What is the experience of red of someone who is colourblind but does not know it? — unenlightened

Yes, :ok: if we can address it without slipping back into the Cartesian version, as possibly here,

23 odd years of talking about something he could not see and not noticing that he could not see it. — unenlightened

... as though (on one reading) the problem (slash non-problem) is that he was seeing a different colour but calling it like us.

Better to address it as: what class of things (even better: class of illumination events) was he associating with any one thing he called red, i.e. what things was he disposed to call red, i.e. what was the extension of "red" when he asserted it of a thing?

And then, what if anything does that difference in our external reds have to do with our colour discourse which purports to talk about internal reds?

The thesis claims that every scientific hypothesis requires a belief in a set of assumptions. — Curious Layman

Not some clearly defined set from which to reason deductively, no.

Inductive, associative, habitual, holistic. On this more inclusive view of reason, a finite web doesn't need a clear starting point. Morality, science etc. are large going concerns with unclear sources. — bongo fury

The entire scientific method is based on foundationalism — Curious Layman

Contra Duhem and Quine?

Day 93, 11.25: Not impressed with a particularly vivid GS image immediately upon its consideration. So tried to launch a search, by way of passive waiting. Next image vivid enough to urge testing. Verified. I suppose that passivity required losing track of the relation to the first image. So that relation unknown. But nvm.

15.15: I think the sequence here was: first GS fairly vivid; implied Ravel image far too low (2 semitones); "waited" for second GS image, hopefully uninfluenced by Ravel judgement; result good.

17.00: Waited (a second or two) and was pleased enough with the first image (GS); and my pleasure (with the vividness) was validated as an indication of truth.

19.35: Noticed a GS image already playing as ear-worm. Seemed authentic enough, but the corresponding Ravel image seemed badly flat, by a fourth, in fact (duly verified). So this trial (if significant at all and probably not) then a point against the hypothesis of notatability (of a musical stimulus) varying inversely with non-relational pitch sensitivity.

21.35: As per 11.25.



Day 94, 10.10: As per yesterday at 15.15.

12.45: As per 11.25 yesterday, but result a semitone sharp.

16.00: Good. As per 17.00.

21.40: And again.



Day 95, 13.05: As per day 93 at 15.15.

Time to choose target stimulus no. 5. WILTY the panel show reminds me of the Charles and Eddie... will try that. The Ravel fits nicely... truly it turns out.

What we expect is that the normal propensity to produce images at an arbitrary pitch, which may or may not be a result of skill in relative pitch, will reduce, as the ability to produce them at the correct absolute pitch increases. Will that be a shame?! Do we expect it, actually?

16.05: Reasonably vivid. The Ravel found the image to be a semitone too high, though. Which was indeed the case.

Pasting the Ravel into other mental images is proving fairly easy. Must try more often to paste it into sounding ones.

18.30: Fairly vivid Ravel/C&E mashup: not sure which appeared first; anyway, verified.

20.45: Hmm... mashups not rushable: semitone sharp.

Luckily, analysis of "right thing" and "evolutionarily advantageous" causes them to be distinguished clearly more often than confused.

what "inter-subjectively agreed" adds to just "agreed". — Isaac

Well put, but it suggests an answer, which is "overcoming differences of perspective". So it's useful, because it succinctly forestalls the unnecessary baggage of "subjective" and "objective".

Day 91, 13.15: Good.

17.55: Good.

20.50: Decided to find a fourth stimulus to try and perceive non-relationally. Well, another Stones clip that the algorithms had lately found me receptive of is Gimme Shelter. I must have been exposed to it upwards of 10 recent times and, as with HTW, I wondered whether the vividness of an image of it, that had now launched (or rather, landed - see below) immediately upon consideration of the tune as an option, might be a sign of its veracity pitch-wise... perhaps disconfirming yesterday's no doubt rash conclusion that the number of exposures is "no matter". This time I didn't attempt an estimation straight away but planted the Ravel opening into the midst of it and found it (the putative g4) a comfortable fit on step 5 of the Stones' key. I don't mean I tried alternative placings of it for comfort; rather, it seemed to land there. (A third elephant. Or second can of worms.)

So, turns out the GS image was precisely a semitone flat. But then, no wonder the Ravel fit so nicely. Placing it on step flattened-fifth would surely have been awkward. I even wonder whether the Ravel image (true, as it turned out) could have dragged down the GS image. It probably kicked up enough dust upon "landing" to obscure the shift. (Had the original GS image been also true.)

23.50: Good.



Day 92, 13.35: Good. Tried to overlay a GS on a Ravel; not quite sure what happened (too much dust), but then bringing the Ravel up a semitone seemed to allow the GS to land in what I'm now aware is the right place relative to the semitone-sharp-Ravel, i.e. a fourth up from it. And the Ravel turned out to be where it ought, i.e. truly a semitone up.

16.25: GS rather immediate and vivid. And true.

Elephant 3: the "landing" of images... implying a flight, from a launch. But the launch and the flight are invisible (inaudible). It used to be (and still is in the main) that the image landed (and played out) without delay, at an arbitrary pitch. Now (for the 3 or 4 test clips) there is a delay while waiting for the system as a whole to find the right place. I suppose the sense of flight and of landing results from the time-limit imposed by such props as: imagining reaching to push with a finger on the g4 of a keyboard. In order to aid recall. And from the frequency of erroneous results. One isn't (yet) prepared to wait indefinitely for an image on the expectation of it being true when it arrives. One assumes that the image will need weighing up and then adjusting. And one feels that only a time limit will (as yet) stimulate the unconscious background search that would make the first image any more reliable than chance.

I'm constantly struck by the comparison between this process (if it isn't a completely empty fantasy) and a more familiar effort of recall: that of finding the right word. (wts)

19.35: Good, or just noticeably flat. But again, based on a first image of GS, whose vividness again presses the question whether some sound fragments are perceived non-relationally more easily than others. With GS (the intro) we are talking about a decorative display of glides and glissandos as much as clearly defined pitches, and I wonder if such a pattern, being relatively poorly captured in notation, is more easily perceived non-relationally than, say, a piano pattern? (There could well be research on that. See previous excuses for ignorance.)

22.40: Almost surprised to find the first GS image not confirmed upon pitching a Ravel image a tri-tone down. The Ravel protested and wanted to be two semitones higher: subsequently verified. I was thinking the foregoing theory must be true and I'd missed an obvious trick. But maybe not. Or the test was flawed. Try again tomorrow.

Option (b) because prescription is basically description: you ought to do the thing, inasmuch as its true description is "right thing".

But option (c) because facts are true descriptions, and true is a value.

Day 86, 13.50: Good.

16.30: Good.

19.05: Flat.

22.41: Flat.



Day 87, 11.35: Flat.

13.55: Good.

18.08: Good.

21.05: Good.

23.05: Good.



Day 88, 14.00: Flat.

14.50: Sharp.

15.50: Good.

17.20: Good.

21.15: Good.

23.40: Good.



Day 89, 09.55: Astounding inertia in acting on the foregoing insight, belated as it was, and bothering to check against a different clip: the Stones HTW. Good, anyway.

14.40: Good. (Ravel)

18.30: Yikes, 2 semitones sharp, wtf?

23.10: Again!! (Both the Ravel)

00.45: Good.



Day 90, 14.30: Slightly flat.

22.30: Definitely flat.

Both of the mooted new test clips cause a small opening in the can of worms that is (so called and alleged) octave equivalence. Also they draw attention to the elephants in the room that are: the differential sensitivity to absolute pitches (to some more than others), and the differential sensitivity to a particular absolute pitch in different musical contexts. Second elephant first:

E.g. I just noticed that a first image of HTW seemed vivid enough to warrant testing, to see if the vividness happened to be on target. But a mere image of the Ravel at the same pitch was enough to conclude that the HTW image was roughly half an octave out. This fits with the assumption (see OP) that vividness had been previously unfettered by choice of pitch, and only now (through training) correlates with accuracy (absolute, non-relational), and perhaps (why not) only or mostly in the case of images of the test clip. That the skill would be strongest with the examples used for training. So, strong with the Ravel intro but not the HTW intro, no matter (because the vividness generally unfettered) how often one had recently played the latter.

A week or two ago I thought it might be time to conclude almost complete failure. Except where allowed a minute's (or more) silence. Thereby excluding any prospect of being able, which I would very much like to be able, to confirm a hypothesis about a pitch relation (such as a modulation) on the basis of a judgment of a subsequent pitch, and not be restricted to the converse justification, deducing a later pitch from knowledge of earlier pitches and judgements of intermediate relations (intervals and modulations). Having (on the contrary) to go into a trance stops it from being, regardless of accuracy, even a party trick, let alone useful.

But I now kick myself for not questioning the reliance on the single "target stimulus" (the Ravel). I suppose the restriction resulted from the complete novelty and possible hopelessness of the task: of trying to consistently disqualify 99 per cent of pitch-wise perfectly good transpositions of the music as true instances of the music.

Anyhow, I have belatedly noticed that certain other frequently invoked intro sounds on youtube (namely those of Honky-tonk Women and the music from Would I Lie To You) were manifesting as "images" with a vividness that I have been learning, slowly, to trust as an indication of pitch-truth. (Slowly because I was fairly expert in producing vivid images of the music that were true only relatively i.e. relationally. Hence the vividness is of a particular and new kind. Though not a Mary's Room level of new (see OP) as yet. :grin:)

Conveniently, both of these stimuli were in more or less the same key as the Ravel, making it feasible to collage their images swiftly. A lot more easily, for example, than collaging alternative pitchings of any one of them. Judging the absolute (as opposed to relational) pitch-truth of the whole collage caused a surprising and promising feeling of confirmation, as though triangulating from information at relatively distant points in the cortex. (As though.)

Which makes the prospect of judging an image in the midst of a sounding context (without recourse to an undisturbed silent trance) slightly less daunting. And I feel I'm starting to be able to resist automatically parsing musical pitches relationally, or at least to begin to expect to discern their absolute aspect. Haha, we shall see.

...those trapped by erroneous notions of meaning, — Banno

Haha, count me as one of 'em (if you didn't already) :rofl:

To be fair, "wrong" brings to mind countless specific descriptive indications: examples of actions or behaviours that are indicated, described, denoted, labelled, pointed at, by the word.

Sure, those are cases to be proscribed, and alternatives prescribed. Right and wrong are roughly co-extensive with prescribable and proscribable, respectively. That doesn't stop an ethical choice from being one of correct description: finding appropriate descriptive application (pointing) of the ethical words. — bongo fury

I suggest you google Nelson Goodman — sime

:party:

and his ideas concerning irrealism — sime

... well, not to the extent that anyone would (that I can see) benefit from searching for definitions of that ism.

that more or less convey the basic structure of community-level solipsistic logic. — sime

If you say so... very keen to see how you would flesh it out. Are you starting from his treatment of indexicals in Structure of Appearance? Or perhaps from the phenomenalist basis of that book? Or from later ruminations about "world-making"?

On the face of it (while eager for more) I wish to protest in the strongest terms. :gasp:

The traditional way of thinking is to assume that whenever a community of speakers discuss the universe in an absolute sense, they must be referring to the "same" universe. But this is proposterous according to a Goodmanian irrealist, according to whom each and every speaker cannot transcend their personal frames of reference and so cannot refer to the same universe in an absolute sense, even when they insist otherwise. — sime

With that emphasis, yes, fine. "The world" is mysticism. But without the mystical baggage, "worlds", or universes of discourse or of quantification, become the perfectly good basis for a completely general (e.g. analog) semantics, in Languages of Art.

Consquently the irrealist understands every assertion, including assertions of absolute truth, as being relative to the speaker and of the form "according to speaker X assertion Y is true". — sime

Sounds like you have a very particular take. Interested to hear more. My take is nothing at all like a "community of solipsists".

Civilisation and its Discontents. — Wayfarer

See edition of Commentary :rofl:

Why do linguistic animals think they are each two things instead of one?

his homey task assumes — Davidson

I thought "did you mean 'homely'?", while Google thought "did you mean 'homie'?".

I can talk about the content of... — creativesoul

... a correlation?

Or is it already the content? Of a belief? Or is it the belief?

Blimey. Has @Michael written some code to cure the internet?

:up:

drawing correlations between things — creativesoul

Ok, so drawing of correlations between things is formation of dispositions to respond to them which are relative to each other? Maybe? — bongo fury

Or something else?

Or is it only another way of saying having of beliefs?

Which are?

Irreducible mental stuff?

So they probably hope the use-mention distinction is at least half-way not about pointing.
— bongo fury

Then what do they think use is doing, if not pointing? — frank

Everything in "How to do things with words", for starters? (I presume.)

Which is of course laudable. Why ever assume that thought is all in declarative sentences?

In which case, why ever think that meaning is all pointing?

I was responding to Bongo Fury's comment that confusion of use and mention had reached pandemic status. I was asking for his view of it to set alongside Banno's (which is kind of unique, I think). — frank

Yep. Well, maybe not unique but characteristic. Mention of use incites, in many, insurrection against pointing (naming, denoting, describing) as the presumed basis of meaning. So they probably hope the use-mention distinction is at least half-way not about pointing. They must be frequently disappointed, in that case.

"The cup is on the table" can be dealt with in two ways. We can talk about it, saying things like "The cup is on the table" contains six words, or "The cup is on the table" is true; or we can use it to show that the cup is on the table.

That's not an ambiguity. — Banno

Not if it's the choice between mention and use, no. But it isn't quite that. The first half is about mention and is fine. Use of (other) words to mention or point at a sentence. But what is pointing at what when we

use it [the sentence] to show that the cup is on the table. — Banno

?

Nothing so low class as pointing seems to be implied. Much better, we are invited (roughly every other sentence) to see the cup situation as somehow one with the sentence. Distinguishing between picked-out and picker-outer would obviously spoil that mystical game.

So... you think I am jumbling use and mention? — Banno

I do.

The sentence on the right is being used, not mentioned.
— Banno
Used as in setting out a state of affairs.
— Banno
What is on the RHS is a state of affairs
— Banno — bongo fury

...the world as a metalanguage...
— fdrake

To be clear, the metalanguage is on the left, and contains the truth predicate. The object language is on the right. So the object language is the world. — Banno

I take it you mean the object language considered as a whole domain of symbols plus its own semantic world of denoted objects comprises the semantic world of the metalanguage? (Nothing like "the world as a metalanguage", but fine. Thank goodness, indeed.)

But that wouldn't excuse blurring the distinction between syntactic and semantic layers of the object language.

It doesn't matter that it's natural language, where the layers aren't as clear cut as for Tarski. There's still no need to confuse use vs mention, logical or grammatical subject vs subject-matter, state of affairs or disquotation as in statement vs state of affairs or disquotation as in event (or whatever).

Smoke may be a sign of fire, but it is not a symbol of fire. Seems obvious to me. — Janus

Fair enough. Even Goodman explored in that direction early on. But Catherine Elgin (chapter 8 here, but no pdf or preview) argues that his mature theory shows how being a sign of fire, in the sense meant, is fully explained as a species of symbolising fire. Not something essentially different, and hence (though this isn't Elgin's point) not an excuse to impute symbolic thinking (or an alleged cousin of it) anthropomorphically.

Yes, sorry. :ok:

@Banno is doing it again.

the statement and its disquotation are truth functionally equivalent (despite that one is a statement, and one is a worldly event - ). — fdrake

Now you're doing it. The statement is a disquotation (of its quotation).

the world as a metalanguage — fdrake

Qué?

I think the extension of a statement is it's truth value. — frank

Fine, add that to the parenthetical varieties of "alleged referent" above.

As the difference between using a word or phrase to mention (refer to, denote, describe, point at) an object and using a quotation or other word or phrase to mention the word.

I.e. the distinction ignored here,

any subject of a sentence, anything to which we refer.
— SophistiCat — bongo fury

To be is to be the subject of a predicate.
— Banno — bongo fury

we normally use a sentence to assert something about a (referring) subject.
— Andrew M — bongo fury

I'm cool with phrase extending to cover statement, even though I dispute that (or at least how) whole statements refer. As long as the statement isn't systematically confused with its alleged referent (event, or worldly fact as fdrake puts it). E.g. virtually any reference to "states of affairs".

The sentence on the right is being used, not mentioned. — Banno

Used as in setting out a state of affairs. — Banno

What is on the RHS is a state of affairs — Banno

What's the extension of an apology? — fdrake

While confusion of use and mention is endemic, can we please focus on ordinary declarative statements?

Banno's deflationary view doesn't match the sentence with some worldly fact, — fdrake

Well... it can be hard to tell:

The interesting thing is that a proposition will be true exactly when the state of affairs to which it applies is indeed the case. — Banno

We need a general relation between an individual and a possible state of affairs, to use when someone is wrong as to the truth. — Banno

Which show signs of systematic ambiguity (bordering on sophistry) between state of affairs as (A) unquoted statement and (B) worldly fact. Leading to this kind of thing,

Symbolically, x and "x" pick out the same x. — Andrew M

and

The stuff on the right hand side is in unmediated contact with the world;
— Banno — bongo fury

What do you think we are pretending then? We are not pretending that (some) words (sounds and groups of visual symbols) are associated with objects by us. — Janus

No, agreed, but the association itself is pretended, as you virtually allowed here:

the sound of the word or the visible written marks are associated with the objects they (are understood to [i.e. pretended to]) represent. — Janus

There's definitely a mapping game, but no definition at all to the mapping, unless we "agree to pretend".

It's obvious — Janus

Are you sure it's obvious to a bio-semiotician? With their signs, which are allegedly so different from symbols?

Like the weather or a carburettor, the neural collective is actually pushing and shoving against the real world.
That then is the semantics that breathes life into the syntax.
— apokrisis — bongo fury

We do understand (some) words to represent objects; that's simply a fact of human experience. — Janus

Yep, we know how to play the game of agreeing to pretend that certain words and pictures point at certain things. Pretend seems to me a suitable word for that kind of game. I don't mean we don't actually play it.

@Banno @creativesoul @fdrake @frank

I know quoting from my holy book (apocrypha) isn't an argument, but...

One thread of an argument by Herbert Hochberg runs some­what as follows: that "white" applies to certain things does not make them white; rather "white" applies because they are white. Plausible enough but misleading. Granted, I cannot make these objects red by calling them red--by applying the term "red" to them. But on the other hand, the English language makes them white just by applying the term "white" to them; application of the term "white" is not dictated by their somehow being antecedently white, whatever that might mean. A language that applies the term "blanc" to them makes them blanc; and a language if any that applies the term "red" to them makes them red.

Some of the trouble traces back to Alfred Tarski's unfortunate suggestion that the formula " 'Snow is white' is true if and only if snow is white" commits us to a correspondence theory of truth. Actually it leaves us free to adopt any theory (correspondence, coherence, or other) that gives " 'Snow is white' is true" and "snow is white" the same truth-value.

For animals scents and sounds are signs of prey, for example, but they don't represent prey symbolically. — Janus

Indeed. The scents and sounds become significant(meaningful) as a result of becoming part of a capable creature's correlations drawn between them, possible food items(prey), their own hunger pangs, etc. Prior to becoming part of those correlations, they were not at all meaningful for the aforementioned animal. Rather, they were just sounds and scents. — creativesoul

I'm tempted, but remain skeptical. Seems like another (along with "belief") anthropomorphic over-extension of the real thing, which in this case is humans' game of pretend: wherein, as you say,

the sounds of the word or the visible written marks are associated with the objects they (are understood to) represent. — Janus

The anthropomorphising extends too easily (for my liking) to self-driving cars and Chinese Rooms.

Peirce — Janus

But there just is no fact of the matter whether a word or picture is pointed at one thing or another. No physical bolt of energy flows from pointer to pointee(s). So the whole social game is one of pretence.
— bongo fury

Unless you're a biosemiotician? :chin: — bongo fury

(... and you think reference is real.)

I see. Not symbols at all. Signs.

Hence, they cancel out, — Banno

What do?

So the interpretations cancel out? Or the things on either side of the IFF?

Hence, they cancel out, like paired variables in any equation. — Banno

What do?

Ok, so drawing of correlations between things is formation of dispositions to respond to them which are relative to each other? Maybe?

an example of how
— bongo fury

This makes no sense.

The how part is autonomous. It requires certain biological machinery, etc. It just happens(at first anyway)... the drawing correlations, I mean. — creativesoul

If not how, then in what ways? How am I to think of a cat as drawing correlations? By (perhaps?) appreciating how it is

disposed to respond to the event as to a mouse-running-behind-tree event? — bongo fury

Smart phones do not attribute meaning. — creativesoul

Cool. Agreed.

An artificial neural network can have the nameless anticipation (surge in action potentials). Oughtn't we reserve "belief" for the anticipations of a more restricted class of machines?

I suggest: those very much future machines skilled not merely in the chasing of mice, but in the chasing of the imaginary trajectories of the pointings of mouse-words and mouse-pictures. A skill which is ascribable literally to humans from infancy. Only anthropomorphically to cats and present-day robots.

That's too restrictive for people who are sure cats literally have beliefs, of course. They must exclude robots some other way. If at all. — bongo fury