Practical Philosophy. I read The Ethics in Uni, I'll reread more after Deleuze's short book.

↪Pantagruel For me, it's Spinoza's dissolution of the MBP with property dualism. — 180 Proof

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Yes, I have been preparing to revisit Spinoza with a more mature understanding than a simple undergrad. I just bought Deleuze's book as a bit of a reintroduction.

I think we have good reasons to believe that matter thinks, so there isn't a mind-body problem. — Manuel

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Ervin Laszlo's theory of "biperspectivism" is the most intuitive solution to the mind-body antinomy that I have read.

To our best current knowledge, unique.

↪apokrisis Out of interest, what do you think are reasonable speculations in relation to QM? Do you think it can point to idealism? — Tom Storm

I think there are varieties of idealism that cogently complement QM. Critical Idealism, in particular, does not assert the primacy of either the mental or the material, but holds that what is fundamental is the reciprocal interaction of the mental and the material. This is difficult to deny, since it is never possible to isolate a fact from a knower.

Does owning possessions make us satisfied? Or does it make us want more?

I think we need to differentiate between needs and wants. Owning things you need in order to survive is necessary; as such, this type of ownership prevents stresses which might make you unhappy. Acquiring something that you desire is, of course, initially a good feeling. But does continued ownership after acquisition supply the same level of gratification? We bought a really nice 6 person inflatable boat after we moved near the beach and really enjoyed using it a few times that year. Next year we used it once. This year we didn't use it at all. So rather than being satisfied, I am feeling kind of dissatisfied with that possession. Really I am dissatisfied with myself for not using it, or for not knowing better.

Frequently, it isn't the owning but the acquiring that creates satisfaction. That can become a vicious circle.

Thanks. Are you able to make any sense of it? — Yohan

Some sections flow really well, others are really, really dense. You pretty much have to just read through and wait for cumulative clarity there. I'm try to push through it fairly steadily for that reason.

What are you reading? — Yohan

Foundations of Transcendental Philosophy by J.G. Fichte. It basically picks up where Kant left off.

And what happens when the subject makes itself the thing that's under examination? — Yohan

An extremely complex question. It is right at the heart of Fichte's philosophy of critical idealism (the subject-object) and can't be summed up in a few paragraphs. So far, it has involved a lot of descriptions relating the intuiting faculty to concepts and concepts to objects, the relationship between the act of self-positing, pure and practical action, consciousness qua intellect. If you really want to explore that, the book I'm currently reading is all about it.

To me, it smacks of Popper's three worlds, which likewise bridges the poles of the subject-object spectrum.

How do we develop our conciousness and self-awareness?

My first thought is that the inquiry itself is a helpful place to begin exploring.
— Universal Student

My first thought is that I don't know.

My second thought is the same.

And no matter how I try, all my thoughts result in the same conclusion as the first two. — god must be atheist

Self awareness is a skill, just like any other. It is developed through practice. Everything boils down the ability to discriminate and differentiate the subjective from the objective in experience. Because even the "objective" is, for the human mind, a representation of the objective. Consider that objective means both that which is (thought to be) mind-independent and also the state of being independent of subjective predispositions or bias. The Husserlian phenomenological reduction presupposes an accurate self-awareness. The practice of good science requires achieving objectivity.

So yes, the inquiry is itself a helpful place to begin exploring.

I know you’re not anti-science…which is why I question the term “post-science.” If science doesn’t cause these problems any more than philosophy, why single it out as opposed to “post-philosophy”? — GLEN willows

That's true, it was an adoption of the given schema. The problem is really one of abuse and worship of technology. But then, conflation of technology and science is another current problem. There is a better term I'm sure.

Obviously, science isn’t responsible for these things, — GLEN willows

Obvioiusly not. But then again, science is not a way of living either. Which was kind of the point.

Well, the scientific attitude you describe corresponds I think to a post-Enlightenment positivism, characteristic of a nineteenth century "faith in progress" mentality. The kind of mentality that is emerging (I hope) is one based on a more robust scientific understanding that replaces the ideal of technological progress with a systems-centric concept of health. It is still science-based, but it is a more mature kind of science that isn't blindly anthropocentric. That would be the general direction in which I would characterize it.

edit: Your characterizations of pluralism and economic health, for example, are not truly realized in the scientific weltanschauung, but are consistent with the emerging post-scientific ideals.

It's a great concept. One thing though. SInce we are currently not progressing towards a better future (misuse of technology is destroying the biosphere which is essential for human life, social and economic inequality is increasing, not improving), should there also be a "Post-Scientific" column representing an even more mature stage of development that some people already embrace?

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Part of the problem is that the OP didn't really indicate what particular obstacles to self-awareness he/she was facing, only a vague and abstract desire to increase self-awareness.

In that context, I would say that becoming aware that the mind in its natural state is a creature of habit is the best starting point. Invariably, it is our own habitualized choices that form the first and biggest barrier to increasing self-awareness. Learning that we have the power to alter ourselves, even to choose something completely contradictory to what we take as our own inclinations (Sartre), is the beginning of awareness.

It's like anything, caveat emptor. Learning that one has an epistemic responsibility is certainly key to self-awareness! Perhaps, for some, the way to genuine self-awareness leads through the valley of shams.

Witness all the obtuse and self-serving wankers who embrace self-development and awareness workshops in the New Age movement. — Tom Storm

It sounds to me like you are referring to people who are trying to exploit other people who have a genuine belief, which isn't really an indictment of self-development as a genuine goal or a belief.

Also, I do think setting yourself a task of self-awareness is pointless. — Tom Storm

Fortunately a great many people don't share this unfortunate view.

"Anyone who says it is impossible to obtain this says no more than it is impossible for him personally to obtain it" ~Fichte

My second thought is to determine a basic foundation of what we are dealing with. What is consciousness? What is self-awareness? — Universal Student

If you are interested in cultivating an awareness of awareness then Idealism is a logical avenue.

Currently I'm reading Fichte, whose central concept is the self-positing of the I. For me, this really seems an extension and elaboration of "cogito ergo sum," which might be called the original intellectual intuition since it incorporates Fichte's notion of an original action (of positing) which precedes the consciousness thereof.

I find that, at its best, his philosophy reads somewhat like Patanjali's yoga sutras, which are meditative reflections-cum-exercises on the nature of thought. viz: "the act of pure reflection, viewed as a concept, is thought of by the I."

Simultaneously an exploration of the relationship between acting and conceptual knowledge, and where the thought of a concept becomes the concept of thought, becomes thought.

Various recent technological leaps has allowed us to have pretty much access any useful data or information to aid our decision making almost instantly.

At what point does information overload hinder our decision making? — Deus

At the point where it makes it harder, and not easier, to determine what is "useful data"....

Foundations of Transcendental Philosophy
by Johann Gottlieb Fichte

One should not understand this compulsion to construct concepts, species, forms, purposes, laws ('a world of identical cases') as if they enabled us to fix the real world; but as a compulsion to arrange a world for ourselves in which our existence is made possible:we thereby create a world which is calculable, simplified, comprehensible, etc., for us.

Our cognitive apparatus is not organized for 'knowledge.'

[T]he aberration of philosophy comes from this:instead of seeing logic and the categories of reason as means to the adaptation of the world to ends of utility (that is, "in principle," for a useful falsification) men believe to possess in them the criterion of truth or reality.
~Nietzsche

I agree with Habermas, extending this reasoning, that in the context of this "transcendentally-logically conceived pragmatism" there are a wide array of "knowledge-constitutive and knowledge-legitimating interests" beyond the merely logical and technical.

As proven by history that all communist systems have been enforced by dictators I see no further adaptation or advancement of his theory that could save it.

Nuanced forms of socialism could be one way, the other is to accept capitalism as the best we have although not perfect.

Back to the title of the thread and main point there could not be a form of government that embodies Marx’s system without resorting to some form of liberty denying authoritarianism. — Deus

The tone of this seems to fall in the category of demonizing communism typical of many advocates of capitalism. Has the spirit of Marx's communism been corrupted? Sure. Just like every other ideal that humanity attempts to implement. I am not a communist, but I do believe that we can achieve a much higher level of social justice. But that spirit of social justice isn't a product of a particular economic system or form of government. Rather, the success or failure of those is a function of the spirit of social justice.

The simplest way to change the undemocratic, plutocratic system is to take their property away from them without compensation.
— Bitter Crank

Why is this simpler than having workers have a few board seats? I think that’s at least less extreme. — Xtrix

So this is just a special case of the failure of democracy in general. Ideally, a democratic society would naturally evolve to minimize the plutocratic influence. Instead, what we see everywhere and without exception is the ever-increasing corruption of democratic ideals through the infiltration of plutocratic influences. The gap between the rich and the poor has been steadily increasing as long as it has been measured. So clearly technological knowledge is socially and morally meaningless (or worse, socially and morally damaging). Handing out a few board seats is only going to create a few more martyrs. Or a few new plutocrats.

If we turn to those restrictions that only apply to certain classes of society, we encounter a state of things which is glaringly obvious and has always been recognized. It is to be expected that the neglected classes will grudge the favoured ones their privileges and that they will do everything in their to power to rid themselves of their own surplus of privation. Where this is not possible a lasting measure of discontent will obtain within this culture, and this may lead to dangerous outbreaks. But if a culture has not got beyond the stage in which the satisfaction of one group of its members necessarily involves the suppression of another, perhaps the majority---and this is the case in all modern cultures,---it is intelligible that these suppressed classes should develop an intense hostility to the culture; a culture, whose existence they make possible by their labour, but in whose resources they have too small a share. In such conditions one must not expect to find an internalization of the cultural prohibitions among the suppressed classes; indeed they are not even prepared to acknowledge these prohibitions, intent, as they are, on the destruction of the culture itself and perhaps even of the assumptions on which it rests. These classes are so manifestly hostile to culture that on that account the more latent hostility of the better provided social strata has been overlooked. It need not be said that a culture which leaves unsatisfied and drives to rebelliousness so large a number of its members neither has a prospect of continued existence, nor deserves it.
~Freud, The Future of an Illusion

↪Benj96 What difference would it make to our existence whether or not "we live in a simulation"? — 180 Proof

Philosophically, this seems the soundest approach. If reality in general is "of the nature of a simulation" then that doesn't add or subtract anything from the idea of reality as it affects or is affected by us.

On the other hand, this sense doesn't seem to cover what is meant by simulation, which is something that is done or made by someone. So the next logical step in a simulation hypothesis would seem to be the Cartesian demon. In that case, I suppose the possibility arises that we can in some way escape or transcend the simulation. Perhaps in the sense that one seeks to transcend Samsara.

Evolutionary humanism I think views humanity as a kind of apex of naturalism. This certainly fits my perspective.

The most productive hypothesis seems to me to assume that belief in truth has positive merits. What the exact nature of those merits is is what we learn.

But whatever is the truth, you only get as close to it as "believing this true."

So how can you ever be confident in the motivation behind your own beliefs?

So, to what extent can truth be explained logically, or empirically, or in terms of values and, to what extent does the idea of 'post-truth capture fragmentation in philosophical understanding? There are threads which explore the logical aspects of truth, but I am intending this to be more about the meaning of truth and how this comes into play in values. — Jack Cummins

Presumably, our values are what "drive" us - that is, what supply the motive power to what we actually do do in the world. I'd assume that there is a correlation between the awareness of the correspondence of one's values with something true, and the motive force there derived. To the extent that our values are based in fantasy, it'd be unlikely that we would actualize them. Truth really is the only pragmatic option.

to make someone understand what you yourself don't understand? — Agent Smith

If your actions serve as an example, then someone else could learn a principle which you yourself do not grasp. For example, if you poke your hand in the fire and withdraw it in pain, clearly you did not understand the meaning of fire, but I could grasp it by observing you.

The now has no duration. So anything that exists in time (diachronically) must have both a past and a future.

Matter continuing doesn't have to do with conscious existence continuing. — TiredThinker

You might be surprised to hear that there are schools of thought that do not concur with your belief.

Facts are truths about something, an event, an object, people, so on. When they're discovered, they become knowledge. Facts are independent of a knower, knowledge, on the other hand, is not. — TheMadFool

Maybe independent of any specific knower, but not of being known or knowledge in general. I think that is how Peirce would describe the relation.

To me, they seem essentially synonymous or mutually dependent terms, maybe corresponding to the noesis-noema relationship.

Technology as a symbol of evil and its role in the total destruction of our world is a fairly appealing narrative. And Back to Eden solutions have long been popular. Technology seems to magnify all that is terrible about humans - from pesticides to nuclear bombs, chemical weapons to plastic bags and climate change. It can be argued that technology has robbed the world of its charm, displaced people of their jobs and suggested an apocalyptic future for us that is even more horrifying than religious end times. We don't need a theorised position to understand this. — Tom Storm

Yes, all of this.

If you think of knowledge from a holistic perspective, it seems self-evident that our economically-driven societies have over-emphasized technical knowledge at the expense of moral and social. Until we are able to catch up in these other dimensions of knowledge, technology may indeed pose more dangers than it offers benefits. This I would say is the underlying motive.

Everyone has a metaphysics after all, even if they dislike it. — Manuel

Yes, as does science, implicitly. That is the gist.

Nothing is absolutely created or destroyed, it only changes form.

When a star explodes, its atoms continue, and their trajectory reflects and continues that of the star, including the added effects from the event of its demise. In fact, if you view the star as a gravitational phenomenon from far enough away, it has a very similar profile before it has actually ignited and after it explodes.

Is the multiverse science fiction only? Sabina seems to think so. — TiredThinker

As I mentioned in another thread, I see the multiverse concept as indicative of the emergence of a new scientific paradigm, coinciding with the increasing reliance of science on modeling and simulations. Which relates to the attempt to study/quantify/contextualize phenomena at an ever-increasing level of systemic-complexity. It would fit with what Popper calls a metaphysical research program.

More on point

[The metaphysics of science is] the philosophical study of the general metaphysical notions that are applied in all our scientific disciplines....This modal suggestion, that the metaphysics of science is an investigation of the metaphysical preconditions of science, has rather a Kantian flavour. But arguably, the idea that certain metaphysical phenomena are necessary for science was present in ancient thinking, as we will now see.

What is the metaphysics of science, Mumford & Tigby

If metaphysics (qua ontology) is the science of being, then it must have universal relevance. Frankly, there are a lot of terminological niceties in philosophy that give rise to a great variety of competing interpretations. The fact that this is so means that anyone who argues vehemently from some terminological standpoint (such as propositional logic) is really only appealing to lack of consensus as an authority.

The relationship between metaphysical research programs and scientific theories is pretty complex, I'll give you that.

This looks interesting, but it's pretty lengthy. I've only skimmed it.

Criticism and the methodology of Scientific Research Programs

Haven't a clue. It's Greek to me. — jgill

Maybe it's Magick.