 100% of the time? Of course not. Why not? Because reality is fallen - regardless of what you do, you will never be in that state 100% of the time or anywhere near it.But from the viewpoint of a Plotinus, whatever good Epicurus makes of it, is temporary, transient, subject to decay, unsatisfactory. — Wayfarer
But all well-being is in the context of worldly existence. Even the beatific vision. And Epicurus isn't the best comparison, Aristotle is. The mystical isn't other-worldly, but decidedly this worldly.It is noteworthy that Epicurus employs the traditional terminology of philosophy - ataraxia, eudomonia, etc - but that they have a different referent, i.e. maximising well-being in the context of worldly existence. — Wayfarer
The only thing they like in Epicurus is his denial of gods, not his ethics.Epicurus is far more likely to be acceptable to the modern secular intelligentsia, for that very reason. But I'm not amongst them. — Wayfarer
Because the proposed solution doesn't make sense. Now I may be appreciative of the mystical tradition, but I don't agree with it fundamentally. Fundamentally I'm an Aristotelian, not a Platonist. I appreciate the mystical tradition more than I appreciate New Atheism, but that doesn't mean I'm in full agreement with it or the whole way of thinking and relating to the world that it advocates. For me happiness is always found in the material world, not in some other realm. Virtue is the path to happiness in this world, not (primarily) to happiness in some other world.you give the impression of not being interested in either the question, or the proposed solution, so I responded accordingly. — Wayfarer
That presumes that empirical confirmation is required for intersubjective consensus. Do you have empirical confirmation for the meaning of the look a girl gives you?! :-* And yet there seems to be intersubjective consensus between you two... Let me be a good Kantian as you like, and ask a great question! How is intersubjective consensus at all possible?Philosophical ideas cannot be empirically confirmed or disconfirmed, and thus no intersubjective consensus is possible. — John
>:O I see you've learned your economics well!There will be a new equilibrium and the Production Possibilities Curve will shift to the right, I guess. Heh. — Question
I've read it. What's your point?I recommend a reading of Vladimir Lossky's The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church, where these issues are discussed in detail. — Wayfarer
"The beatific vision" is temporary in nature. There is no "breaking out of the game" because of its temporary nature. After you have the "beatific vision" you still live in this world, not another world.'Breaking out of the game' is an analogue for theosis, 'the beatific vision', where the 'worldly realm' or the 'domain of the senses' is analogous to being 'part of the game', but the 'awakening' or 'new birth' is seeing 'beyond the game'. — Wayfarer
