What else, then, should I have done? — Alice
show him that [you] won't be fooled into admitting some continuity, between his standard and meaningful contributions to the discourse, and the nonsense. — bongo fury
In what way was I beguiled? — Alice
As though the nonsense might have been there all along and be seeping all through: in the prior discussions and in the game of syntactic replication and recognition still in play. On which spurious basis (that of such a continuity) Bob and [@Tristan L] both might hope to worry [you] and other sensible people with "yes I agree and therefore the opposite". — bongo fury
Do you not agree with me that I disagree with Bob, whereas he says that I agree with him?” — Alice
As we know from many terms of service, not exercising a right doesn’t mean waiving it. — Tristan L
Bob might be an aspiring sophist, but I’m more and more inclined to think that he is more interested in radical monism — Tristan L
Only by applying PSAN with radical thoroughness could he hope to be taken seriously. — Tristan L
trying to define negation — Tristan L
1) As a word's (or other symbol's) happening not to point at an object
2) As some corresponding negative's (or antonym's) happening to point at the object
Each of which probably implies the other, in some way that would help explain global patterns of word-pointing. Such as, the tendency of a scheme of words towards "sorting" of a domain of objects, through pointing out of (more or less) mutually exclusive but jointly exhaustive sub-domains. — bongo fury
By the way, I’m very well aware that the Principle of the Sameness of Affirmation and Negation (PSAN) applies on the object-logical level and all meta-logical levels, too. And if I say ‘all’, I really mean ALL. — Bob
Yes, Alice, you are right, you said to me, quite clearly, and I quote, "Bob, please do mess with my phone!"
Heck, we don’t even agree whether we agree or disagree, — Alice
Yes, he mis-disquotes her, but he doesn’t mis-quote her. I’m not changing my stance on that, — Tristan L
Bob gave every appearance of being prepared to agree (in a non-surprising way) about these [expressing sentences]. About which phonetic sequences agree with (replicate, quote) which others, and about which ones disagree with (fail to quote) which others. — bongo fury
But he claims that certain pairs of sentences have the same meaning which Alice, you and I think have opposite meanings, doesn’t he? — Tristan L
That is, Alice can expose Bob by pointing out that he applies a not-standard interpretation to her sentences. — Tristan L
Heck, we don’t even agree whether we agree or disagree, — Tristan L
including the point expressed by this very sentence as well as the one expressed by what Bob is about to say. — Tristan L
Worth a look. — Banno
One can discover a truth without being the first to discover it (in this context); it is enough that one comes to believe it in an independent, reliable and rational way.
The difference between merely discovering a truth and proving it is a matter of transparency: for proving or following a proof the subject must be aware of the way in which the conclusion is reached and the soundness of that way; this is not required for discovery.
While there is no reason to think that mental arithmetic (mental calculation in the integers and rational numbers) typically involves much visual thinking,
form a number line representation [only] once we have acquired a written numeral system.
whenever they talk about red they are referring to their red. — sime
Therefore consider the irrealist alternative; namely that ontological disagreements are partly the result of our collectively inconsistent use of language. — sime
'Male' and 'female' are genetic classifications, — Virgo Avalytikh
The Y chromosome is the male-making chromosome. — Virgo Avalytikh
sometimes folk use "that's true" for "I agree with you".
— Banno
...But never, in my experience, for "that is what people in the future will come to think when science has advanced sufficiently far". — Isaac
If you're not defining 'true' by how it is used, then I'm not interested in going any further because I don't hold with trying to define what things should mean, only what they do mean. — Isaac
Searle argument simply [works onrefutes] a wrong model of understanding [as syntax] which he obviously takes as being [universallytoo widely] accepted as correct, but that is a wrong assumption, which once might have been true though. But today it really should be clear he simply starts with the wrong model and then proves the wrong model is wrong, it’s a farce. — Zelebg
Then Searle's argument makes a wrong presupposition that it is an adequate model of how understanding works. — Zelebg
It’s like arguing chemistry is just stupid atoms following laws of physics, so they can not possibly give rise to things like biology, language or consciousness. Where is the confusion? — Zelebg
signal-meaning pairs, — Zelebg
All else is sophistry. — Banno
This reminds me vaguely of a philosophical or logical problem I read about once, and can't remember the resolution to at the moment. — Pfhorrest
can't remember the resolution — Pfhorrest
Agathon: I'm afraid the word is bad. You have been condemned to death.
Allen: Ah, it saddens me that I should cause debate in the senate.
Agathon: No debate. Unanimous.
Allen: Really?
Agathon: First ballot.
Allen: Hmmm. I had counted on a little more support.
Simmias: The senate is furious over your ideas for a Utopian state.
Allen: I guess I should never have suggested having a philosopher-king.
Simmias: Especially when you kept pointing to yourself and clearing your throat.
— Woody Allen, 'My Apology'
It's a complex, ill-posed and frankly outdated assertion. Firstly, an observation O can only materially entail the contradiction of a hypothesis H in a closed finite world. For in an open-world, the meaning of the material implication O => ~H isn't empirically reducible to observations, and is instead an auxiliary hypothesis, A, which isn't itself entailed by some other observation on pain of infinite regress. So in an open world we have A => ( O => ~H) , and hence O => (~A OR ~H) — sime
this problem that you're referring to. — creativesoul
But the question is whether there is any problem with saying that a particular piece of butter (a particular statement) satisfies "melts at some temperature less than 100°C" (satisfies "renders counter-examples verifiable") even though it never got the chance to melt (to render a counter-example verifiable), because I ate it cold (because it had no counter-examples). — bongo fury
I find no issue with that, so it's something to keep in mind. If we arrive at something which contradicts it, we aught pause and reconsider. — creativesoul
To be falsifiable is to be able to be shown as false.
Agree? — creativesoul
"Butter melts at less than one hundred degrees" — creativesoul
It would take observation of particles produced by sub atomic decay that did not subsequently 'exhibit' identical properties to falsify the statement — creativesoul
True statements are unable to be shown as false for they never are.
Better? — creativesoul
Do you have an example that demonstrates your proposed scenario/situation? — creativesoul
no true statement is falsifiable. — creativesoul
Saying that a proposition is necessarily true is really no different to writing the word 'true' in capital letters. — Bartricks
"True" is what we call sentence tokens that bear repeating on their own terms, which is to say, without contextualising in the manner of "... is untrue because..." or "... would be the case if not for..." etc.
Such contexts are potential predators, and must be fought off and dominated. — bongo fury
Truth is not the name for some practice of ours - our practice of calling some sentences 'true', for clearly we could have that practice and some of the sentences we call true could be false. — Bartricks
Not without contradicting other sentences we call true. — bongo fury
Truth is, as I have argued, the assertive activity of Reason: a proposition is true when Reason asserts it. — Bartricks
Ergo, by Popper's account of what a scientific claim is, statement A is not disproved and given [that there are some ravens that are blackthat statement A is falsifiable], statement A acquires the status of a scientific theory - to be taken as [true for all intents & purposesa theory as yet unfalsified and worth testing]. — TheMadFool
↪bongo fury Thanks for noticing the error in my post. I made the necessary corrections.
Sure it is. But it's a problem for induction: for deciding between equally as-yet-unfalsified hypotheses.
— bongo fury
How is it a paradox when you agree that falsificationism requires those who make hypotheses to look for counter-evidence by searching outside the domain of the subjects of hypotheses? The statement, all cats are animals is falsifiable precisely by looking for and finding a non-animal that's not a cat. — TheMadFool
It's a paradox and potential embarrassment for confirmation theory because it appears to entitle those who make hypotheses to look for confirming evidence by searching outside the domain of the subjects of hypotheses. The statement, all cats are animals is apparently confirmable precisely by looking for and finding a non-animal that's not a cat.