Ambiguity and vagueness seem to part of the problem too but for now I'm still in the dark as to how exactly they weigh in. — TheMadFool

Oh gosh, is that my fault, for suggesting that offside is about vagueness, not induction? And you thought I meant induction is about vagueness, not the opposite? Or you thought it would be just a shame to examine induction without ambiguity and vagueness in the mix (even if that was good enough for Hume, Goodman and Kripke, and probably Wittgenstein)? And hey what about Leibniz's law too?? You want it all in the pot!!

You mad fool!

I think vagueness requires a continuum to exist in. The classic heap paradox illustrates that quite well I believe. — TheMadFool

Well it illustrates the opposite, because it proceeds step by discrete step. But a continuum can make the vagueness ineliminable, yes.

However Wittgenstein's paradox seems to be about clear and distinct rules. No continuum. — TheMadFool

"No vagueness", and yes, my point exactly.

I guess the example given is insufficient to capture the essence of Wittgenstein's paradox because both the off-side example and the plus-quus example are about acquiring more information.
Could you guys give me a better example? Thanks. — TheMadFool

Presumably plus-quus isn't in doubt as a case of Kripgenstein, at least? But compare blue-grue if you want another (or very close).

I was questioning offside as a suitable example of (yes) generalising from limited (but presumed non-vague) information, and recommending it instead as a case of vagueness, specifically the ineliminability of vagueness in measurement with no margin of error. (I.e. a case of the futility of insisting on exactness, where the latter is assumed absolute rather than relative to a margin of error.)

This comment has virtually nothing to do with what I wrote either in terms of its intention or its substance. — Baden

Admirable caricature of the standard defense of an essay fortified against all imagined objections, so that anyone who disagrees must be wrong.

Although they might just be suggesting looking from a different angle.

I disagree.

You have potentially an excellent forum for point/counterpoint, marred mostly (not entirely) by people writing essays at each other. And now you actually encourage them to lengthen and fortify these essays against all imagined objections, so that anyone who disagrees must be wrong, e.g. incapable of reading or otherwise misinformed, and the author will be in an even better position than they currently typically are to provide a 5-times-longer counter-objection... and so on.

I prefer it when it seems to be about trading ideas. As opposed to persuasion, which never happens and always defaults to posturing.

Still, whatever... but how about at least a word limit?

Some forms of behaviorism have no room for reference of any kind, — frank

Oh, I wonder. Not Quine, though, obviously.

but I shouldn't have brought this up — frank

Glad you did.

None of these uncontroversial senses of inscrutability add up to a grand philosophical thesis. — sime

Then they fail to convey Quine's point, so I'll have a go.

A uniquely (as far as we know) human faculty is for pointing words and pictures at things, and for discerning and distinguishing the pointings, and determining which words and pictures are pointed at which things.

But there just is no fact of the matter whether a word or picture is pointed at one thing or another. No physical bolt of energy flows from pointer to pointee(s). So the whole social game is one of pretence. Albeit of course a powerful one.

But the pretence largely benefits from suspension of disbelief, amply supplied by habit, perhaps by innate prejudice, and by logic, a kind (when interpreted) of cgi automatic pointing machine; and the suspension of disbelief is further entrenched by more or less conscious attempts to ground the pointing fantasy as a matter of fact. So that the aspect of pretence and fictitiousness does indeed provoke disbelief, as per the OP.

I think Chomsky avers (somewhere on youtube) that Hume and Heraclitus were privy to the same insight. Of course he draws a different lesson from it than Quine. But he doesn't say the doctrine itself is mistaken, or even that it is behaviouristic. And it isn't. It points out that you can't objectively ground reference in behaviour.

Yeah indeed, hence my parenthetical edit that you likely didn't see.

You can't point to all of the instances of anything — Terrapin Station

Ain't that the root of all our (thinking we have) problems?!

But if you have a problem with "run" pointing to "run(ning)," then you'd have an equal problem with "Joe" pointing to "Joe" or "cat" pointing to "cat" or whatever . . . — Terrapin Station

It helps to drop the second pair of quote marks in each case, no?

I.e. "run" points to run(ning), "Joe" points to Joe and "cat" points to cat?

There are two possible rules — TheMadFool

... or as many as you like. I think you're back on Plus/Quus.

Just saying, offside rule disputes may be a good example of a different (interesting) problem, but not this one.

There is no black and white. Simply shades of grey. — TheMadFool

Except that one such intermediate shade is sufficient, usually, to facilitate perfectly reliable separation of black and white.

Not that such a separation is possible between the categories designated by "offside" and "not offside", which are assumed to exhaust the domain of football-play-states, and must therefore eventually overlap, however keen the effort and eyesight of referees.

Consideration of which is, I would think, a better use of the example than using it for discussion of Plus and Quus. The definition aspect of offside is an unproblematic equation of "offside" vs. "not offside" with "nearer to the opposing team's goal-line than are the ball and at least all but one of that team's players" vs. "not nearer... etc." Which, as you point out, isn't about induction or generalisation, and isn't what creates disputes.

And not that Plus and Quus aren't fascinating as anything, e.g. Blue and Grue. But they don't depend on necessary vagueness ('open texture') of terms. I.e. on the impossibility of keeping one term separate from another (such as its complement) without a margin for error, an impossibility that does explain the sporting disputes.

Concepts are a means of calling/considering phenomenon a and phenomenon b the "same thing"--namely whatever the concept term is. So I think we used "yellow" as an example. That way you can see the color of, say, a car and the color of a guitar and use the term "yellow" for both. (Which is using a general term--that's what concepts are, and referring to particulars--the particular yellow of that particular car--for example, if that answers that question). — Terrapin Station

Cool. So why do you say,

"Classing all the cases together" is a way of talking about the concepts we formulate as such--those are abstractions that range over a number of unique instances. — Terrapin Station

and not see the point of,

What about insofar as we're using concepts to talk about (e.g. compare and sort) the unique instances? — bongo fury

?

And earlier, why react in alarm to my response here,

In terms of our experience, it's a particular dynamic state of synapses, neurons, etc.
— Terrapin Station

Particular in the sense of general but awaiting a clear physical definition (which would decide if a particular brain state was an instance of it)? — bongo fury

?

After all, you volunteered the comparison between, on the one hand,

With respect to the object (the objective stuff), it's the fact that it reflects that wavelength of EMR, sure. — Terrapin Station

... where "yellow" is applying wherever the physical definition is satisfied, and by the way we clearly are "classing all the cases together" yet talking about instances as much as concepts... and then on the other hand,

In terms of our experience, it's a particular dynamic state of synapses, neurons, etc. — Terrapin Station

... where I just thought it made sense to point out that we would likewise be distinguishing cases of mentally-yellow from mentally-non-yellow (and again using the concept to sort the instances but not thereby be talking about concepts), despite having no corresponding physical definition of when a (unique) brain state or brain state property counts under someone's general concept of mentally-yellow.

Do you not intend your example of the car and the guitar to play out on both levels, objectual and mental, in roughly this way?

Shouldn't it make sense to discuss the extensions of our phenomenal colour concepts as well as, and perhaps in relation to, the more easily defined extensions of physical colour concepts?

"Classing all the cases together" is a way of talking about the concepts we formulate as such--those are abstractions that range over a number of unique instances. And sure, insofar as we're talking about concepts, that's fine.
— Terrapin Station

What about insofar as we're using concepts to talk about (e.g. compare and sort) the unique instances? — bongo fury

[That] question seems to be about concepts where they aren't abstractions ranging over a number of particular instances. I wouldn't say that would qualify as a concept. It would just be a name and/or description of the particular. ("Description of" isn't really possible without concepts ranging over a number of particulars, though.) — Terrapin Station

Oh, I get it. I'm right to interpret your "concepts" as mental events analogous to general terms like adjectives. (No?) But when I blithely speak of using them to sort particulars you are alarmed because you see a general term as naming (or pointing at or designating or referring to) a whole class of or abstraction from the instances, as an entity in its own right. You can't see it referring to a particular and still being general? (Correct me.)

But can't a nominalist deny the class or abstraction, and reconstrue a general statement (e.g. a predication or attribution or description) quite simply as shared naming, i.e. as ascribing the property to, or simply pointing out and thereby sorting under the term, all of the instances, severally? I'm not saying that approach doesn't throw up problems. But it's what I was about in the second paragraph.

Re the content of that paragraph, I don't think there's any way to experience someone else's consciousness--I think that in principle that is impossible. — Terrapin Station

Fair enough. Inconceivable, even? If my ability to compare my successive mental events (dynamic brain states) is afforded by continuous neural connection between them, couldn't I in principle get a similar bridge between mine and yours? I mean I can quite believe it might be inconceivable on your view. Just trying to see the view.

"Classing all the cases together" is a way of talking about the concepts we formulate as such--those are abstractions that range over a number of unique instances. And sure, insofar as we're talking about concepts, that's fine. — Terrapin Station

What about insofar as we're using concepts to talk about (e.g. compare and sort) the unique instances? Not fine? E.g.,

Given we're both looking at some distinct particular objects classed nonetheless together under the concept (which is to say, under any or all of my and your countless mental instances of the concept) of 'yellow-wavelength-reflecting', I notice that my dynamic brain states during this period all have properties which it is natural for me to class together as (which is to say, under any or all of my countless mental instances of my concept of) yellow (in the mental sense). And I wonder (as y'do) if my concept of mentally-yellow is roughly coextensive with yours, as I assume is the case with our concepts of EMR-yellow, and as might be tested if I got the right kind of acquaintance with your brain states and their properties?

Is that fine?

Ok, and "yellowness" might be a property of my experience while perceiving an object reflecting a certain wavelength?
— bongo fury

Right, it's a property of that object reflect[ing] that wavelength of EMR, and it's also a property of your experience per se (which is what qualia are). — Terrapin Station

I want to ask: is it a disposition or ability to reflect the certain wavelength?
— bongo fury

With respect to the object (the objective stuff), it's the fact that it reflects that wavelength of EMR, sure. That's not what it is with respect to our experience, though--our mental phenomena don't reflect that wavelength of EMR. In terms of our experience, it's a particular dynamic state of synapses, neurons, etc. — Terrapin Station

Particular in the sense of general but awaiting a clear physical definition (which would decide if a particular brain state was an instance of it)?
— bongo fury

Say what?

No, particular as in particular. And it has nothing to do with definitions, etc. — Terrapin Station

Ok, but I thought you were happy to at least class all the particular cases of yellow-wavelength-reflection together as cases (albeit different particular cases) of possession of "yellowness" (in the objective sense) by an object?

So I thought you would be happy to form a corresponding class of cases (each of them particular and different of course) of possession of "yellowness" (in the mental sense) by a brain state?

In terms of our experience, it's a particular dynamic state of synapses, neurons, etc. — Terrapin Station

Particular in the sense of general but awaiting a clear physical definition (which would decide if a particular brain state was an instance of it)?

Right, it's a property of that object reflect[ing] that wavelength of EMR, and it's also a property of your experience per se (which is what qualia are). — Terrapin Station

Ok. One more thing, for now. This property... is it meaningful to ask: what is it? E.g., I want to ask: is it a disposition or ability to reflect the certain wavelength?

Right, it's a property of that object reflect[ing] that wavelength of EMR, and it's also a property of your experience per se (which is what qualia are). — Terrapin Station

Ok. One more thing, for now. This property... is it meaningful to ask: what is it? E.g., I want to ask: is it a disposition or ability to reflect the certain wavelength?

Yes, for maybe the fifth time now, properties are simply ways that things are, characteristics they have. — Terrapin Station

Ok, and "yellowness" might be a property of my experience while perceiving an object reflecting a certain wavelength?

No. And I'm a physicalist, by the way. — Terrapin Station

Oh yes, I knew that. So you assume a physicalist basis, but properties are part of it, not something you would (like Goodman) expect to construct?

Cool. Goodman was agnostic as to what we construct from what, though. Are you siding with what he would have called a phenomenalist basis, as against e.g. a physicalist one?

"Same/different" is qualitative. — Terrapin Station

And we construct quantities from qualities, a la Goodman in Structure of Appearance?

All properties that are not quantities (that are not simply numerical). — Terrapin Station

What about higher/lower... more/less... same/different ?

Btw, less words is more :up: :up: :up:

Going on my to-do list.

:up:

I hope that this explanation is more intuitive than this one wiki. Any comments? — alcontali

Just in case pictures help anyone with the wiki proof.

Grateful for notification of errors, or suggestions for further signposting or clarification.

Single pdf here.








No toilet humour intended. :chin:

What, in your opinion, is the difficulty with using music as a language? — TheMadFool

I just meant comparing or defining them at all is a challenge. (Fool's errand!)

It could be that language is already musical - there is such a thing as intonation in speech. Do you think this is sufficient to qualify language as musical? — TheMadFool

Yes, exactly... to say nothing of rhythm, tone, dynamics etc.

I think a few people here have emphasised the proportion of overlap of the two circles.

Some have noted the obvious distinction when it comes to semantic function (if there are no words). But, how to understand that very distinction? (Here, of course.)

Perhaps music as a language would require a level of proficiency that either only a few possess or requires an amount of practice that is just too much compared to the usual and easier process of language acquisition. — TheMadFool

Rap?? But of course you meant wordless... except that you envision (I take it) conventions of musical meaning... i.e. words, roughly speaking.

Actually I think I'm correct about what I said. It doesn't matter which note you choose the music is recognizable as long as you maintain the intervals and timings of the notes. — TheMadFool

Yes, along with all manner of analog features, not always preserved from one performance to the next, a melody contains a "core" pattern of relative pitch and duration, which is digital in the sense of being reliably identifiable (equate-able) across instances. Some instances higher than others, some faster than others.

Note that relative pitch is a log scale of frequency, turning ratios into arithmetic differences. Otherwise you will get confused, trying to do the kinds of comparison you are suggesting, which are difficult but worthwhile (and fun).

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tone_%28linguistics%29?wprov=sfla1

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pitch_%28music%29?wprov=sfla1

In a world where identity is properly understood, — TheWillowOfDarkness

Grateful for a brief outline.

feelings at the thought of being more feminine,
— Pfhorrest

... i.e. of having a different sexual essence, no? — bongo fury

That's just having an identity. There is no specific set of properties which amount to being more feminine or not. — TheWillowOfDarkness

You should probably take that up with the OP, as the whole sentence is,

But I get good feelings at the thought of being more feminine, just physically, not talking about anything social yet. — Pfhorrest

Willow, I think the only semblance of common ground among everyone (else) here is acceptance of biological sex as an unproblematic (though complex) biological classification.

If you were at least on that ground (but I fear not), then I could read your comment,

There is no specific set of properties which amount to being more feminine or not. — TheWillowOfDarkness

as a critique of essentialism about sex. Would that be appropriate?

IME trans people only accidentally sound like they are employing gender essentialism because of the conflation of gender with what I have dubbed “bearing”. — Pfhorrest

But then you not only reinforce the received, mythical psycho-sexual essences called genders and orientations, you invent some more and call them bearings. This is more essentialism not less. You aren't questioning the abstraction of masculinity and femininity (and all their specious, arbitrary and culture-specific associations) from biologically male and female at all. You are reinforcing it by proposing to measure or survey people according to, for example, their

feelings at the thought of being more feminine, — Pfhorrest

... i.e. of having a different sexual essence, no?

Political, religious, economic, philosophical, musical, sexual and gender subversives... I expect them to subvert, because I see them subvert.

Since money/ownership is a mythical cultural construct. Folks should be combating the cultural construct, not bowing to it while claiming to be trying to buck it.

Somehow, I suspect my version will not garner such enthusiastic support. — unenlightened

Obviously at least half of economic and political theories try to understand money as a social construction, not a natural or theological one. So your comparison is welcome after all.

Don't let people think you actually oppose gender-non-conformism, though? As though you think conventional genders are natural?

essentialism/constructionism. — fdrake

Seems to me that the lost tempers and tribal signalling are mainly about this.

@Swan (and I, and possibly @Bitter Crank, @Terrapin Station and @Artemis) incredulous that gender-non-conformists, of all people, would be essentialist about sex, to the extent even of being able to wish to have a different sexual essence. (As though anyone even had one.)

OP and the mods keen to defend gender-non-conformists whatever their thesis, especially since attacks, and civilised objections too, so often suggest essentialism. Like, a notion that cultural norms have a biological origin. (Which, when I put it like that...)

But the suggestion is often mistaken, i.e. misread, not there.

They actually are named after him according to Wikipedia. Evidently the present owners don't consider Gottfried's mug a selling point, sadly. Nice biscuits though. If not the best of all possible. :scream:

It makes me feel trapped in my self and give me anxiety. — raindrop

I can cheer you up.

See yourself as an information processing machine (don't go away...) levels more complex than any artificial model, but still a machine we could in principle enter...

as into a mill. And this granted, we should only find on visiting it, pieces which push one against another... — Gottfried Leibniz, Monadology

Then notice that, often, it isn't at all clear where one such "mill" or processing system ends and another begins.

Certainly, within a physically defined building or person, processing appears to consist in sharing of information by relatively independent subsystems, but this doesn't lead us to doubt the single collaborative function of the larger whole.

Less obviously, but arguably, information mills and persons, by sharing information (talking, singing, grooming, exchanging letters), often collaborate in a larger system of the same kind that each of them exemplifies individually.

On this view, seeing mind as a function or process instead of a substance, human communication (when it happens) is what we often naively take it to be: a meeting/joining of minds. Only dualistic habits of thought spoil the view, and make us think we are separated from each other, and each trapped in some interior, like an audience in a theatre.

Can anything? (... support a normative?)

Logic can't prove a normative. — Terrapin Station

Can it support it?