Although I should add to my previous response that according to Epicurus the gods were still made of atoms and belonged to the universe - there was no transcendence. So his notion of gods was tongue in cheek atheism ;)Believe it or not Epicurus was not an atheist. He had an argument for the existence of gods. He just also believed they had nothing to do with us, and that we are on our own. — anonymous66
Although I should add to my previous response that according to Epicurus the gods were still made of atoms and belonged to the universe - there was no transcendence. So his notion of gods was tongue in cheek atheism ;) — Agustino
Despite this, Epicurus says that there are gods, but these gods are quite different from the popular conception of gods. We have a conception of the gods, says Epicurus, as supremely blessed and happy beings. Troubling oneself about the miseries of the world, or trying to administer the world, would be inconsistent with a life of tranquility, says Epicurus, so the gods have no concern for us. In fact, they are unaware of our existence, and live eternally in the intermundia, the space between the cosmoi. For Epicurus, the gods function mainly as ethical ideals, whose lives we can strive to emulate, but whose wrath we need not fear.
although the precise nature of the gods according to Epicurus remains obscure (for contrasting intepretations, see Konstan 2011 and Sedley 2011); but the gods, for him, do not interest themselves in human affairs, since this would compromise their beatitude (see Obbink 1996: 321–23).
Konstan, David, 2011. “Epicurus on the Gods,” in Jeffrey Fish and Kirk Sanders (eds.), Epicurus and the Epicurean Tradition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 53–71.
But, at first glance, Epicurus believed there are ethical, powerful eternal beings who live in a different realm, and that these beings created us.Sedley, David, 2011. “Epicurus' Theological Innatism,” in Jeffrey Fish and Kirk Sanders (eds.), Epicurus and the Epicurean Tradition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 29–52.
Would you also argue that independent of someone thinking about it, there would be no moon? — anonymous66
But truth - when you consider the meaning of truth besides merely "truth value", applies to the world. The truth includes the facts that hold true, and their connections. — Agustino
So certainly "Joe is getting beaten up" is true if Joe actually is getting beaten up regardless of whether there is someone to affirm it. — Agustino
The notion of truth is built into the notion of fact - a fact is something that is true. I can't speak of false facts. — Agustino
Okay, but shouldn't we dispute the standard view of analytic philosophy then?That's not the case on the standard view re analytic philosophy that I'm referring to and operating in the context of. — Terrapin Station
Why is that?On analysis, folks are uncomfortable with the idea that falsehoods would be a different kind of thing than truths. — Terrapin Station
Again, what's the motivation for saying they should be that?Truths and falsehoods should be two different modalities of the same kind of thing. — Terrapin Station
Yes but why can't there be true or false facts? There can't be false facts, because if something is false, then it can't be factual. And there can't be true facts, because the notion of true is already incorporated within the notion of fact. When you think of a fact, you always think of something that is already true. When I tell you "that's a fact", then I mean that it is the case - ie it is true.So there are no false facts, and there are no true facts. There are simply facts. — Terrapin Station
Okay, but shouldn't we dispute the standard view of analytic philosophy then? — Agustino
But it's not at all a category error for the very simple reason that it's not the way truth is commonly used in our language. If your philosophy student comes to you and says my dog ate the homework, you're going to say "No, tell me what the truth is!" What the truth is! The truth can't be the modality of a certain proposition, at least not in that context. When you're asking for the truth you're asking for some states of affairs. And truth is simply used in this manner in everyday language. It's part and parcel of what we understand by truth. So fine, you can arbitrarily decide that for philosophical use truth will represent a property of propositions, and fact will represent states of affairs. But if you do that, you merely take the meaning people commonly attribute to the word truth, and split it in two different words. You're still going to have the same issues you had before with truth, only that you'll shift them in two different words. And I think that's problematic precisely because it is mere semantics, it doesn't change the fundamental issues.I think it makes a lot of sense, as I explained in that post. I rather don't think it makes much sense to say that truth and falsehood would be a completely different type of thing, rather than different modalities of the same thing. That would suggest that something is going wrong with one's analysis. It would be like saying that blue is a particular frequency range of electromagnetic radiation, but orange is a type of tennis shoe, or that a major scale (ionian mode) is a particular sequence of whole and half steps, but that a minor scale (aeolian mode) is an emotion. — Terrapin Station
So who would you consider as the most convincing atheist then? (taking that as the opposing view to what you hold now) — Agustino
But it's not at all a category error for the very simple reason that it's not the way truth is commonly used in our language. — Agustino
Neither.Which implies, "Category errors can not occur in normal language usage." Do you really want to claim that? And would you be claiming it as a definition of "category error," or are you just saying that there's some relation between the two that prevents category errors from ever occurring in normal language usage? — Terrapin Station
Sure, but meaning is given to words by the context in which they are used and the manner in which they are used.At any rate, philosophy isn't journalism about how people colloquially think about language re what their beliefs are with respect to the terms they use. It's not simple philology, lexicography or anthropology. — Terrapin Station
And it's neither simply because the way you use the word truth, it doesn't have the same MEANING it has in common language. That's my problem. That's why it's not a category error. If jealousy means pink, then to speak of jealous trainers isn't a category error, because the meaning of the word is different. Why is it so hard to understand this @Terrapin Station?Neither. — Agustino
Sure, but meaning is given to words by the context in which they are used and the manner in which they are used. — Agustino
And it's neither simply because the way you use the word truth, it doesn't have the same MEANING it has in common language. That's my problem. That's why it's not a category error. — Agustino
Well but it's not. If someone tells you "tell me the truth" in a specific context, say you lied about where the car keys are, then you're not going to answer with any proposition which has the modality true. They're not asking for a proposition. They're asking for a fact! So in what sense is the philosophical analysis largely an analysis of how the term functions in normal usage? If it was that, then you'd see that part of the meaning of truth includes facts.I would say that philosophical analysis of a term like "truth" is largely an analysis of how the term functions in normal usage, relative to coherence requirements, relative to what actually exists, etc. And that is the context in which truth refers to a property of propositions. — Terrapin Station
They're not asking for a proposition. They're asking for a fact! — Agustino
No this isn't about their beliefs. This is about how they're using the term. What are they asking you for when they ask for the truth?You're not at all comprehending the idea that philosophical analysis is NOT a reporting of how someone happens to think about a term re their beliefs about what it is. — Terrapin Station
Okay, say I don't make any statement, and I point my finger to a drawer opposite me. They seem to be satisfied by that, and yet I made no statement. So how for fuck's sake do they want me to make a statement?As I JUST SAID: They want the person to MAKE A STATEMENT — Terrapin Station
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