It's an accurate painting of the front of your house on a rainless day. — Michael

I would say that what you described as a "property" of a painting is more accurately described as a relation between a painting and something else that holds in a certain way and under certain conditions.

being an integer greater than the number 3 makes no sense without reference to the number 3 — Michael

"greater than" is a relation between two integers; it is an arity-2 predicate from which you have produced the arity-1 predicate "greater than 3" by fixing the second value.

(And, not for nothing, but were you tempted to try to formulate this in terms of numerals rather than numbers? Aren't numbers the sorts of abstract objects you wanted nothing to do with?)

Well, yes. A sentence about it raining is only true if there is rain, and a painting of a landscape is only accurate if there is a landscape. But truth and accuracy are properties of the sentence and the painting, not properties of the rain or the landscape.

As in, as a straightforward account of English grammar we say “the sentence is true” and “the painting is accurate”; we don’t say “the rain is true” or “the landscape is accurate”.

My point is that talk of truths without sentences is a category error, just as talk of accuracies without paintings is a category error. Without sentences and paintings there’s just rain and landscapes.

Aren't numbers the sorts of abstract objects you wanted nothing to do with? — Srap Tasmaner

I want nothing to do with mind-independent abstract objects à la Platonism or mathematical realism.

True or false?

Yes, well, everyone seems to think plain common sense supports their position. What fun.

My point is that talk of truths without sentences is a category error — Michael

Truth is about what is the case. The fact you need sentences to assert what is the case is incidental to what actually is the case in the world. A true sentence is one where - what the sentence is about actually is the case.

I want nothing to do with mind-independent abstract objects à la Platonism or mathematical realism. — Michael

For me, there is no dividing line between abstract objects like numbers and abstract objects like sentences or chairs or points. All our concepts are abstract in some sense given our cognitive abilities to attend or engage with some distinctions and ignore others. For me, if all concepts we use to engage with the world are in some sense abstract, there is no point in trying to gerrymander things to do away with some concepts and not others, with bizarre consequences. From the perspective of the brain there is no fundamental distinction between different concepts because they are constructed and used in the same way by the same set of neural machinery. Sure, there is a meaningful distinction between numbers and chairs in the sense I am inclined to say one is more physical and the other is not; but there are a huge number of these abstract distinctions you can possibly make about anything. The physical is like anything else a concept which is difficult to define but can nonetheless abstract from our sensory information caused by the world.

Truth is about what is the case. — Apustimelogist

Yes, a true sentence is about what is the case. But note that truth is a property of the sentence, not a property of the rain.

Yes, a true sentence is about what is the case. But note that truth is a property of the sentence, not a property of the rain — Michael

If I said “It is the case that it is raining outside”, I do not mention anything about “truth” Would we need to say “what is the case” is a property of “It is raining outside.”? Or just say “what is the case” is neither a property of a sentence nor the rain? Like those who assert “existence” is not a predicate.

If I said “It is the case that it is raining outside”, I do not mention anything about “truth” Would we need to say “what is the case” is a property of “It is raining outside.”? Or just say “what is the case” is neither a property of a sentence nor the rain? Like those who assert “existence” is not a predicate. — Richard B

Just say "it is raining".

Phrases like "it is the case that" and "it is true that" don't add anything to the above; they're vacuous, not actually referring to some entity ("it") having some property ("true"/"the case").

Sure, and being an integer greater than the number 3 makes no sense without reference to the number 3, but being an integer greater than the number 3 isn't a property of the number 3; it's a property of the numbers 4 and 5 and 6 and so on. — Michael

"Greater than" (>) is a relation.

Well, yes. A sentence about it raining is only true if there is rain, and a painting of a landscape is only accurate if there is a landscape. But truth and accuracy are properties of the sentence and the painting, not properties of the rain or the landscape. — Michael

You have this weird idea that truth and accuracy can only be properties and cannot be relations. Historical philosophy says otherwise.

The picture theory of meaning? Do you really want to invoke that?

The left side of a T-sentence is about the sentence. The right side is about how things are. <"The cat is on the mat" is true> is about the sentence "The cat is on the mat". <The cat is on the mat> is about the cat , not about the sentence "The cat is on the mat", and not about any picture of it raining, mental or otherwise.

<"The cat is on the mat" is true> has the form f(a), were "f" is "is true" and "a" is "The cat is on the mat". A single-place predication. Relations have the form f(a,b). Truth is not a relation.

Shouldn't it at the very least be a property of a pair <sentence, interpretation>? — Srap Tasmaner

Well, no. The interpretation is not a part of the sentence. In formal systems the domain is not a part of the sentence, but is part of the way the sentence is used - it's in the semantics, not the syntax. The interpretation assigns elements of the domain to the various variables. "The cat is on the mat" is true only if the cat is one of the things that is on the mat. The domain and interpretation are not part of the true sentence but part of the language in which the sentence occurs, or better, the use to which it is put. That use is what "binds" the cat to "the cat". There is no need here for a picture-of-cat that sits between the cat and "the cat".

"greater than 3" isn't. Any relation can be reinterpreted as a single-place predication.

"Greater than" (>) is a relation. — Leontiskos

4 is greater than 3.
3 is smaller than 4.

The same relation is described even though "greater" does not mean the same thing as "smaller". Being greater than 3 is a property of 4 and being smaller than 4 is a property of 3.

Yes, a true sentence is about what is the case. But note that truth is a property of the sentence, not a property of the rain. — Michael

Yes but, to be fair... satisfaction of "it's raining" is a property of the weather event, not a property of the sentence.

:joke:

The picture theory of meaning? Do you really want to invoke that? — Banno

That would be Michael. Ask him.

the use to which it is put — Banno

This is what I was getting at.

The what did you mean with the following?

Is it? Shouldn't it at the very least be a property of a pair <sentence, interpretation>? (Or a triple that includes as well a world.) — Srap Tasmaner

We use "true" as a predicate for sentences, propositions, and so on. The interpretation is not a part of the sentence, so much as something we can do with the sentence. Was that your point? That a sentence is true only under some interpretation? If so, then sure, but it is the sentence that is true or false, not the interpretation. An interpretation does not have a truth value.

what did you mean with the following? — Banno

Consider that question for a moment, and then tell me again how it's the bare sentence and not the use made of it that matters.

Look, you can treat "is true" or "is greater than 3" or "is holding" each as attributing a property to an object, and the surface grammar agrees with you.

I'm just not that impressed by the surface grammar. "4 > 3" says something about 3 and about 4, and about ordering. "The paperclip is holding" says something about the whole Jerry-rigged business. And "What you say is true" is not just a statement about your words.

Or so it seems to me.

Sure, all that. "...is true" is predicated to sentences, in a context that gives that sentece an interpretation. But the interpretation is not part of the syntax, it's part of the semantics.

Perhaps that's the issue - the difference between being a predicate and being a property. Would you have been happy if Michael had instead said "Truth is a predicate of sentences"? Calling it a property has implications of hypostatisation? Incipient Platonism?

Yes, well, everyone seems to think plain common sense supports their position. What fun. — Srap Tasmaner

In that case there must be a few different versions of commonsense. Some less common than others?

Something that is true is something that is the case. That something is the case is not just a property of a sentence. It is referring to things in the world.

Just say "it is raining".

Phrases like "it is the case that" and "it is true that" don't add anything to the above; they're vacuous — Michael

But you use them all the time and its very hard not to. You even tried replacing "truth" with "correct description" even though "correct" is more or less just a synonym for "true".

I think it may be fair to say that truth is vacuous in the sense that we use words like "truth" or "correct" just to assert something. But then what we are left with is our attempts at referring to what is the case based on our encounters with the world. If "truth" adds nothing on top, then clearly all that it is doing is servicing the same attempts at referring to what is the case.

I'll just have to accept this is what you find perhaps intuitive while I do not.

Consider that question for a moment, and then tell me again how it's the bare sentence and not the use made of it that matters. — Srap Tasmaner

You can have a Davidsonian theory of meaning where the meaning of a sentence is it's truth conditions. That takes care of use. The truth bearer is still just the sentence.

I'm just not that impressed by the surface grammar. "4 > 3" says something about 3 and about 4, and about ordering. "The paperclip is holding" says something about the whole Jerry-rigged business. And "What you say is true" is not just a statement about your words. — Srap Tasmaner

Well said.

In general I think we want to properly recognize prima facie judgments. For example, Michael may want to claim that there is some prima facie reason why truth is thought to be a property of a single object. Where does that come from? Why would it be the starting point? The way you corralled the "surface grammar" accounts for this.

I'm not saying that truth is vacuous.

1. "it is raining" is true
2. it is raining
3. it is the case that it is raining
4. it is true that it is raining

(1) describes a sentence using the adjective "true". This, I think, is the proper use of the word "true", and is meaningful.

(3) means the same thing as (2) and so the phrase "it is the case that" is superfluous, saying nothing that isn't said without it.

(4) either means (1), in which case it is describing a sentence using the adjective "true" but doing so without the use of quotation marks, or it means (2), in which case the phrase "it is true that" is superfluous, saying nothing that isn't said without it.

So we can reduce the above to simply these two sentences without losing anything:

1. "it is raining" is true
2. it is raining

Truth and falsehood are properties of the sentence. The sentence is true if it is raining, otherwise it is false.

I'll quote from the SEP article on truth:

One of the important themes in the literature on truth is its connection to meaning, or more generally, to language.

...

We thus find the usual candidate truth-bearers linked in a tight circle: interpreted sentences, the propositions they express, the belief speakers might hold towards them, and the acts of assertion they might perform with them are all connected by providing something meaningful. This makes them reasonable bearers of truth.

My point is simple: truth-bearers are linguistic entities, and so if there is no language there are no truth-bearers and so nothing has the property of being either true or false.

I'm not saying that the existence of rain depends on language.

linguistic entities — Michael

Since this thread is, so I understand, in theory about metaphysics, I'm curious whether you have anything to say about these entities. Are you proposing some variety of dualism? What makes an entity linguistic or non-linguistic? (Rain, I take it, is not linguistic.) Are there other kinds of entities or just those two?

I'm curious whether you have anything to say about these entities. — Srap Tasmaner

We make sounds or draw symbols and these sounds and symbols mean something to us. I don't think there's much else to add, other than to reject any kind of Platonism.

But I don't think this has anything to do with metaphysics at all. Metaphysics concerns the nature of truth makers, not truth bearers. Is rain a mental phenomenon, à la idealism, or physical, à la materialism? Can an unknowable event occur, something Dummett's anti-realism rejects? Do counterfactual truth-makers exist?

But I don't think this has anything to do with metaphysics at all. Metaphysics concerns the nature of truth makers, not truth bearers. — Michael

"Entities" was *your* word. If you want to pretend that's not a metaphysical word, I don't know what to tell you.

Would you prefer it if I said “truth bearers are features of language”?

I didn’t mean anything special by the term “entity”.

Would you prefer it if I said “truth bearers are features of language”? — Michael

Do you want to say that? I'm not sure what that's supposed to mean, but be my guest.

I didn’t mean anything special by the term “entity”. — Michael

Clearly. It was a kind of placeholder "I don't know what to put here" word. But it is the natural word, in one sense, since you intend to attribute properties to these whatever-they-ares. So why are you backing away from it?

Metaphysics concerns the nature of truth makers, not truth bearers. — Michael

This whole discussion is directly related to the metaphysical status of truth bearers, and this has been an important question throughout the history of philosophy. Your simple appeal to the idea that truth bearers are linguistic just shuffles the central issues under the rug instead of furthering the investigation.