I think you're absolutely right, inasmuch as resentment builds when deprivation of a desired thing occurs. But I add to it that I also feel that I've been "wronged". It is more than just a feeling of loss. It is a feeling that people should not behave certain ways. This is not pushed on me; I feel that way when something gets stolen from me, or when something gets stolen from someone else. Interestingly, I don't feel it's wrong when I steal. But social conditioning has conditioned me to feel I'm in the wrong when I steal, although in my natural, original state, I don't even bat an eyelash over it. This is why children are normally cruel, (lack of empathy), and lying, cheating, unscrupulous little nips (lack of moral spine): they are in the natural state when they are being able to feel wronged, but they can't cast the domain of this feeling of theirs to being generated by others' misfortunes via empathy.

Then it gets very complicated from there, and basically there could be situations where everyone feels they've been wronged by each other (a closed set of people), such as when war is fought; and some philosophers (Kant, Socrates, Liebliniak, Campiere, D'Inuzzio et cetera) attempted to create systems in which everyone feels there are no wrongs done. Their systems worked theoretically, but not in practice... precisely because morality is developed in the individual via training by society, and most times the training is only partially successful.

@Franz Liszt, you should ask instead, "Is it moral to declare and to pretend I am an atheist, but when I am accused of being a theist, I deny it at first, and then continue on with opinions and outright devotion to a deity in my ensuing posts?"

↪TheMadMan Good point. If morality is subjective, why should you not call me ugly? I don’t know what country you live in, but I can safely assume that it’s not against the law. Why not call me ugly? — Franz Liszt

People don't call each other ugly not due to some moral consideration, but because of the possible and likely repercussions. People don't make enemies for fun. To make people hate you is an evolutionary disadvantage, not a negative moral principle.

Thank you for bringing the articles on the connection between modern research and Heidegger to my attention.

Apology to @sime. I spelled your name as Slime. Honest mistake, I have at times double vision of vertical lines. It's due to my diabetes, if my sugar is high or if it is low, I my eyes play tricks on me.

My sincere apology. My vision seems to be sharp today. My mind? I dunno.

The only theory of meaning Wittgenstein ever published was in the Tractatus, which was a solipsistic, subjectivist or idealistic doctrine of meaning that constituted conclusions he drew via methodological solipsism , that is to say by phenomenological investigation strictly in the first-person, that discounted the applicability and relevance of third-personal scientific rationalisization.

And the later Wittgenstein, whose solipsistic methodology remained the same as the earlier Wittgenstein and who now directly asserted that philosophy was purely therapeutic and descriptive and wasn't in the business of proposing theories, didn't immediately contradict himself by proposing the frankly ridiculous theory attributed to him that meaning is grounded in inter-subjective agreement or in some publicly obeyed rule-set sent decreed from above by the guardians of meaning in Platonia.

The confusion here, seem to partly stem from the public's lack of understanding of the positivistic epistemological ideas of his time that he was attacking, as well as a general lack of awareness regarding Wittgenstein's so-called "middle period", in which he wrote about his phenomenological inquiries and negative conclusions that there was no hope of obtaining a phenomenological theory of meaning of the sort proposed his earlier self proposed.

But that doesn't mean Witt then concluded "in that case, by appealing to the law of excluded middle realism is true. I propose a new epistemological foundation in which there is only one sort of meaning that is decided by the public, platonia or scientific naturalism in a mind-independent reality". All he concluded is that due to the overwhelming complexity and uncertainty of phenomenological analysis, it is impossible for himself to give an exhaustive and unconditional phenomenal theory accounting for his own use of words.

It is therefore understandable, as to why Wittgenstein was sympathetic towards Heidegger and could personally relate to Being and Time on the one hand, while at the same time insinuating that Being and Time was nonsensical when viewed as a collection of propositions with an inter-subjectively determinable truth-value.

Nonsense doesn't mean "false", it merely refers to an inability to determine the sense of a word when it used in a context from which it did not originate. Wittgenstein's sympathies towards Heidegger demonstrate that he did not believe the most important types of meaning to be inter-subjectively decided. Only inter-subjective meaning is inter-subjectively decided.

We can all agree that we can relate to Being in Time, without pretending to ourselves that we understand each-other's understanding of this work when viewing our agreement from the perspective of a different language-game. — sime

Thank, you, @slime. You have given me more insight into the works of these two great misspent minds than the ten years of post-doctorate philosophical fellowship I do not have studying the works of Witt and Heid. In fact, getting ANY meaning directly reading the two, pages side-by-side, seems like a game of Seek-and-Heid. I am not being facetious, I mean it that I value your description, as it gave me acceptable knowledge. Very much like the in-the-face difference described by @Banno, whose declared insight was, quoted not verbatim, "one was a weatherman, the other, a soldier." Well, duh. That is not the kernel of the difference between the philosophy of the two. One was blue eyed, the other brown eyed, or one was 5'8", the other, 5'9". Or one used to shave with blades, the other, with a razor.

It's true that you CAN read their professions into their psychological differences, but while psychological disposition may influence one's philosophy, the philosophy of a thinker are not determined purely by the psychological disposition.

Personally, I can't describe any difference or similarity between the two. One is six, the other, half a dozen. If anyone claims they get something out of their works, I ask them to say what it is, and I ask them to show me passages and ask them to show me the connection between the two. I doubt anyone can come up with anything sensible for the connection. If yes, someone can come up with something sensible for a connection between the read material and the interpretation, furthermore it is a non-disputable transliteration, then I am wrong. But so far nobody has proved me wrong on this.

Ah, but see the title. I addressed it directly. — Banno

Banno, you can't address the title "What’s the biggest difference Heidegger and Wittgenstein?" directly. It is impossible to address it directly or indirectly. The text of the title is syntactically incorrect, therefore semantically nonsensical. How can you address something that does not make sense? that does not make sense.

This guy is brilliant. — Olivier5

I looked up his website. Apparently "Brilliant" is his last name by birth. He changed to Ashleigh from Imbecilius, though.

"The greatest enemy of Truth and Wisdom (philosophy) is the Tooth of Wisdom. If it aches, you can't think straight." - Ashleigh Brilliant

"Philosophy, after all, is not about truth or wisdom. It's about the love of truth or wisdom." -- Ashleigh Brilliant.

I went to a philosophy meetup sometime a decade or so ago. It was a physical meeting in a bar. The hosting couple were philo majors. They proved under two minutes that the forms are necessarily physical and must exist. I could not find anything wrong with the proof. By now I forgot it, too. I am sure there was a fallacy of sorts involved for sure.

'I have abandoned my search for truth and am now looking for a good fantasy' — Tom Storm

:100:

Like Pato's theory of forms? Can it not be explained in a simple sentence? — Tom Storm

It has to be a very long sentence.

For the record, I still don't understand the theory of forms. Are they real? Do they exist? Are they imitable? I imagine having heard that they are real but not existing in this world. I also heard from others that they are real and necessarily exist in this world. Yet others told me they are not of matter, and they don't exist in our physical world.

Point is, just because someone wrote something down is insufficient to say anyone after then has been 'Influenced' by it. — Isaac

This is true. But what if you say, or somebody else said, "was influenced by the ideas within it?" Still not always true, as people can come to brilliant ideas, published ones, by themselves without familiarizing themselves with the work aforehand.

"Consider the following: two people from thousands of years ago can meaningfully talk about their minds, agreed? They can exchange meaningful information with each other about their mental states. Now, if minds and brains are the same thing, then two people in ancient times exchanging meaningful information about their minds must also be exchanging meaningful information about their brains. But of course, ancient peoples had no idea how the brain worked. They thought it cooled the blood. It's an absurdity to claim ancient peoples were meaningfully exchanging information about their brains, so the claim mind=brain entails an absurdity." — RogueAI

I am sorry, but I fail to see the relevance of this paragraph to our discussion. I am not saying that the mind is the brain. I am saying that we can dismiss any knowledge of the physical world when we say "cogito ergo sum". We already agreed that our physical world is a huge uncertainty for both its existence and its details of existence. Any forays into its workings or structure is futile. So we ought not to do that in this discussion. Therefore when I say "the mind is not known to be physical or an idealistic entity" I am saying it is not necessarily the brain, because the brain we perceive in the physical world, and therefore it is uncertain for its appearance, and physical qualities. I am saying instead, that since we can't rely on our senses that the physical world is as it presents itself, we can't say anything more about the mind if it's physical than that it's physical.

Kidney function: people talked about their pees, but they could not talk about their kidneys producing the pees.

A state of the mind is not the mind. I really don't even know what you or I mean by mind. If I am sad, is that the state of my mind? So it's not my mind, but a feeling it generates. Much like my pee is not my kidney, but what my kidney generates.

The state of one's mind is not the mind; it is its product. So no, it is not true that the ancients would have needed to know that the mind is the brain (and that is not my proposition, anyway.)

In this thread. — RogueAI

Could you please tell me on which page, and from the top, how manieth post it is that contains it? I really, but really don't want to read posts only to reject the necessity of reading them (because they are other than what the conversation between the two ancient men).

If you say that the mind is some physical thing we have no conception of i have a feeling physicalism is going to turn into idealism. — RogueAI

I think I am staying away form defining the physical description of the physical mind, because our discussion assumes that the physical world is assumed. I in several places mentioned that we have no certain knowledge of the physical world. So I don't want to treat it in our discussion as anything but something which is not purely of ideas, and the very certainty of its existence is unclear.

This makes it impossible in our course of debate (between you and me here) for me to declare any knowledge of the physical world, beyond the facts that 1. It may or may not exist, and 2. our knowledge of it is unreliable.

I wish you would address my thought experiment about the two ancient people talking meaningfully about their mental states. — RogueAI

Where do I find the description of this thought experiment of yours?

I don't need my senses to know that my mind is not physical, in the sense that materialists/physicalists use the word. It's simply not in that category of things, because it's missing physical characteristics. — RogueAI

You use physical categories to help you decide that the mind is not physical. It lacks weight, volume, smell, etc. So it IS physical characteristics that you use to determine that it is not physical. However, physical characteristics are of objects in the physical realm, our knowledge of which is not reliable, because our senses can lie.

Therefore it is conceivable that the mind is physical; and the only reason you don't experience it is that your perception of it is distorted.

I think this is the biggest achievement of Descartes "cogito ergo sum": that it determines that physical things can and do exist, in case the mind is a physical thing. It is just as likely to be physical as non-phyiscal, as there is no indication as to its origin, to its working modus,that excludes the possibility of the mind being physical. I think (and I know you don't agree, which is fine with me) that it is a fallacy to exclude the possibitlity of the mind as being physical. The brilliant thing is that it does not have to be: "cogito ergo sum" works both ways, whether the mind is physical or not.

my mind is not a physical thing with physical characteristics, like size, shape, weight, volume, etc. that I'm not making an assumption when I say my mind is not a physical thing. — RogueAI

Good point.

Now let's get back to the beginning. You assert, and I agree, that the only empirical thing that is proven in an a priori way is "I think therefore I am" or "My thoughts prove that my mind exists". This is absolutely true.

On the other hand, we both agree, that the physical world is doubtful that it exists.

My addition to this latter agreement is, that our senses tell us the physical world exist, but our senses can't be trusted. They may give us illusionary signals, true or false, we don't know.

So... we are unsure of the physical world because there is no way we can prove or ascertain that it exist. It may exist in the form we perceive, or it may not exist, or it may exist in a form that is completely different from what we perceive. At any rate, there is an assumption involved in each of the three scenarios, because of the lack of certainty.

This proves that the idea-world exists without any doubt, and the physical world does not.

All the above are true if we can guarantee that the mind is not physical, but only part of the world of ideas.

How can we guarantee that? That is the million dollar question. Our first clue that the physical world is independent of our scrutiny. This is due to the untrustworthiness of our senses.

If we can't rely on our senses to prove the physical world; can we rely on our senses to know that the mind is not physical? No, we can't. We have a mind; if it were physical, then we could sense it, but our sense can lie to us. If it were not physical, then we would not need to rely on our sense to realize that the mind exists, since we use it daily to generate thoughts.

But this is a slippery slope. If we can't rely on our senses to tell the objects and events in the physical world, and we can't rely on our senses to tell if something is in the world of ideals, then we actually are at a loss of knowing if our mind is physical or in the world of ideals.

So I put the question to you, again, @RogueAI: what makes it so sure for you that the mind is not physical? You say you can't measure it or smell it or weigh it. But can you measure, weigh, or smell anything else AND be sure that your perception is that of reality? If you can not measure, weight or smell, it does not mean the thing is not physical... it just means that your senses are not reliable.

I suggest to you therefore, that the mind is either physical (not part of the brain, but a physical entity of which we have no knowledge or concept), entity, or else a non-physical entity; but to declare that the mind is not physical with the confidence level of 100%, is a fallacy. Because, like I said, physical reality can't be known if we experience it as it is or differently.

The most important paragraph in this post is the last one. Feel welcome to skip to there and ignore the in-between contents.

My position, on the other hand, doesn't depend on an assumption that consciousness exists. — RogueAI

True. But you seem to be absolutely sure that mind is idealism stuff. I guess I hadn't clicked on "Post comment" for the following I had written up earlier today -- I was distracted.

To put it simply, the foundation of idealism is stuff that *has* to exist: mind and thought. The foundation of materialism is stuff that *might* exist. I think it obvious idealism clearly has an a priori advantage. — RogueAI

Mind and thought exists for sure. But why are you so absolutely certain that they both are matters of idealism? Mind could be matter, from where we sit, we don't know if it is or not; and conversely, we don't know if mind is idealism stuff or not. You say it is obvious that mind is idealism stuff. To me it's not obvious.

That's A. B. is that while we can't at this point or in 5000 years explain how consciousness or mind arises from matter; but because we can't explain it, it is not inconceivable that it does.

Again, you may say: yes, but to know that mind and thought exist, we don't need any assumptions that they exist, but for matter to be known to exist, we must have assumptions.

Right. The material world is an empirical world; the rules of logic apply, but the existence of the material world is a belief. We sense the physical world, so we assume it exists. We sense our thoughts, we assume it exists, but hey, in the least thoughts exist in our mind, so two things exist for sure: mind and thought. This is the only EMPIRICAL truth that has an a priori foundation. If we had no mind, thought would not exist.

So far we agree. My objection, only objection, is that you are adamant that the mind is not a physical unit. You may be right, but just as equally likely you may be wrong. There is no proof or indication of any source, in the "Cogito ergo sum"'s logical structure, that denies that the mind is physical.

And I'll ask you the same question I asked another person: suppose in 5,000 years, science has explained pretty much everything except how consciousness arises from matter — RogueAI

I'll ask you the question I suppose in 5,000 years, when spirituality has explained pretty much everything it is mandated to, except how matter arises from consciousness.

All things being equal, we should prefer the theory with the least amount of assumptions. — RogueAI

True, but only if two different theories explain the one and same thing.

But Idealism does not explain the material world. whereas materialism explains the material world. In your line of thinking, idealism stops at the end of "cogito ergo sum". It needs not to do anything more, I guess you surmise, because matter is not proven, so it needs no explanation. Or matter does not play a role in "cogito ergo sum", which is the only a priori proven proof of empirical truth. You simply dismiss that matter has to be explained by idealism.

Well, in case of a belief of solipsism, yes, you are right. But we can't decide if we live in a soliptical world. Precisely because matter is not explained let alone proved by idealism. Therefore if you take the assumption by idealism that matter exist, then and only then idealism inherits all the assumptions of the materialist explanations, and adds one more, which is, like I said, "matter exists".

Yep, it's you. Interesting to hear how you describe the reasons to get banned. My memory (as faulty as it is) recall is that you were banned because you simply ignored valid and irrefutable reasons to counter your theories or the theories you presented. You were invincible in arguments because you simply dismissed or did not counter arguments, which were, like I said, valid and irrefutable. Oh, and you never actually made a point, even when you were squeezed: you kept on talking about some great hifolutin' secretive truths that only you, Plato, and Simone Weir understood, but when you were put to the task to describe what the secret knowledge was, you never revealed it.

Well, welcome to this site, and I hope you have better luck here. I always liked your intellect, despite the above.

I don't think humans want to live forever. But they don't want to die either. So the upshot is "just one more day", and if their wish would come true, life would stretch out to infinity. Not due to wanting to live, but due to wanting to not die.

I think your plan, @dazed would only work if you drank some time-release poison now, that activates in your system in ten years, or else if you hire a hit man or woman to off you in precisely ten years. If it comes to die in ten years, and you haven't secured a way to die, then at that point (with a healthy mind and in a relatively healthy body) that decision won't come to fruition.

This is a good idea, man. But I suggest you, and about 7000 000 000 humans ought to have done that ten years ago. Then and only then would we free up some very much needed elbow-room on this finite-surface planet.

an infinitely long horn, were you to pour paint into it, could be filled with a finite amount of paint — tim wood

How do you figure this? It's impossible. The integral of any function that is between zero and plus infinity and the curve of which never reaches the X axis, is infinity. And if the curve reaches the X axis, but on the opening end it is constantly widening, as a horn would be, then the definite integral is still infinity.
I am obviously wrong in this opinion.

Nikolas, I remember you from that other philosophy site, I forgot its name, because my mind is quickly turning to mush. The memory part. There are tons of people here from that other site, including, but not limited to JohnDoe7 (written backwards). There may be more, I only remember the memorable ones, like yourself -- your devotion to holding Simone Weil as the person being the smartest next to god is unmistakably you. Plus your name was nick something or other. No disrespect, only faulty and leaky memory here.

Blondie has immortalized this concept in her song "Rapture".

(...)
And you get in your car and drive real far
And you drive all night and then you see a light
And it comes right down and it lands on the ground
And out comes a man from Mars
And you try to run but he's got a gun
And he shoots you dead and he eats your head
And then you're in the man from Mars
You go out at night eatin' cars
You eat Cadillacs, Lincolns too
Mercurys and Subaru
And you don't stop, you keep on eatin' cars
Then, when there's no more cars you go out at night
And eat up bars where the people meet
Face to face, dance cheek to cheek
One to one, man to man
Dance toe to toe, don't move too slow
'Cause the man from Mars is through with cars
He's eatin' bars, yeah wall to wall
Door to door, hall to hall
He's gonna eat 'em all
Rapture
(...)

In short, it's fishy that theology has to be so fishy — norm

:100:

However, in an a priori state of knowledge, we know that ideas and at least one mind exists, so to claim reality is made of mind(s)/thoughts begs a lot of interesting questions that don't have answers, but it has one crucial advantage over materialism: the existence of mind and ideas can't be doubted. — RogueAI

True. Materialism is a theory, and as such, it can't be proven. Nothing can be proven. The only thing we know (not via proof, but via the mechanism of the structure) is cogito ergo sum.

Is this equivalent to "Does Materialism Have an a Priori Problem?" A problem...? You mean it is self-contradictory? No it is not. Is it a paradox (meaning switching between "yes" and "no" states depending on the state, which immediately brings us to its opposite state)? No. The problem, if you wish, is that it is not proven, it is not given. It is an assumption.

Are assumptions problems? That's a value judgment, not a given. If I want, it's a problem, if I no want, it is not a problem.

Ah go on, just because I chose the translation with pictures doesn't mean it is too flowery. :lol: I am afraid you are right about me not being a huggy kissy person. That spreads disease, yuck. But in my private life, in solitude by the river, I am flooded with happiness, and I am good with the matter of my physical form dissimulating and becoming one with nature. While walking down the river path, I have no desire to hit anything or anyone with a hammer. :grin:

My father was an engineer. He worked on the Apollo that landed on the moon. He was in favor of language that was straight and to the point. That is fine for guys and women who want to be like them, but I enjoy being a girl. A bit dreamy. :grin: — Athena

Interesting. Reading your posts, I always have envisioned you as a seven-headed serpent-monster, who has snakes coming out of the heads for hair, and poisonous ones, too; and that you spit fire and brimstone at the passersby in front of your cage.

JUST KIDDING!!!

Very true! Because of the US war with Afghanistan and a huge investment, half of Afghanistan has been Americanized and brought into the modern world, and half has not. When we pull our troops out, other countries will likely do the same, and there will be a blood bathe as the more barbaric Aghanstanians fight to take back their country and the way of life people had when the Bible was written, complete with beheading some people and stoning others. The best fighters in this war are the women who want the equality they have gained. They are our sisters and we are about to turn our backs on them and their children. — Athena

I missed the role of the philosophers in this paragraph, making the world better than it is.

Just because an atheist has asked a question that might seem to go against atheism, it doesn’t mean you should just reject it. — Franz Liszt

What do you mean by "reject it". You mean dismiss the argument? No, my main drag was not to dismiss your argument but to question your authenticity.

I admit, you can't do anything to convince me that you are not a theist. I may change my opinion as time goes on. However, you made a few statements OUTSIDE your argument, that an atheist well versed in philosophy would never say, but a theist well versed in philosophy would definitely say. For instance:

We believe that we are just biological animals or just chemicals grouped together through evolution — Franz Liszt

We, atheists don't believe that; not all of us, although conceivably some of us would believe that. But to state that ALL of us atheists believe that, is a typical claim of a theist.

I feel the only way to escape this paradox is to say that we are designed by some higher truth in the universe. — Franz Liszt

What you sincerely seem to claim, and this is not a devils' advocate type of claim, but sincere, that solution to the puzzle is a function of something that is outside the natural realm. If this is not a theist claim, then please put a dagger through my neck two weeks ago.

The answer, if we are just a bunch of chemicals, is that we can’t. Using this logic, science is just an illusion, so is logic. However, we have used science and logic to come to these conclusions, which becomes a paradox. — Franz Liszt

Whether we are a bunch of chemicals or a different order of movement form, logic and science is not illusionary necessarily (although they can be, if we live solipsism). They can be conceptual, not material, while not being illusionary.

There is an important difference between illusion and conceptual thought. Illusion is the mistaking of one meaning or interpretation of an event for a different one. Conceptual thought is a process in which one builds a mental image of reality and manipulates it.

From this it should be clear that all illusions are conceptual, but not all concepts are illusions.

It is conceivable (but can't be proven) that our perceptions and our interpretations of our perceptions are actually right on. This may not be the case in effect, but it very well may be the case in effect. We don't know which, and we will never know.

However, in your version the claim need the assumption that our concepts are all NECESSARILY false. That is not true. They are possibly false, possibly right on. The problem is, we don't know which. But it still does not give us the right to reject the possibility that our perceptions and their interpretations by us are right on.

The problem with it is we may know it (the claim of some theists that they experience god in a convincing way) is BS, but how do we help them understand it is? — Tom Storm

That's our fallacy no. 1. We don't know if it's bs. We have no knowledge of their experience. But it's not revealed to us whether their claimed experience is authentic or not. However, we do have the right to maintain that old adage by the proverbial umpire: "I calls them as I sees them." it is conceivable that god speaks directly to them in a fashion that is convincing enough to take god for god. I don't deny that it's conceivable. I deny, however, their right to demand that we believe their claims.

There are many people who believe they have access to knowledge about God and see evidence of God's works. — Tom Storm

Now, here I disagree. They may see it that way; but that's not enough to claim that their way of seeing it is pervasive and necessarily true. If we put the onus on the negative truth, it can't be done; and it can't be done if we put the onus on the positive truth either (empirically; empirical evidence is missing).

Your argument goes like this: "1. a person who believes in god 2. claims that he understands god and has direct evidence of god's existence in his mind." This is circular reasoning in one short step. Back to square one, without even ever having left it.

All you are saying is you disagree. — Tom Storm

I am saying just a tad little more. I am disagreeing for a reason: no empirical or a priori evidence is extant. Those who say they have direct line to god or direct knowledge, are incapable to convey this to be other than delusion or imagination or a straight lie. That must amount to something. If one can do it, all should be able to do it. But all are not able to do it.

You may also counter, "if one can't do it, nobody should be able to do it." And that leads back to my claim: no positive, no negative proof exists, and it is a matter of belief. However, to get at the ATTRIBUTES then mere belief in existence is not enough. Some evidence is required outside of faith. Those who claim the evidence is extant to them, base it on faith. So that's dismissable. Evidence in the mind alone is not accountable evidence.

Good questions. My points were aimed at an atheistic audience, not at a religious or else at an analytic albeit atheistic audience. The audience should, I mean, the audience is required to self-select in case they attend a point delivered on the existence or non- of a god. Otherwise the point won't work.
:lol:

For me a hidden God is functionally exactly the same as no God. There would still be no good reason to believe. — Tom Storm

This is good for the atheists as a supportive documentation, but to theists it is not an excluding factor. That is the problem for both sides. No exclusive proof can be built using logic, either way. All ontological arguments include at least one fallacious reasoning, and all anti-religious propaganda miss the point of something being possible even if no evidence exists.

It is, on the other hand, ridiculously easy to falsify the possible existence of the biblical god. Unfortunately the Christian god is not the only god that is an only god in existence by believers.

There is another hurdle for the theists: what is god's nature, and what attributes does it have? Nothing can be hung on him (no pun intended) that is not purely belief, or unsupported superstition. Nobody knows anything about the real god, if one exists, so how can some pretend to assume god is this way or the other way. This applies to all scriptures: fiction. Not substantiated, and therefore they contain less believability by empirical, speculative or a priori considerations, than conspiracy theories.

How do we know that meaning or logic are not a product of the natural universe? This would also need to be demonstrated. — Tom Storm

Meaning and logic are human's tools to explain things. In and by themselves they don't exist. If there were no human minds, logic would not exist, nor would meaning. Meaning, in and by itself, is nothing but a process or else part of the process or else else a convention to recreate reality as models of reality in the humans' minds.

This may be a proof of god not being the creator of logic and meaning. If humans don't exist, for instance via extinction of the species, and logic doesn't exist as a consequence, then it's not a creation of god, since god could maintain his one creation even if another of god's creation perishes.

:grin: