The Master Mind of Mars (Barsoom #6)
Edgar Rice Burroughs

:ok:

Whether there is a society around me or not, I can reason — Lionino

Yes. And everything that you might think about will relate to the human existence of being part of a collective. We relate to the universe through the mechanism of our evolution. Those are the only laws that matter. People conducted the business of life long before there was any concept of logic.

self-reporting is riddled with bias — Philosophim

Exactly, which is why I estimate the greatest challenges to knowledge to be those of our own presuppositions. Because at the end of the day, if you cannot be honest with yourself, no other kind of knowledge will be more reliable. Belief precedes understanding.

People thinking they can solve philosophy of mind problems from a purely philosophical perspective are deluding themselves. — Philosophim

Since the immanent experience of mind is both what is being explicated and what is doing the explicating this is a mischaracterization. Perhaps it is in some sense a story, that does not make it un-factual, only historical. Scientific facts likewise exist within an historical context, which can be extensively revised as scientific understanding evolves.

I would also like to point out that the kind of consciousness being discussed up until now is individual-centric. Whereas in nature we see considerable evidence of consciousness operating at the level of the collective (colony organisms, hive organisms). So it isn't unreasonable to suppose that there is likewise a collective-consciousness of the human species. Evidenced by the fact that even at the level of individual consciousness, prototypical features like reason are essentially social, communicative, dialogical, dialectical in nature. Which again is in aid of my argument for adopting an expansive rather than a reductive view of the nature of consciousness.

Even acquiescing that logic is a construct, there are laws of logic (and related) without which we cannot productively have discourse. Law of identity, non-contradiction, law of excluded middle, the possibility of analytic judgements, etc. It is perfectly fine that a construct is fundamental. Scientific discourse relies on non-contradiction, as does any discourse. — Lionino

Yep. There are rules of discourse. The law of non-contradiction doesn't apply to dialectical logic in any non-trivial sense, since dialectics assumes that opposing viewpoints can reach a synthesis. More generally, the "rules" exist in order to facilitate social interactions, which are themselves the bases of the meanings of our existence. So the laws of reasonable discourse are in aid of reasonable social interactions, not the determinants of them.

I don't see how logic could not be our rational basis; rational discourse is destroyed without logic. — Lionino

What logic? Symbolic logic? Propositional logic? Dialectical logic? You are speaking of logic as if it were an objective reality, instead of a construct. There are political logics, aesthetic logics, sociological logics. Life is a synthesis of overlapping domains of thought, not one of which is privileged. The essence of dystopian fiction is in the enforcement of a single vision of life, to the exclusion of the rest.

The notion that you can encapsulate any meaning completely is illusory, and abstraction, perhaps an ideal. Symbolic logic, pushed to its logical limits, is just so much nomenclature. As soon as you attempt to link it to practical realities, its limitations appear.

Interesting blend of the materialistic and phenomenal here. The question of personal identity can be asked of the phenomenal conscious itself, whose most interesting feature perhaps is its evolution in time. Since each new thought is not a new consciousness, and yet it is not identical with the previous thought, thought must be the author of its own changes. "A mind which knows its own changes is by that very knowledge lifted above changes." (Collingwood).

Perhaps the problem originates from the categorical nature of the distinctions you make between what you understand as the subjective and the empirically objective, the physical and the mental. — Joshs

Yes, this.

This may help to determine whether the source of the difficulties you raise lies with the philosophical models or with the limits of your imagination. — Joshs

And this.

It seems to me that your hypothesis would benefit from a more concise formulation. As I said (and as the quotes from Joshs also highlight) it is possible that the limitations you descry are with the specific approaches themselves, and are not endemic to the question of the philosophy of mind, per se.

Speculum Mentis
by R.G. Collingwood

How does the phenomenology of culture, art, history, ethics, and aesthetics, fit in you analysis? Or does it? It seems that you feel the philosophy of mind must be yoked bi-directionally with-to-by the mechanism of science.

To me, it appears that you have reduced the problem of the philosophy of mind to a set of failed approaches, and then declared the problem eliminated, rather than recognize the limitations of the approaches. Deacon describes this exact problem rather extensively in his book Incomplete Nature.

the meaning of life is to do whatever the fuck you want with yours — Vaskane

Which as I read it means accepting absolute responsibility for the consequences of your thoughts and deeds, which raises philosophical questions. Raising the additional philosophical question of subjectivity and interpretation.

I try to read 90 to 120 minutes per day. I'm hoping to increase that a bit, as I just retired. I couldn't say about retention, my personal focus is on integration, to have the information fit into an overall coherent framework. From the Dewey critique I'm currently reading I learned about John Ruskin, who seems to be something of a modern renaissance man and epitomizes the kind of socially conscious and impactful philosophy to which I aspire. Reading should be inspiring. The key, for me, is to make it part of your routine.

I had rather thought it was the opposite. Crabs and lobsters are sentient beings, but would we call them 'consciously aware'? — Wayfarer

The question isn't whether we would call them consciously aware, but whether they are. (What is it like to be a bat?) The problem lies in attempting to apply a standard to something that we know exists across a spectrum, from the standpoint of our own existence which operates from a specific portion of that spectrum. Indeed, we can see the spectrum of consciousness evolve in the individual human mind from infancy. In fact, we have all experienced it. If it is possible to be "less conscious" (but still conscious) it is also possible to be "more conscious".

Per my earlier post, it makes no sense to be restrictive in the definition.

Why don't you choose to harass someone else? After all, that is what philosophy is about.

Thanks for polluting my Lounge thread with your nonsense.

Why not just concede the point like an adult? Btw, your selective misreading is both tedious and disingenuous. — 180 Proof

What point? You made one unsupported claim - that evolutionary psychology and neuroscience contradicts Collingwood - I offered to listen to your explanation, but you ignored that and chose to continue your rants. Your suggestion that what we have is a Weltanschauung and not a Philosophy is trivial and a matter of taste, convention, or nomenclature, so not worth debating. You seem to hold some sort of negative opinion of the role of mythologies in determining behaviour although you won't say what, only that I am wrong when I attempt to characterize it.

You will note, this isn't a topical forum, it isn't the Shoutbox, it is the Lounge. For me, it is a relaxed space to exercise my philosophical speculations in a productive way. Not dogmas, metaphysical speculations concerning the metaphysical nature of belief and action, that beliefs are the ultimate constituents of mind and thought, which is a metaphysical supposition – not an axiom, theorem or statement of fact – so no "burden of proof" required (to quote you).

You, sir, are an ill-mannered lout.

Again, something you brought up. Forgive me for misunderstanding you, your writing really isn't very clear.

Perhaps you should start your own Lounge topic? Or test your mettle in one of the topical forums. I see the Lounge as an opportunity for friendly constructive speculation. You seem not to grasp the concept.

Your dogma, sir, flies in the face of the demonstrable fact (throughout history and across cultures) that very few people actually live examined lives (i.e. actually philosophize). — 180 Proof

Twas yourself equated philosophy with reflection. I made careful to point out this is not necessarily the case. If you've no issues with religions, mythologies, and ideologies as cultural and personal drivers, fine; I could have sworn you meant to subject these to critical revision.

It's clear to me that your philosophical objectives are not synthesizing or synergistic, and you seem determined to misinterpret my writing to facilitate your own criticisms. You want to expound on how evolutionary psychology and neuroscience (in some mysterious way) contradict Collingwood's humanistic agenda? Have at it. I'm all ears.

I stand corrected. You are criticizing these elements as faux-values to be reflectively corrected. I stand with Collingwood's view, that everyone has a philosophy. The fact that it hasn't evolved to a reflective stage is central to his model. I'd disagree that these humanistic elements are negative and require only critical correction (I hope I've got that right). They suffer from being misinterpreted by first-level dogmatic scientisms whose goal is to subjugate these disparate values, rather than understanding them. Why should anything Collingwood says be interpreted as contradicting evolutionary psychology or neuroscience? Again, only from the perspective of a critical dogmatism.

You seem to be implying that mythologies, theologies, and ideologies do not have actual impacts on how people behave. This is patently not the case. Collingwood's strength is that he recognizes the complex and pluralistic nature of the human experience of reality, which includes the aesthetic dimension, as well as the others you cited. Cultural anthropology is an inclusive, not an exclusive project.

Like Descartes, Collingwood sees mind as the true object of philosophical inquiry, and I concur. Science reveals as much about the nature of (the instrumentality of) the scientific mind as it does about its putative objects. As I mentioned elsewhere, to much derision as I recall.

R.G. Collingswood seems to exaggerate — 180 Proof

I'm very much concerned with why people actually do what they do. My take is that rationality is constitutive and instrumental for the thinking thing. From what I have seen (and experienced) the real challenge to reason is less an external than an internal one. We don't discover, embrace, and implement optimal truths because, at some perplexing level, we don't want to. This requires a deep commitment powerfully motivated, operating at the level of the existential commitments described by Collingwood. What you call exaggeration, Collingwood calls conviction. As do I.

I'm not sure I agree. But want to extend the discussion to you. If you think living things are "conscious" or aware or have a "me" from which they reference the world, does this apply to all living things? Or where is the cutoff point? And why? — Benj96

Seeing consciousness as paradigmatically human is so limiting. If I allow myself to be aware of a spectrum of consciousness that extends far below my familiarity, I likewise open my intellect to the possibilities of consciousness far beyond my imagination.

The whole notion of a "possible reality" or possible worlds gets a lot of airplay. Metaphysics is about the real. You can't get more real than real, certainly not through possibility. Collingwood does talk about "meta-metaphysics." But only in the sense of there being a priori presuppositions underlying the historically self-making concrete mind. He says that when people become absorbed in a viewpoint (e.g. Logic) then they make that their metaphysical-rational basis. This is what he describes as a first-level ontological dogmatism. Reflective analysis leads to a pluralistic understanding, that embraces the diverse truths of the various categorical modes of thought - aesthetic, religious, positivistic, scientific, historical. Culminating in a synthesis which is a categorical thinking founded on universal a priori propositions (as mentioned). He has a penchant for the "concrete universal" and the "concrete mind" where the historical fusion of thought and reality are transcendentally real. He says metaphysics is "the science of beliefs."

A metaphysical impossibility contradicts reality. Viz. "Nothing exists". So it's logically possible that "nothing exists" but it's metaphysically impossible.

Logic is a construct, metaphysics is a concept, the concept of the real. There may be no "universal logic"; however there certainly is a universal metaphysics, the reality of the real. You cannot in any sense constrain or extend the latter by the former (which is what the notion of "possibility" seems to suggest), only characterize or represent it.

The Chessmen of Mars (Barsoom #5)
by Edgar Rice Burroughs

I don't have a problem with this: that's what I was essentially saying too. — Bob Ross

:ok:

Of course the word relates to content, but another word can be swapped for that word and related to the same content; thus, the word is distinct from the content. The fact that the word relates to the content does not entail that the content is somehow modified or transformed depending on the word used. That's all I am trying to point out for the sake of the conversation I was having with the other person, and I don't think it is that controversial (but correct me if I am wrong). — Bob Ross

The word is dependent on the content. I suppose you could say it that way too. It's distinctness comes from its dependence. What's in a name?

Semantics is about meaning, which is about how and what words relate to what underlying content; and has nothing to do with that underlying content itself — Bob Ross

This is not true Bob. In fact, it is not even true by your own assertion "Semantics is about words—i.e., what is the best or chosen word to describe something". There would be no semantics without the "something" about which the word is. You can't say that semantics is both related to content and yet "has nothing to do with content." Your assertions would be (are) self-contradictory.

Semantics is about words—i.e., what is the best or chosen word to describe something—and not the what those words reference themselves (i.e., their underlying content). — Bob Ross

I think this is misleading. You cannot abstract semantic meaning from its putative external correspondences. Semantics deals with the nature of signs and the relationship to their referents.

Is logical impossibility the same thing as nonsense? Doesn't what is logically impossible conform to the criteria of meaning that allow a judgement of its meaningful incompatibility to be made? For something to be outside of this metaphysical criteria would be for it to appear as random, chaotic, not subject to logical judgement at all. — Joshs

Yes. Consider the logical touchstone of analytic truth. If x is red then x is coloured. Its analyticity derives from the metaphysical reality of the species-genus relationship. If you denude a proposition of all connection to this categorical content, you are left with a purely formal construct that has no meaning.

Thuvia, Maid of Mars (Barsoom #4)
by Edgar Rice Burroughs

As long as some people to continue to be offended by a word other people will continue to use it.

You can't legislate social conscience. All you can do is educate.

This is logically possible: something red which isn't coloured. They're different predicate symbols. — fdrake

This is only possible for a logic that is is purely syntactical. However such a logic would be meaningless (ex hypothesi, since meaning requires semantics). In which case so is the attribution of "possibility" to it, since possibility implies a realization.

Good day :) — Corvus

Well concluded. Happy New year. :)

My friend, you are very reactionary in your comments. All I have done is been accommodating to your perspective and all you have done is quibble. I never said that you said it was purely passive, I acknowledged that my own position was designed to highlight that it was not purely passive.

As far as filtration being an incorrect usage, you literally couldn't be more wrong. The concept of "perceptual filters" has been around for ages. Here is the APA dictionary of Psychology link.

I have attempted to bridge the nominalist-realist problem (of ideas) by suggesting a way in which a concept (idea) evolves in the course of the practical inter-evolution of an organism and its environment, linking language, idea, and action in the context of praxis-perception. I don't know what it is that you are suggesting.

It sounded like you were saying that perception is purely active. It rang a bell, it can't be true. — Corvus

And yet I explicitly offered that comment quite early that it was not "purely passive." Just goes to show you how perceptions can get pre-filtered.... :)

I think this is the most popular view today, right? — frank

It seems to me constrained by the burden of the physicalist presupposition though, which is why I didn't attempt to actually construct the argument. I don't disagree with the general characterization, as far as it goes. I just don't see where it is going to.

I think that the only possible argument for physicalism has to start from a neutral monist metaphysical position, then argue that emergent psychological properties are real, in a strong sense. So mind is not denied but rather affirmed at the physical level.

But think again. You keep insisting perception is active activity meaning that you can control perceiving the world and objects with your own will or desire. — Corvus

But think again. If I learn to anticipate that there will be cheek and ear pulling I can modify my activity patterns to avoid those circumstances. Perception is an amalgam of external inputs selectively rejected or embraced. Being poisoned is much more painful and deadly a perception than being pinched. But some animals develop an immunity to the poison of their chosen prey. Our existence as a receptive organism is predicated on our capacities as an active organism.

I was not denying that perception is active, and it is an activity.   I was suggesting that it is active, but also passive at times, and sometimes it can be both active and passive. — Corvus

Right. And I said I just wanted to emphasize that perception is not purely passive. Upon which it seems we can agree.