I tend to agree with classical scepticism, which means that I prefer postponing judgement. I stand firmly on my "maybes". That means the opposite of my views also consists of classical scepticism, since the opposite of "maybe" is "maybe not", even though it already is implied in the first term.

"The formulae "perhaps" and "perhaps not," and "possibly" and "possibly not," and "maybe" and "maybe not," we adopt in place of "perhaps it is and perhaps it is not," and "possibly it is and possibly it is not," and "maybe it is and maybe it is not," so that for the sake of conciseness we adopt the phrase "possibly not" instead of "possibly it is not," and "maybe not" instead of "maybe it is not," and "perhaps not" instead of "perhaps it is not." But here again we do not fight about phrases nor do we inquire whether the phrases indicate realities, but we adopt them, as I said, in a loose sense. Still it is evident, as I think, that these expressions are indicative of non-assertion. Certainly the person who says "perhaps it is" is implicitly affirming also the seemingly contradictory phrase "perhaps it is not" by his refusal to make the positive assertion that "it is." And the same applies to all the other cases."
-Sextus Empiricus, "Outlines of Pyrrhonism" book 1, ch. 21.

I'm partial to the ideas presented in transcendental idealism.

That means the opposite of my views also consists of classical scepticism — Ying

That's why:

The thing with Hume... it's very easy to take out his atheism and replace it with theism given his philosophical framework. Johann Georg Hamann did exactly that. — Agustino

Believe it or not Epicurus was not an atheist. He had an argument for the existence of gods. He just also believed they had nothing to do with us, and that we are on our own. — anonymous66

Although I should add to my previous response that according to Epicurus the gods were still made of atoms and belonged to the universe - there was no transcendence. So his notion of gods was tongue in cheek atheism ;)

I see. So who would you consider as the most convincing atheist then? (taking that as the opposing view to what you hold now)

I eschew agnosticism, theism, and atheism, so I can't really answer your question. But to try, the greatest philosophers opposite to my view (which is ignosticism) would be those who think they know what it is they're talking about when they use the word "God."

Well I am kind of an ignostic theist :D

Sounds contradictory. Do explain.

Well I'm never too certain what I mean by the word God - that's the place of faith. When I say one believes in God, I don't mean they have a certain knowledge that others don't. It's more about how they relate to the world/reality. And I do believe that debating "Does God exist?" is meaningless to a large extent.

That's classical scepticism, not whatever Hume was doing:

"Scepticism is an ability, or mental attitude, which opposes appearances to judgements in any way whatsoever, with the result that, owing to the equipollence of the objects and reasons thus opposed, we are brought firstly to a state of mental suspense and next to a state of "unperturbedness" or quietude. Now we call it an "ability" not in any subtle sense, but simply in respect of its "being able."
-Sextus Empiricus, "Outlines of Pyrrhonism" book 1, ch. 4.

Although I should add to my previous response that according to Epicurus the gods were still made of atoms and belonged to the universe - there was no transcendence. So his notion of gods was tongue in cheek atheism ;) — Agustino

Not according to this...

Despite this, Epicurus says that there are gods, but these gods are quite different from the popular conception of gods. We have a conception of the gods, says Epicurus, as supremely blessed and happy beings. Troubling oneself about the miseries of the world, or trying to administer the world, would be inconsistent with a life of tranquility, says Epicurus, so the gods have no concern for us. In fact, they are unaware of our existence, and live eternally in the intermundia, the space between the cosmoi. For Epicurus, the gods function mainly as ethical ideals, whose lives we can strive to emulate, but whose wrath we need not fear.

But this suggests there is some disagreement about how to interpret Epicurus' views on the gods...

although the precise nature of the gods according to Epicurus remains obscure (for contrasting intepretations, see Konstan 2011 and Sedley 2011); but the gods, for him, do not interest themselves in human affairs, since this would compromise their beatitude (see Obbink 1996: 321–23).

Yes but consider Epicurean writings. The Gods are eternal - what's eternal in Epicurean metaphysics? Only atoms and void. Thus the Gods have to be formed of atoms and void too. For everything that exists - so holds the Epicurean - is atoms and void. There's no other substance.

@Agustino
There are differences of opinion (see Konstan and Sedley above)...

Konstan, David, 2011. “Epicurus on the Gods,” in Jeffrey Fish and Kirk Sanders (eds.), Epicurus and the Epicurean Tradition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 53–71.

Sedley, David, 2011. “Epicurus' Theological Innatism,” in Jeffrey Fish and Kirk Sanders (eds.), Epicurus and the Epicurean Tradition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 29–52.

But, at first glance, Epicurus believed there are ethical, powerful eternal beings who live in a different realm, and that these beings created us.

Would you also argue that independent of someone thinking about it, there would be no moon? — anonymous66

No, not at all.

But truth - when you consider the meaning of truth besides merely "truth value", applies to the world. The truth includes the facts that hold true, and their connections. — Agustino

That's not the case on the standard view re analytic philosophy that I'm referring to and operating in the context of. Facts are simply not at all the same type of thing as truth on this view. (And truth is just one mode of truth value.) Treating them as the same sort of thing, on this view, is a category error. So if you can understand this, it should be easier to understand what I'm saying.

So certainly "Joe is getting beaten up" is true if Joe actually is getting beaten up regardless of whether there is someone to affirm it. — Agustino

Here is where my view is idiosyncratic. "Joe is getting beaten up" is not true regardless of whether there is someone to affirm it, because when it's just pixels on a screen, or ink marks on a page, or sounds (or magnetic patterns etc.) on a recording, or anything like that, it (a) has no meaning--so we don't even have a proposition in the first place, and (b) has no relation to anything of the relevant types--correspondence, coherence, etc.

The notion of truth is built into the notion of fact - a fact is something that is true. I can't speak of false facts. — Agustino

That you can't speak of false facts is the primary reason that facts are different than truths on the standard view in analytic philosophy. On analysis, folks are uncomfortable with the idea that falsehoods would be a different kind of thing than truths. Truths and falsehoods should be two different modalities of the same kind of thing. What would they be two different modalities of? A particular sort of property of propositions. So there are no false facts, and there are no true facts. There are simply facts. What's true or false are propositions. Hence why it's a category error to equate "truth" and "fact."

That's not the case on the standard view re analytic philosophy that I'm referring to and operating in the context of. — Terrapin Station

Okay, but shouldn't we dispute the standard view of analytic philosophy then?

On analysis, folks are uncomfortable with the idea that falsehoods would be a different kind of thing than truths. — Terrapin Station

Why is that?

Truths and falsehoods should be two different modalities of the same kind of thing. — Terrapin Station

Again, what's the motivation for saying they should be that?

So there are no false facts, and there are no true facts. There are simply facts. — Terrapin Station

Yes but why can't there be true or false facts? There can't be false facts, because if something is false, then it can't be factual. And there can't be true facts, because the notion of true is already incorporated within the notion of fact. When you think of a fact, you always think of something that is already true. When I tell you "that's a fact", then I mean that it is the case - ie it is true.

Okay, but shouldn't we dispute the standard view of analytic philosophy then? — Agustino

I think it makes a lot of sense, as I explained in that post. I rather don't think it makes much sense to say that truth and falsehood would be a completely different type of thing, rather than different modalities of the same thing. That would suggest that something is going wrong with one's analysis. It would be like saying that blue is a particular frequency range of electromagnetic radiation, but orange is a type of tennis shoe, or that a major scale (ionian mode) is a particular sequence of whole and half steps, but that a minor scale (aeolian mode) is an emotion.

I think it makes a lot of sense, as I explained in that post. I rather don't think it makes much sense to say that truth and falsehood would be a completely different type of thing, rather than different modalities of the same thing. That would suggest that something is going wrong with one's analysis. It would be like saying that blue is a particular frequency range of electromagnetic radiation, but orange is a type of tennis shoe, or that a major scale (ionian mode) is a particular sequence of whole and half steps, but that a minor scale (aeolian mode) is an emotion. — Terrapin Station

But it's not at all a category error for the very simple reason that it's not the way truth is commonly used in our language. If your philosophy student comes to you and says my dog ate the homework, you're going to say "No, tell me what the truth is!" What the truth is! The truth can't be the modality of a certain proposition, at least not in that context. When you're asking for the truth you're asking for some states of affairs. And truth is simply used in this manner in everyday language. It's part and parcel of what we understand by truth. So fine, you can arbitrarily decide that for philosophical use truth will represent a property of propositions, and fact will represent states of affairs. But if you do that, you merely take the meaning people commonly attribute to the word truth, and split it in two different words. You're still going to have the same issues you had before with truth, only that you'll shift them in two different words. And I think that's problematic precisely because it is mere semantics, it doesn't change the fundamental issues.

Ok, for example, because of that distinction, you'll tell me the truth of everything depends on who is assessing it. And I will say, oh I don't mean truth in your language, I mean facts. Do facts depend on who is assessing it? No. Well that's what I mean when I say that not everything depends on who is assessing it. You're merely shifting the problem in a conceptual labyrinth, nothing else.

So who would you consider as the most convincing atheist then? (taking that as the opposing view to what you hold now) — Agustino

That's a tough one... maybe Don Cupitt... He believes that God is not real, (but does deny being an atheist- although if I read him correctly, he believes we invented the concept of God- w/o man God wouldn't even exist) and calls himself a Christian non-realist.

But it's not at all a category error for the very simple reason that it's not the way truth is commonly used in our language. — Agustino

Which implies, "Category errors can not occur in normal language usage." Do you really want to claim that? And would you be claiming it as a definition of "category error," or are you just saying that there's some relation between the two that prevents category errors from ever occurring in normal language usage?

At any rate, philosophy isn't journalism about how people colloquially think about language re what their beliefs are with respect to the terms they use. It's not simple philology, lexicography or anthropology.

Which implies, "Category errors can not occur in normal language usage." Do you really want to claim that? And would you be claiming it as a definition of "category error," or are you just saying that there's some relation between the two that prevents category errors from ever occurring in normal language usage? — Terrapin Station

Neither.

At any rate, philosophy isn't journalism about how people colloquially think about language re what their beliefs are with respect to the terms they use. It's not simple philology, lexicography or anthropology. — Terrapin Station

Sure, but meaning is given to words by the context in which they are used and the manner in which they are used.

Neither. — Agustino

And it's neither simply because the way you use the word truth, it doesn't have the same MEANING it has in common language. That's my problem. That's why it's not a category error. If jealousy means pink, then to speak of jealous trainers isn't a category error, because the meaning of the word is different. Why is it so hard to understand this @Terrapin Station?

Sure, but meaning is given to words by the context in which they are used and the manner in which they are used. — Agustino

I would say that philosophical analysis of a term like "truth" is largely an analysis of how the term functions in normal usage, relative to coherence requirements, relative to what actually exists, etc. And that is the context in which truth refers to a property of propositions.

And it's neither simply because the way you use the word truth, it doesn't have the same MEANING it has in common language. That's my problem. That's why it's not a category error. — Agustino

It's a category error because using truth as synonymous with facts means that falsehoods are something completely different.

I would say that philosophical analysis of a term like "truth" is largely an analysis of how the term functions in normal usage, relative to coherence requirements, relative to what actually exists, etc. And that is the context in which truth refers to a property of propositions. — Terrapin Station

Well but it's not. If someone tells you "tell me the truth" in a specific context, say you lied about where the car keys are, then you're not going to answer with any proposition which has the modality true. They're not asking for a proposition. They're asking for a fact! So in what sense is the philosophical analysis largely an analysis of how the term functions in normal usage? If it was that, then you'd see that part of the meaning of truth includes facts.

Instead of answering with words, you could point somewhere for example. Are you then still using a proposition? And if you're not, according to your notion, how are you giving them the truth? This is just so incoherent.

They're not asking for a proposition. They're asking for a fact! — Agustino

You're not at all comprehending the idea that philosophical analysis is NOT a reporting of how someone happens to think about a term re their beliefs about what it is. Your objection here is that someone doesn't think about it so that they're asking for a proposition.

You're not at all comprehending the idea that philosophical analysis is NOT a reporting of how someone happens to think about a term re their beliefs about what it is. — Terrapin Station

No this isn't about their beliefs. This is about how they're using the term. What are they asking you for when they ask for the truth?

Functionally? They want the person to make a statement that matches the facts.

Okay, so are they asking for a proposition or are they asking for the facts?

As I JUST SAID: They want the person to MAKE A STATEMENT

As I JUST SAID: They want the person to MAKE A STATEMENT — Terrapin Station

Okay, say I don't make any statement, and I point my finger to a drawer opposite me. They seem to be satisfied by that, and yet I made no statement. So how for fuck's sake do they want me to make a statement?