That says it all. Scientism attempts to extend "science" beyond its domain of enquiry, through the use of false premises, such as the one you describe above, that the human species is an entity which can be treated as a system — Metaphysician Undercover

That is not a false premise, but an established scientific fact. Aggregates of human behaviours have been proven to be amenable to systems theoretical analysis. That is good science.

Rather, what you are doing is attempting to utilize the gloss of scientism to foster your own metaphysical agenda, which is bad philosophy, since it is pure prejudice.

No, obviously I didn't say that science is the same thing as scientism. But assuming that a scientific theory provides us with a true understanding of the events which it predicts, because it has a proven track record in its predictions, is a mistake of scientism. — Metaphysician Undercover

That is a complete mischaracterization. Scientism claims that scientific certainty is exclusively authoritative, even in domains that are beyond that of its inquiry.

Science obviously provides an accurate understanding of the phenomena it examines, that is the whole point of science.

edit: although scientific knowledge is always an approximation and constantly evolving, I"ll give you that...

This is the folly of scientism, the belief that the capacity to predict implies a true understanding of the phenomenon. Pragmaticism provides us with no guidance toward ontological truth. — Metaphysician Undercover

Are you implying that science is the same thing as scientism? If so, you are operating under a massive misconception and a prejudice.

Systems theoretic analysis has a proven track record across a broad range of empirical fields, including sociological ones.

I've spent the last six months reading material which entirely contradicts your position. Mead, Parsons, Habermas. Of course, you are entitled to your opinion. Just be aware, there is an opposing viewpoint, and it is cogent and coherent. Viewing collectives of biological entities as complex systems in their own right perhaps is just too "modern" a perspective for you.

It may indeed be a scientific term, nevertheless, the species is also the sum total of its organic constituent entities on the planet. And we are not in a science class, nor are we using the term for classificatory purposes. If you really think that the term "species" has no organic extension then that would be an end of fruitful discussion I fear.

edit: spe·cies
/ˈspēsēz,ˈspēSHēz/
noun
1.
BIOLOGY
a group of living organisms

Clearly, the species is an abstraction. — Metaphysician Undercover

The species certainly not an abstraction. It is entirely concrete. And as the overall expression of cumulative genetics, arguably more concrete than the individual. It is a question of perspective. In any case. Characteristics of the species I could see one arguing are abstract, but the species is no less concrete than the entities which compose it. That is like saying, atoms are concrete, but a ball composed of atoms is abstract.

Ernst Cassirer, Language and Myth

"In this study Cassirer analyzes the non-rational thought processes that go to make up culture. He demonstrates that beneath both language & myth there lies an unconscious "grammar" of experience, whose categories & canons aren't those of logical thought. He shows that this prelogical "logic" is not merely an undeveloped state of rationality, but something basically different, & that this archaic mode of thought still has enormous Power over even our most rigorous thought, in language, poetry & myth. The author analyzes such seemingly diverse (yet related) phenomena as the metaphysics of the Bhagavat Gita, the Melanesian concept of Mana, the Naturphilosophie of Schelling, modern poetry, Ancient Egyptian religion & symbolic logic. He covers a vast range of material that is all too often neglected in studies of human thought."

Clearly, what is the case is that the "species" is an abstraction, nd individual beings are the true existent things. — Metaphysician Undercover

The species includes the individual, the individual represents the species.

Just think about what it would mean to build up a framework of communication ab initio. We share much, much, much more than we are unique.

I don't wish to downplay the importance of the individual, but without the social, meaning loses its...meaning. I'm about to undertake Saussure, so I'll certainly be bearing your comments in mind.

Autopoiesis - systems theory as metaphysics
— Pantagruel

Thanks for that - I wasn't aware, I'll check it out. — Pop

Check out Fritjof Capra's A Systems View of Life to see the scope of the model's applications in hard science. I'd start with Ervin Laszlo's Introduction to Systems Philosophy if possible. It purports to be a "new paradigm" for viewing reality and, in my opinion, meets the burden of that goal. Enjoy.

The facts of evolution and civilization seem to support the position that we are social animals. The very idea of an individual entity abstracted from its species and social context is meaningless. Language is entirely a social construct.

I am an evolving process of self organization — Pop

Autopoiesis - systems theory as metaphysics. Makes sense to me.

↪healing-anger Who gives a fuck about what you believe, apart from you.

Provide evidence, or at least an argument. — Banno

Lots of people care. And a question is just as good as argument. Maybe better; it shows, at least, the desire to have an open mind.

"Heuristics to reduce cognitive load"? This appears as self-contradictory. Heuristics, by their nature, seem to be a cognitive load. Are you saying, that norms are habits, so that we do certain things without having to think consciously about these things, thereby reducing the cognitive load? — Metaphysician Undercover

Exactly. Habermas' argument is that in a past-traditional, pluralistic society the weight of cognitive processing would be very high otherwise. So social norms ease that burden. And I do think heuristic is the correct term. A heuristic is by definition something that lightens the workload, a shortcut.

Keep in mind, Habermas' position is that the we are primarily intersubjective or social beings, so he doesn't need to explain that, it is fundamental to our makeup. This is a common sociological stance. So when he says we have a "massively shared" lifeworld. He takes for granted these heuristics, which, by their nature hide "underneath" cognition. He also mentions that "reason" is called into play precisely where these heuristics break down.

It seems to me like there is ambiguity within norms and conventions, by the very nature of what these things are. For example, the variety of answers Plato got when asking in The Republic, what is "just". — Metaphysician Undercover

There can be disagreement between norms in the sense that there are differing normative positions. That makes dialog more difficult because people are then approaching a topic from different value-positions. So either they agree to make the norms themselves the topic, or they are restricted to "bargaining" about means and ends. But, in general, norms in Habermas' discourse theory function as heuristics to reduce cognitive load

I guess the best way to answer that is take the notion of "ontological truth" for example. Whatever conclusions that can be arrived at through specialized discourse will need to be re-absorbed by the community at large, through traditional mechanisms (graduate degrees, awards) and ultimately be re-presented in a more universally understood language. Like Ontological Truth for dummies perhaps?

Practical reason (or what Mead calls "value rational") isn't ambiguous. In fact, practical reason is intended to function because it does disambiguate and allow us to be guided by norms and conventions, even when a purely utilitarian calculus might fail. The most important truths on this view are the ones we reach through discursive collaboration.

How we manufacture the capacity to communicate is through conformity, uniformity, and standardization in education. — Metaphysician Undercover

Habermas says that our communicative actions derive from a massively shared lifeworld (lebenswelt). This is a background set of assumptions so fundamental that they resist analysis. His observations on specialized languages (from specialist knowledge-domains) are also interesting. Because the value of special theoretical domains can only be measured to the extent that they manage to re-integrate themselves into the universal community, they must eventually find a way to communicate in everyday language. In fact, Habermas says that everyday language is the best meta-language.

Well, if god is not bound by morality then equally he is not bound by rationality. So if rationality is no longer the arbiter of meaning (because god is) then the universe is reduced to absurdity.

Why is god a tyrannical despot, ergo undesirable, in the eyes of anti-theists? Well, I suppose it has to do with God's omniptence. Omnibenevolence and, to some extent, omniscience, would function as the checks and balances on omnipotence but God wouldn't be God unless God has free will. If so, God's omnipotence becomes a liability for he can resist and run counter to his omnibenevolence and omniscience i.e. God can do "bad things" - it's not an if question but a when one. — TheMadFool

And counter-rational things. I think this idea of god undermines the notion that the universe is rational also.

hought is caused by X, whereas awareness isn't caused by X but, instead, is a state of X's being ... thereby making thought and awareness ontologically distinct givens. — javra

It sounds like you are drawing lines similar to those of Locke, between passive and active thought. Personally, I would describe all types of thought as being unified under something like a transcendental ego. So I would still view thought and awareness as united at some level.

The OA hasn't been refuted in a way that silences its proponents or satisfies its opponents. — TheMadFool

The first premise is a veiled ontological assertion. Among all beings, there is some being which is the greatest being. That being is God. It doesn't prove god's existence so much as define it.

Then, if it is granted that an ameba can in its own way be aware of what is relative to itself predators and prey, and act accordingly, would you then also confer thoughts to the given ameba? — javra

I would. But then I'm a strong subscriber to a systems theoretic interpretation of reality. From a systems theoretic perspective, even inanimate things can be said to participate in thought "in a way". It lends itself to a brand of panpsychism.

No. Philosophy of mind is a vastly complex issue, I agree. I was only interested in whether you interpret "thought" and "awareness" to be identical. — javra

Well, they are both just words whose extension is debatable. In my experience, those words mutually entail.

Hmm. Can't one be aware while devoid of thoughts? As one example, while zoning-out? But this gets into the murky issue of what one interprets by the abstraction of thought. In short, is not awareness and thought two distinct - though intimately entwined - givens? — javra

If you think we should get into the mechanics of thought, then I'd dive right into things like "passive volition", which is an advanced yogic concept. Willing without willing. Thought can be amazingly complex, easily housing contradictions, aporias, paradoxes. But are the actual "mechanics" of thought relevant to the conditions of its possibility? Emergence is a funny thing.

That established, there's a follow up question: How does one know that thinking takes place to begin with? In other words, what entitles Descartes to say "thinking is occurring"? — javra

If you can't say, "this is thought now" then there is no thinking. It's an assertion of awareness. Thought is aware of its own authorship. It is fundamental to the nature of thought.

Is there always a choice between being happy and being sad ? — healing-anger

That depends on the abilities and habits you cultivate. Ideally, yes. Although I would say, happy and sad so much as having an optimistic or pessimistic perspective. You can be sad without be pessimistic about it.

2. If the only reason to create music is to listen to it yourself, — TheQuestioner

I've heard it said, if you want to read a good book, write it. I record my songs to hear them. I'm a pretty average musician, but I think a better than average songwriter, so it's for my enjoyment. Creation is pleasure. I do share them with my friends. :)

Kinda makes me wonder if people who just like Kant like to give his books away? — Moliere

Maybe when their heads start hurting?

More Habermas, The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory

Given the tenor of politics, especially in the states, it is interesting to note the emphasis he places on the idea of civility in rationally founded political and democratic will-formation.....Of course it applies to all rational deliberation really.

Dickens' Mystery of Edwin Drood

I have to do 5 more books by the end of the year to meet my Goodreads goal, so I'm throwing in some shorter works (although I like nothing better than to be immersed in a Dickensian epic).

H.G. Wells, Selected Short Stories.

Still wading through Habermas....

:up:

It's a typo for Descartes' "Meditator" - i.e. the guy doing the meditation. It's in the first line of the text in the link supplied by Mww.....

You would need to provide a bigger excerpt than this. I cannot find that text online.

Are we on the verge of a cultural collapse? — Jack Cummins

"In the throes" I would say.....

In Tune, Mark Lewison — 180 Proof

:up:

As long as the subjective is accounted for. That's why I favour Scientific Realism. There is a strong bridge between the subjective (methodology) and the real. I have found that sociological theories of communicative action take it just that much bit further, to a constituted-constituting reality.

Just had to ask. It's interesting how you invoked a mathematical concept as the bridge to subjectivity.

representation of a reality that might be nothing like its representation — Pfhorrest

But if these are distinct categories, then would not the concept of "reality" by definition (and usage) have to be expanded to encompass both? Maybe it is an "inflationary" reality(-concept). ie. the representation has a reality also.

My general position on the nature of reality is empirical realism. — Pfhorrest

If empirical realism is an ontological verus an epistemological stance, then how do you describe the status of subjective experiences, from an empirical realist standpoint?

Meliorism