All experience consists of a creature capable of attributing meaning. — creativesoul

And putting the ability into practice, presumably?

Ok, and you say that such creatures might have no language? Do you mean none at all, and if so, roughly what are you counting as language?

Loaded questions. — Andrew M

Not the first, though:

So is the second sentence a typo, — bongo fury

Symbolically, x and "x" pick out the same x. — Andrew M

One way or the way other, please clarify.

If there is some state of affairs, then there can potentially be a statement that picks out that state of affairs. Symbolically, x and "x" pick out the same x. — Andrew M

So, is the second sentence a typo, or deliberate sophistry? Which the otherwise unaccountable banality of the first sentence is designed to camouflage?

Or have you convinced even yourself that the picker-outer is properly identified with the picked-out?

We need a general relation between an individual and a possible state of affairs, to use when someone is wrong as to the truth. — Banno

That's plausible, but it doesn't mean we need to recognise any mysteriously non-actual facts ("possible states of affairs" if they can't be just plain old alternative statements). Any more than we need to recognise mysteriously subsistent individuals ("the present King of France" etc. if they can't be just fictive or hypothetical terms, empty and non-referring).

How it could look for suitably deluded cats is a question not at all clarified by this metaphysical extravagance.

Ah, I get you. Although "existing in their entirety" isn't a phrase I associate with Banno... :lol:

:ok:

Existing without existing?

Cool.

What are facts, though...

I'd presumed a common ground of realism; that we agreed there were things in the world about which one could make true statements; — Banno

Seems fair enough.

... in a word, that there are facts; — Banno

What are facts, though? Presumably, not single objects. Larger space-time regions, of various (e.g. mouse-running-behind-tree) kinds?

Or platonic abstractions, like "states of affairs"? Do you allow such things on your watch? If so, why bother restricting "propositions" to statements?

To believe that the mouse ran behind the tree is exactly to believe that "the mouse ran behind the tree" is true; — Banno

Yes, but isn't it also roughly to be able to recognise the fact (the kind of event), and respond accordingly?

I don't see a problem with what I wrote. Feel free to be more specific. — Andrew M

Again?

You presume to lecture people on failure of reference. You cite Strawson, who uses "subject" explicitly and unambiguously in just one of its two notoriously opposite uses ("snow", not snow). But notions about Aristotle (or whatever) induce you to systematically equivocate between the two. So you are actually confused, here:

So, just to be clear, do you at last see why

(referring) subject
— Andrew M

would have to be a typo?
— bongo fury

I don't. Feel free to say why you think so. — Andrew M

And then you go straight from (half) acknowledging the error to encouraging the same confusion in Harry.

That is my specific problem with your pre-modern schtick.

There is a parallelism between words and the world, as well as important differences between the two. — Andrew M

Good luck with that schtick! But it is confused.

If at all. — bongo fury

:smile:

Smart phones, though?

I have it in mind that the cat believes there is a mouse behind the skirting board hole, but there are no statements in the cat's mind, but a nameless anticipation. — unenlightened

An artificial neural network can have the nameless anticipation (surge in action potentials). Oughtn't we reserve "belief" for the anticipations of a more restricted class of machines?

I suggest: those very much future machines skilled not merely in the chasing of mice, but in the chasing of the imaginary trajectories of the pointings of mouse-words and mouse-pictures. A skill which is ascribable literally to humans from infancy. Only anthropomorphically to cats and present-day robots.

That's too restrictive for people who are sure cats literally have beliefs, of course. They must exclude robots some other way. If at all.

The first word is necessarily a complex of beliefs [nameless anticipations] in communication [in the narrower sense of the chasing of trajectories in games of symbol-pointing] that cannot yet be stated. Language developed as a set of beliefs and practices that did not start with the expression of those linguistic [and non-linguistic] beliefs [anticipations]. — bongo fury

Fair enough. I should have used the word "existing" instead of "referring" — Andrew M

Cool. The opposite sense of subject to Strawson's sense, but fine if you are careful not to mix in that other usage without notice, or without noticing. Ah, but you see no such requirement.

(or even better, omitted the qualifier altogether). — Andrew M

Hence no need, apparently, to point out that Harry's usage is at least partly the opposite one:

subject:
1. A person or thing that is being discussed, described, or dealt with.
— Andrew M
So subjects are nouns? — Harry Hindu

You instead immediately resume the confused (Aristotelian?) insinuation of some benign parallelism between the two, which the philosopher has just clarified, if only we followed the clear logic.

Or the ball (the subject) is being kicked by Alice (the object). [...] it is the ball that is being described (i.e., in subject-predicate form). — Andrew M

The philosopher has no robes.

Why the stubborn attachment to "subject" at all?
— bongo fury

It's ordinary English. — Andrew M

Sure, but notoriously ambiguous between conflicting senses as a technical term, if not clarified in favour of one or the other.

From Lexico:

subject:
1. A person or thing that is being discussed, described, or dealt with. — Andrew M

Sure, and I offered

subject-matter — bongo fury

in precisely this sense, which is the one you chose when offered a choice.

Fine. Other words for the same kind of thing are available, but that needn't matter, as long as we aren't confusing the two senses. Attachment to "subject" in preference to "object" or "referent" only seems suspect because of,

So, just to be clear, do you at last see why

(referring) subject
— Andrew M

would have to be a typo?
— bongo fury

I don't. Feel free to say why you think so. — Andrew M

... which looks very much as though you are using the other, conflicting, sense of the word at the same time. Because, the only obvious reading of "(referring) subject" is to have it mean "word or phrase that refers".

This opposite sense is Strawson's, but he adopts it consistently and exclusively. He does discuss Russell's (further) distinction between grammatical subject and logical subject; but obviously both of these are "snow", and not snow. And we don't

normally use a sentence to assert something about — Andrew M

either of them (the types of "snow"), but only about the snow.

How about:
"The point here though is that we normally use a sentence to assert something about a subject (where the subject exists)." — Andrew M

So, just to be clear, do you at last see why

(referring) subject — Andrew M

would have to be a typo?




Why the stubborn attachment to "subject" at all? Why not referent or object for snow, and term, word, phrase etc. for "snow"? Does a neo-Aristotelian perhaps need to equivocate systematically between the two senses?

Something to do with states of affairs having grammatical form?

That could explain the trouble it took to get you to examine the matter instead of presuming to lecture further.

"The belief is not a statement" is not the same as "the belief has propositional content". It is not something I wish to defend. — Banno

Typo. (wish to attack?) Or unclear.

Boxing Day, 10.25: Just noticeably sharp.

13.10: Semitone sharp.

16.25: Good.

17.40: Good.

20.20: Good. Maybe sharp.

23.25: Bit sharp.



Day 36, 11.10: Good.

12.40: Good.

14.40: More than just noticeably sharp.

17.45: Good.

21.15: Slightly flat. (But quick.)



Day 37, 15.45: Semitone sharp.

18.55: Good.

22.20: Most of a semitone flat.



Day 38: 16.35: Good. And Quick.

20.25: Slightly flat.

21.15: Good.



Day 39: 10.05: Good. and Quick.

13.00: Good.

18.15: Slightly sharp.

21.30 Good.



Day 40, 10.15: Slightly sharp.

16.45: Good.

18.45: Semitone sharp.

21.35: Good.



Day 41, 10.35: Good.

12.50: Good.

16.05: Good.

18.55: Good.

20.55: Good.

23.05: Good.



Day 42, 10.05: Good.

11.40: Good.

15.30: Well flat.

16.50: Good.

21.20: Good.



Day 43, 08.40: Good.

15.50: Good.

19.00: Semitone sharp.

20.00: Sharp again.

22.50: Good.



Day 44, 12.55: Semitone flat.

19.35: Good.



Day 45, 08.20: Good.

17.45: Good.

20.40: Slightly sharp.

20.55: Good.



..day 46, 07.50: Good.

11.30: Good.

13.05: Good.

16.20: Good.

17.15: Most of a semitone sharp.

19.20: Good.



Day 47, 12.30: Good.

16.05: Good.

18.50: Good.

20.55: Semitone sharp. Ish.

22.40: Good.



Day 48, 12.55: Good.

16.05: A tad sharp.

22.00: Good.

23.40: Good.



Day 49, 10.30: Good.

12.25: Slightly flat.

13.00: Good.

16.25: Good.

18.40: Good.

21.40: Good.



Day 50, 10.10: Good.

12.10: Good.

16.05: Good.

19.35: Good.

20.43: Good.



Day 51, 17.35: Good.

23.00: Good.



Day 52, 17.40: Good.

22.10: Good.



.Day 53, 10.50: Good.

17.50: Good.

18.45: Good.

21.10: Good.

23.20: Good.



Day 54, 08.30: Slightly sharp.

14.15: Ditto. (Both hurried.)

18.00: Good. (And hurried.)

24.00: Good.



Day 55, 13.20: Good.

16.10: Good.

19.50: Good.

21.35: Good.



Day 56, 09.50: Good.

14.15: Good.

16.20: Good.

23.50: Semitone sharp.



Day 57, 09.45: Good.

14.25: Good.

20.05: Good.



Day 58, 14.05: Good.

15.45: Good.

17.45: Good.

00.15: Can't get YouTube but pretty sure it's good. In at least 20 per cent of trials I now have this feeling straight away, generally confirmed. Still have to wait a while usually.



Day 59, 09.50: Haha, forgot to hang on and check last night's dubious claim. Anyway, good right now, but only after a couple of minutes' struggle to obtain an "image" having the required feeling of certainty.

17.10: Good.

00.35: Good.



Day 60, 15.05: Good.

16.30: Good.

18.45: Slightly sharp.

21.00: Good.



Day 61, 08.30: Good.

15.00: Good.

21.20: Ouch, can't hurry yet. Semitone sharp.

23.00: Good.



Day 62, 10.00: Good.

19.45: A bit flat.

20.35: Good.

22.10: Good.



Day 63, 10.55: Slightly flat.

14.35: Good.

17.20: Good.

00.55: Good.



Day 64, 09.25: Good.

15.50: Good.

17.20: Good.

20.00: Good.

21.30: Good.



Day 65, 16.40: Good.

19.40: Sharp.



Day 66, 10.05: Good.

17.40: Good.

22.20: Semitone flat.



Day 67, 12.20: Slightly flat.

17.55: Good.

23.45: Good.



Day 68, 19.05: Good.

00.30: Good.



Day 69, 14.55: Good.

16.50: Good.

21.10: Good.

00.50: Slightly flat.



Day 70, 10.45: Slightly flat.

15.00: Slightly sharp.

17.45: Good.

21.00: Good.

00.45: Slightly flat.



Day 71, 09.45: Good.

12.05: Good.

18.55: Good.

20.30: Good.



Day 72, 19.50: Good.

21.35: Slightly sharp.



Day 73, 10.15: Slightly flat.

12.20: Good.

17.00: Good.

21.20: Good.

23.50: Sharp.



Day 74, 10.55: Slightly flat.

18.30: Good.

21.00: Aargh, semitone sharp. Still can't hurry.



Day 75, 14.30: Flat.

17.35: Good.

19.25: Good.

00.00: Good.



Day 76,10.30: Good.

15.15: Good.

18.40: Flat.

20.35: Good.

23.00: Good.



Day 77, 13.00: Good.

17.15: Good.

20.15: Flat.



Day 78, 11.45: Good.

14.40: Flat.

16.20: Good.

21.10: Good.



Day 79, 11.35: Good.

19.10: Good.

22.00: Slightly flat.



Day 80, 09.10: Good.

18.00: Good.

21.35: Good.

23.05: Good.



Day 81, 13.10: Good.

17.25: Good.

19.00: Good.

22.25: Good.



Day 82, 13.20: Good.

16.35: Good.

19.00: Slightly sharp.

20.50: Good.



Day 83, 09.00: Good.

11.55: Good.

15.55: Good.

18.15: Good.

20.30: Good.



Day 84, 08.35: Good.

13.50: Good.

18.05: Flat.

20.00: Good.

23.20: Good.



Day 85, 11.00: Good.

13.20: Good.

16.30: Good.

19.10: Slightly flat.

22.25: Good.

(referring) subject.
— Andrew M

was a typo?
— bongo fury

No, I meant it in the sense of "existing" or a successful reference, as opposed to a failure of reference (such as the present King of France). — Andrew M

So, not

"Snow" or snow?
— bongo fury

Snow. — Andrew M

At all. Not, one instead of the other. Rather,

"Snow"'s referring to snow.

Something like,

The point here though is that we normally use a sentence to assert something about the reference of its (referring) subject term to its referent. — Andrew M

A typo, then, but a different correction now?

:up: Ordering that book today. Despite...

Where fans of synaesthesia allege "cross-talk" between folds of cortex (so what?) I prefer this kind of talk:

How our lookings at pictures and our listenings to music inform what we encounter later and elsewhere is integral to them as cognitive. Music can inform perception not only of other sounds but also of the rhythms and patterns of what we see. Such cross-transference of structural properties seems to me a basic and important aspect of learning, not merely a matter for novel experimentation by composers, dancers, and painters.
— Goodman: Languages of Art

(My emphasis.) — bongo fury

Language is not needed for the event to happen, — creativesoul

There is the space-time region independent of our talking about it now (or whenever), sure.

nor is it [language] needed to believe that a mouse ran behind the tree. — creative soul

Language isn't needed to correlate the event (region) with others of the same (mouse-running-behind-tree) kind?

Because the cat shows it has drawn exactly or roughly this correlation?

snow outside — Andrew M

Indeed. Deep and crisp and even. Not composed of four letters. So, just to be clear, this phrase,

(referring) subject. — Andrew M

was a typo?

we normally use a sentence to assert something about a (referring) subject. — Andrew M

Gosh.

"Subject" in the sense of grammatical [or logical] subject, a word or phrase (e.g. "snow" or "king of France") capable of referring to an object or subject-matter (snow or French king), but which is not itself, typically, what the sentence containing it is used to assert something about?

Or "subject" in the sense of a typically non-referring object or subject-matter (snow or French king) about which we use a sentence to assert something? ... Normally to the exclusion of referring to or asserting about any parts of the asserting sentence?

"Snow" or snow?

Oh, an experiential facet. I see.

Banno can grant beliefs to cats because he assumes beliefs are mythical folk psychology anyway. He needs them to be propositional so that they can be true or false all the same.

Others assume that beliefs are real mental furniture, or real behavioural or systemic dispositions. Or real something. They need to liberate them (the beliefs) from language in order to be able to grant them to cats without having to anthropomorphize.

But, when used to define belief, the two senses of the word are alike in appearing (superficially at least) to deny beliefs to cats, who are oblivious to either sense.

Would you brush a speaking in tongues question away to a religion forum?

are all mental disorders just distortions or exaggerations of aspects of normal mental functioning? — Pfhorrest

Arguably.

https://philosophybites.com/2016/01/steven-hyman-on-categorising-mental-disorders.html

But is skepticism on a spectrum, or is there a discrete categorical syndrome of anti-psychiatry?

perhaps DID is "all a fake", but no more than anyone's usual self-identity is "a fake". — Pfhorrest

To the asylum with you!

:ok:

https://youtu.be/Uzx2UWKvrM4?t=1407

Is it,

[1] Can we see the whole world as it is?

Or is it,

[2] Can we see a suitable portion of the world as it is?

Assuming the latter, is this short for,

[3] Can we see a suitable portion of the world as it is described truly?

Or does it have to be,

[4] Can we see a suitable portion of the world as it is described truly and completely?

Or,

[5] Can we see a suitable portion of the world as it is described truly and definitively?

Or is it short for something else? Or is "as it is" perfectly clear as it is?

Answer:

I consider it 'consulting the experts' in a way. — dan0mac

There are hardly any professionals here, a few well-read dilettantes, — SophistiCat

Well they did put scare quotes and say "in a way".

In philosophy, a proposition is the meaning of a declarative sentence, where "meaning" is understood to be a non-linguistic entity which is shared by all sentences with the same meaning.” --wikipedia — frank

Yes, but @Banno keeps on explicitly disavowing this definition. His definition is truth-apt statements. (Hooray.) I.e. syntactical not semantical objects.

Then the semantics via truth, of course. But you have to go via the T-schema (boo), which needs statements. That's why people can't tempt him to stretch "beliefs" to be about [to have as "content"] more than just the meanings of statements. He doesn't believe in such things. (Hooray.)

Edit: Frank... Meh. Context favoured "statements".

A world of zombies would not include talk of colors, tastes and pains. — Marchesk

How on earth not? How are the blessed creatures expected to agree policy toward the myriad stimuli if not by ordering and classifying them?

But of course the paradox is rather easily resolved if we recognize that having words in mind or thinking silently in words no more implies that we have anything called a mind with words in it than having peace as a hope implies that we have anything called peace or a hope. — Goodman, On Thoughts Without Words

:rofl:

True. :smile:

Philosophy as dentistry. — Banno

Point counterpoint.

T-sentences set this out as clearly as possible: — Banno

If only.

The left hand side is about words, ... — Banno

More specifically, the left hand side raises the question whether the quoted sentence has succeeded in pointing the word "white" at snow. So it's about both.

... the right hand side is about the world, ... — Banno

More specifically, the right hand side raises the question whether snow is such as to be pointed at by the word "white" (in English, else by "weiß" etc.). So, both again.

... and truth is what brings them together. — Banno

No longer makes sense.

The stuff on the right hand side is in unmediated contact with the world; — Banno

Is as mystical as the 'mediated' version.

that is, it just says how things are. — Banno

How they are organised by language.

And it does this simply because that is what words do. — Banno

Hand waving.

I can describe my cat's actions in terms of its beliefs; — Banno

Anthropomorphically, sure.

So the physical representation changes, while the meaning is invariant. So how could the idea it carries be physical? — Wayfarer

Quite. But why can't it be fictional?

Some things are practically intractable. — Marchesk

This isn't necessarily one of them. Just saying.

but we will never be able to reduce psychological explanations to physical explanations - — Banno

With that attitude.

I merely think I understand Hume to have pointed out that justification (or reason or logic or derivation or inference) is sometimes deductive but just as often inductive (habitual or associative).

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/331201 — bongo fury

In my view, this aspect has been largely ignored in philosophy -- with the exception (in my reading) of Aristotle's Ethics. — Xtrix

Hume.

Day 24, 13.50: Slightly flat.

Yikes, 22.05: Good.



Day 25, 07.45: Slightly flat.

13.05: Semitone sharp.

21.00: Good.



Day 26, 08.30: Good.

11.25: Good.

18.35: Sharp, about half a semitone. Hurried.

20.55: Flat this time. Too hurried again. (Plausibly.)



Day 27, 07.05: Good.

12.50: Good.

15.20: Good.

20.20: Sharp.

21.35: Good.



Day 28, 09.50: Good, maybe slightly sharp, was aware it might be; couldn't (gave up on it) get the image a fraction (rather than the whole) of a semitone flatter. Which happens sometimes. Probably never achieve anything more precise than a flattening or sharpening by some entirely uncertain fraction.

14.40: Same again.

17.20: Slightly flat. (Hurried.)

20.15: Good.



Day 29, 08.05: Good.

12.10: Good.

14.10: Semitone sharp.

15.30: Tad sharp.

22.00: Good.



Day 30, 08.35: Semitone sharp.

11.05: Good.

17.20: Bit flat.

21.55: Good.



Day 31, 15.15: Good.

17.45: Bit sharp.

23.45: Good.



Day 32, 11.25: Good.

17.45: Bit flat.

19.00: Semitone flat.

20.45: Slightly flat.

00.27: Slightly flat.



Day 33, 08.55: Good.

22.10: Semitone flat.



Xmas Eve, 16.20: Half a semitone sharp.

21.30: Good.



Xmas Day, 12.30: Slightly sharp.

15.40: Good.

19.25: Good.

22.35: Good.

00.20: Good.